# Thinking About "Dual Descriptions" **URL:** \ **Category:** General Philosophy\ **Created:** [September 15, 2026, 12:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086 "2026-09-15T12:36:41Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 9
**Author:** ![EQV](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/b782af/32.png) [@EQV](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/EQV)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 12:40am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/161 "2026-09-24T00:40:02Z")
> [@WhoKnows](#): > > Perhaps Hylomorphism requires EST (Expanded) in order to be a contender for dissolving the HP? Let’s take a look: > [@WhoKnows](#): > > | Hylomorphism | Simulation Theory | > | --- | --- | > | Matter is potentiality. | The code defines what is possible. | > | Form is actuality. | The execution actualises the possible. | As I mentioned before, I’d actually map matter to execution and form to code. I can go into the reasons for that if you’re interested, but for now I’ll just leave it at that. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > | Hylomorphism | Simulation Theory | > | --- | --- | > | The composite is the thing. | The running simulation is the actualised world. | This is where, I think, the mapping starts to break down a bit. For me, the universe itself is not a _hylomorphic_ unity of matter/form (i.e. a “thing”), but an _ordered unity_ of things and relations between them. Furthermore, hylomorphism typically includes a distinction between natural things which have an internal principle of change, and artificial things whose form is imposed externally. The mapping essentially breaks that distinction by making everything artificial. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > | Hylomorphism | Simulation Theory | > | --- | --- | > | The efficient cause is missing. | The efficient cause is the player. | It’s not missing, it’s out of scope. Hylomorphism is primarily a thesis about _intrinsic_ principles of unity. Most traditional hylomorphic metaphysical systems were accompanied by a theory of causality. In these systems, efficient and final causation are generally considered _extrinsic_ to the thing, and the so-called “first” efficient cause is generally identified as “God”. But in my opinion, hylomorphism does not, in itself, entail such a committment. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > | Hylomorphism | Simulation Theory | > | --- | --- | > | The ground is missing. | The ground is consciousness - that which designs, runs and experiences the simulation. | Again, historically most hylomorphists, starting with Aristotle, posited some kind of agentic consciousness as a “ground” of one sort or another. Probably the majority of theorists were theistic rather than pantheistic or panentheistic. Again, hylomorphism itself does not necessitate any particular answer here, but neither is ii incompatible with such answers. ---
**Author:** ![EQV](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/b782af/32.png) [@EQV](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/EQV)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 12:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/162 "2026-09-24T00:57:30Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > This continues to intrigue me. We both know that “the Hard Problem is dissolved/malformed/not a problem” is a fairly common claim, but I want to learn more about Jaworski et al. Jaworski is worth taking a look at, though I should mention that Jaworski hasn’t really engaged with thinkers like Juarrero or Deacon (or vice versa). Jaworski is bit more of a traditional metaphysician and interacts more with thinkers like Kit Fine, Mark Johnston, Kathryn Koslicki, Bernard Williams, Jaegwon Kim, etc. Not saying that’s a bad thing, just didn’t want to give the impression that he’s in the same milieu as the other thinkers I’ve mentioned. > [@Jay](#): > > There are a couple of different worries. The famous one about “What is it like to be a bat?” is meant to show we can’t eliminate 1st-person experience reductively. His question about the status of the claim “I am Thomas Nagel” is harder to pin down. As I read him, this isn’t so much a question about experience as it is a question about what counts as knowledge. Does the _self_-knowledge that Nagel claims from the 1st-person POV carry over as knowledge about the world? What part of the world? What exactly _is_ it a piece of alleged knowledge about? This seems highly Kierkegaardian to me; if so, it may be aporetic, as it was for Kierkegaard. Leap of faith, anyone? That’s an interesting connection. I’m not as familiar with Nagel’s work as I am with (say) Chalmers’s. I’d like to rectify that at some point. Personally, I find Lonergan compelling on these kinds of questions. He once wrote that objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, which could be read as a response to Kierkegaard’s “truth is subjectivity”. It keeps Kierkegaard’s insistence on the existing subject but refuses the opposition between subjective and objective. For Lonergan, “I am a knower,” and “I am Thomas Nagel,” are not aporetic. They are judgments and, once authentically affirmed, are facts within being. But Lonergan still has a place for something like the Kierkegaardian leap, only it shows up at the level of decision and religious conversion, where what’s important is not more knowledge but committment and self-transcending love. So for Lonergan, the leap belongs to _becoming_ oneself, rather than to _knowing_ that oneself exists. ---
**Author:** ![EQV](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/b782af/32.png) [@EQV](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/EQV)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 1:17am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/163 "2026-09-24T01:17:03Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > It can only reframe, but never rejoin, subject and object. I actually agree that nothing should try to “rejoin” them. Personally, I tend to see the problem of how to bridge the subject “in here” to an object “out there” as a pseudo-problem that arises from a broken picture of what knowing is. On that point, at least, I have affinity with Davidson’s rejection of scheme/content dualism. Where we differ, I think, is that I don’t see hylomorphism (matter/form, with substance as the composite) as a bridge at all, but as part of an account of the _structure_ of whatever is known (e.g. material objects). > [@Banno](#): > > Naming an answer is not giving an explanation. Agreed. I see hylomorphism as “heuristic”: “form” ultimately names whatever is to be understood, like the ‘x’ in an equation, and the sciences supply the content. So I think we probably agree about explanation, and disagree only about whether hylomorphism claims to be such an explanation. > [@Banno](#): > > leading us to apprehend them as about the same thing. But are they? To me, whether two accounts are about the same thing is a question of identity that grammar alone can’t settle. The hylomorphic notion of a “thing” or “substance” is an answer to exactly that question. > [@Banno](#): > > this is not difference between form and substance, but between finance and metallurgy. The money example is a good one, and I largely agree with you. Finance and metallurgy as irreducibly different explanatory categories, with money partly constituted by meaning. One small quibble: I wouldn’t say that money has come loose from matter entirely, since even ledgers require some physical realization. > [@Banno](#): > > We should drop the insistence that there must be One True Ontology I agree with you if this means rejecting one “privileged” vocabulary. I’m less inclined to agree that there’s no “way things really are”. > [@Banno](#): > > And causes are not rule-governed, not in the way Davidson supposes; see Anscombe. Agreed. Statistical laws and non-systematic conditions sit much more comfortably with Anscombe than with Davidson’s nomological principle. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 3:45am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/164 "2026-09-24T03:45:32Z")
Is this to say, I addressed one version of hylomorphism and you are defending another? > [@EQV](#): > > Most traditional hylomorphic metaphysical systems were accompanied by a theory of causality. In these systems, efficient and final causation are generally considered _extrinsic_ to the thing, and the so-called “first” efficient cause is generally identified as “God”. But in my opinion, hylomorphism does not, in itself, entail such a committment. Is you version therefore one which has sought to use The Razor on those older versions? Simulation Theory of course doesn’t avoid the implications that we exist within a created thing, which then implies a “creator” or “creators” - which may be why some “opinions” emerge about certain philosophies such as **Hylomorphism**. Be that as it may, I think trying to solve The Hard Problem without accepting the possibility will have those trying to solve it, continue chasing their tails… This problem of “God” of course, is understandable, but ST doesn’t go so far as to make claims as to the name or nature of such, as does religion, and I don’t see it as a problem which requires avoidance or reinterpreting any philosophy to suit that approach. If indeed hylomorphism does not, in itself, entail such a commitment, one is probably talking about something else rather than. > [@EQV](#): > > For me, the universe itself is not a _hylomorphic_ unity of matter/form (i.e. a “thing”), but an _ordered unity_ of things and relations between them. Semantics? EST regards “The Universe” as being one thing which had a beginning and consisting of many things, all of which together are “The Universe”. Perhaps the problem with philosophy is that there are so many and some are even in opposition to others, which would mean either one finds a way to bring them all together in coherency or dump philosophy as a means of dissolving the Hard Problem or dump any which show they are unable to do so? ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 1:04pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/165 "2026-09-24T13:04:44Z")
> [@EQV](#): > > Personally, I find Lonergan compelling on these kinds of questions. Yes! A shamefully undervalued philosopher. > [@EQV](#): > > For Lonergan, “I am a knower,” and “I am Thomas Nagel,” are not aporetic. They are judgments and, once authentically affirmed, are facts within being. Interesting. The aporetic element I had in mind is indeed the one that, for Kierkegaard and perhaps for Lonergan, prompts an individual to leap out of thought and into faith, from “knowledge” to “commitment,” from “knowing” to “becoming.” This may be placing too much weight on Nagel’s simple question, I acknowledge. Still, what you’re calling an “authentic affirmation” of self-awareness seems to result in something different than a new fact, though it’s quite difficult to articulate precisely where the problem lies in simply calling it a fact. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 1:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/166 "2026-09-24T13:45:42Z")
> [@creative](#): > > As always, it’s an analogy, aimed at improving another’s understanding of where I’m coming from, not as a one-to-one accounting practice. Something tells me that you already know that, but just in case another reader may not, hopefully I’ve helped. It’s always helpful to have that reminder. Us philosophers and our analogies . . . !! 😬 So back to the pie: We don’t have any trouble understanding how the ingredients of the pie come together in the cooking process. If asked, a culinary scientist (is there such a thing?) could give us a highly detailed account. We also understand why we need a new term, “pie,” to describe the result: Not only is “pie” a functional description which it would be incredibly cumbersome to avoid, but the ingredients have been subjected to a process, mixing + heating, which has changed their constitution from what it was at the beginning. Nothing like this clarity applies to consciousness, I contend (except maybe the obvious need for the term itself). We sense, dimly, that _something_ like this must be happening, as we “mix and heat” the physical and the mental, but to say more would be premature. So to those who want to argue that “something like this” is enough to solve or dissolve the Hard Problem (similar to a fallback to “emergence”), I can only say that for me it’s not enough. > [@creative](#): > > By virtue of doing so, the purported ‘need’ for qualia was dissolved. > > I credit him with that, and I’m certain that there are many who do not agree with my take on that. It’s been a million years since I read _Consciousness Explained_. I know I disagreed strongly with Dennett’s views on nearly everything, including qualia, but I’ll keep mum since I can no longer recall his specific arguments nor my objections. But yes, I’d say you’re right that, for Dennett, consciousness is basically a user illusion. > [@creative](#): > > The very idea of a language-less concept, that is - concepts that do not consist of language use - doesn’t make much sense to me. . . . I think there may be some very interesting discussion to be had by setting out this line between language and concepts. I’ve been waiting for someone to bring this up! It’s absolutely the vulnerable point in my contention that we can apply different language to the same concept, and know that it _is_ the same concept. Yes, I’m painting a picture in which conceptual apprehension can be pre-linguistic, or linguistic-adjacent. (I’d call it para-linguistic but that term is taken, and means something different.) See this exchange between @Banno and @EQV : > [@EQV](#): > > Banno: We should drop the insistence that there must be One True Ontology > > EQV: I agree with you if this means rejecting one “privileged” vocabulary. I’m less inclined to agree that there’s no “way things really are”. Just so, according to me as well. I’m suggesting there can be an inquiry into the “way things really are” that remains aloof from any privileged vocabulary. Indeed, the assumption that there _must be_ a privileged vocabulary is responsible for a lot of wasted philosophical energy. But rejecting this picture doesn’t have to involve rejecting a privileged conceptual structure, perhaps even what Sider is happy to call a privileged ontology. How do we apprehend concepts without starting with words, with language? Not only is this a very interesting discussion, as you say, it’s also probably way outside the confines of this thread. Maybe one of us conversing now will start a new thread? I’d be happy to see it either defended or contested. But just in a sentence or two: I think we can conceive of grounding relations pictorially, or else in terms of logical form. We _see_ the building blocks, imaginatively, and bracket the labels. When we do put it in language, we might start with, “There’s this building block here that’s called by many ‘physical’ and this other building block there that’s called by many ‘mental’; what grounds what?” And the vulnerable point in all of this is: Is this really “pre-linguistic”? Don’t you need language to go on to do the conceptual analysis? Also, I’m in the process of taking on board some of what McDowell has to say about this, so the whole idea may be a work in progress for me. Anyway . . . huge topic, thanks for the question. ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 5:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/167 "2026-09-24T17:12:19Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Sure. If I shout something, the sounds have a frequency but are not said to have musical pitch. For a sound to be identified as a pitch, the frequencies involved have to show a regular pattern of repetition. Sorry for the delay in responding. Your question made me aware of my relative ignorance of the physiology of hearing, and researching the subject lead me down a bit of a rabbit hole. In the process of reading up on the topic, it occurred to me that a couple of idiosyncratic things about me that I had never considered connected might well be connected. (Poor sense of rhythm and poor ability to follow a conversation in a noisy environment.) It turns out that relevant research has been done and those characteristics are correlated. Anyway, I understand what you are asking better, and yes, for something to sound musical there needs to be periods where the frequency of sound is sustained. A yell has frequency content, but not necessarily a sustained constant frequency. For example, a yell might have a continuously rising frequency (like if a trombone slide was being pulled in while playing a ‘note’). A time domain description of a yell would certainly contain information that would be obscured in a frequency domain description. A frequency domain description of a trombone sliding would indicate that the pitch was changing during the slide, but it wouldn’t provide information about whether the pitch was rising or falling. BTW, I downloaded a free spectrum analyzer app for my phone called Spectroid. It provides a frequency domain description in graphic form of whatever is picked up by your phone’s mic. So you can whistle, sing, yell, etc. and see a frequency domain representation of the sounds. Things like the second and third overtones of my whistle are clearly visible. You might have fun playing with it. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 6:06pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/168 "2026-09-24T18:06:37Z")
> [@wonderer](#): > > a couple of idiosyncratic things about me that I had never considered connected might well be connected. (Poor sense of rhythm and poor ability to follow a conversation in a noisy environment.) It turns out that relevant research has been done and those characteristics are correlated. I’d like to hear more about that, if you have the inclination. My former wife suffered from bizarre forms of “amusia” so I’m kind of a connoisseur. > [@wonderer](#): > > A time domain description of a yell would certainly contain information that would be obscured in a frequency domain description. A frequency domain description of a trombone sliding would indicate that the pitch was changing during the slide, but it wouldn’t provide information about whether the pitch was rising or falling. Interesting, thanks. > [@wonderer](#): > > a free spectrum analyzer app . . . You might have fun playing with it. I do a lot of home-studio recording, so I use those gizmos a lot. You can’t really get the hang of how music _sounds_ (as opposed to harmonic theory) until you take the overtones into account, and having them laid out by a freq analyzer is essential to avoid all kinds of horrible production. It also highlights the freq/pitch distinction, because I might have to tinker with the frequencies of, say, a snare drum, which has no pitch at all. But the issue of overtones still applies. ---
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 11:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/169 "2026-09-24T23:17:56Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Yes, I’m painting a picture in which conceptual apprehension can be pre-linguistic, or linguistic-adjacent. (I’d call it para-linguistic but that term is taken, and means something different.) It is my contention that experience emerges long before the capability to talk about it. I’m sympathetic to the allure of “pre-linguistic”. I spent better than half a decade trying to successfully employ “pre-linguistic” within my own position but found it incapable of picking out and/or accurately describing creatures that are amidst language creation/acquisition. That’s a very large swathe of candidates being left sorely neglected. Hence, I abandoned it. You’ve picked that vulnerability out in the quote below, albeit on a different complexity level… > [@Jay](#): > > And the vulnerable point in all of this is: Is this really “pre-linguistic”? Don’t you need language to go on to do the conceptual analysis? Also, I’m in the process of taking on board some of what McDowell has to say about this, so the whole idea may be a work in progress for me. Understood. Indeed, it is a work in progress for myself as well. I’ve watched McDowell and Davidson’s discussion as well as Strawson, Dummett, and Quine’s. Stemming from my own ‘theory’ of meaning, which is unlike the two dominant methodological approaches, I have a notion/understanding of language with a much broader scope than just picking out words; it’s more of an outline, as it were. I’ve mentioned this general idea of an outline before, in an earlier exchange of ours regarding thought, belief, and meaning. In line with the need to be able to describe language less animals’ experience, any notion of experience worth its salt must be amenable to evolutionary progression. That is to say that it needs to be capable of taking proper account of other creature’s experience as well as our own. Hence, and filling out the “pre-linguistic” aspect, Nagel’s (in)famous question “What is it like to be a bat?”, would have a much more practical answer, despite the very peculiar way the question itself is formed. That much is apparent - to me anyway - after considering the fact that _each and every segment/duration dissected from any individual candidate’s experiential timeline **is different** from the rest_ of the segments within their own timeline, our own first person ‘qualities’ of experience notwithstanding. As you say though, this is all well beyond the scope of this thread’s focus, which is Davidson’s notion(s) of dual descriptions. ---
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 11:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/170 "2026-09-24T23:24:24Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Nothing like this clarity applies to consciousness, I contend (except maybe the obvious need for the term itself). We sense, dimly, that _something_ like this must be happening, as we “mix and heat” the physical and the mental, but to say more would be premature. So to those who want to argue that “something like this” is enough to solve or dissolve the Hard Problem (similar to a fallback to “emergence”), I can only say that for me it’s not enough. Well. 😜 You did exactly what I warned against, even after commending the warning. I think the speech act folks may count that as performative contradiction. The critique is certainly fair enough, as I’ve given very little ‘substance’ to go on. The point of the pie analogy was to highlight the seemingly disparate sides of the consciousness debates as well as to hint towards and/or skirt around the inherent lack of explanatory power of either side, if taken by itself. In addition to what I’ve said about the analogy previously… Let the pie be thought and belief. ---
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 11:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/171 "2026-09-24T23:27:39Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > It’s been a million years since I read _Consciousness Explained_. I was referring to [Quining Qualia](https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/DennettQuiningQualia1988.pdf) ---
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 12:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/172 "2026-09-25T00:00:25Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > > [@EQV](#): > > > > Banno: We should drop the insistence that there must be One True Ontology > > > > EQV: I agree with you if this means rejecting one “privileged” vocabulary. I’m less inclined to agree that there’s no “way things really are”. > > Just so, according to me as well. I’m suggesting there can be an inquiry into the “way things really are” that remains aloof from any privileged vocabulary. Indeed, the assumption that there _must be_ a privileged vocabulary is responsible for a lot of wasted philosophical energy. But rejecting this picture doesn’t have to involve rejecting a privileged conceptual structure, perhaps even what Sider is happy to call a privileged ontology. On the one hand, I completely agree with the general thrust as I understand it. Particularly as it pertains to the different domains, and the tremendous attention to certain details that some frameworks lay out nicely. Others may focus upon completely different aspects/features of the very same thing. However, if experience is the sort of thing that happens prior to language creation/use, then we can get it wrong on a very basic level. I don’t think I’d call it an “ontological” level, but I can’t help but to stand firm on the idea that we can be mistaken about what needs to be the case in order to facilitate experience. For example, I think most, if not all would agree that certain biological machinery is necessary. When contemplating experience that happens long before our words ever hit the paper, we can most certainly be mistaken about everything that such experience consists of. I’m reminded of centuries past dogma regarding the neglect to admit that other creatures had experience, or emotions, or thought, or belief. We’re well beyond that sort of false elevation of humans above other animals regarding those facets of being alive in the world. At least, we’ve begun to acknowledge the fact that while other animals may not be capable of metacognition, and all sorts of other ‘mental’ feats that humans are, many are indeed quite capable of thinking about what’s going on around them; they do so with simpler thought and belief… hence, simpler experience. Circling back to the idea of not privileging one vocabulary or framework above another… I would most certainly privilege an accounting practice that proved capable of effectively setting out how experience emerges. I wouldn’t call that “falling back onto” emergence. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 12:45am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/173 "2026-09-25T00:45:14Z")
> [@creative](#): > > I was referring to [Quining Qualia](https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/DennettQuiningQualia1988.pdf) If memory serves, the chapter in CE called “Qualia Disqualified” was a reworking of “Quining Qualia” (or possibly the latter was a reworking of the chapter), making the same arguments. > [@creative](#): > > Well. 😜 You did exactly what I warned against, even after commending the warning. I think the speech act folks may count that as performative contradiction. Sorry, I’m lost. I may well have done what you say, but could you point me back to the context you’re referring to? What was the warning? ---
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 1:27am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/174 "2026-09-25T01:27:26Z")
No worries, Jay. It was not an explicitly worded warning, and it’s not directly relevant to the discussion regarding dual descriptions. I do not want to detract from that. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 1:05pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/175 "2026-09-25T13:05:20Z")
> [@creative](#): > > No worries, Jay. It was not an explicitly worded warning, and it’s not directly relevant to the discussion regarding dual descriptions. I do not want to detract from that OK! Though as I get older, I’m aware that I forget shit, including shit I wrote myself, so don’t hesitate to point it out. > [@creative](#): > > _each and every segment/duration dissected from any individual candidate’s experiential timeline **is different** from the rest_ of the segments within their own timeline, Yes, this seems sensible. Can you say more about the significance it has for the “pre-linguistic” question? Do you mean that the difference, as experienced by a non-linguistic animal, would still be conceptualized by them? > [@creative](#): > > When contemplating experience that happens long before our words ever hit the paper, we can most certainly be mistaken about everything that such experience consists of. This is tricky. I agree that we can be wrong, in two distinct senses: We can give a mistaken account of what causes or constitutes the experience, and we can be wrong about whether the experience is veridical – that is, whether it is of what it appears to be of. But I think there’s a third sense in which we can’t be wrong. My account of a experience of a mirage in the desert can be wrong on both the above scores, but I can’t be wrong in claiming that I _appear to have had it_. Oh, I suppose we could construct a case where even my memory is false, but then we would just say, “I had the experience of having a false memory of something.” > [@creative](#): > > while other animals may not be capable of metacognition, and all sorts of other ‘mental’ feats that humans are, many are indeed quite capable of thinking about what’s going on around them; they do so with simpler thought and belief… hence, simpler experience. Absolutely. > [@creative](#): > > I would most certainly privilege an accounting practice that proved capable of effectively setting out how experience emerges. > > I wouldn’t call that “falling back onto” emergence. Nor would I. But I’m sure you used the term “effectively setting out” with deliberation. If I’ve effectively set out how experience occurs (using language to do so, we assume), have I captured basic ontology? Does the fact that my account is the most effective one so far (let’s say) mean that there can’t be any daylight between the terms I’m using and “the way things are”? I’d say that what we’d have would be an excellent match, employing really useful language, but quite a long way from a privileged vocabulary. Any formal logical language would be a good example of this. Moreover, in order for the account to _be_ useful, the users must agree on how to use the terms – what they’re meant to refer to, how they match up with other terms, etc. Such agreement can’t be achieved by consulting some “other reality” that is different from the one under discussion – no Big Glossary, in other words, that can mediate disputes between philosophical traditions. So again, “correct” and “incorrect” use of an ontological vocabulary is going to be both contextual and consensual. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 2:05pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/176 "2026-09-25T14:05:43Z")
> [@Patterner](#): > > Gotta wonder what The Ives Jazz Quartet would sound like. 😁 So I googled it. Not quite what we were talking about, but interesting . . . [![](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/Nfymdphrb58/hqdefault.jpg "Eric Hofbauer Quintet - Prehistoric Jazz, Vol. 3\_ Three Places in New England (Full Album)") ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nfymdphrb58) ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 3:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/177 "2026-09-25T15:12:55Z")
Nice! 😃 ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 4:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/178 "2026-09-25T16:12:33Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I’d like to hear more about that, if you have the inclination For a look at a scientific study of the subject there’s [The role of rhythm in perceiving speech in noise: a comparison of percussionists, vocalists and non-musicians](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) If your interest is in my idiosyncrasies I can’t say that I have any insight to speak of, on how my poor sense of rhythm plays a role in my difficulty with following conversations in a noisy environment. I’ll be somewhere with a crowd and band tonight. Perhaps I’ll gain some insight then, but I don’t have any confidence in that happening. ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 4:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/179 "2026-09-26T16:28:38Z")
Just a followup after my night out… I paid attention last night to what my auditory experience was like when I was trying to listen to people across the table from me, while a band was playing and people all around me were carrying on conversations. It seemed to me as if I was failing to pick up on syllable boundaries, as if my brain were trying to combine the end of one syllable with the beginning of another syllable and interpreting such ‘misaligned pseudosyllables’ as gibberish. The rhythm of the music seemed to especially dominate my auditory experience and impede my ability to get in sync with the speech of the person I was listening to. So I need to attend to my auditory experience in a noisy environment without music sometime, to see if music in the background makes it particularly difficult for me to parse speech or not. Anyway, I’m glad you asked about it, because I did attend to my auditory experience under such conditions, in a way I never had before. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 7:25pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/180 "2026-09-26T19:25:58Z")
Appreciate your report on your night out! What you say about the rhythm factor suggests a couple of things. Maybe the experiment to try is: noise in the background that has some rhythmic regularity (a washing machine going round and round?) versus just plain noise. Or see what happens if the background music is loud but very “ambient,” not much rhythm. Vary all these factors (noise, rhythm, music), in other words. The description of what happens to your perception of syllables is also suggestive. You probably know about “masking,” when two instruments are emphasizing the same frequency range, so they cancel each other out in the listener’s ear. I wonder if something like that can affect hearing where syllables break. Totally speculation here, but there’s a temporal reality you have to pick up on, in order to hear syllables and words; you have to be able to hear when they “stop and start.” If there was a different, very insistent tempo that was occurring at the same time, it’s like it’s competing for your attention, wanting you to break the words at the same points that the 4/4 (say) tempo breaks its beats. So the experiment to try _there_ would be to have a friend speak to you in synch with the rhythm of the background music (sort of rudimentary rap) and see if the problem recurs. OK, that’s my imaginative trip for the day, thanks! (Except now I’m trying to imagine getting a cadre of people together to “experiment” with you. You might have pay them, or bribe them . . . 🙂) [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086.md?page=8) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086.md?page=10)