In fairness Pinter’s use of ‘gestalt’ is rather different to the ideas of gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy. It’s similar but Pinter re-contextualises it in cognitive and evolutionary science differently to those sources. I recommend Pinter’s book which can be found here Client Challenge
I certainly like the level ontological playing field between “out there” and “point of view”.
I would say that this interplay between what is over there (moon) and what is right here (telescope’s reflection), can be likened to the interplay between the gestalt triangle (here) and the coins (there) becoming the gestalt circle (here), and the metal and the metal coin (there). You are trying to level or unify the space between the subject and object, like I was trying to unify the space between the gestalt and its substrate, be it a gestalt three-coin triangle perception, or a gestalt one-coin circle perception.
I agree. But I think a dualist could also agree. This is hard to express, isn’t it?
So I think we can make two problems out of this picture.
We could say there is a noumenal object, in the world, an “independent of the mind” tree falling in the forest, doing what trees do regardless of third-party perception of them. We never perceive that object in-itself, but it has an in-itself, because that is how the world is. We are just unfortunately disconnected from direct access to the world, and our method of knowing the world generates phenomena, which we perceive and experience and can say we know, but must admit we don’t know the noumena. So that is the traditional, dualist type problem.
The other problem doesn’t care about the phenomenal/noumenal split. The other problem is that, because of the highly particularized influence of having a point of view, no two perceivers ever really perceive the same phenomena - that is not possible. This is not a question of any dualism between perception and reality, but there is a disconnection between persons trying to address what they assert is the same object/topic of discussion. I say we are talking about heads, and you say we are talking about tails, every time we speak.
Direct access to noumena, in a world where noumena had differentiation prior to perception, (naive realism) solves the first problem and provides a solution (a world that has a monopoly on what is real) to the second, where we each keep discussing the coin, and because the coin remains the coin in itself, we can eventually see how heads and tails (two particular perspectives) provide a fuller understanding of the coin in-itself.
But I’m just restating the problems.
I agree 100% that dualism isn’t satisfactory (at all). And this sounds promising: “‘consciousness’ is understood as the ‘it is there’ of the coin now ‘for Joe.’”
I think that could be called “a gestalt”. I think this is so hard to speak about. I think we substance dualist distrusters are all trying to say similar things, so something is there about a more unified ontology. But because of the way our descriptions and sentences have to butcher the idea, it always raises concern about what I am really trying to say.
“‘consciousness’ is understood as the ‘it is there’ of the coin now ‘for Joe.’”
Joe is needed in this picture to provide the consciousness and the “for” of “for Joe” (at least the receiver of what is “for”). But there is this meddling “coin”. I know it is not a “coin-in-itself”. It all somehow still feels like we’ve drawn a line between Joe and something else there with Joe. And we have to maintain this distance to some degree, or we are all just talking about Joe’s fantasies (by fantasizing with ourselves, alone in our solipsism).
“‘consciousness’ is understood as the ‘it is there’ of the coin now ‘for Joe.’”
So this is one gestalt, and it can only be perceived by other gestalt perceivers (only persons conceptualize like we are), so a gestalt cannot be said to be an image of some thing independent of the gestalt-moment-perceiver. It’s all one moment: “coin-for-Joe” is the single thing. There are not three things: 1 coin, 2 Joe, 3 Joe’s internal image of a coin’s head.
But because we have the structure of Joe’s mind in-itself (Kant’s categories), it seems to me we remain aware of the possibility that the “coin-for-Joe” moment need have zero to do with some noumenal world living a full life without us.
My only solution would require years to develop, but it is basically that the nature of the human being is of a body, receives impressions, and that knows it receives impressions (self-reflects). The mind is a mirror facing a mirror that faces the light. We are the view from nowhere, always looking somewhere. We are utterly empty and need to be filled in order to exist, to be conscious, and we are always filled. It’s like saying “consciousness is consciousness of” (animal consciousness) while saying simultaneously “human consciousness is consciousness of consciousness, which is consciousness of.”
See, impossible to talk about. Full of weak points. Still flirting with dualism…
See I really think we are getting at the same thing. Trying to say something less divisive of human experience, while acknowledging space for a process of coming to know a currently unknown world.
Time has a curious influence on all of this. It can be a thing, with an in-itself as a necessary participant in change, it can be a purely mental construct, it can be a measuring stick bridging mind with motion… “Outside of time” does seem like a square-circle.
However, I don’t think I really follow you here. You, like Heidegger, seem to view time itself more fundamental than I have grasped. Maybe you could restate the above? What does time versus outside time matter in this context? Are you saying, what exists, exists in time, and so, the dualist who places triangles and subjects in a space where existence can be suspended, have placed themselves out of time, and therefore, where things don’t exist? Something like that?
This sums up my ping-pong match of a post.
I am curious what you meant by “ontologically real”?
It is the same thing to think as it is to be.
Consciousness is, consciousness of.
Same ballpark?
So I think I agree, and this reflects my references to a flatter ontology; no hierarchy or dualism.
We use the triangle, the coins, undifferentiated flux, subjects, subjective construction - all of these are foils for the root question “what does it mean to be” or “what we mean by it being real” at all, in any way.
So we are in the same ballpark.
That is my fall back, so I can find the cheese in the refrigerator and not keep eating soup sandwiches.
This sounds like Aristotle, and I have never found anything as satisfactory as Aristotle on some of these issues. Still, of course, areas to reassess.
This points to a problem with our method. And something I’ve been trying to express to myself but can’t quite. Perceiving has epistemological aspects, and what is perceived has metaphysical/ontological aspects to it. I think part of the confusion holding a notion like “it is the same thing to think as it is to be” when thinking about a triangle of coins, is that we unwittingly blur epistemology, metaphysics and ontology. We are wondering about the ontology of the triangle staring at us in the mind, because we are wondering about how a triangle outside us got into our minds, because we are wondering what a triangle is in itself… And we never hit the mark.
I agree I am trying to speak around and see past “two independently intelligible domains”. Maybe the relation is as present as is the whole, as are the parts, and this thereness of relation helps bridge what appears separate under a flatter sense of ontology? I need to think about that. Very interesting.
This is the goal. I believe we can grasp what it is about our world. But obviously, we need to keep clarifying how this happens.
I did have a thought that the gestalt whole-part experiencing mechanism might provide more of a methodological approach to inquiry (we inquire moving from whole to part, taking a whole, then making one part of that a new whole, then making a part of that a newer whole, or taking the part as a whole and fitting that part into a bigger whole…). That’s why I mentioned mereology.
But I think it is still instructive to think of the gestalt as like a phenomenal perception. Perhaps it is not that clarifying of a new way to point to an old problem.
I really appreciate that you are engaging me on this topic. I was reading Mach a couple of years ago and my entire concept scheme flipped after 30 years of studying philosophy. I think it has remained marginal in the tradition because it is different all the way to the core. This or that piece of it out of context sounds crazy. So thank you for reading seriously and responding so thoughfully.
Yes, I think you get me. All of this is related. As I see it, dualism gets in the way, because it involves the postulation of a “true external situation.” This “true external situation” seems to imply a “one right description vocabulary.”
People have wanted to make this “atoms and void,” for instance. Then every thing else is a kind of “fiction” built on atoms and void. But in fact they live the telescope-in-use as the moon. This “true description” attitude wants the coin/triangle to “really” be this or that. This “really” is also static. But why can’t it be a this/that as a function of time ? Philosophers tend to take over the spatial/numerical “time” of physics uncritically. The time we live is a now that anticipates and remembers, that is “on the way” like a flying arrow.
I am indeed trying to unify subject and object. The subject is the “being” of the object. The object is there with the character of “from a POV.” But this character is how the object itself there. “From nothing in the visual field can it be inferred that it is seen by the eye.” But we see one another’s eyes as objects, and our eyes are there for us in mirrors. We learn the strange relationship between seen objects and seen eyes from experience. But “from-POV-ness” is usually just uncritically understood in terms of subject-internal images, which forces consciousness to be one stuff in relation to another stuff.
I think a dualist has to try to explain this in terms of two internal images “caused” by an “external true object.” But I think a coherent dualist has to admit that the perceived brain is then one more image. But it’s only our experience of perceived brains that makes such dualism plausible in the first place.
If we go this route, I think we leave representationalism behind. It suffices that we feel understood and are able to cooperate. Objects become “infinite” in that they are not “fixed” in terms of a “true” description. We just do live the belief of sharing the same sun with other people, and then already gives us the sun as a temporal-perspectival synthesis of its “faces.”
As I see it, we never needed a Euclidean metaphysical “proof” in the first place. I agree with Peirce. Genuine doubt is hesitation. The problem is not proving that picture is secure beyond all possible theoretical-artificial doubt. We just want to live well. For me this includes the compatibility of my theoretical beliefs with the way I act in the world non-theoretically. In fact I have never lived any doubt of my direct contact with objects that other people are also in contact with immediately, albeit from other points of view.
I can only “pretend” to doubt this. This mere theoretical doubt starts to look all the more pointless the more I look into Gestalt stuff and the way that language works. The “literal frozen truth” approach begins to look artificial and even hopeless – though fortunately also unnecessary.
I’m glad that someone else also feels the not-so-good-ness of dualism.
I am also fascinating by the difficulty of saying it. To me this even makes sense. If we aren’t dualists, then our thinking is a chain of public signs from personal points of view. The same words signify differently for different points of view. So people have to trade many signs to hopefully develop a sense of approaching the world in a similar way. Insight can’t just be stuffed into marks and noises as if context doesn’t matter. Bakhtin is great on this stuff.
This problem is wildly complex. I think one of the problems is that “consciousness” is overloaded with uses. We have “linguistic (self-)consciousness” and then “being-from-POV” which is radically simple. I see the “interior monologue” as “in the world.” “My” interior monologue is in the shared world but pragmatically invisible to others, for now.
Something like that.
If you try to see your own entire “stream of experience” as an immediate streaming of the world itself, but from the POV of your body, then “consciousness” names the “being ( there )” of that stream and not the “contents” of the stream.
The “fixed form” of experience becomes the “fixed form” of the world. This is the “fixed form” of “the now.” Now really Heidegger is trying to point at this fixed form in a tentative way. The goal is to point out this form. This is an update of Kant.
So the fixed form of the “now” is the experience of a passionate creature navigating the “temporal depth” of the world. Basically we are always “on the way” to a desired future, plotting a course. We plot this course in terms of the past. But where is the past as past ? Nowhere. Likewise the future as future is nowhere.
Yet a metaphorical past and metaphorical future are here as part of what is then a “triune now.” Fancy language, but the expectation is that anyone can validate this themselves. For instance, consider your reading of this very paragraph. You expectantly proceed while remembering. The now “slurred” or “stretched.” In general, expectation is primary. The future is primary. Care is directed “forward.” Our biology agrees, as we look and smell and eat and walk all in the same direction. Reality is “always in the future.” We call “real” most honestly what we in fact trust with our lives. The telescope is “really” a moon when my future behavior is aimed at the moon and not the telescope. So the “real” is fluid, futural, and pragmatic.
No word is sacred or final. Time is not a number on the clock but the shape of the now of expectant active care, the body in the middle of a project. The clock is a tool for arranging social life in terms of the care that motivates the institution. We only make maps and worry about “accurate picturing” in terms of what we want from those maps. I use assertions here, but I don’t mean them as “true pictures.” I speak from out of a POV, so I can’t “know” or “prove” that the “now” is like this for others.
Existence is a fire, so the only thing “frozen” would be this burning structure of the now. “Things outside of time” would be un-experienable, approximately. I can check “any time I want” that 7 is “still prime.” So I believe. But that checking is “within” time.
I was going to ask you the same thing! In short, I simply mean “real”. But here’s the thing. If we take the subjects of mathematics, in what sense are they real? I mean, numbers don’t exist in the same sense as do objects of sense (the proverbial apple or chair).
Augustine would describe them as “intelligible objects”, although the use of “object” in this context makes me uneasy, as they’re only objects in the sense of being “objects of thought” or the “object of an exercise”.
This is why I believe that some form of realism concerning universals and numbers is required. But it goes against the grain of most modern philosophy. And why? Because of the ontology of materialism: that what is real must ultimately comprise those objects and forces studied by physics.
There’s a gem of an essay that I often refer to called What is Math? published by the Smithsonian Magazine. It discusses the “Platonist” attitude —which is that number is real—and then the critics, saying:
Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?
This is the whole issue in a nutshell! Not only the ontological question, but also the cultural issue, which is the association of Platonism with Christianity. But the triangle or the number 7 are examples of a “real intelligibles”. Nominalism will insist that only particular triangles are real, and that the idea of a triangle is internal to an individual’s act of thought. But universals and numbers can’t be subjective, as they’re the same for all who think:
“(…) if ‘whiteness’ were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts” ~ Betrand Russell, The World of Universals.
So—I say that what we naturally assume to be “the external world” that is real separately from us, is in fact held together by such universal ideas, woven throughout language and reason as elements of our worldview. They are among the constituents of rational ideation. It is an Aristotelian kind of insight, as you observe.
At risk of yet another very long post, I do want to say something in defense of an heirarchical ontology. Another typical characteristic of modernity is the adoption of a flat ontology, the notion that everything that is real exists in the same way. But once we acknowledge the reality of numbers and universals, we realised that these are real in a different sense to (once again) the proverbial chair or apple.
Werner Heisenberg, one of the principal founders of quantum physics, was a convinced Platonist. He said:
The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts (of existence) cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer …to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato’s sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
I’ll leave it at that for now.
I agree. And it is has imperiled honest inquiry. The distrust of the seemingly non-empirical has closed minds, not clarified what should count as objects of inquiry.
And I should say I remain open to the notion of levels or types of being. I don’t grasp hierarchical or non-hierarchical being/becoming to any degree that doesn’t leave this at least an open question.
What is we waited to claim there are different ways of being, and broke the contrast of universals versus chairs into two questions: what, and how. What is a universal, and how is a universal there? What is a chair, and how is a chair there?
To keep this short, clearly the answers to WHAT have be different. But if a universal can be there (exist), and if a chair can be there (exist), although what is there have many differences, do we have to say how they are there has differences? I’m not sure.
There is much I could say in direct response to your recent posts, but I have a few ideas I am hoping will inspire.
It looks to me like we’ve already identified some things the three of us might agree on, but there are also some things where only two of us agree, and others where we might all disagree. Seems like a great mix from which to distill something new.
Also, it seems to me this is a version of the same conversation we have all over this forum. “Can morality be objective” has become a discussion about accessing universal truths, and so is comparable to “is the triangle ontologically real”. We could swap in a gestalt “ought” and contrast it with an “is”, and be asking here: “is an ought ontologically real”. And I think that is what at stake. The fate of the triangle’s existence is important. That is why I said another version of these same questions is “does the triangle matter as much as the coins seem to matter.” What is at stake is whether our ideas could possibly matter, and if they can, how much they might matter.
Picture yourself entering a giant room, but it is totally dark, so you see nothing. The room could be full, or empty, or anything.
Now picture that you have a coalminer’s headlamp fixed to your head. You turn it on, and, in the direction you face, out of the empty darkness, differentiated things appear - this here, that there. You yourself are the headlamp, and you are the source of the image before you; without you and your headlamp, distinct things never come to be.
Isn’t the dark/empty room the undifferentiated, or the noumenal? Doesn’t the light going on depict the gestalt moment, or the experience of phenomena?
Firstly, I want to say Kant’s phenomena/noumenal split seems fairly absolute. It makes sense on paper, and explains a lot about reality and illusion in experience. It even models sensation (the sky is not blue because the sky is blue, but because of the sunlight filtered through the sky, through my eyeball…terminating in the new birth of my phenomenal experience called “blue sky”). It seems pretty absolute.
But I think maybe we turn too quickly away from the opaqueness of the undifferentiated, noumenal world, and lock ourselves too tightly under the veil of phenomenon.
The question is, are my gestalt, phenomenal experiences wholly and completely of my own construction, saying nothing of the noumenal world, or do they require some contribution from the in-itself, the undifferentiated, that might otherwise remain beyond my direct grasp?
I seem to be questioning whether the noumenal/phenomenal split truly is absolute. But I think I can answer this one way that preserves the split, and another way that indeed does pierce the phenomenal veil to some degree and grants us some access to the noumena. This second way is obviously more problematic.
Let’s look at the gestalt moment as not just a light going on allowing our eyes to passively detect differentiation (because that builds too much differentiation into the undifferentiated). Let’s say our headlamp is really a three-D printer, or a carving knife (Pinter said carving I believe). We don’t just elucidate the dark noumenal world, we carve into it and by carving create the carvings that are then the content of the gestalt moment. We ARE the creators of the particulars we experience.
I think that is still right, and it preserves the noumenal/phenomenal split. We don’t learn what the dark room looks like; we create something new out of it and learn about that. However, though we remain cut-off from the noumenal in-itself, this augments what actually is happening in the generation of the phenomenal experience. I seem to have three conceptual nodes in my carved phenomenon metaphor. First, there is the noumenal clay which we will never touch, see, feel, know; second there is the subject perceiver; and third there is the carving that the subject created, which seems to have nothing to do with the noumena directly.
This can all be mapped to the atoms and the teacup, or the allegory of the cave…
But it also does sort of create a new dualism. All I may have done is shift the ontological question formerly lodged between a noumenal world and a perceiver’s world, and shifted it to the perceiver’s world and the phenomenal object; instead of the perceiver standing in a veiled relationship to the noumena, I’ve simply renamed the phenomenal world it’s own universe, and stood the perceiver against it. (Husserl maybe?)
But I can’t help but think this is right. The whole undifferentiated universe was never some hidden store of truth. It was clay at best. What we know are the ways clay can take form, and the forms we know come from the way we particular perceivers can perceive.
There is still a lot of room for truth and objectivity in there. We don’t wholly invent triangles we perceive, but that is because of the shape of ourselves in a noumenal world. Triangles are triangular because of the nature of triangles; but none of that happens until the perceiver enters the room and carves with it.
I’ll stop with that there, admitting it needs more to really get us somewhere.
I did have a second answer that more directly challenges the absolute break between noumena and phenomena.
I don’t think we really know what we are saying or referring to when we say “the undifferentiated”. And I think we defeat it by even conceptually referring to it as distinct from phenomena, from the gestalt, from anything.
So I need to preserve some concept of the undifferentiated to make the model above, but at the same time, I’m not sure “the undifferentiated” makes any sense at all.
Earlier in the thread the undifferentiated was referred to as undifferentiated flux. I think, because of “flux” that becomes a square circle.
Flux means motion, dynamism, becoming, change, living, having momentum. So in order to even conceive of such things, we automatically have to differentiate here from there, this changing to that, then becoming now… Flux is the process of differentiating. There is no flux where there is no differentiation.
At the same time, if we take the flux out of the noumenal undifferentiated node in our model/world, we are left with something stagnant and dead. It can have no shape, so it is best imagined like, The One. But the One, having no shape, like a Parmenidean globe of infinite size, is really not a globe. I could go on and on to get where I’m going, but in the end, if there is a truly undifferentiated noumenal world, it must be empty and the same concept as the concept nothingness. The minute we add any property to the nothingness, we’ve added differentiation again.
All this is to say, we cannot be completely cut off from the noumenal world, and the universe without any perceivers may still maintain some form and structure.
These problems and me skipping to the end here don’t change what I said above. I built phenomenon out of pure undifferentiation, because of me the perceiver’s influence, so if the formerly undifferentiated contributes actual form, we just have another source besides ourselves to give birth to perceivable form.
Long enough. Again. Hope you think of something.
I think that is a very good analogy! I’m quite in agreement.
Of course they do, and I think Kant explicitly acknowledges that. Remember that he rejects Berkeley’s esse est percipe with its implication that objects only exist in perception. He says
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me ~ Critique of Pure Reason, B275,
So he’s emphatically not saying ‘the world is all in my mind’.
Well, Charles Pinter’s book does suggest a dualism. The paragraph after the ‘three circles making a triangle diagram is:
“If existence is limited to the material, then you have only three things, because no new material is added when the threesome is formed. However, if reality were limited to what is material, there would be no such things as structure or form, because they neither add to, nor take away from, matter. The threesome of coins is a separate reality for us because it has a separate quality in perception.” *(*Mind and the Cosmic Order, p. 44, bolds added)
There’s a very interesting, but challenging, book, Kant’s Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reasons, by Konstantin Pollok. He describes Kant’s position as ‘transcendental hylomorphism’.
Aristotle’s hylomorphism distinguishes matter (hylē, literally ‘wood’ or ‘timber’) from form (morphē). Kant doesn’t simply adopt Aristotle’s framework, but transforms it. Senseability supplies the manifold of intuition, while the a priori forms of sensibility and the concepts of the understanding co-operate to constitute experience. In this way, Kant re-interprets the form–matter distinction against a transcendental background.
Note that this is emphatically different from Descartes’ dualism of mind and body — which is what, I think, underlies your unease about the suggestion of dualism. The point about hylomorphism is that matter and form are distinguishable, but not two independently existing substantiae. In a concrete particular, neither is intelligible in isolation from the other: matter is always matter of some form, and form is the form of some matter.
In transcendental hylomorphism
- Matter (Content): This represents the raw data of our minds, such as sense impressions, desires, feelings, or unstructured concepts. On its own, this matter is incomplete and cannot be used to make universally intelligible claims.
- Form (Structure): These are the “possible functions” or innate rules inhering in the cognizing subject (such as the forms of sensibility—space and time—and the categories of the understanding). Form is what assimilates and structures raw matter.
- Normativity: Matter and form are never experienced independently. In Pollok’s view, form acts as a “currency” that makes our mental representations valuable, shareable, and valid among a community of conscious minds. It provides the “normative oomph” required to transform a subjective sensation into an objective, appraisable judgment (ref).
Notice how well this maps against Charles Pinter — not surprisingly, as Pinter names Kant as ‘the philosopher of Gestalts’ and includes many references to his work in the book.
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I like your analogy.
I like emphasizing time here. The darkness is the unknown future.
The headlamp is personal POV.The darkness is also the unknown ways that the world shows itself to others.
Perhaps my lamp lights up a forgotten pickaxe. The pickaxe is there for immediately as also-for-others. They too could light up that same object later. Perhaps they already have, long ago. In this sense, it is a temporal interpersonal synthesis.
The “darkness” isn’t a “stuff” in my view. It is possibile experience, which is to say our sense of the future and our sense of others’ perspectives on the same world.
I suggest we understand “consciousness” or the “pure subject” as nothing but “pure point of view.” The “pure subject” is empty. Experience is not “inside stuff.”
Nothing is more real than shared objects and other people. We already live this belief as sanity itself, so we might as well work from it theoretically.
We can do psychology on the relationship of the empirical subject and how the world is there for that subject, but this is a different issue.
I suggest that apples and chairs are just as “ideal” as numbers. I don’t mean “mental” or “inside the mind.”
I am saying that an apple is a ideal temporal synthesis —an “idea” — just like the number 7.
Where in “materialistic” terms is the apple as “intelligible” or “speakable” unity ? Where are its exact boundaries ?
Or consider Husserl’s analysis of the chair into its adumbrations.
External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as a unity in the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them.”
“Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. We cannot avoid speaking of such and such sides of the object that are actually perceived. Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a statement of fact: it is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception
To me it’s all right there. No adumbration is the chair. But the chair isn’t other than all possible adumbrations. The “idea” or “ideal identity” of the chair is an “open” synthesis of these adumbrations.
Numbers are special, though. That should be addressed.
Of course 7 can be “summoned” when ever we want. We can’t so easily conjure an apple or a chair. 7 is constantly present as a possibility. In this sense, it is atemporal. Not outside of time but rather always around when needed. In the extreme case, we can just imagine it. But we will usually want a pencil.
To be fair, we should consider numbers like 9838340923343. I don’t think that is present to the intuition as a definite quantity. But the numeral is an “ideal” intersubjective temporal synthesis that we know how to check for primality, etc.
To me this fits with ontological perspectivism. So we “meet in the intelligible objects of the world.” My “consciousness” is ( for instance ) the being of an adumbration or moment of an object that absorbs my attention. I don’t thematize this moment as a moment but rather as the object itself. So it’s phenomenology that manages finally to thematize objects as syntheses of their moments. Saussure did this with his “sound-idea” also. An important structure, IMV.
Just one approach, but I hope of interest.
To me you have put your finger exactly on it.
What if we approach ontology as a “confession” of the fundamental beliefs that we cannot live without ?
One does not prove that proof itself is possible. To try to prove anything is to already enact as given what is supposed to be proved, namely that a “framework” is in place, that language “works” and “touches common objects.” Let us not pretend to doubt what we do not. Without this framework, there is no rationality, so we can safely adopt it as an explicit assumption.
Our sharing objects is radically and usually “blindly” presupposed by all sincere discussion. I don’t need Plato here as an authority, but I think we have a reading of Plato via just this concern.
The “idea” is the “ideal” or “co-intended” identity of the object as a temporal-inter-perspectival synthesis of its differing manifestations to different perspectives at different times.
No two perceivers access the same “moment” or “aspect” of the apple. But “ideally” ( so we hope and enact ) they intend and discuss the same apple.
We don’t need to read Plato this way. We aren’t appealing to authority. But I am intrigued by possibility that this phenomenological reading was overlooked by thinkers who came after Descartes and just could not see around their dualism.
For dualism, we have the “true” physical apple as A. Then we have “internal” mental images of the apple like f(A), g(A), h(A),.... This structure is like a spoked wheel, with A at the center and the functional internal images at the periphery. This structure makes sense if one assumes that “from-a-point-of-view” implies “inside-ness.”
This structure also appeals to our insistence on an absolute truth-maker. But the problem of course is access. The “truth-making” “physical” apple has been cast out of experience by definition. This simultaneously makes experience secondary and almost unreal. Yet this is completely alienated from how we live with objects together, discussing their flavor and aesthetic value, etc.
Gadamer, a close student of Plato, ends a mighty passage with “nothing repeats.” I think he meant nothing repeats exactly. We all live the general continuity of experience in terms of shared, enduring objects. So we have the adventures of the changes in these objects. You mention “flux.” We have a flux “studded” by discrete, ideal identity. Particular objects “change” precisely because their are the temporal syntheses of their differing states, which also differ for differing perceivers.
On those stepping into rivers other and other waters flow.
The sun is new each day.
He might have added “for each perceiver” and indeed that it is “new with each perception.” Every streaming moment of life is a new context, yet connected to what came before. Heidegger is great on this stuff. We mostly live the familiar as dormant background, but the familiar becomes “visible” through contrast. It shapes what counts as a surprise.
Empty in what sense? Cognitive science and biology understand that cognition comprises the interactions of billions of cellular processes, many beneath the threshold of conscious awareness, which combine to generate the sense of subjective awareness. (Daniel Dennett exploits this fact in his ‘competence without comprehension’ argument, but let’s not go there.)
But then there’s the indubitable unity of subjective experience. Materially composed of innumerable bio-cellular entities — yet I am one! (This is the problem explored in Tim Bayne’s The Unity of Consciousness.) And it hark back to the classical problem of the One and the Many.
Apples can be eaten, and chairs sat on. That surely means something.
But I’m interested in Husserl’s ‘ideal objects’:
The Pythagorean theorem, [indeed] all of geometry, exists only once, no matter how often or even in what language it may be expressed. It is identically the same in the “original language” of Euclid and in all “translations”; and within each language it is again the same, no matter how many times it has been sensibly uttered, from the original expression and writing down to the innumerable oral utterances or written and other documentations. The sensible utterances have spatiotemporal individuation in the world like all corporeal occurrences, like everything embodied in bodies as such; but this is not true of the spiritual which is called an “ideal object” ~ Derrida on Husserl The Origin of Geometry, p161
This indeed points towards the ‘principle of unity’ which is so central to the Platonic tradition. Also highlights the sense in which Husserl maintains some continuity with that tradition despite his many differences from it.
I’m surprised you don’t have a sense of what I intend. I use “pure” to exclude the empirical-linguistic subject. Basically the “pure subject” is “consciousness as presence/being.” As in Fasching.
The reason why I cannot find my consciousness as a phenomenon of its own in addition to what I am conscious of is simply that consciousness is just this: consciousness. It does not consist of any contents of consciousness– some inner pictures, feelings or the like– but is precisely consciousness of whatever contents I am conscious of, i.e. it is my being aware of them. And to be conscious of some content means nothing other than that this content is there for me. Consciousness is the presence-for-me of whatever I am conscious of.
I see much of the confusion on this issue to be driven by the conflation of the conscious empirical subject and the consciousness “of” that subject.
When I am asked,“Show me your consciousness”, I do not know where to point: Among all the objects in the world that are there for me, my consciousness is not to be found– it is the thereness-for-me of all these objects, and this very thereness is not a part of the world that is there for me… When I imagine another person’s consciousness I do not bring it before me as some kind of object in the world appearing to me, but put myself, by “reproducing” her consciousness, in the other’s position, i.e. I imagine it as itself being world-presence. And this means that what we are actually doing when we imagine the other’s consciousness is to imagine other contents of consciousness,“the world as seen from over there (from the perspective of this person)”. To imagine other consciousness is always to imagine the world as given differently, never to imagine it as some item within the appearing world.
It’s easier said that done, but I think we already understand this non-theoretically. We treat others as “witnesses” of the same world, as witnesses of our own speech and other conduct. The world that is “brutely present” for us is likewise “brutely present” for them.
Sure, but we can also eat two apples. And “sand thinks” via of the flow of electrons that “dance” base-2 arithmetic.
If you try to lift numbers out of the world, you basically ignore their role in making the world intelligible. Yet it is just this that is fascinating — the collision of the ideal and the sensory. Likewise, the “eternal” is “woven into” flux that can thereby be recognized as flux.
I have a very good sense of what you mean, but I’m trying to draw out the implications! You will notice I didn’t actually disagree with what you said. I attempted to relate it to an issue in first in the classical tradition (the One and the Many) and then in relation to Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics. I’m trying to situate my response to your comments, in relation to the OP. I would be obliged if you read the post you’re responding to again, it really wasn’t meant as a challenge to you, but as an attempt to find a common ground.
I think the scientific approaches just don’t seriously consider the problem of signification. Nor do they consider the way that we enact the unity of selves and the “lifting” of numerals up into numbers.
An investigation of “the realm of meaning” requires a certain holism. What is the “life” of this strange sign “I” ? Do we zoom in to figure it out, or zoom out ?
One approach to “the one and the many” is related to Husserl’s grasp of the transcendent object as the unity ( temporal synthesis ) of its adumbrations. This is not something one finds with the microscope. This is something that is utterly taken for granted so that the microscope is a microscope in the first place. A scientist reacts to an optical situation as “my favorite microscope in the lab.” Likewise, a particular throat sound registers as a saying the repeatable sign “microscope.” ( Saussure’s sound-idea.) All of this is “prior” to scientific investigation.
All inquiry “presupposes” the “unity” and “identity” of the objects under discussion.
I was reading Gerson on Plato last night, and I think it makes sense to read Plato as looking into what is “under” any particular investigation as the condition for its possibility. The “idea” of a thing is perhaps well understood indeed as the “one” that includes “many.” A thing is a unified thing not because of something “beyond our inquiry” but within our inquiry and through our inquiry.
We don’t prove that we are talking about the same objects because any proof already assumes and requires our ability to do so. Of course communication sometimes breaks down, but only against the background of our general sense of its success, especially in the practical realm.
Most inquiry can just take this “deep system” for granted. It suffices that certain practical situations are predicted or controlled, etc. But I think the “eros” of philosophy is directed beyond this, toward the fundamental. Even if such fundamental insight isn’t of practical value in economic terms.
Here’s Walker Percy, making what I take to be a crucial point.
Denotation, the act of naming, requires the two, namer and hearer. My calling this thing a chair is another way of saying that it “is” a chair for you and me. (Mead’s “conversation of gestures” between two boxers or two dogs would seem also to require the two. However, the boxer or the dog responding to his opponent’s gestures is not generically different from the polar bear responding to splitting ice.) It is inconceivable that a human being raised apart from other humans should ever discover symbolization. For there is no way I can know this “is” a chair unless you tell me so. But not only are the two a genetic requirement of symbolization — as the presence of two is a genetic requirement of fertilization — it is its enduring condition. Even Robinson Crusoe writing in his journal after twenty years alone on his island is performing a through-and-through social act. Every symbolic formulation, whether it be language, art, or even thought, requires a real or posited someone else for whom the symbol is intended as meaningful. Denotation is an exercise in intersubjectivity. The two are suddenly no longer related as organisms in a nexus of interaction but as a namer and hearer of a name, an I and a Thou, co-conceivers and co-celebrants of the object beheld under the auspices of a common symbol.
…
It is something of a fool’s errand to attempt to derive intersubjectivity by theorizing about interactions among organisms, responses to responses. Physico-causal theory is formed entirely within the intersubjective milieu and cannot of its very nature transcend it. A physical function, 𝑎 =𝑓(𝑏), is a saying of one scientist to another, an I to a Thou, that such and such a quantifiable relation obtains among the data before them. It does not say anything about the behavior of the scientists themselves because they are practicing intersubjectivity in their uttering and under standing of their causal function. They are co-knowers and coaffirmers of the function 𝑎 =𝑓(𝑏), but their co-knowing and coaffirming cannot itself be grasped by this particular instrument which they have devised between them. If we wish to study the knowers themselves, the I-Thou relation, we must use some other instrument, speak some other language, perhaps an ontological one rather than a physico-causal.
I think the ontological will indeed search into signification itself and the realm in which humans live specifically as humans. IMV, a “floating above” pretense in terms of a mythical/confused “view from nowhere” is likely to fail. I think we overlap on this.
As long as consciousness is grasped as “emergent stuff,” the “meaningful structure” of life will be cast aside as inessential. So essence itself is cast aside, essentially ( and paradoxically.) To me it’s notable that special sciences can “afford” to be ontologically naive. Philosophy in its serious mode is “helpless.” Insight, if achieved, cannot prove itself with technical power.
Just to clarify my position for others, I think we can read Plato’s “idea” as “Gestalt.”
Of course we don’t have to drag in Plato, but his “unwritten doctrine” is extremely compatible with this if we understand it in terms of ontological perspectivism.
The world is qualitative ( color, sound, taste, pain, thirst,…) and yet “intelligible” in terms of “unified” or “discrete” entities that are “wholes.” All inquiry takes this for granted, offering marks and noises that are themselves only possible as repetitions of “ideal” forms. Saussure points this out decisively.
The “realm of gestalts” or the “articulated life-world” can be taken as reality itself. Of course the socialized brain is part of this, but this doesn’t make the experience enabled by the brain “unreal.” Nor should it encourage us to put the gestalt-experienced world inside the pineal gland, for this leads to absurdity. (It makes the brain the product of itself).
The gestalt-experienced world is the idea-organized world is the “articulated qualitative continuum.” This articulation includes a particular microscope in the lab and triangularity in general and Joe as the “same” person throughout each of his 56 years so far.
The problem with dualism is that it wants to “paint on” the significance of signs as if of secondary reality. This is a performative contradiction, because it depends on the “life” of signs in order to “kill” signs. Likewise the pretense that value is “painted on” is self-subverting.
My take is that the best position in detail is far from obvious. But we can rule out approaches that are self-cancelling as we think them through.
I’d also follow Peirce here. There’s no point in false doubt. Nor would it make sense for me to prove to others that I share a world immediately with others.
Well, yes! That’s what I’ve suggested in the essay (Mathematics of Idealism), while also acknowledging that Pinter himself, the source of this particular account of Gestalts, doesn’t read Plato that way. He sees Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics as forms of naïve realism — but I wonder whether the distinction between their views and his is quite so clear-cut.
I think Plato and Aristotle intuitively grasped something fundamental about the relationship between form and intelligibility, but then understood it in ontological terms. Pinter, by contrast, understands form in terms of the cognitive functionality of Gestalt perception. Yet both perspectives concern the intelligible unity through which something becomes recognisable as the thing it is, even if they differ over the ontological status of that unity. In any case, I’ve acknowledged the interpretive liberties I’ve taken throughout this conversation.
All that said, yes, now I think you’re really interpreting it as I intended it.
Again, I agree with you — but I trace the development of “modern” dualism via a distinct geneaology within which Descartes, Galileo and Newton were principals, and which is deeply implicated in the ‘Scientific Revolution’ and the Enlightenment. The dualism I think you’re referring to here and elsewhere is that same “Cartesian division”, summarised succinctly by Thomas Nagel in Mind and Cosmos:
Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36
The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand – how this physical world appears to human perception – were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind – as well as human intentions and purposes – from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.
So the reason this form of dualism wants to ‘paint’ life back onto matter is because it has first of all declared that only the extended and the measurable are real. That is modern materialism simpliciter (with the late Daniel Dennett as an exemplar.) I suggest this is the source of your criticism of ‘consciousness as an emergent stuff’ — the folk version of Descartes’ res cogitans.
Not just “cognition”, but prediction. Cognitive scientists have concluded that the human brain is not just a passive observer, but an active participant in constructing a useful model of the non-self world1. Humans especially, can imagine (infer) something missing (absence), or not yet real (possibility), and take action to evade or capture what is currently an Emptiness or Illusion. My typical real world example is the Panama Canal, which was imagined centuries before it was realized, with blood, sweat, and masses of monetary investments in a potentially profitable future .
But sometimes that creative talent causes us to “chase illusions”, “waste time on fantasies”, or to "believe in magic"2. So, is Platonic Idealism a fantasy, or a fill-in-the-blanks inference3? Is our human pattern-seeking ability, to imagine unseen possibilities, an asset or liability? Should we gamble on probabilities or wait for actualities? Are Ideas and Ideals a waste of time & money? Does Idealism only construct air-castles, or inspire aspirations?
Perhaps our ability to see beyond Real things to imagine Ideal forms4 (abstractions)5 is the superpower that allowed upright apes to convert the wild world into a civilized habitat. Perhaps the “Mathematics of Idealism” is simply what we call Logic : the power to infer the missing element. ![]()
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1. The human brain functions as a continuous prediction machine (or generative prediction engine) that actively forecasts sensory inputs, language, and actions rather than just passively reacting to the environment.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=brain+prediction+engine
2. To chase illusions, fantasy, and magic is to willingly step beyond the boundaries of the ordinary. It is the pursuit of wonder, the desire to find extraordinary depth in a mundane world, and the choice to believe in possibilities that logic cannot explain.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=to+chase+illusions+fantasy+and+magic
3. The brain infers what is not there through Predictive Coding, Pattern Completion, and Perceptual Filling-in, using past experiences and top-down neural signals to construct a continuous reality out of incomplete data.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=how+does+the+brain+infer+whats+not+there%3F+incompleteness
4. Shared Fictions and Imagination: Human language allows people to invent and collectively believe in abstract concepts like money, nations, laws, and corporations, creating a shared reality that binds societies together.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=humans+rule+the+world
5. Abstractions are general mental concepts or compressed rules that strip away specific physical details, while ideal forms (or Platonic Forms refer to the timeless, non-physical, and unchangeable essences of things that physical objects imperfectly copy.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=abstractions+are+ideal+forms