The limits of my language … Wittgenstein

This is perhaps one of Wittgenstein’s most famous quotes and id like to probe it further to see if it holds any truth beyond language games.

Christopher Columbus who was a renowned explorer was certainly not limited by language when he ventured out to explore the seas discovering new lands even if by accident. His limits weren’t his language when it came to the world he lived in at the time but his adventurous spirit, tools and the capability of his ship.

However this is only the strict interpretation of this quote as what Witt really meant was rather mystical in that there are certain feeling or sensations that language fails to capture…so then he goes on to say whereof we cannot speak we must be silent.

Sure I cannot describe a certain new flavour of a dessert apart from the limited use the word sweet has so it must be enjoyed without having to articulate to convey the taste to another. So it is here that witt’s sense of the mystical manifests itself the strongest in these types of sensations and feelings (ordinary or not)

I do however think that we can convey that which cannot be conveyed through other forms of communication such as body language or dance and even music (with or without lyrics) and art so in this respect I do not think the limits of language means the limit of my world or that whereof one cannot speak one must be silent for in doing so we could not have art or music.


Thoughts ? Btw I’m no Wittgensteinian and my knowledge of his philosophy is rather limited so I’m happy to be enlightened on the matter.

Thanks and looking forward to different ideas agreement or disagreement.

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From the preface to the Tractatus:

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather— not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

It might be helpful to begin by noting the distinction he makes between the world and my world. About the world he says:

1 The world is everything that is the case.

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.

1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2 The world divides into facts.

1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.

About my world on the other hand:

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.) (emphasis added)

This follows from:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

My language is the expression of my thoughts. As he says in the preface, he is attempting to draw the limits of thought by was of the limits of language.

But this is only a part of what he is getting at:

6.4 All propositions are of equal value.

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value.

If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world.

6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.)

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Then it appears that Witts limit of his world appears self-imposed by the flexibility and limits of his vocabulary, no ? I object to this as I can express myself non-verbally without words and might even come close to expressing the ineffable which Wittgenstein thinks is not possible.

His concern in the Tractatus was propositional language, that is, what can be said. He distinguished between what can be said and what is shown. As I understand him, ethics and aesthetics fall outside the limits of the logic of language. He draws limits to language in order to open up or free ethics and aesthetics from logical analysis.

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Columbus was a very mediocre explorer. He thought he was in India, for fuck’s sake.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is based on the first-order logic Russell developed from Frege. Both wanted to build a perfect language to set knowledge on a firm base; both were logical atomists. For Russell, the logical atoms, the irreducible particles, were individuals, given in standard logic by the individual constants a, b, c, and so on, and in English first by proper names for objects of our immediate acquaintance. This roughly phenomenal approach led to all sorts of difficulties.

That first sentence of the Tractatus runs a different atomism: “The world is all that is the case”, stipulates the topic of the text: what is the case is the set of true statements, not individuals; in standard terms, that’s the predicate sentences, f(a), and so on.

Wittgenstein’s ideal language consists in those sentences that are true, and the world is set out in its entirety by those true sentences.

Hence, the limits of that ideal language are congruent with the limits of the world.

That’s what he is saying.

He understood that there was more here, but the crystalline perfection of first-order logic held him captive; over a period of years, he came to see that we are able to do more with words than just make statements; that realisation led to his return to philosophy, and to the Investigations.

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There’s a dullness in thinking that because one says something in body language or in interpretive dance, therefore what is said cannot be contained in a statement.

If you have said something, then what you have said can be set out in a statement. If you are making some specific claim, then even if you are using music or a facial expression to say it, there is an interpretation that can be stated in English.

Some might protest that the English sentence might not properly capture what is meant; as if the interpretive dance faired better.

The dance perhaps induces a profound conviction, a powerful feeling, but that is not what is being stated. The dance is not stating more than the language, but it might be showing more. It is not stating more than could be set out in an English sentence, but it is doing more.

Despite his otherwise excellent exegesis of Wittgenstein, @Sam26, of loving memory, never seemed to quite understand this.

( I am obliged to register my disapproval of Sam’s being suspended. It is a mistake. I’ll say no more here.)

Thank you for the succinct and brief summary of early Wittgensteinian thought … I’ve been looking into his investigations where he turns his back on the tractatus by proposing the idea of language games and meaning is use.

I think this is a major improvement to overcome the rigidity and crystalline nature of the tractatus which advocated the novel idea of perfecting first order logic through language.

It is here where he hits on some actual philosophy by understanding what philosophising involves that is the communal nature of language and language games.

Having said that I will provide further feedback or critique on his later thought here despite being in uncharted territory when it comes to Wittgenstein

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Wittgenstein didn’t think of the world as a collection of objects. He thought of it as things happening. So the world isn’t a set that has the sun and earth as members, but rather a set of situations, such as the earth orbiting the sun.

So the world includes things like:

It’s true that the sun is orbited by the earth.

Or we could just have it as an assertion:

“The sun is orbited by the earth.”

Since all the members of the world set are along the lines of thoughts, such as x orbits y, Z became a supermassive blackhole, etc. the world for Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) is bound by what we can say and what we can’t.

It’s not really mystical, but it’s definitely ontological anti-realism (which is the view that we can’t learn what the whole world is made of.)

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I would agree with this and instead of a dance we could use any classical composition by say Beethoven, Mozart or Bach etc. These types of works can evoke and stir up certain feelings when listening which words and language alone cannot capture or mimic, though this is not the fault of language but rather the medium transmitting the feeling in that they are different, one being the musical type and the other articulatory so music id say does it better the same way the feeling of an orgasm cannot be conveyed by language but is simply felt. So it is with music the build up, the tension the release and so forth.

In effect the performance of a musical piece remains unmatched by language in this respect and is superior to it while language itself may surpass it in other ways such as perhaps its definitive function and precision of certain terms and ideas which can most often be outside the remit of music or other types of art.

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The limit on what can be said is not a limit on what can be done.

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Yes, music can evoke emotion. But that is only one part, and arguably not the most important part, of what music communicates. Probably that communication is ineffable or unparaphrasable, in the sense we’re now discussing, but that isn’t because the subject matter, so to speak, is emotions.

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Sometimes music just communicates without a clear message to be gleaned from it.

A bird doesn’t sing because it has an answer, it sings because it has a song.

Similarly the expressions of different types of art forms can come about from the joyful wish to create. So the expression of such creativity is called art not philosophy and while they may overlap they’re fundamentally different.

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I think so.

As far as a “message” in music, that may be going too far but I do think there is conceptual content. This is very hard to express in non-musical terms. But just to put it stupidly simply, if you listen to a symphony movement that’s written in sonata form, you’re going to get the sense of going on some sort of journey, with various ups and downs and problems and resolutions along the way, and then returning, somewhat the better for it. Moreover, this tension-and-release pattern is replicated in miniature within much smaller spaces – a bar or two, perhaps. And through familiarity, we associate certain musical materials with attitudes and visions and concepts (and yes, sometimes feelings). So I’d suggest this all is part of the “something” that music tries to communicate.

How successful is my paraphrase at “stating” what the music does? Not very. Language isn’t precise enough. But I could sit at a piano and play what I’m talking about, illustratively. I guess that would showing, in Witt’s sense.

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And . . . the limit on what can be stated is not a limit on what can be said.

I’d urge caution here. But yes, we do other things with language besides make statements.

the caution is to avoid doing something else and thinking one has set out a truth. It’s statements that are true.

Consider: “This piece of music is objectively terrible”. Looks like a statement. Is it?

The piece of music is objectively terrible would need consensus from all listeners so it can be true from that pov if not from the artist who created the music who might disagree.

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Right, or at at least truth-apt.

Hmm. Probably not, since I’d say it was a misuse of “objectively” that renders the sentence hard to parse. More like an expression of disapproval, then – which is a good example of what you can say that might matter quite a bit, even if it’s not true or false.

I dunno. Bay City Rollers songs were pretty horrid, but popular. (I found a couple of albums, presumably purchased by Wife in her adolescence, in the vinyl collection while cataloguing it last week. I’ll keep them handy to play when she needs chastising.)

I don’t see that “objectively terrible” works as a predicate.

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I take it back. They are objectively horrible! :slightly_smiling_face:

I suppose the question is how you would arrive at objectivity … is it simply a matter of consensus or does it align with what constitutes terribleness, objectively.