# Using code for Newcomb's problem

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/using-code-for-newcombs-problem/1183>\
**Category:** Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics\
**Created:** [May 31, 2026, 4:33pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/using-code-for-newcombs-problem/1183 "2026-05-31T16:33:28Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 38

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**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\
**Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 9:49pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/using-code-for-newcombs-problem/1183/38 "2026-06-11T21:49:09Z")

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> [@felipec](#):
>
> Case closed. We don’t even need to calculate the expected value to arrive to the correct answer.

> [@Suny](#):
>
> So yes, 1,001,000 is greater than 1,000,000 therefore you should two-box. Being against that is denying basic arithmetic.

It’s kind of amazing that both of you argue your positions the same way, and make fun of each other for doing it. Look at just one aspect, and declare ‘case closed’, ignoring the full story.  
And yes, repetition doesn’t make it true. I don’t see counters to my examples where the strategy fails.

> [@Suny](#):
>
> Let’s say you have a lottery where you pay $1 to enter and you have a 40% chance of winning $1,000,001. Your analysis would say the probability of ending up with a million is 40% and the probability of ending up with -$1 is 60%, therefore you shouldn’t play this lottery.

You are completely misrepresenting the position of felipec. His argument is based on one arbitrary person (Bob) to compare himself to. So not 40%, but rather 28%. He would decline to risk the dollar just because probably having a dollar more than specifically Bob is far more important than hitting any jackpot.

> [@felipec](#):
>
> Easy:
> 
> ```auto
> r <- sum(outer(c(0,1) * b, c(0,1) * b + a, '>') * outer(c(1-p,p), c(p,1-p))) >= 0.5
> cat(sprintf('Choose %s\n', ifelse(r,'1B','2B')))
> 
> ```
> 
> Which simplifies to:
> 
> ```auto
> r <- (b>a)*p^2 >= 0.5
> 
> ```

Thank you. It precisely states your position when it has been foggy in some places. Remind me not to hire you as a money manager.

> [@felipec](#):
>
> Are you going to get more money if the prediction is 99% accurate?

I don’t care. It’s not about expected outcome. It’s about expected utility, especially with taking DMU into account.

You don’t address what everybody else points out: taking a big risk of losing it all just to ‘probably’ get an outcome that is larger by 1. It’s a bad gamble: close to 48/52 odds that Bob will get 1000 (or even 2000) more than you. But hey, expected outcome (52/48) is you’ll beat Bob by that $1, and apparently it’s all about gloating to Bob and not about utility at all.

> [@felipec](#):
>
> You don’t understand what the table is showing. The whole table is expected value.

I’m talking about expected utility, not expected value, something which hasn’t been yet defined. The table shows expected outcome.

> [@felipec](#):
>
> and why the two-box approach of slicing by prediction makes no sense, especially when p=1 𝑝 =1.

But I was illustrating the 75% case, which especially shows weakness in your strategy.

> [@Benkei](#):
>
> Imagine that instead of a prediction, Omega has built a quantum entangled device that reads your mind and upon your decision whether you will 1B or 2B the opaque box either stays empty or is filled

This makes no sense at all. It sounds like you expect ‘entanglement’ can be used to deliberately cause some outcome. It can’t. That would be FTL message sending, which is forbidden.

> [@Benkei](#):
>
> Or in other words, why does the passage of time make this a different choice?

It probably matters only to a 2-boxer.

And yes, such posts probably belong in the other thread. We’re using this one to make fun of felipec’s program/strategy.

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