Without reading the essay, hence also the peremptory nature of the following, it seems to be that Strawson and Harris-style determinism is built firmly upon the foundations of Pierre LaPlace’s famous daemon:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past could be present before its eyes.
But while they’re prepared to sing LaPlace’s dictum from the rooftops, they’re considerably more reticent when it comes to Heiseberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which shows that at the most fundamental level, reality is in some sense indeterminate. And furthermore that the choices of experimental apparatus have a role in determining an observation! Which seems to me to torpedo all of the popular science enthusiasm for determinism.
Although a question that ought to be asked here is whether liberation, mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, affirms the freedom of the will, when it really depends on relinquishing the idea of self, of which the will is an instrument. I agree that Buddhism is not determinist in the Harris/Strawson sense, but at the same time, the kind of freedom it expresses is not necessarily compatible with the liberal conception of free will, either. In academic speak, Madhyamaka is a soteriological philosophy, its aims are what would be called in other contexts religious in nature.
I don’t recall Harris ever being specific enough to really get a relevant metaphysics out of him. I read Sapolsky more recently though, and I seem to recall a similar approach by Harris where there simply is no metaphysics and what you get is rather an extremely promiscuous world view that flip-flops between forms of “smallism” and “bigism” depending on what will make the current argument go through.
With Sapolsky (who does cover quantum mechanics and chaos theory in a cursory way) I found myself wondering if you could wring a metaphysics out of his descriptions that would let you say that anything exists, rather than simply being an arbitrarily labeled heap of external causes in a monoprocess going back to the Big Bang.
That only makes sense though. Prima facie, if one has no principled response to the Problem of the One and the Many and cannot even define a being (even roughly) it can hardly be the case that there are free/self-determining beings, because there are no beings and no selves (except equivocally or epiphenomonally). That’s fine as far as it goes (there is a long history of illusionism in philosophy after all), the issue I have with this is that it isn’t made clear at all and is presented as just shaking out of empirical findings as an obvious consequence of “the science.” In reality, I think the scientific descriptions do very little actual lifting in the texts; they could have been delivered just the same with 19th century scientific descriptions (and were back then!).
Strawson is an interesting case because the conception of freedom at the center of it, and particularly of desert (he uses Heaven and Hell as key examples) are deeply voluntaristic (i.e., moral failure primarily defined in terms of extrinsic punishment). It’s interesting to note then that the “you didn’t choose your parents, education, species, etc.” line is basically unconditional election without an “elector” and the abolition of desert is sola gratia without the grace.
It depends what you’re tlaking about. Daniel Dennett, for instance, is one of the least-respected on this topic, and indeed, one of the most well-known and subscribed. But his position is considered hand-waving. So you can’t really call this a fact, in any meaningful way at all.
I think your following attack on Harris fails at every single claim made.
Because you’ve completed, grossly misinterpreted the position. Which was my initial claim to the other poster.
Your constitution of his position is abjectly dumb, and so I understand your response. But it’s just wrong. His position is that Free Will can only occur sans determinism. The argument hinges on this - not agreeing with your version of “free will”. There are plenty of philosophers and neuroscientists who make the same claim. I think you’re conflating his position, with it’s misalignment with your interpretations of the terminology, which is fine, but I’ve heard Harris discuss his position enough to know you’ve missed it. I suggest this is why you had to presume, to make your case. This isn’t a dig - it’s just how things work when you aren’t quite hitting the mark.
I find this laughable. It is exactly the position, when drilled into, for a standard compatibilist. If you are one, I am sorry.
I think perhaps you’re not actually reading what Harris has said? Brain is not mind. It never has been. That causes in the brain supervene on the mind is not an issue for Harris’ position. It just may be an issue for hte objector who misses it.
Again, i have no strong position on the question but this take on Harris is exactly what I said it was. But taking soeone like Blackford, who was made much of in opposition to Harris, crudely, and laughably makes suggestions like that our desires and decisions are causally effective in terms of the brain’s physical state. Sure. This has absolutely nothing to do with the question: If those desires and decisions are causally determined, then the can in simply kicked further. Mental Causation is just another aspect of determined reality (on Harris’ account) and so that’s no objection at all. Same goes for Blackfords other key objections: Determinism = / = fatalism. Duhh. His use of alternate choices to somehow undermine the fundamental reality that choices are determined (on Harris’ account) is genuinely bad philosophy and bordering on shitty reading/being a shitty interlocutor. You can’t argue with someone who entirely misconstrues or, in this case, ignores your fundamental argument.
I don’t know of any other writers who have come closer than Blackford. Feel free to point me to them. I can’t quite defend myself on these claims: They are my opinions on things you’re saying about other people. I think you’ve got them obviously wrong. Not sure where this can go Our actual positions likely talk past each other.
No. The question is whether they just think they do. You cannot know all elements going into the probability - that’s my point. If you knew everything, omnisciently, there would be zero of these cases (this is a suggestion - not my position).
Agreed here; comments are on methodology and effeective conclusions. I think he was a totally reasonable worker.
I remember an article about a grad student who had been driven to despair by being persuaded by Strawson’s ‘basic argument’, but then that argument is not really about determinism, but whether we can be ultimately responsible for our actions. So I should acknowledge that.
Yes, a seasoned scientist like Libet wouldn’t make silly mistakes. His methodology and inferences were scientifically sound. His paper appeared in a peer-reviewed journal (?).
Well we can obviously define a word any way we like to make it coherent. I can define “free will” to mean a ham sandwich and thereby prove that free will exists.
But in terms of what people typically mean by free will, I think it’s almost always critical that the agent is culpable for the action. So when you say “not controlled by humans” it depends what you mean. It needs to be at least mostly controlled by the agent for it to count as free will by most definitions.
When you mentioned the word “algorithm” before, you seemed to be contrasting it with free will. You said that an algorithm means our choice is predictable.
So I am confused by the question.
Sure, and decisions are the product of antecedents.
Put it this way: let’s say after you make a decision, I ask you why you did that thing. It might be that you can articulate reasons, even if those reasons are not ends in themselves (e.g. if you say “I chose Paris because it’s always seemed romantic to me” then of course we can drill more into why that city has that characteristic for you, and why you desire to go to a place with that characteristic, why that was more important than other considerations etc etc)
Or you could shrug and say you don’t know why you did it.
Are you suggesting that only the latter kind of decision is free?
Dunno about the linked article, but the crux of the free will debate, from this particular well-formed armchair, is the incessant yet misbegotten conjunction of “free” with “will”.
German Enlightenment moral philosophy suggests the will, a mere aesthetic faculty, is that by which the agent obligates himself with respect to moral/ethical behaviors, hence it is the subject himself that is free in one sense, re: to determine his choice of behavior, but at the same time not free in another, re: to behave inconsistently with it.
But being, in some sense, “unseen” is a given here. No-one claimed our thoughts are public. The issues at the heart of this are whether our thoughts are in some sense predictable, or random.
I think from your previous posts, your “algorithm” is in principle predictable. Most people would not call that free will.
I do believe I freely make choices in the first sense. Because my choices come (at least proximately) from me; from my personality and knowledge.
However, “free will” in the second sense: where my decision somehow has no antecedents (like personality and knowledge) but yet I am culpable for, makes no sense at all.
Personally, I don’t like to describe my choices as “free will”; because there is too much baggage here. It’s usually taken to be the magical, from “nowhere”, libertarian free will.
Right, and if it’s purely the product of antecedents, then most of the people who use this term “free will” wouldn’t say it’s free either. After all, this debate is almost always framed as “Determinism vs free will”.
It’s why, as I say, the conclusion I came to is that the concept itself is garbage. No version of decision-making “counts”.
It’s purely a get out of jail card for things like the problem of evil now. It never stands up to any scrutiny.
As you say, the debate suffers from an “indefiniteness of terms”, i.e. the answer to (1).
Two of the more prominent answers to (1) are:
We could have done otherwise
We control our actions
The issue with (3) alone is that it could be true if stochastic quantum behaviour has a causal affect on macroscopic behaviour, but is that sufficient? We have free will just if we randomly could have done otherwise? I’m sure many might think not; if (3) is true but (4) is false then we don’t have free will.
Then what if (4) is true but (3) is false? This is the compatibilist’s answer: determinism entails that (3) is false but doesn’t entail that (4) is false, and we have free will just if (4) is true.
The free will libertarian disagrees with this, and requires that both (3) and (4) (and maybe something more) are true. This is where we start to struggle; how is this achieved, given what we seem to know about the world? Is our “will” some physical phenomenon that (somehow) avoids the determinism (or randomness) that every other physical phenomenon is subject to, or is it some non-physical phenomenon that (somehow) has the power to move the body? We’re possibly approaching the territory of mystical mumbo-jumbo, a bunch of vague claims like “we’re the source” or “we did it but not because of anything that happened before” with no real explanation of the mechanics involved in making our muscles move.
Does some neuron (or collection of neurons) in our brain trigger the release of neurotransmitters without having been caused to do so by some prior bodily event? It seems to be what free will libertarians require, but there’s not much of an explanation of how this happens or evidence that it happens.
Agreed. To describe choices presupposes a system, in me of course, by which both the possible choices consistent with my moral disposition is established, and, a particular choice from those, consistent with my aesthetic judgement, is validated.
Our actual positions likely talk past each other.