My project is a hydra, Zeno’s hydra, no matter how far I travel, I’m still only half way there.
Following up on one concept that winds up forcing me onto another. Wish I had that serious organizational skill to track me better. But I’m a sort of chaotic person by nature anyways so doing best I can with what I have.
It’ll probably be a while before I respond again to my other thread, I want to be careful and specific in my responses, and want to push the envelope, it’s not avoidance. Need to get my ducks in a row. Plus I’m in the process of another significant rewrite of that OP, doesn’t flow the way it should.
Fortunately as I continue getting into the weeds I’m relieved finding out there are many current serious thinkers who do provide support for my intuitive position. But sorting it out, …
But what we know at every waking moment is that biological machines exist and are able to monitor their own brain processes. Monitor indirectly, of course. Not like an MRI. By processing peripheral sensory information “as-if” it causes pictures in the head.
We don’t know that pictures in the head (“phenomenology”) exist at all, let alone with more certainty than we know that other things, such as the biological machines and what they bump into, exist.
There has been considerable discussion of Galen Strawson on the Forum over the years. I liked his exasperrated put-downs of Daniel Dennett — writing in The Times Literary Supplement,he famously joked that Daniel Dennett should be prosecuted under the UK’s Trade Descriptions Act for naming his 1991 book Consciousness Explained when it did no such thing!
I read the original paper Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism in which he presents his case for the unarguable reality of panpsychism. But I saw it as an attempt to rescue or preserve physicalism by stipulating that what is physical must somehow be conscious. One of the axioms is that everything in reality is physical. Since subjective, conscious experience (experientiality) undeniably exists, he argues that experience itself must be a physical phenomenon.
But those who reject physicalism will not agree that ‘everything in reality is physical’. I agree that there are no ‘non-physical things’, but reality does not consist of things. It also comprises relations, abstractions, absences, constraints, and so on, which provide the matrix within which judgements are derived about what constitutes ‘the physical’. For which, see Real but not Existent (Medium).
Both Strawson’s concepts of qualia and panpsychism, and the mechanistic ‘machinic’ model of organisms, presuppose the same split between mechanism and vitalistic teleology, so the kind of knowledge which presumes that biological machines exist is not much of a alternative to what Strawson thinks he knows. An alternative to both is available, which posits living systems neither mechanistically nor through a vitalism but via processes which encompass both dimensions without succumbing to either.
My counter to Galen Strawson’s premise has always been ‘even if every thing is physical, this does not “entail that consciousness is physical” because consciousness – whenever a self (subject) to varying degrees feels like it’s separate from nonself (object), or disembodied – is not a thing (any more than music is a thing).’
What did I write that “seems semantic” to you? I didn’t deny “consciousness exists”. Music exists, for instance, which, not being reducible to physics, does not entail that music (or sound) is a fundamental property of the physical world.
Well, the semantics is using proxies for things like “object” vs “exist” as potential descriptors of “something”.
As i said, for Galen, consciousness doesn’t need to be an object; just something. So I think the words are explicitly (albeit, not intentionally at all) misleading as to what in the objection can be sustained.
I dont think Panspyschism is is a physicalist theory. It suggests that materials have properties other than those predicted by physics.
By making consciousness a magical property inherent in matter it distracts us from the most important question which is how evolution created organisms with different experiences using the known physical properties of matter.
To my mind this is mixing some things - “music” in this sense isn’t an object. But a CD, record, an orchestra itself, the movements of a conductor (i.e the physical actions, not the trajectories), the vibrations in the air - these are all actual. The concept “music” which is, as I think you’re getting at, a confluence of a few things that aren’t music, is not an object and can’t quite be pointed out. But it clearly exists.
First - I agree with your rejection of panpsychism - makes no sense in light of scientific understanding.
Second - Wouldn’t that start with recognizing the distinction between “physical matter” and “biological matter” - the latter being an amazing highbred of physical matter in a class by itself?
Isn’t the point rather that organisms are not fully determined by physics? They don’t disobey physics, but are determined by principles other than those found in physics.
@Johnnywas, It’s worth keeping in mind the profound difference between basic atomic matter - chemistry/physics and biological matter.
Biological matter figured out how to make “open systems” that can collect energy from it’s surrounds to utilize for its own survival.
Another detail, laws of physics doesn’t actually determine the form of things.
That requires initial and boundary conditions, that follow the laws of physics for sure, (still they are laws and not nature).
An alternative to both is available, which posits living systems neither mechanistically nor through a vitalism but via processes which encompass both dimensions without succumbing to either.
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The argument can be made that it is all process. That matter itself is not composed of “particles” but of “events”. That waves or fluctuations in fields are the ultimate constituents of reality and it is not to far a stretch to talk about “relationships” instead of “properties”.
Strawson thinks “experience”, “qualia”, “mind”, “consciousness” and other mental attributes cannot arise from “matter” or the “physical” which is entirely devoid of them. Such a mysterious appearance would be a break in the continuity of nature. Therefore he concludes that some form of primitive mental experience must be an part of the intrinsic nature of what we call “matter or the physical”. That is of course the fundamental claim of panpsychism although many variations of that thesis have been proposed.
