This is not how philosophy is done. You definition of decision is arbitrary, wrong. You have to work from general logic, towards specific instances. Every decision is “considered”? Oh really. That is just an arbitrary example of some decision, and not every decision.
You must simply solve the problem of how to apply the general logic of decision, to your specific example, and not the other way around.
No problem – it’s already been proven that it’s impossible to consciously cancel an action already initiated by a brain signal within 200 milliseconds. This is the point of no return. (The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements - PubMed)
And this is as it should be, since we all know that the brain carries out the thought process in the human body, and human will is the product of its activity.
I’ll state this up front: I’m not claiming that I can show determinism is necessarily true. What I’m demonstrating is that it is possibly true. You have not yet acknowledged that it is even possibly true. Nearly everything I’ve said pertains to demonstrating its possibility. The only exception is when I provided the reasoning for my belief that it’s true. I’ll respond to your comment about that reasoning, but after that - it’s just a defense of the possibility determinism is true. You can cut this short if you will simply acknowledge that determinism is possible.
It is based on the facts of which I’m aware, and as I said - I’m open to facts I’ve overlooked. Sure, the judgement is subjective - but open to criticism. You’ve provided no facts I’ve overlooked, and you haven’t challenged the reasoning I’ve described. So you haven’t undercut the reasoning.
No. I brought up the detective scenario to demonstrate the fact that when we do not have knowledge of the metaphysical possibilities, our only recourse is to make epistemic judgement of possibilities. The actual perpetrator is the only metaphysical possibility. Obviously the detective doesn’t know that, so he explores the epistemic possibilities: a set of suspects he’s identified based on the limited set of facts available to him.
I brought this up because you have repeatedly claimed that, if determinism is true, we are wasting our time considering the possibilities as we see them, because there is only one actual possibility. You repeat this error in this next quote:
Your error was to conflate epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility. We don’t KNOW what the one metaphysical possibility IS; we only know the EPISTEMIC possibilities. So we aren’t wasting our time at all: we are PRODUCING the outcome. Once again:
INPUT - PROCESS - OUTPUT.
Your are obsessing on what’s different in the analogy and ignoring what they have in common:
INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT
Sure, the processing that a computer does is different - it’s less complex, and has fewer factors influencing the outcome. For example, a computer lacks feelings and intentionality, and it’s much less likely to have a random element (although not impossible for a random neutrino to result in flipping a bit sometime during the processing). But mental processing is still PROCESSING. There’s processing irrespective of whether determinism is true. If determinism is false, the processing includes some aspects that operate independent of physical laws of nature, whereas if determinism is true, the processing is entirely a product of laws of nature.
Furthermore, the exploration (the reasoning we employ) of those epistemic possibilities is what produces the outcome. This pertains to your second error: your claim that determinism implies this process is unnecessary. It is necessary. I am confident you are intelligent enough to recognize this if you would make the attempt to understand what I’m saying. The fact that you’d say, “This is not what we are talking about” suggests to me you aren’t trying to understand.
Yes: you could have, but ONLY IF determinism is false.
On the other hand, if determinism is TRUE, then you could not have. Notice that you’re defending your position by restating your assumption: that you could have stopped your deliberation earlier. This is the central point we’re debating! You have not supported your position with facts or reasoning - you’ve only restated your assumption in different words. The closest thing you have to support for your position is that it seems like we could have. THAT is subjective opinion, but unlike mine - you’ve provided no facts or reasoning to support it, and you haven’t seriously considered that this “seems like” is purely a product of hindsight.
You continue to conflate epistemic and metaphysical modality. Here’s a correction:
The “process” we are talking about is a matter of applying those conclusions toward epistemic future possibilities for events. This process would be completely unnecessary if determinism was true. There would be no future metaphysical possibilities for events.
By adding the correct modality to each “possibility”, I’ve shown that your statement (“this process would be completely unnecessary”) is false. Just like the detective trying to determine the perpetrator based on limited facts, we are figuring out (determining) the outcome on the basis of limited facts - clearly we don’t know what we’re going to choose before we deliberate,
You are ignoring or not grasping what I said. We’re considering a past case in which you made a choice. Before acting on the choice, you could have changed your mind N times (where N could be any number from 0 to thousands). This is a past event. The fact that you changed your mind N times is immutable history. There was a LAST time that your mind changed before the act.
I get it, that:
(1)if determinism is false, then it was metaphysically possible for you to have changed your mind N+1 times.
However:
(2) If determinism is true, then it was not (metaphysically) possible for you to change your mind that N+1th time.
What you are essentially doing is asserting that (2) is false because (1) is true. You aren’t supporting your position, you are just restating it and denying the alternative.
Obvious error of contradiction. There is no possibility in determinism.
That’s false. Every necessary fact is also a possible fact. If strict determinism is true, then there are no non-actual possibilities. But what actually happened, had to be possible. (I don’t actually think strict determinism is true, because quantum indeterminancy does entail non-actual possibilities in any quantum collapse).
When discussing future “possibilities” with Meta, modality is relevant. Epistemic modality entails what is possible (or necessary) per some body of facts. Metaphysical modality entails what is actually possible (or necessary).
When we deliberate, we are entertaining epistemic possibilities: what we judge to be possible per the facts (or beliefs) we know. If strict determinism is true (set aside quantum mechanics), then there is indeed just one metaphysically possible outcome of the deliberation, but we don’t know what that outcome is: we don’t have a crystal ball that reveals the future. We can only weigh the epistemic possibilties.
Let’s start with an agnostic view: determinism is possibly true, possibly false. Consider a deliberation: options (i.e. epistemic possibilities) are weighed, and you land on a final decision. Assume you changed your mind on that decision 7 times, but the last one ended up being the final decision. The pivotal question is: was it truly metaphysically possible for that final decision to have differed? A determinist says “no”. An indeterminist (i.e. a defender of libertarian free will) will say, “yes”. Both answers are entirely dependent on the belief in determinism vs libertarian free will. There is no evidence that can prove either one correct - because we can’t actually rewind the clock and replay it. Each final decision gets made only once.
My point is that we need other reasons to choose whether libertarian free will is true, or determinism is true.
But we have simple cause and effect calculations.
In stretching determinism beyond it’s proper limits, you seem to be undermining the simple determinism of cause and effect logic. While a world with freedom still also allows things that are perfectly forced.
That doesn’t make sense, deductive logic proceeds from premises such as definitions, not the opposite way.
From your reference:
“Our data suggest that subjects can still veto a movement even after the onset of the RP.”
200 milliseconds is the approximate human reflex time. So that “point of no return” simply reflects the amount of time it takes for the subject to react and push the button.
I think you have provided a good example of misinterpreting the science.
But this is not the question we are discussing right now. We are discussing whether this activity is causally determined or not. The human will might be a feature of brain activity, but if that brain activity is not causally determined due to quantum indeterminacy (the subject we are currently debating), then the truth of “free will” is supported by that.
This is why I’ve been imploring you to accept the theory of quantum indeterminacy within brain activity. This is a theory which is supported by real evidence of EM radiation. By choosing this theory, we choose a theory which is consistent with our lived experience of being able to choose, instead of choosing a theory which is inconsistent with that empirical evidence. The latter choice being unscientific because it is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
Sure determinism is possibly true. But it is inconsistent with a vast quantity of empirical evidence, which we all experience continuously every day, the capacity to choose from possible future acts. Therefore I believe that it is extremely improbable that it is true. So to convince me that there is any significant likelihood at all, that it may be true, would require a very good argument.
I pointed out already, this would be faulty reasoning, a category mistake. It’s like saying that if I cannot determine what it is possible for me to do in the next hour (metaphysical possibilities), I should just work with what is logically possible (epistemic possibilities). Well, pretty much anything which does not involve contradiction is logically possible, so you might as well think about jumping up to the moon and grabbing some green cheese for lunch.
See, if you do not have knowledge of any metaphysical possibilities, you wouldn’t work from epistemic possibilities to determine what to do. You’d work to determine metaphysical possibilities (perhaps employing epistemic possibilities in this activity). Then when you obtain some knowledge of metaphysical possibilities you can safely decide what to do. If you went straight from logical possibilities to action, you’d be trying to do unrealistic, even impossible, or very dangerous things.
You are not paying attention to what I told you. Free will, making choices, deals with future possibilities. Those are “metaphysical possibilities” (I prefer “ontological possibilities”). There are no metaphysical possibilities in relation to the activities of the past, only epistemic possibilities. There is only one “actual perpetrator”. That is not a metaphysical possibility because there is only one, no possibilities, only a necessity. The detective doesn’t know who it is though, so he deals with epistemic possibilities in an attempt to determine the actual necessary answer.
That is all irrelevant to free choice though, which deals with possibilities for future acts. They are metaphysical possibilities, because (unless you believe in determinism) there is more than one thing which can be chosen. So imagine that the detective has to decide whether to accuse Mr. X as being the perpetrator or not. These are real metaphysical possibilities, the choice may be to accuse or not to accuse. Now, the detective may employ epistemic possibilities, and logic to assist, but these do not produce the decision. The detective still has to decide whether the criteria is met, and make the decision on the metaphysical possibilities of accusing Mr. X or not accusing Mr. X, regardless of whether epistemic possibilities are considered or not. The epistemic possibilities are not necessary to the choice. They are a tool which may be used to assist in making the choice.
It’s not an error, look. If determinism is true, then whether or not the detective accuses Mr. X as being the perpetrator, is already predetermined, even before the crime is committed. Therefore the detective does not need to think about the metaphysical possibilities of accusing Mr. X or not accusing Mr. X, because no such metaphysical possibilities exist. Whether or not the detective makes the accusation is already determined. So whatever inclination comes to the detective, he ought to move immediately in that direction, because it is impossible that he could make the wrong choice. Whatever he does it’s what’s predetermined and necessary. It would be extremely stupid of him to think maybe I’m doing something wrong, or I should consider doing something different , and get stressed out about it, because he cannot do anything other than what is predetermined anyway. Whatever he does, it was what was necessary for him to do, so thinking about what to do is completely unnecessary.
So if you believe in determinism with any certitude, you can just do whatever comes to mind, and know with certitude that you are doing the correct thing when you do it, because it is impossible that you could do otherwise, or do the wrong thing.
First, under determinism it is not “one metaphysical possibility”. There is no such possibility, because it is one necessity. It will occur as it does, by necessity. Therefore the second point is that we do know what that necessity is, it is whatever we do. Whatever we do, we know with absolute certainty that this is the thing which it is necessary to do, if determinism is true. It is impossible to do otherwise. Therefore whatever comes to your mind to do, do it, and you can know with absolute certainty that it is the thing which it is necessary for you to do, if you truly believe in determinism.
I keep telling you, this is irrelevant. We are talking about making actions. And if determinism is true we do not need to think about possibilities, just act out what is necessary for us to act out. It is impossible to make the wrong act, so why do you think we would need to think about it? Do you think that a rock performs an “INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT” to determine whether it should fall under the force of gravity? Such a thinking process, of considering future possibilities, is completely unnecessary if the world was deterministic. We could just act according to necessity, and do what we must do, like the rock falling.
The computer is completely different. It is created and programmed to do a specific type of task, like other tools. We are talking about choosing our acts from possibilities. The computer does not do this, it follows it’s program, and that is called “processing”. Choosing from future possibilities is not a matter of “processing”. I think this idea is misleading you.
This is your false deterministic premise. The outcome, being the act, is produced by the will, not the reasoning. As I’ve been saying, one can do all sorts of reasoning, come to a conclusion, and still change one’s mind, or act in a contrary way. This is proven by experience.
Asserting the same thing over and over again doesn’t prove anything. I’ve provided a very good logical argument which demonstrates that if determinism is true reasoning about future possibilities is completely unnecessary. One could always do the next thing which comes to mind, without any reasoning whatsoever, and always know with absolute certainty that they are doing the only thing which they could possibly do, if determinism is true. Tell me, how do you think reasoning about what to do is in any way necessary if determinism were true?
I am saying that a modified (1) would be true because it’s consistent with my experience, your experience, and the experience of every other human being, while a modified (2) is false because it is inconsistent with my experience, your experience, and the experience of every other human being. If you do not apprehend that as supporting my position with empirical evidence, I think you are just denying. I say “modified” because I would not word it as “N+1 times”.
So, are you accusing the authors of this article of being ignorant of neurophysiology? I seriously doubt your conclusions and prefer to consider the conclusions drawn by scientists. Specifically, the signal for a specific action/decision is transmitted by the brain before conscious awareness, and a person cannot consciously block or cancel this signal within 200 milliseconds. I trust scientists more on this matter.
Unfortunately, the brain’s thoughts are already being read (translated into words) by recording the action potentials of individual neurons. Science and practice have proven everything you’re trying to refute. The fact that it’s so difficult to accept as reality, alas, doesn’t negate reality itself. These are scientific facts that cannot be ignored, no matter how much you want to.
The definitions are not arbitrarily given, they must be organized simple to complex, so that each element can be named. Starting with the simple; making one of alternative possible futures the present, and then adding consideration as a variation of decision-making.
My interpretation is based on the conclusion of the scientists, as stated. so I assume you are doubting my interpretation.
This is not what was written in the abstract. It is not “the signal for a specific action/decision”, it is a “readiness potential”, which gradually arises some time prior to a movement. Here is the statement:
One such signal is the readiness potential (RP) that gradually arises within the last second preceding a movement
And the issue investigated was:
whether people are able to cancel movements after the elicitation of such RPs, and if so until which point in time.
The method of experimentation, was “a brain-computer interface (BCI) that had been trained to detect their RPs in real time and could produce stop signals”. The subjects could push a button to produce the stop signal.
This is the conclusion:
Our data suggest that subjects can still veto a movement even after the onset of the RP. Cancellation of movements was possible if stop signals occurred earlier than 200 ms before movement onset, thus constituting a point of no return.
I simply pointed out, that 200 ms is approximately the average reflex time, the amount of time it would take to push the button. Of course, this type of experiment is very problematic though. The RP being detected would be the one related to the movement of pushing the button, because this would be the subject’s principal focus. So the subjects are being asked to make the movement (push the button), to prevent a movement they’ve already made, pushing the button. Further, it would be impossible to hit the stop button in any time shorter than the reflex time. If you look at the actual results given , there is a lot of inconsistencies.
Please stop Angel. You are not making any sense. The electroencephalograph (EEG) measures the electrical effect of the dendrites of millions of neurons together, as a unified feature of the brain. It does not measure " the action potentials of individual neurons". This is the difference between the micro and the macro which I explained to you already. The EM field is proposed as a feature of the individual neurons (micro), but it is extremely difficult, expensive, and problematic, to study.
OK, I’m on board with this Syamsu. We’ll start with “making one of alternative possible futures the present”. I’ll call this the act of the will. What I am saying is that there is a gap between this act of the will, which makes one of the possible future actual at the present time, and the decision making process, which is reaching a resolution through conscious consideration.
You seem to disagree with me concerning this gap, but experience demonstrates that it is true and real. For example, I can decide today what I will do tomorrow. That’s a large gap. But even if I am deciding on something more immediate, whether to stand up from my sitting position or not, I can decide to stand up, but then at the last second, change my mind and stay seated. This is what is discussed in the experiment presented by Angel, above. Therefore I think it is necessary to conclude that there is a gap, a temporal gap, between coming to a conclusion through any decision making process, and “making one of alternative possible futures the present”. Don’t you agree?
No I don’t agree, and I’ve already explained this.
Are you saying that I misused the word “individual neurons”? So be it. But I never said that thoughts are the product of the activity of a single neuron. The action potentials on the membranes of individual neurons create engrams that form thoughts—that’s the idea I was trying to express. And they are read using an fMRI scanner, by the way. So even though one such minimal cube in an fMRI image contains anywhere to one million neurons, it is still a recording the work of neurons that change the permeability of their membranes, albeit in aggregate (As I understand it, by the blood oxygenation level dependent signal).
But you’re right, I should stop telling you about new scientific advances. If you wanted, you could easily find the information yourself online. The only problem is your desire. I will do the same because science is advancing faster than we think. There is still much that I do not know, and I’m not ashamed to admit it, because, as I already said, it is impossible to know everything that is known to humanity.
P.S. Back to the topic.
You still haven’t realized that before you make a conscious decision to press the right button instead of the left, your brain has already made the choice for you and sent a command to your muscles to press the right button. But you don’t yet consciously know that the decision has already been made.
And your brain’s decision will ALWAYS precede your conscious decision by at least 200 milliseconds.
Even your brain will be the first to decide to change your mind and will send a signal about this 200-400 milliseconds before you consciously change your mind.
And this is the fact that you try in every possible way to ignore, constantly changing the conversation to other points.
The way I understand “free will”, this is irrelevant. The issue is whether the choice is causally determined or not. So the issue of how the brain and consciousness are related is not important to that question. Regardless of how consciousness and the brain are related, the question is whether a choice is causally determined.
This is why I asked you to consider the representation of action potentials which include EM, and quantum indeterminacy. Your description is a representation of determinate physical mechanics, which excludes quantum phenomena. In this way, that theory excludes the possibility of free choices. This is a problem because it is not consistent with our experience of being able to choose. But if you select a theory which includes EM and quantum phenomena then you have a way to possibly overcome this problem. Notice I frame it as a “problem”, because the goal of science is to produce theories which provided an understanding of our experience, not to make theories which are inconsistent, and simply deny that the experience is real.
I do not deny that what we experience as consciousness is just a reflection of a small portion of overall brain activity. Exactly how and why we experience it in the way that we do is unknown. The issue with free will is that if there are real ontological possibilities (the truth of which seems to be implied by QM), then we need to assume an agent which actualizes a selected potential. The actualization of a real ontological possibility requires an agent which selects. Many philosophers will simply posit consciousness as the agent. But I agree with you, that this is incorrect.
Classical metaphysics holds a distinction between soul and mind, where mind is a property of the soul, but the soul is the active agent in free will. This allows for the reality of what I’ve been arguing with the others, we can decide with the conscious mind what to do, but still not do it. The conscious mind is not the agent. Plato went deep into this issue in refutation of the principle that virtue is knowledge. Knowing what is good does not necessitate that the person will act that way. So if we model opposing forces acting in the brain, bodily wants and desires, against conscious reasoned determinations of what “ought” to be done, the agent which actually chooses must be free from both.
Your description assumes determinism is false. I’ll expand on your description, to highlight the critical difference:
Irrespective of whether determinism is true:
The detective has to decide whether to accuse Mr. X. He considers the evidence, assessing its strength, and imagines how Mr. X would defend the accusation if it went to trial. He considers how this set of evidence compares to prior cases he’s been involved with that went to trial, and what was effective and not effective. After sleeping on it, he wakes up and while drinking his coffee, he makes the decision, and cements it by calling his superior and telling him.
From this description, can you tell whether or not he exercised libertarian (indeterminate) free will? If this isn’t sufficiently detailed to tell, then provide some additional details that would make it clear. You can’t just add “he decided A but could have decided B”, or something similar, because that’s just stating the assumption. What behavior, or what thought processes, gives it away as indeterminate or determinate?
It’s different in a relevant way ONLY IF determinism is false. If determinism is true, a series of (one or more) thoughts (or other brain activities) occurs that results in a choice.
“Proven” by experience”? You’re turning every “freely willed” decision into whim – reached for no reason at all. How do you know there isn’t some cause of that whim? What’s your basis for ruling out a subconscious basis, an emotional basis, or even just some random basis – like a neuron that fires due to some autonomic brain activities? You say it’s “proven”, so share the proof.
You don’t understand modal logic. If X is necessary, then X is possible. That’s elementary modal logic.
But yes, the result will occur necessarily, but as a result of every step in the causal chain. Every step in that causal chain occurred necessarily, steps that include all the brain activity. You’re in an ice cream store and choose to buy the chocolate. It’s your favorite flavor (a favorite that was established early in life), and that’s why you bought it. Your wants are part of the causal chain.
You seem to be suggesting that since the result is the product of determinism, we might as well pick randomly, ignoring our wants. That’s silly. Satisfying one’s wants is consistent with both determinism and indeterminism.
No, you haven’t. You’ve simply asserted that we might as well ignore our wants, because the result will be the same. That is false. Rather: if we fulfill our wants, each wish-fulfillment will have been necessary.
Also, if we ignore our wants, each “random” choice will have been necessary. But the causal chain includes the production of the false belief that our wants cannot affect what we do.
When we make a decision after a complex deliberation, no “simple cause and effect calculation” can predict it. You’d need to have a perfect simulation of the person doing the deliberation.
Explain what the “proper limits” of determinism are.
I am a compatibilist. I believe we freely make choices. Our choices are the result of reasoning (which we have learned to do), goals (which we’ve previously established), desires (which we’ve developed beforehand), sometimes whims (a psychological disposition that we’ve developed), under the processing of our minds (a product of our DNA, biological development and experience).
No, this is false right off the bat. If determinism is true no “decision” is required. The detective would just proceed in the way he is inclined to without needing to decide anything. It is impossible that he could do the wrong thing. In fact, by a strict understand of “decision”, decision would actually be impossible. If there are no ontological possibilities to decide on, no decision can be made. Any mental process which considered possibilities to decide upon, would be unsound requiring that false premise, that there is possibilities to decide upon.
What is important here is that he exercised a belief in free will. This is what I am telling you, we act as if we believe there is real ontological possibilities. That is what we know from experience. The empirical evidence is that we act as if we believe in free will. So to deny that we have free will is to be hypocritical, first off, and secondly it requires good sound logic to justify such a denial.
This is incorrect. You are using the word “choice” here deceptively. If determinism is true, then no choice is made, because “choice” implies choosing between possibilities. Even if you call them epistemic possibilities, “choice” is only made if the person can freely select one or the other. If determinism is true, no choice is made, and the person is deluded, thinking that a choice is being made, when none is being made.
So, with that premise in mind, we can look at what you said. We can say that if determinism is true, an action followed from some brain activity. Now, let’s put the conscious mind into this model. The conscious mind experiences that brain activity as choosing between possibilities. We can follow the rule of scientific method, and judge according to the empirical evidence (why wouldn’t we, because all knowledge is grounded in conscious experience?), and say that the referred to brain activity must involve something non-deterministic, called free will, or we can deny the reality of that experience of choosing, and insist that the brain activity is deterministic. If we choose the latter, denying the empirical evidence as an illusion, then we need an airtight undeniably sound demonstration as justification, because it is completely contrary to the empirical evidence.
Here’s an example to look at. Consider that three thousand years ago people believed that the sun rose, and the sun moved across the sky, and set. This was the empirical evidence, and there was a corresponding theory that the sun, planets, and other heavenly bodies were engaged in eternal orbits around the earth. That theory was directly supported by the empirical evidence. Some people started to deny this, believing that the earth was actually spinning and this created the illusion of these bodies orbiting the earth. The point is that since the denials were in direct contradiction to the empirical evidence, the denials could not gain any traction until Kepler modeled the orbits as elliptical, allowing for all the little discrepancies to be accounted for. This made the heliocentric theory “better” then the geocentric.
So you might think that it’s obvious that free will is wrong, and determinism is better, but denials don’t do any good unless you show the problems with the free will model, and explain how solving these problems would lead toward the reality of determinism. That’s what I’m explaining to you. If determinism is true, then all that thought, considering possibilities, and decision making, is wasted time, and unnecessary thinking. This is a serious problem, because we’d be way better off just to get on with doing what we are determined to do, instead of suffering all this mental anguish. Therefore if you really believe that determinism is reality, then you should be working on demonstrating how we can solve this problem of wasted time in unnecessary thought, by acting as if we believe in determinism, and avoiding all that vast amount of self-deceptive thinking which is based in the belief that we can freely choose.
The basis for that claim is experience. And I believe we all experience it in a similar way. Experience is the basis of all human knowledge. You seem to be claiming that I should consider the possibility that something else is acting in a way which is contrary to what my experience is (something you call the subconscious), but why should I even consider the possibility of this mysterious, magical force, which completely evades our experience?
Your proposal is just like that of the radical skeptic who doubts the entirety of the physical world. You say that I should consider the possibility that this whole empirical reality, this continuous experience of needing (notice that word needing, because in life it is constantly necessary to choose between possibilities) to choose, is just an illusion. If you are going to play that role, of the radical skeptic you need to provide support for your denial.
Modal logic is based in false premises. That’s very clear. “Possible” implies at one time, the capacity to both be or not be. If X is necessary, then it is impossible that X not B. Therefore if X is necessary X is not also possible, and modal logic uses a false premise.
Here’s the problem in a nutshell. The human mind evolved to be like this, to have lots of of brain activity (much of which may be deterministic), with the end goal of that activity to decide, to choose from possibilities. Notice, that everything within that thought process may completely follow deterministic laws of physics, but the end, the choice, cannot be deterministic, or else it would not actually be a choice it would just be a continuation of the chain.
If determinism is true, then that end goal is not something real, there is no choice to be made. There are no possibilities to choose from. Therefore all that evolutionary progress, which produced this great capacity which we have, to choose from possibilities, is just a sham, there are no possibilities to choose from. You know how evolution proceeds don’t you? The successful survive, and the unsuccessful die off. Therefore this great evolved capacity to choose from possibilities is a success, and not a sham. But determinism proposes that it is a sham, self-deception. How can you reconcile this?
I think you’re missing the point. All these things could be “part of the causal chain”, wants, thinking processes, etc.. But what we are talking about is the act of selecting form possibilities. So all these things which you claim are part of the causal chain are just tools, like hammers and saws, and cars, and trucks. The wants and thoughts are tools which aid the free will agent in its acts of choosing between possibilities. Those things you refer to wants and thoughts, are not what makes the choice. The choice cannot be a part of the causal chain, or else this would not be a “choice”, but just a continuation of the causal chain, with no real possibilities, and no choices made.
I said that if determinism were true, we ought to follow our first inclination (that is the want), and act that way. There would be no need to think about possibilities because it would be impossible for one to make the wrong act. If determinism is true, thinking about possibilities is left superfluous. However, as explained above, we evolved to think about possibilities, and this has proven very successful. Don’t you see that the logical conclusion is that determinism is not true?
This is incoherent. You believe a deterministic detective has inclinations, so why can’t he have the inclination to weigh the evidence and reach a decision on whether or not to accuse?
Deciding is just making a selection. In this case, some form of reasoning is performed that leads to the selection.
The detective is making a selection on the basis of the information he has. The suspect’s DNA is on the knife, and a video shows the killer driving away in a car that matches the color, make, and model of the suspect’s car, and hairs were found on his jacket that matched the victim’s. A computer that is fed those facts could compute a selection: accuse him. If the only available data was the car video, the computer would select “don’t accuse”.
We agree the computer is deterministic, but notice that the selection depends on the data.
A different computer could be programmed differently, and this could result in a different selection. So the selection also depends on the specific programming.
A deterministic detective is similar to the computer: his selection is a function of the data and his “programming”. That “programming” includes his inclinations.
Yes, given the data and programming, the specific outcome is a necessary one. But in both cases, the program must process the data to produce the selection. The “ontological” possibilities are not included in the input data, and they are not encoded in the program.
No, I don’t think it’s obvious.
There is only one thing wrong with the (libertarian) free will model: accounting for it’s existence in a deterministic universe. How can determinism beget objects that act indeterministically? That issue is the pivotal one for me. I’ve brought this up before.
If there were no good reasons to believe the universe evolves deterministically, then it would be a toss up- because the behavior in question can be accounted for under either premise.
It’s not incoherent, I explained it. Such an inclination never would have evolved in a deterministic world, because it’s useless.
Selection is not possible in a deterministic world.
The process of making a selection is absolutely useless in a deterministic world, so there is no practical purpose to designing a system, computer or whatever, which misleadingly creates the illusion of making a selection. The computer would not be making a selection, it would be following its program and coming to a pre-determined end. There would be extensive wasted energy and time making it appear like the program is making a decision when it really is not.
You are not talking about a “selection”. You are talking about coming to a predetermined position. Each thing, in different circumstances acts differently, by deterministic laws. What you call “programmed differently” is just a different set of circumstances. The computer is coming to the necessary position dictated by the applicable deterministic laws. To claim that it is making a selection is deception.
So, I’ll explain the problem again, because it appears like I am not getting through to you. If the world is deterministic, and the detective is “programmed” to consider possibilities for selection, this would be a completely meaningless and useless programming, succeeding in doing one thing only, and that is to deceive the detective into thinking that he is making a selection.
Let me consider this as a real possibility, though for the sake of argument. Deterministic forces have caused people to develop thinking habits which are completely useless and meaningless except as self-deception. This is not possibly consistent with evolutionary theory which shows that only useful traits survive.
I think this is a step in the right direction. Consider that there is no good reason for human beings to have evolved into thinking that they can freely choose, if the world was deterministic. If the world was deterministic evolution would not have produced the thinking patterns which we have. This is the way of thinking which considers future possibilities, and makes decisions based on this. This is a very useful, and highly evolved way of thinking in our world. It would be absolutely useless in a deterministic world.
So insisting on determinism is a denial of evolutionary theory. The two are completely incompatible.
Nonsense. Drawing conclusions from evidence is extremely useful. You’re hunting. You see tracks that resemble an animal, and follow the tracks because you’ve concluded that they are likely to lead to the animal.
Again, nonsense. As I’ve said multiple times, a computer executing a program makes selections.
You chose to define “decision” as an indeterminate process. So instead of debating semantics, I shifted to selecting. Computer programs most certainly select a logic path on the basis of inputs, or prior computations (see this). Example:
Input X;
Select;
When (X<0) set X to 0;
When (0<=X<9) set X to 1;
When (X>9) set X to 2;
Otherwise set X 3;
Output: X;
The program selects a new setting for X on the basis of the number that is input. This is, by definition, a selection.
No. I am talking about the process of reaching the necessary result. See the above computer code. If you input 7, the output will necessarily be 1, but only because of the presence of the instruction “set x to 1”, which must be executed to create this output. You treat that instruction as superfluous - as if the setting of x to 1 would occur even if the instruction didn’t exist.
False assumption. As I pointed out above, the drawing of conclusions from evidence has a survival value.
This demonstrates that your view is based on an unjustified assumption: that there’s no survival value to drawing conclusions from evidence.
How does an indeterministic process come about in a deterministic universe?
Excellent conclusion! Indeed, whether our brain (and not our conscious will) chooses the right or left button depends on factors hidden from our consciousness. Therefore, we don’t know what exactly caused the brain to make this choice.