# Thinking About "Dual Descriptions" **URL:** \ **Category:** General Philosophy\ **Created:** [September 15, 2026, 12:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086 "2026-09-15T12:36:41Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 7
**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 2:59am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/121 "2026-09-22T02:59:21Z")
Hi Jay. I’ve enjoyed your and Banno’s discussion of Davidson. I wish I was more fluent in music, so that I could glean more understanding. I’m fond of Davidson, at least the parts I understand. Now, I understand a bit more of the anomalous monism. It’s an interesting endeavor. Kudos to the both of you. That said… I’ve never quoted Chalmers verbatim that I can recall. I have participated in many a discussion where the ‘hard problem’ was the topic, a tangent, or was somehow underwriting the conversation, but now that I look at how this is worded by Chalmers himself, I can better understand why some hold that it’s an ill formed problem, or pseudo problem, although I likely diverge from Dennett and others on how. Chalmers said… “The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of how physical processes in the brain give rise to the subjective experience of the mind and of the world”. On my view, the processes are experience, but they’re not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location, particularly “in the brain”. Rather, those processes extend in a physically connected manner throughout the central nervous system and/or biological machinery of any creature under consideration. Experience is not the sort of thing that can be taken proper account of using the internal/external, mind/brain, mind/body, physical/mental and/or material/immaterial dichotomous frameworks. Experience is both, immaterial and material, physical and ‘mental’, internal and external in the sense that it consists, in large part at least, of associations and/or correlations drawn between perceptible/imperceptible things. Experience IS the process of drawing correlations/associations between different things by a creature so capable. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 3:15am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/122 "2026-09-22T03:15:40Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I prefer to wrestle with the problem more or less as stated by Chalmers, perhaps informed by some new insights @EQV has offered about hylomorphism. My take is: the Hard Problem is not a problem to be solved. It is the ground. It dissolves when we recognize what we are. The desire to write it off is understandable - but the desire to solve it is also a misunderstanding. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 1:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/123 "2026-09-22T13:28:14Z")
> [@creative](#): > > Kudos to the both of you. Thanks. Some very good exchanges on this thread, IMO. > [@creative](#): > > Chalmers said… > > “The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of how physical processes in the brain give rise to the subjective experience of the mind and of the world”. > > On my view, the processes are experience, but they’re not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location, particularly “in the brain”. Rather, those processes extend in a physically connected manner throughout the central nervous system and/or biological machinery of any creature under consideration. Fair enough. I’ll defend what I think Chalmers means here. First of all, I’m sure Chalmers would agree about the expansion of the “location” language. The involvement of the CNS was perhaps less widely foregrounded in 1994. I think we should also remember that, in what you quoted, Chalmers was trying to say briefly and simply what he thought the problem was, and so had to dispense with some important nuances. Lord knows, the subsequent 30 years have restored those nuances, and then some! But this simple version captures what I think Chalmers wanted us to focus on: There is an explanatory problem about how to understand the relation of the physical to the mental. So the point is not so much whether the brain is the right location for subjective experience, but rather the issue you next raise: whether “experience” ought to be thought of as some kind of “dichotomous framework” requiring explanation at all. This is certainly a good question. What I would ask in return is, “Suppose we decided, or learned, that experience was indeed more like what you propose. Would that mean that the question ‘How can dual descriptions along the mental/physical nexus be made compatible?’ has been answered?” I think you want to say that it would be revealed as a pseudo-problem, but that isn’t obvious, at least not to me. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > My take is: the Hard Problem is not a problem to be solved. It is the ground. It dissolves when we recognize what we are. The desire to write it off is understandable - but the desire to solve it is also a misunderstanding. I would call this position an example of writing off, or dissolving, the Hard Problem. So I’m not sure why you also say that “the desire to write it off is understandable,” as if that were some different option. Or maybe I’m not quite getting you. Can you say a little more? ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 2:29pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/124 "2026-09-22T14:29:35Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > You might know the answer to a related question: We establish musical _pitch_, as opposed to frequency (all sounds have frequencies) by reference to regularity of repetition of the frequency. The standard line on this is that perception of pitch is subjective, but that’s not entirely true, right? There are semi-rules about repetition rates that will affect most people’s perception of pitch – so my question is, would that kind of analysis be a time domain description too? But of course the repetition doesn’t involve amplitude, I don’t think, so . . . Well, any help would be appreciated. I likely don’t have sufficient musical background and/or aptitude to grasp the sense in which you are using “pitch” here. So before attempting an answer I need to get more clarity on the question. One thing I wonder about is whether you have good recognition of pitch labeled in terms of notes (A, B, etc.). For example, if I were to strike a key on a well tuned piano, would you be able to identify the note by the sound alone? (FWIW, despite some childhood piano lessons and playing trombone in school band I don’t have the ability to identify what note I am hearing.) If you do have such an ability, do you think that there is a band of frequencies around 440 Hz that you would recognize as A4? ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 2:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/125 "2026-09-22T14:32:37Z")
Somehow you’ve attributed a quote to me that was not written by me, and doesn’t even seem to appear in this thread. Just FYI. ---
**Author:** ![Johnathanrs](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/8e8cbc/32.png) [@Johnathanrs](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Johnathanrs)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 4:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/126 "2026-09-22T16:36:59Z")
@WhoKnows > [@WhoKnows](#): > > So, how does this all tie into solving - not only the Hard Problem, but also this language duality discussion This quote? My prior post was for you. > [@wonderer](#): > > Somehow you’ve attributed a quote to me that was not written by me, and doesn’t even seem to appear in this thread. Just FYI. My mistake. Apologies. The first letter is right at least. Can I buy a vowel? ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 6:02pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/127 "2026-09-22T18:02:13Z")
> [@wonderer](#): > > One thing I wonder about is whether you have good recognition of pitch labeled in terms of notes (A, B, etc.). For example, if I were to strike a key on a well tuned piano, would you be able to identify the note by the sound alone? (FWIW, despite some childhood piano lessons and playing trombone in school band I don’t have the ability to identify what note I am hearing.) Not terribly many people have this ability, called _perfect pitch_ or _absolute pitch_. I knew a guy who coyotes tell you what not the florescent light was humming. I’m not aware of any musical advantage it gives over sometimes who had very good relatives pitch. Meaning you can hear intervals, so, once you know one note, you know what the other notes are. An interesting weakness, though. A choral piece was too high for most of the singers, so we were going to sing it down a while step. The pianist was good enough to see it in the key of (say) D, and play it in C, transposing it in her head. We were able to do the same with our voice parts, which is nothing. Except for the guy with perfect pitch. He could not look at f#\>e\>d on the score, and sing e\>d\>c. Not a big deal. He just had to write out his part, transposing it to the new key. Still, I think it’s very interesting. ---
**Author:** ![wonderer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wonderer/32/106_2.png) [@wonderer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/wonderer)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 6:44pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/128 "2026-09-22T18:44:43Z")
> [@Patterner](#): > > Except for the guy with perfect pitch. He could not look at f#\>e\>d on the score, and sing e\>d\>c. Not a big deal. He just had to write out his part, transposing it to the new key. Still, I think it’s very interesting. Very interesting to me as well. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 8:26pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/129 "2026-09-22T20:26:25Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > > [@WhoKnows](#): > > > > My take is: the Hard Problem is not a problem to be solved. It is the ground. It dissolves when we recognize what we are. The desire to write it off is understandable - but the desire to solve it is also a misunderstanding. > > I would call this position an example of writing off, or dissolving, the Hard Problem. So I’m not sure why you also say that “the desire to write it off is understandable,” as if that were some different option. Or maybe I’m not quite getting you. Can you say a little more? Certainly. I was coming from/bouncing off the phrasing you use - you wrote; > [@Jay](#): > > Indeed, the strong desire that many people feel to write off the Hard Problem is a testament to its centrality. While I didn’t directly comment on, or agree with that, from what I understood about it is that the position is along the lines "we are compelled by the HP to either not engage with it (write it off/hand wave it away as trivial) or to engage with it. Perhaps I misunderstood what you were meaning? What I was meaning is that where one realises and accepts what is doing the experiencing, is essentially what they are, the hard problem dissolves due to that realisation and acceptance - something which cannot be approached in any way through handwaving/trivialising. Indeed, the opposite stance is necessary - the observation and study of - the introspection - the work to get to that place of self identifying correctly = dissolving the false identity inherited by that which controls the narrative we are born into. My understanding is that “writing something off” is a different process that working something out and through the work dissolving that which is found untenable in demystifying the HP. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 8:26pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/130 "2026-09-22T20:26:27Z")
> [@wonderer](#): > > I likely don’t have sufficient musical background and/or aptitude to grasp the sense in which you are using “pitch” here. So before attempting an answer I need to get more clarity on the question. Sure. If I shout something, the sounds have a frequency but are not said to have musical pitch. For a sound to be identified as a pitch, the frequencies involved have to show a regular pattern of repetition. I’m not expert enough about this to explain the details, but for practical purposes here in the West, “pitch” means one of the 12 standard tones of the chromatic scale, or at the least, a note that can be described in relation to them. > [@wonderer](#): > > if I were to strike a key on a well tuned piano, would you be able to identify the note by the sound alone? That’s called “perfect” or absolute pitch, and it’s very uncommon. Many great composers had it; I don’t. Interestingly, it can’t be taught. But your question about a “band of frequencies around 440Hz” would apply to relative pitch recognition as well. (Once I’m told a single pitch’s name, I can identify any other by relating the interval to that first pitch.). And yes, what would be identified as A440 would definitely be within a certain band of frequencies – no need to hit the pitch right on the nose. Too wide a band and the listener might say, “That’s an A but it’s a little flat (or sharp).” A very wide band might elicit, “Hmm, that’s a quarter-tone (or a ‘blue’ note) between A and Bb.” > [@Patterner](#): > > I’m not aware of any musical advantage it gives over some[one] who had very good relative pitch. Ah, I see Patterner already answered about perfect pitch. I think there’s at least one musical advantage – it’s a tremendous aid to remembering music. If you can remember music not only by “how it sounds” but also by what the names of the actual notes are, that’s a real plus. This isn’t so different from relative pitch if we’re talking about a short piece, but it’s very hard to retain the original pitch that everything else is “relative to” if it’s a long, difficult piece with many key changes etc. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 8:34pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/131 "2026-09-22T20:34:50Z")
> [@WhoKnows](#): > > While I didn’t directly comment on, or agree with that, from what I understood about it is that the position is along the lines "we are compelled by the HP to either not engage with it (write it off/hand wave it away as trivial) or to engage with it. > Perhaps I misunderstood what you were meaning? No, you’ve got it. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > My understanding is that “writing something off” is a different process that working something out and through the work dissolving that which is found untenable in demystifying the HP. That’s fair. I understand better now what you meant. If I wanted to keep tinkering with words, I might call what you’ve described “dissolving” the problem . . . but the exact taxonomy isn’t important, the main point is that, as you said, the HP demands the attention of any serious philosopher when discussing these sorts of issues, even if only to show how we’re now in a position to move past it. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 8:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/132 "2026-09-22T20:36:49Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > the main point is that, as you said, the HP demands the attention of any serious philosopher when discussing these sorts of issues, **even if only to show how we’re now in a position to move past it.** What is you position on that ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 9:31pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/133 "2026-09-22T21:31:34Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > think there’s at least one musical advantage – it’s a tremendous aid to remembering music. If you can remember music not only by “how it sounds” but also by what the names of the actual notes are, that’s a real plus. If someone with perfect pitch and I both learn the same piano piece, why would they be more likely to remember the names of the actual notes than I am? I do wonder if those of us without Perfect pitch are missing something. Why would a composer who has perfect pitch write a piano piece in a specific key, rather than write everything in C major? Maybe it actually sounds different in a different key? I don’t know. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 9:44pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/134 "2026-09-22T21:44:14Z")
> [@Patterner](#): > > If someone with perfect pitch and I both learn the same piano piece, why would they be more likely to remember the names of the actual notes than I am? Ah, OK, I was thinking about listening or performing without a score. If I go to a concert and hear a piece for the first time, and if I have perfect pitch, I’m going to have a much more complete experience of the music, first time round. (Shostakovich used to be able to come home from such a concert and play the whole piece from memory at the piano – but in addition to having perfect pitch, he was a human tape recorder.). And if I’m performing with a jazz or pop group, where it’s all “head” arrangements, perfect pitch would likewise help me out a lot. But you’re right, if you learn from a score, you’re learning the correct names of the notes as you go along, so perfect pitch wouldn’t matter when you remember/play the piece. > [@Patterner](#): > > Why would a composer who has perfect pitch write a piano piece in a specific key, rather than write everything in C major? Maybe it actually sounds different in a different key? I don’t know. Well, yes, it does sound different. For instance, if a piece has a certain melodic range, that range may be more effective in one key over another, since it would start from a different (higher or lower) note. Also, I can attest that composers develop personal associations with keys that make no sense to anyone other than themselves. Also, that if you play the Moonlight Sonata in D minor rather than C# minor (or get your AI to do it), no one without perfect pitch will be able to tell the difference – the keys are too close. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 9:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/135 "2026-09-22T21:50:39Z")
> [@WhoKnows](#): > > > [@Jay](#): > > > > he main point is that, as you said, the HP demands the attention of any serious philosopher when discussing these sorts of issues, **even if only to show how we’re now in a position to move past it.** > > What is you position on that I think the problem remains unsolved. We don’t understand how or why the mental and the physical accompany each other. It may turn out to be the case that this way of stating the problem is ill-formed and/or dissolvable, but we don’t know _that_ either. I have a perhaps too optimistic faith in scientific inquiry. I think there will be a scientific answer, one that involves concepts we in 2026 can’t even guess at. If you’ve “heard” me say this before, I apologize, but it’s the best analogy I know: We’re like scientists in 1750 wondering what the relation of space and time might be. The question could barely be posed coherently, and _none_ of the necessary concepts and math were available. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 10:11pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/136 "2026-09-22T22:11:33Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I think the problem remains unsolved. We don’t understand how or why the mental and the physical accompany each other. It may turn out to be the case that this way of stating the problem is ill-formed and/or dissolvable, but we don’t know _that_ either. > > I have a perhaps too optimistic faith in scientific inquiry. I think there will be a scientific answer, one that involves concepts we in 2026 can’t even guess at. If you’ve “heard” me say this before, I apologize, but it’s the best analogy I know: We’re like scientists in 1750 wondering what the relation of space and time might be. The question could barely be posed coherently, and _none_ of the necessary concepts and math were available. I think the problem derives from the way it is looked at, so unless scientists change that thinking in themselves, science will not answer the question. Boiled down, the question itself stems from the question “how does a mindless thing create mindful things?” That is the problem to solve. The assumption being, that consciousness is the property of a mindless process. We intuit the absurdity in that because it doesn’t ring true in the mindful. Yet, at the same time, we hesitate to reach further - to investigate the intuition and where it might lead. There will be an answer to “why” we hesitate - the short of that being we do not want to go against the grain of popular/general consensus. So the problem remains. To add to this - scientist do not need to solve the problem as they have mush more interesting problems to solve. The question and answer are for The House of Philosophy to grapple with - not The House of Science… ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 10:16pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/137 "2026-09-22T22:16:12Z")
> [@WhoKnows](#): > > I think the problem derives from the way it is looked at, so unless scientists change that thinking in themselves, science will not answer the question. Sure. That’s pretty much what Einstein did, right? We need an Einstein of consciousness. Plus, in all seriousness, new scientific solutions almost always need new math – it’s not just about “looking at it” using language. ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 10:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/138 "2026-09-22T22:27:27Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Sure. That’s pretty much what Einstein did, right? We need an Einstein of consciousness. Plus, in all seriousness, new scientific solutions almost always need new math – it’s not just about “looking at it” using language. _I had added to my previous post, this:_ _To add to this - scientist do not need to solve the problem as they have mush more interesting problems to solve. The question and answer are for The House of Philosophy to grapple with - not The House of Science…_ And there are mathematicians working on this problem. [Donald Hoffman](https://sites.socsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/) springs to mind - and as I recall he claims the math shows that “Spacetime is doomed” - meaning, it is not fundamental. His understanding of the math shows that it is more likely Consciousness is fundamental. This type of thinking turns the problem on its head because it at least infers that spacetime is the property of consciousness (a mindful thing) rather than how The Narrative humans have lived with has told it - that Consciousness is the property of spacetime… I am neither a recognised philosopher or scientist, yet even so, I understand - at least basically - what the turning implies… ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 10:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/139 "2026-09-22T22:37:01Z")
> [@WhoKnows](#): > > His understanding of the math shows that it is more likely Consciousness is fundamental. Fascinating. A signpost to the scientific future, perhaps. > [@WhoKnows](#): > > The question and answer are for The House of Philosophy to grapple with - not The House of Science… No, I think we need the two houses right next to each other, with a secure bridge back and forth. Indeed, at this particular moment of the inquiry, I’m kind of tapping my foot, waiting for neuroscience to lead philosophy into the next phase. (Hope they’re not waiting for us!) ---
**Author:** ![WhoKnows](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/whoknows/32/1145_2.png) [@WhoKnows](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WhoKnows)\ **Post date:** [September 22, 2026, 11:51pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086/140 "2026-09-22T23:51:36Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > No, I think we need the two houses right next to each other, with a secure bridge back and forth. Indeed, at this particular moment of the inquiry, I’m kind of tapping my foot, waiting for neuroscience to lead philosophy into the next phase. (Hope they’re not waiting for us!) Which room in THoS would you think would be the most appropriate to draw the attention of this thinking to THoP? Perhaps the science of mind? What makes you think or have faith in that particular science even going there? For that matter, what stops you as an individual going their yourself and examining the idea that Consciousness begat everything else? [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086.md?page=6) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/thinking-about-dual-descriptions/3086.md?page=8)