He would exploit the trust of people who took him at his word.
Perhaps it is time to reconsider our financial contributions to this forum…
Okay, so you’ve noticed people don’t make decisions independently from their experiences and the values they’ve gathered from their environment. Sure. So what does that change for you?
But not in that order. In fact, I voted red but later recommended blue.
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I think that 80% of people will not understand the question so it’s irrelevant, has no meaning because the effective pressed button will be random.
If that’s true, does that guarantee 40% of blues? And does that mean the 20% of people who do understand the problem are obligated to hit blue to save the 40% who didn’t understand what they were voting for?
maybe. This is pure statistical analysis but a fine analysis would have to deal with the way people doesn’t understand the logical problem and rely on another source than randomness, for example the color red is unconsciously nice. What I want to say is that these typical English thinking problems presents themselves as deeply philosophical and revealing something about human thinking but they are just artificial logical games like chess. They reveal only one thing : the incapacity of English people to do real philosophy 
So what does it look like to do “real philosophy” here? How does a real philosopher choose which button to press, in the moment that he has to?
As a metaphysician I don’t understand the question (I’m 66) so I will not push anything. But I understand by observation the way English people imagine what doing Philosophy is and why it is not: that is real philosophy: see the difference? See where philosophy is?
That’s just your sociopathy.
I probably fall somewhere between the Boston Strangler and Son of Sam in terms of sociopathy as the hypothetical murderer of countless blue button pushers in a thought experiment on a philosophy forum.
Nothing. But I didn‘t know that in addition to being threatened with death along with the rest of the world, we were being tricked into playing a game in order to pass moral judgment on each other based on statistics. So I’m taking a trolley home so I can restfully think about how to be moral with a gun to my head.
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I thought you opposed consequentialism, yet your reasoning here is literally consequentialism.
But as before, these are equivalent:
- If most vote red then only red survive, else if most vote blue then everyone survives
- Red voters are guaranteed to survive and blue voters survive only if most vote blue
(1) is true if and only if (2) is true. You cannot derive “therefore, I ought vote blue” from (2), and so you cannot derive it from (1).
As before, the OP is agnostic on why blue voters die if most vote red. My example with the virus and the vaccine is consistent with the OP even if not explicitly the OP. If you accept that in my example it is not unethical — and even rational — to vote red (and take the vaccine) then you must accept that the correct answer to the OP cannot be determined until additional information is provided.
That’s exactly the issue. Here are two different scenarios consistent with the OP:
Scenario 1
- Everyone is in a gas chamber
- Those who push the red button may leave
- Those who push the blue button may leave only if most push the blue button
Scenario 2
- There is a gas chamber
- Those who push the red button are voting to put blue voters in the gas chamber
- Those who push the blue button are voting to not put anyone in the gas chamber
@tabemann , @Banno , et al. are interpreting the OP as like Scenario 2, even though it doesn’t say that. The only thing we know from the OP is that everyone who votes red survives and everyone who votes blue survives only if most vote blue.
In Scenario 1 it is not unethical to push the red button and foolish to push the blue button, and in Scenario 2 it might be unethical to push the red button and selfless to push the blue button. Unless we know whether we’re in Scenario 1 or Scenario 2, it’s impossible to answer the question.
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For the record, the judgement isn’t coming from me. With a lot of these dilemmas, I understand the reasoning behind both answers and don’t disparage people who choose the other one, even if I wouldn’t choose the same.
That’s an interesting way of framing it. It makes it clear that, despite the two scenarios being arguably functionally equivalent, if you frame it a different way the obvious moral answer may change entirely.
I enjoyed that, good post.
You’re alleviating an epistemological problem in your scenario #1. You literally see the folks in the gas chamber and they see folks walk out and survive in your example.
The game theory aspect relies upon prediction based upon what information you have, and if there is any sort of information feedback that changes from the OP to your recasting of it in the hypothetical, then your decisions may change.
Everyone is in the gas chamber at the same time and must vote in an isolated booth. Only after everyone has voted may those eligible leave.
As mortals everyone dies sooner or later. Now suppose “survival” meant immortality.
If you vote red, then you survive and become immortal. But if you don’t want to become immortal, then your only chance is to vote blue and hope less than 50% of the voters do the same.
If you want everyone to become immortal, then you vote blue and hope more than 50% of the voters do the same. You could also vote red and hope everyone does the same.
The experiment seems to omit the possibility to vote for mortality for everyone, i.e. “everyone dies”. It also makes it less complicated to vote red, because by voting red you know what you get, but with a blue vote you never know what you get. It’s about self-preservation only, and whether we want to survive alone or together.
The sub-chamber within the chamber where one engages in the democratic process just outside the machinery of death. I can imagine awaking to a normal Monday and then finding myself standing before the voting machine wondering how things turned out in this unexpected way.
I still think that any tinkering with the OP doesn’t provide clarification but instead creates differences where that modifies the hypothetical. Knowing that death is imminent and real adds a fear factor and certainty to the otherwise deliberate decision making suggested by the OP. Your example adds an emotive aspect that might result in less rational decision making, but maybe your point is that subtracting the realness from the decision is what is leading to all this sanctimonious “I’d save the world over my self” talk. You change the question from what ought I do to what would I really do if staring down death.
Personally, I’d push the red button. You are forbidden to endanger your own life based upon uncertain outcomes and your own life cannot be voluntarily given up. But that’s part of a code I live by, not an argument.