To blue or not to blue?

I don’t believe in ragging on reds though. Mostly, I reckon they’re overthinking it (or overcalculating it to be more precise). After they are saved from being condemned to a dysfunctional dystopia by blue solidarity, many of them shall realize the error of their ways and too become blue.

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I join a community of 1000 people

Situation D

501 people have pressed red and 499 people have pressed blue. More than 50% will have pressed red, so 501 will survive and 499 will die.

If I press red, then 502 will have pressed red and 499 will have pressed blue. More than 50% will have pressed red, so 502 will survive, including me, and 499 will die.

If I press blue, 501 will have pressed red and 500 will have pressed blue. More than 50% will have pressed red, so 501 will survive, and 500 will die, including me.

You are correct that in this situation:

If I press red, 499 will die but I will survive
If I press blue, 500 will die, including me.

Situation C

500 people have pressed red and 500 people have pressed blue.

If I press red, then 501 will have pressed red and 500 will have pressed blue. More than 50% will have pressed red, so 501 will survive, including me, and 500 will die.

If I press blue, 500 will have pressed red and 501 will have pressed blue. More than 50% will have pressed blue, so 1001 will survive, including me.

Summary

In situation D, I bear no moral responsibility for the 499 other people dying, as they would have died regardless of which button I pressed.

Situation C is different, in that I do bear a moral responsibility for the 500 people dying, as the number of people dying explicitly depends on my choice as to which button to press.

Therefore, I do bear a moral responsibility to press the blue button.

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So your argument is that only if my vote is the swing vote do I have a moral responsibility to push the blue button? Does this also require that I know that my vote is the swing vote?

Then what if we don’t know whether we’re in Situation A, B, C, or D?

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It’s not that I’m willingly destroying a portion of humanity. It’s just that I don’t have faith in people these days. I might regret saying this or edit it away if it stirs up an argument but, I look at who my president is and roll my eyes as I watch the chaos. There are still people saying global warming isn’t real. Anti-Vacs. I just don’t know what to think about society anymore. And having only lived in the same country my whole life, I can’t say I understand the culture and logic of people from the many other countries out there.

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See To blue or not to blue? - #84 by Banno

It’s a global vote, luckily for you.

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Because the votes are private I don’t know whether we are in situation A, B or C.

In situation A, the majority have pressed blue. My vote has no overall effect, as everyone survives.

In situation B, the majority have pressed red. My vote has no overall effect, other than my own survival.

In situation C, 500 have pressed red and 500 have pressed blue. My vote decides whether 500 people will die or not.

But even though I don’t know whether I am in situation A, B or C, I know that I must be in either situation A, B or C.

I know that if I press red it is possible that I will be responsible for the death of 500 people.

The mere possibility of causing the death of 500 people is the moral reason why I should press blue.

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I don’t think this follows. Consider this:

  1. Those who press the red button drink water
  2. Those who press the blue button drink poison
  3. If most press the blue button then everyone drinks an antidote

There is a sense in which if I’m in situation C and if I press the red button then I am causally responsible for those who drank poison being killed (i.e. in the counterfactual sense that they would not have been killed if I had pressed the blue button), but am I morally responsible? I don’t think so.

So you’re missing a step that gets you from “I am causally responsible (in the counterfactual sense)” to “I am morally responsible”.

The fact that the OP doesn’t say anything about drinking poison isn’t sufficient to allow you to avoid justifying this step.

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If you already know how everyone else will vote beforehand, it’s kind of trivial. If you know 90% of people will choose red, then choosing blue would simply be suicide. If you know most will vote blue, then really it doesn’t matter what you choose. There’s nothing interesting about the scenario if it’s not private.

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Situation C

In situation C, 500 have pressed red and 500 have pressed blue. My vote decides whether the 500 people who pressed blue will die or not.

Because I know the rules of the game, I know that C may possibly apply. I know that if C applies, my pressing red will cause the deaths of the 500 people who had pressed blue. Because I know a possible consequence of my actions, I am morally responsible for my actions.

If I did not know the rules of the game, I would not know that my pressing red may cause the deaths of the 500 people who had pressed blue. Because I did not know a possible consequence of my actions, I am not morally responsible for my actions.

If I press red then I am causally responsible for the deaths of the 500 people who pressed blue. If I did not know the rules of the game, I agree that I would not be morally responsible. But I do know the rules of the game, because they are set out in the OP, so I am morally responsible.

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Would you still be morally responsible if it wasn’t a difference of one vote, but of two or three?

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This is what needs to be justified.

I know that a possible consequence of me pushing the red button and drinking water is that those who pushed the blue button and drank poison won’t be given the antidote.

It does not follow that I am morally obligated to push the blue button and drink poison.

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In situation D, 501 have pressed red and 499 have pressed blue.

If I press red, then the 499 who had pressed blue will die. If I press blue, the 499 who had pressed blue will still die.

In that event, I would be neither causally nor morally responsible for the death of the 499 who had pressed blue, as they would have died regardless of my vote.

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Situation C

In situation C, 500 have pressed red and 500 have pressed blue. My vote decides whether the 500 people who pressed blue will die or not.

I press red. The 500 who have pressed blue will drink poison, won’t be given an antidote and will die.

I press blue and drink poison. But everyone who had pressed blue will be given an antidote and survive.

In this situation, I would have thought that I am morally obligated to press blue rather than red, as this would prevent the deaths of 500 people.

I don’t know what you mean when you say I am not morally obligated to press the blue button.

So even though you’ve made the same decision, with the same information available to you, just because the outcome is different, you’re immoral in one circumstance but not in the other.

Doesn’t that seem odd to you?

Exactly that.

If I don’t know that I’m in Situation C then I am not morally obligated to push the blue button and drink poison. You don’t get to demand that I risk my life because others probably chose to risk theirs.

Blaming me for the deaths of anyone who chose to drink poison is putting the blame on the wrong person. If anyone is to blame then it’s them; they chose to drink poison when they could have just drank water.

If I join a community of 1,000 people, both situations C and D are possible, but I cannot know which.

If Situation C is in fact the case, 500 have pressed red and 500 have pressed blue. My vote will count, in that if I press red then I will cause the death of the 500 who pressed blue. If my vote counts, then I must be held morally responsible for the outcome.

If Situation D is in fact the case, 501 have pressed red and 499 have pressed blue. My vote won’t count, in that regardless of whether I press red or blue, the 500 who pressed blue will die anyway. If my vote won’t count, then I cannot be held morally responsible for the outcome.

However, I can only make one decision based on both C and D being possibilities. I am not making one decision based on C being a possibility and a different decision based on D being a possibility.

I don’t know whether C or D will be the case, but morally I must minimise any harm my decisions make, which is to assume the possibility of C, and press the blue button.

Morality is not black and white, but trying to minimise the harm of one’s decisions.

You are straying from the OP.

There is nothing in the OP about the people pushing the blue button knowingly choosing to drink poison.

But they’re the same decision. Voting red. If you’re immoral for voting red in one circumstance, and the other circumstance is, from a decision-making point of view, identical, then the decision should be equally immoral in both circumstances from my view.

You’re letting one guy off the hook morally because he got lucky, essentially, even though morally speaking he did the exact same thing you’re morally condemning the other guy for. That should give you pause, at the very least.

What’s the relevant difference between these?

Game 1

  1. If most drink water then only those who drink water survive
  2. If most drink poison then everyone survives

Game 2

  1. If most push the red button then only those who push the red button survive
  2. If most push the blue button then everyone survives

The general form of these games is:

  1. If most X then only those who X survive
  2. If most Y then everyone survives

Either it follows from this that for all X and Y, we ought Y, or it doesn’t. So unless you can explain the relevant difference, your response is special pleading.

If you can’t explain the relevant difference then you must either commit to saying that we are morally obligated to drink poison in Game 1 (which is absurd) or accept that we are not morally obligated to push the blue button in Game 2.

I would agree that if I pressed red not knowing the circumstances of C and pressed red not knowing the circumstances of D then my decision should be equally moral.

But I do know the circumstance of C (500 have pressed red and 500 have pressed blue) and I do know the circumstance of D (501 have pressed red and 499 have pressed blue). This is why my decision can have a different morality.