Hmm. Probably neuroscience, as I suggested, though you may know that Roger Penrose proposed quantum physics as the locus for an explanation of consciousness. My “faith” that neuroscience is interested in theories of consciousness hardly needs explaining, does it? Or if you prefer, call it the “science of consciousness studies” to make it interdisciplinary. Whatever we call it, there is a huge amount of research into the topic going on, especially around what Chalmers called the “easy problems” (which are only easy compared to the Hard Problem!).
As an individual, I can of course examine the idea that “Consciousness begat everything else,” but that would not be science. Kind of like those 18th century thinkers “examining” time and space. Pure speculation, or at best some interesting hypotheses, such as yours. I want data, and peer-reviewed studies! But I think we’re a long way off from a genuine science of consciousness.
I’m not sure that that’s as nuanced as what follows from my position. The very manner of describing meaningful conscious experience(that’s actually redundant on my view, because all experience is meaningful to the creature having it) in terms such as “subjective experience” is akin(roughly) to calling apples and cinnamon “apple pie”, insisting that apples and cinnamon are not the same sorts of things as flour, water, and butter, and then wondering how we can effectively bridge the gap between apples and cinnamon and all of the other necessary ingredients required for apple pies.
Well, I’m confident that there’s a problem, but I’m rather inclined to think that bridging the physical/mental ‘gap’ in order to solve the question of how the physical can give rise to the mental is not THE problem, but rather an inevitable consequence/position arising from an inadequate linguistic framework to begin with.
I’m not well versed enough on Davidson’s Anomalous Monism to have enough well-grounded confidence to even comment on your last question to me. I am quite fond of some of Davidson’s other work. Although, monistic and dualistic accounts of meaningful conscious experience make my tail twitch.
It seems to me that any description of experience that is couched in pure physicalist/materialist/objective/external terms or pure immaterial/private/subjective/internal terms are both mistaken in the exact same way. They’re accounting malpractices, both inadequate for taking account of that which consists of both physical and mental, subjective and objective, internal and external, material and immaterial. They’re both found sorely lacking.
I gotcha. Well, not having perfect pitch, I can’t say it wouldn’t help in that scenario. I never would have imagined that going through anybody’s head. But I’m not a Shostakovich or Mozart. I wonder if the world’s greatest musical talent who does not have perfect pitch could think of it in any key while listening, remembering it just as easily in their chosen key as Shostakovich and Mozart did thinking of it in the actual key. Then go home and play it perfectly in their chosen key.
Interesting. Human hearing varies. Some people prefer high pitches, some low. I suppose the sound is preferable in some keys than others because the highest or lowest notes of a melody go places the composer isn’t as comfortable with. Maybe such things play a big role in a composer’s “feelings” for keys.
Your response here Jay, is a classic example of the scientism boundary move - the assumption that only peer-reviewed, data-driven inquiry counts as legitimate knowledge, and anything else is “pure speculation”.
What I refer to as following The Narrative. It has it’s perks of course. But it can mean living a whole lifetime no closer to any significant truth which by and large might serve you - the individual - and you experience being human.
It is a safe place and is also quote telling as to how significant The Hard Problem really is to The Humanities as a whole and perhaps even philosophy in general. Something to talk about between the advent of life and death.
So, let’s take a philosophical look at the implication of that position.
Claim
Implication
Neuroscience is the appropriate locus for consciousness studies
Consciousness is a biological phenomenon to be studied like any other
I want data, and peer-reviewed studies!
Only empirical evidence counts
Examining the idea that Consciousness begat everything else… would not be science
Metaphysical questions are not science
Pure speculation, or at best some interesting hypotheses, such as yours
Your model is speculation, not knowledge
We’re a long way off from a genuine science of consciousness
The science hasn’t matured - so your model is premature
The problem I find with such a position in relation to my own is
It says “I want data.” But data about what? If consciousness is the ground of all things, then data is a content of consciousness - not something separate from it. Asking for data about consciousness from within consciousness is like asking a fish to provide data about water. The demand is circular.
It says examining “Consciousness begat everything else” would not be science. That is right - it would not be science. But science is not the only way of knowing. Mathematics is not science. Logic is not science. First-person experience is not science. And yet all of these are valid forms of knowledge.
It says: “We’re a long way off from a genuine science of consciousness.” This assumes that with enough data, the hard problem will be solved. But the hard problem is not a data problem. It is a conceptual problem. More data about brain states will not explain why brain states are accompanied by experience. That is not a gap in data - it is a gap in the explanatory framework itself. No less a gap than supernaturalism.
It wants “data.” But the most immediate and undeniable data any of us have is experience itself. The fact that we are conscious is not a theory. It is the ground of all theories. Dismissing it as “not science” is not skepticism -healthy or otherwise. It is a category error.
None of us are wrong to value science. But committing to an unexamined metaphysical commitment: that consciousness is a phenomenon property of the natural world, to be studied like any other. My “model” supports consciousness is the ground of the natural world. That is not a scientific claim - but the evidence I provide (see the threads I have started - including the one you locked down) it is not less rational for being metaphysical.
The question is: which set of assumptions is more coherent?
Materialism: consciousness emerges from matter
CCA: matter is a formation of consciousness
Both are metaphysical. Only one of them explains why there is experience at all.
Rather than go through your response point by point, I’ll instead just say that you’re reading me carelessly, and seriously misrepresenting my position.
I never said, and don’t believe, that “only peer-reviewed, data-driven inquiry counts as legitimate knowledge.” What I believe is that only such inquiry counts as legitimate natural science. Natural science may or may not have a role in eventually understanding consciousness; I thought we were exploring the possibility that it does.
Likewise, that doesn’t leave the only alternative as “pure speculation.” I regard hypotheses like “Consciousness begat everything else” as exactly what I said: “an interesting hypothesis.” Other, less interesting formulations are indeed pure speculation, according to me.
Does this help you make better sense of what I’m saying? There’s really no need to bring out the big guns here, and aim them at a non-existent “scientism boundary move.”
I love this analogy but I’m having trouble matching it to "describing meaningful conscious experience. . . in terms such as ‘subjective experience’.” Would you mind laying it out a little further? I think I get that there are different classes of ingredients in the pie (corresponding to mental and physical descriptions?). And that there isn’t a mysterious gap between all of them and apple pie?
OK, good. I agree – and I think many others who’ve written about this do as well – that the “bridging the gap” metaphor may be wrong, and may distract us from a more central problem. Why it is wrong is contentious. Your idea is that the malfunction is rooted in the linguistic framework. Mine is that, if it turns out to be wrong (which I’m not positive about), the malfunction will be conceptual. But there’s a fine line between words and concepts . . .
Yes, and that’s one of the places to push back on Davidson’s account. He acknowledges your point, and insists that neither description is primary, and neither is adequate by itself. But anomalous monism also insists that there is only one kind of stuff, one item in basic ontology – the physical. Can Davidson have it both ways? – equality at the level of description, but monism at the level of ontology? And what sort of picture of experience is that?
Very good point. That would be the workaround, all right. In my own modest way, it’s the one I often use when I listen to something I need to remember. I just postulate a key for it and (try to!) remember all the chords accordingly. Another, better way to do this is to just label everything in terms of functional harmony, so what I’m postulating for memory purposes is not “A | C#m | D | E” but “I | iii | IV | V”. I generally find this easier when making the switch into whatever the correct key turns out to be.
Yes, or places the performer isn’t as comfortable with. If you’re writing something in a key that asks the flutist to get up toward high C a lot, you’d better rewrite in a lower key. Playing up there is hard to do well, and often doesn’t sound that great, and can dominate the ensemble.
Exactly. The question remains whether or not those with perfect pitch still have an advantage because of knowing which notes they actually are. Of course, at some point, those without are good enough that that advantage doesn’t make a difference.
No, you’ve convinced me – if the music in question is this straightforward, the perfectly pitched don’t have an advantage.
As for complicated music, I guess we’d have to ask someone with Shostakovich-like abilities. I picture such a person listening to a demanding 30-minute orchestral composition for the first time. Surely they’d get lost once or twice? If so, perfect pitch would show them where they are. And if the music isn’t strongly key-centered, then remembering in terms of functional harmony won’t work. If you were an ideal tape-recorder (“phonographic memory”?), you could just play it back for yourself as you copy it at the piano. But anything short of that, it would probably be helpful to have remembered specific pitches.
I hadn’t thought of that kind of scenario. Yes, I think you would need the photographic memory, since you wouldn’t have an overall structure or recognizable chord progressions to help.
I often wonder how many composers of such music notice wrong notes played during concerts.
I’ve wondered this about Ives in particular, where a certain level of chaos seems to be the point, so it wouldn’t much matter if a note was a half-step off. (But he might still have noticed.). We’re so used to privileging pitch and rhythm as being the “necessary” elements that make a performance correct or incorrect. Many approaches to jazz see it quite differently.
Sorry for the delayed reply. I’ve been traveling and haven’t had much free time.
And thanks for the question. Your confusion is reasonable given my phrasing. I’ll try to clarify.
I think that the matter/form question is more general than the mental/physical description question. The former concerns what it means for anything to be “one” thing. The latter is about how two seemingly incompatible descriptions might nonethless refer to one thing. Hylomorphism may provide an avenue for answering the latter – e.g. it may be that the relationship between mind and body is (in some sense) that of form to matter. In that sense, the questions can be seen as “analogous”, even though they are actually asking about different things.
Does that help?
Yes, I think the questions probably pull apart. As for which is harder, I don’t know. I think a lot of it depends on what would count as an acceptable “explanation”. Chalmers is specifically interested in questions about necessity and causal closure. Hylomorphism reframes these topics in a way that may (or may not) deflate some of his specific concerns. Some contemporary hylomorphists (e.g. William Jaworski) have argued that hylomorphism dissolves the hard problem completely. I’m more apt to say that it transposes the problem rather than dissolving it, leaving open the possibility that the transposition may prove illuminating and/or fruitful in a way that other framings may not be.
Yes. And this raises the question of “what is objectivity”? In comtemporary analytic philosophy the objective/subjective split is very often understood in ontological terms. People talk about the “objective world” or the “objective facts”. In contintental philosophy it is somewhat more common to give an epistemic reading. Here “objectivity” is an achievement of the subject, and “objective knowledge” is understood as the fruit of that achievement. On that reading, knowledge of the subject can be just as “objective” as the knowledge of anything else, even granting that the subject never appears as another datum amongst the sensible data of experience. Whether or not that kind of approach ultimately dissolves Nagel’s worry, I’m not sure.
Such are the way with words. It appeared you were describing your position in a manner which suggested finality - as in, you did not want to explore with me the alternatives I have been sharing, preferring to wait for science to do the work. Thanks for clarifying. So where to from here Jay?
Does subjective experience fit into the objective world?
How does physical matter produce subjective experience?
The objective account is incomplete.
The Hard Problem names the gap.
The first-person perspective is left out.
The Hard Problem is the problem of the first-person perspective.
Perhaps this is where philosophy is most useful? Because it can care for personal experience in the sense of giving it the importance it deserves, rather than sidelining it as expendable.
Not sure. If you’re indeed clear now that scientism isn’t the issue, I suppose we could go back to my answers to your questions:
What branch of science might be involved in providing new concepts for philosophy on this topic? Neuroscience, unless Penrose turns out to be right. But I think “consciousness studies” is now a legitimate interdisciplinary scientific branch in itself.
Why might neuroscience provide conceptual help? Because they will need the concepts themselves, and science has a very good track record of busting open old ways of thinking, philosophically.
Why shouldn’t I investigate your idea about consciousness? I could – indeed, I do, if doing philosophy counts – but my investigation wouldn’t be scientific, and I’m especially interested to follow the progress that science is making on this and related questions. As I said: I want data! I want something new to theorize about. (And yes, new data and new concepts will hopefully march in step.)
I could appreciate that more if this were a Science message board Jay, rather than a Philosophy message board.
Not to say that these are not related of course.
So, what have you got from Neuroscience which accepts (or rejects) the concepts I am introducing re Expanded Simulation Theory or is it fair to say that Neuroscience has nothing to say about that either way?
Yes, thanks. The mental/physical question is proposed as an example of the more general question about “how to be one thing.” And the hylomorphism answer suggests an analogy along lines that would dissolve the apparent “two things” problem, much as it does for form and matter.
This continues to intrigue me. We both know that “the Hard Problem is dissolved/malformed/not a problem” is a fairly common claim, but I want to learn more about Jaworski et al.
Yeah, that’s more my hope too. God knows it needs some transposing. And some science. If we can study the phenomenon of life, then we can study the phenomenon of consciousness.
This is more my understanding. The whole subjectivity problem gets a much more sympathetic treatment in the continental tradition starting from Kierkegaard, IMO. Part of why I value Nagel is that he knows quite a bit about that tradition too, and is bothered by some of the same questions, especially as they emerge in existentialism.
Me neither. I doubt he would think so. There are a couple of different worries. The famous one about “What is it like to be a bat?” is meant to show we can’t eliminate 1st-person experience reductively. His question about the status of the claim “I am Thomas Nagel” is harder to pin down. As I read him, this isn’t so much a question about experience as it is a question about what counts as knowledge. Does the self-knowledge that Nagel claims from the 1st-person POV carry over as knowledge about the world? What part of the world? What exactly is it a piece of alleged knowledge about? This seems highly Kierkegaardian to me; if so, it may be aporetic, as it was for Kierkegaard. Leap of faith, anyone?
Speaking too generally, I can’t see hylomorphism as a solution here because it already presumes the metaphysical dichotomy of substance and form. It can only reframe, but never rejoin, subject and object. Davidson’s approach is very different in that the dichotomy is in the dual descriptions, and a question of grammar rather than of ontology.
Hylomorphism tries to answer two questions at once, “what is there”, and “how is it organised” - by giving each a name: what is there? “Substance”; How is it organised? “form”. Naming an answer is not giving an explanation. Renaming the discontinuity between subject and object, mind and matter, is not providing an explanation.
The appeal of Davidson’s approach is that there is no dichotomy; reasons and causes are differing accounts that make use of things around us, leading us to apprehend them as about the same thing. But are they?
Here’s a metaphor, or an example. Money was once gold and silver disks, the value of the coin determined by the metal. The metal could be melted, debased, reformed; the value was once tied to that metal, so that changes in the metal were changed in the value of the coin. But over time the two came apart, so that now we do not have money tied to metal disks at all; Money is an entry in a ledger. The two uses, physical and financial, were once thought of as the very same, but no longer. We don’t find the value of a coin by how many grams of gold it contains, but recognise that the value of the coin is different activity to alloying.
Crucially, this is not difference between form and substance, but between finance and metallurgy. Perhaps AI will see the separation of intent and body, paralleling the separation of coin and dollar.
I want to distance myself somewhat from this speculation. It is not anywhere near tightly enough argued. But I still think it a more promising approach than rewarmed Aristotle. The ontology of money and the ontology of metal came apart long ago. We should drop the insistence that there must be One True Ontology, in favour of what there is being a function of what we are doing. Also, I’ve expressed dissatisfaction for the application of token/type here; it misrepresents the argument. Mental and physical vocabularies aren’t two labels inside one theory in the way “dominant 7th” and “augmented 6th” are both harmonic-theory labels for one keyboard-strike. And causes are not rule-governed, not in the way Davidson supposes; see Anscombe.
Sure, but I think you understood the gist of the analogy.
Let an apple pie equal consciousness. Let the parts of consciousness typically attributed as being subjective in their nature(such as qualia) be apples and cinnamon. Let the parts of consciousness typically attributed as being objective/physical in nature(such as the biological machinery doing their job) be flour, sugar, water, and butter.
Just to be clear, that’s a rough analogy of the conventional approach/contention that I find equally lacking on both sides. As always, it’s an analogy, aimed at improving another’s understanding of where I’m coming from, not as a one-to-one accounting practice. Something tells me that you already know that, but just in case another reader may not, hopefully I’ve helped.
I feel like saying a bit more regarding the conventional contentious debates between Chalmers and Dennett…
In Quining Qualia, Dan Dennett did a remarkable job using a purely physicalist explanation to render the typical “subjective”, “private”, qualia talk as unnecessary and/or untenable, depending upon the specific terminology under scrutiny. I was left with the impression that Dennett believed that consciousness simply IS the biological machinery doing its job and explained the subjective qualia aspects of consciousness by virtue of setting out the biological explanation. By virtue of doing so, the purported ‘need’ for qualia was dissolved.
I credit him with that, and I’m certain that there are many who do not agree with my take on that.
However, I remain unconvinced that Dennett’s view is any more capable of taking proper account of experience than Chalmer’s, despite what I found to be a very successful naturalist deconstruction of the very notion of qualia.
I typically use “linguistic framework” and “concept” and “notion” as semantic equivalents. The very idea of a language less concept, that is - concepts that are not existentially dependent upon language use; concepts that do not consist of language use - doesn’t make much sense to me.
The issue(s), as I understand things anyway, is(are) far more basic/foundational/fundamental/elementary/primary than the conventional debates capture. The participants do not seem to even recognize the issues. They certainly do not articulate them. They’re focused upon the more conventionally accepted issues. At least, that’s true of the ones that I’m familiar with and/or have read/studied in past endeavors.
All that being said, I think there may be some very interesting discussion to be had by setting out this line between language and concepts.
