# The Liar's Paradox

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447>\
**Category:** Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics\
**Created:** [March 26, 2026, 4:02am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447 "2026-03-26T04:02:33Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Porge0](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/porge0/32/452_2.png) [@Porge0](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Porge0)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 4:02am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/1 "2026-03-26T04:02:33Z")

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This is a paradox that, as I, a logic purist (If such a label exists anywhere) have read, troubles me, for it seems to strike a jab at one of the three most foundational laws of logic, which is that of _noncontradiction_ (A or not A, or formally, A v ~A). If such a principle of logic was _not_ necessarily true, or else, in every instance of a possible world, it does not hold in at least _one_ of them, then utterly absurd things about reality could be true, such as that it is possible that I am writing this post and that I am _not_ writing this post at the _same time_. Indeed, it would, if the law of noncontradiction is not necessarily true, be possible for me to be both fat and _not_ fat, for the sun to also _not_ be the sun, and for me to know English (Necessary for me to write this very sentence) and to _not_ know English (And so I shouldn’t be able to write this sentence), both _simultaneously_ with one another, not merely as a sequential change of _state_ from, say, Not A into A (For example, for me to go from not knowing English to _knowing_ English). This seems completely wrong, and it should be. But then here comes the liar’s paradox, stated thus:

_ **This sentence is false.** _

Interesting, for if it is the case that it is _true_ that the sentence is false, then it is _false_ despite it being _true_. And if it is _false_ that the sentence is false, then the sentence must be _true_, despite it being _false_, which is an outright logical contradiction, for this means, then, that the sentence is, depending on what truth value you assign to it, both _true_ and _false_ at the exact same time. What should follow from this, then, is that certain propositions, such as “This sentence is false”, do _not_ follow the law of noncontradiction, and so cannot simply be either _true_ or _not true_, and if this is the case that some propositions don’t follow the law of noncontradiction, then it follows that the law of noncontradiction does not hold in every possible world, and if the law of noncontradiction does not hold in every possible world, or else is _contingently_ true, then it is possible, in some world, for me to know English and to also _not_ know English. Yikes.

But something seems wrong with this Paradox, and it can be unearthed if we dissect what “This sentence is false” actually _means_. And we can do it with this simple question: What is “This sentence”? Is “this sentence” the full proposition as stated, “This sentence is false,” which can be expressed as A, or else is it “This sentence” by itself, expressed as A, and then the “is false” expresses a _negation_ of “This sentence” (A), which would look like ~A? If it is the former, then what would be true is that if it is _true_ that “This sentence is false”, or it is true that A, then all that would happen is that it turns out that A is asserted to be a true proposition, and that the only problem, then, would be to characterize what A actually _means_, or else it would be up to us to characterize what the contents of A have, or what their _predicates_ are, to determine if the assertion that A is true is either a _true_ assertion or a _false_ one. For example, if I assert that it is _true_ that I dropped my ice cream, then it would be up to others to determine whether or not my assertion of the _truth_ of me dropping ice cream, or else the truth of me declaring A, is a _true_ assertion or _not_ a true assertion, on the basis of the existing evidence in support of the assertion, and this would not be a contradictory, nor an unreasonable, way to characterize “This sentence”. Now if the _latter_ possibility is true, which is that “This sentence” means the first part of the sentence, “This sentence,” is the proposition, or A, and that the last part of the sentence, “is false” is a _negation_ of the first part of the sentence, or A, then “this sentence” can be expressed as Not A, or formally, ~A. So if we defined “this sentence” this way, then if we assert that “this sentence is false” is _true_, then we would be saying, instead, that it is true that Not A, or it is true that ~A. Therefore, if defined this way, then this would be analogous to me asserting that it is _true_ that I _didn’t_ drop my ice cream, or it is _true_ that Not A, or ~A, and this would not be a contradictory way to define “this sentence”.

What I think follows from this argument, then, is that the liar’s paradox, which is “This sentence is false,” is not a true instance of a proposition that can violate the _law of noncontradiction_, but instead is an instance of a proposition that, depending on how specifically it is _defined_, can lead to instances where the truth value assigned to the specific definition can be _preserved_ or _negated_. Therefore, since _definitions_ aren’t fixed, but the objects which propositions can be assigned to _are_ fixed, then the paradox seems, from this, to be a larger problem in _linguistics_ than it does for logic itself.

To be frank, writing this post kind of melted my brain, and I’ve _not_ looked into other solutions to the problem very deeply other than the problem itself, so if something seemed to be of question in this post (This is my first post), then say something.

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**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 4:16pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/2 "2026-03-26T16:16:01Z")

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What does it mean for a sentence to be true or false?

“It is raining” is true if it is raining and false if it is not raining. Can we explain what it means for “this sentence is false” to be true or false in a similar way, i.e. without using the words “true” or “false”? If not, I’d question its very coherence; it’s gobbledygook that only appears to be saying something.

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**Author:** ![Porge0](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/porge0/32/452_2.png) [@Porge0](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Porge0)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 5:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/3 "2026-03-26T17:08:35Z")

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That is basically the point being made. Unless we are allowed to press into what “This sentence” even means, then “This sentence” could, in truth, be referring to three different possible things at the same time:

1. It could be referring to a proposition outside of itself, such as if I said, “I played dominos,” and the sentence would be saying, in effect, that “This sentence is false”, or else saying that I did _not_ play dominos, and this is, if defined this way, not incoherent if this is the case.
2. “This sentence” literally refers to “This sentence is false”, because it _is_ a full sentence, and because the liars paradox, taken as is, doesn’t generally refer to anything else outside of itself. But then if this is true, then “This sentence is false” would be a whole proposition, and so would be formally expressed as A. So if someone were to say that “This sentence is false” is _true_, then they would merely be saying that A is true, which is not a contradiction.
3. “This sentence” could refer to the first half of the sentence, “This sentence”, and so _that_ would be the full proposition, or A, and then the second half, “is false”, would be an informal expression of a _negation_, or a Not, or a ~, and so, put together in this way, “this sentence” would, in formal expression, be referring to say Not A, or ~A, and so defined this way, then to say that “this sentence” is true, would be to say that ~A is true, and if defined this way, this would not be incoherent.

What this is getting at, then, is that the liar’s paradox works _only if_ you permit “This sentence” to remain ambiguously defined, because if done so, then “This sentence” is equally capable of saying A, or Not A, which is why the contradiction _seems_ to emerge if you allow it. It is a problem regarding _semantics_ and word meaning, more than some issue with logic itself, and this, in a sense, demonstrates why equivocation is such a serious fallacy in Philosophy, because undefined words can cause serious problems in preserving an argument’s truth value, if not clarified up front. Like that time I spent 6 posts trying to debate the semantics of “God” with you, I hope this comes to show why semantics is so important.

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**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 5:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/4 "2026-03-26T17:24:14Z")

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> [@Porge0](#):
>
> So if someone were to say that “This sentence is false” is _true_, then they would merely be saying that A is true, which is not a contradiction.

The point I was suggesting is that saying that “this sentence is false” is true is like saying that “bish bash bosh” is true.

What do “this sentence is false” and “bish bash bosh” even mean? If we can’t explain this then we don’t even reach the point where we have to consider whether or not them being true is a contradiction.

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**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 5:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/5 "2026-03-26T17:24:43Z")

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I’m going to adopt a convention where (1), (2), and so forth serve as names to the sentence which follows them.

(1) – (1) is false.

That’s pretty clear, no?

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> So if we defined “this sentence” this way, then if we assert that “this sentence is false” is _true_, then we would be saying, instead, that it is true that Not A, or it is true that ~A. Therefore, if defined this way, then this would be analogous to me asserting that it is _true_ that I _didn’t_ drop my ice cream, or it is _true_ that Not A, or ~A, and this would not be a contradictory way to define “this sentence”.

I’m not sure I’d go this far. I’d rather say that the liar’s sentence shows a paradox about self-reference, and points to logics which drop the PNC in favor of some other method of stopping explosion, which is what you’re referring to here.

Explosion is undesirable because it leaves us with little to evaluate after.

But if you can contain explosion then perhaps you could have a class of sentences called dialethia. These are the sentences which are both true and false.

Now how this stops your ice cream example is we could claim that “I dropped my ice cream” is bounded by the circumstances we’re asserting which, in this case, includes the LNC.

But dialethia are the sorts of sentences which clearly do not.

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**Author:** ![Porge0](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/porge0/32/452_2.png) [@Porge0](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Porge0)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 7:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/6 "2026-03-26T19:28:40Z")

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> [@Moliere](#):
>
> I’d rather say that the liar’s sentence shows a paradox about self-reference

A self-reference to what?

> [@Moliere](#):
>
> and points to logics which drop the PNC in favor of some other method of stopping explosion, which is what you’re referring to here.

And the point I would be making here is that, because the contents of the liar’s sentence is ambiguous, there are _three_ equally plausible definitions as to what the liar’s sentence self-refers to, specifically, and that each one is capable of _agreeing with_, or _negating_, the truth value assigned to it. This is not a problem with logic, specifically, but with language itself, as language cannot perfectly map out the rules of logic, due to certain words and phrases being _multidefinitional_, and the liar’s sentence is one sentence which is not only multidefinitional, but a multidefinitional sentence where the different possible definitions are the _opposite_ of themselves, or A and ~A, depending on how it is _defined_. This is an issue with _semantics_, not just the rules of logic, such as the law of noncontradiction.

> [@Moliere](#):
>
> But if you can contain explosion then perhaps you could have a class of sentences called dialethia. These are the sentences which are both true and false.

True and false _simultaneously?_ Words, and their possible definitions, are merely a _possible_ way which a word can be validly defined, not one which is actually the case at the same time as other definitions. This is why Wittgenstein’s concept of “word games” is very important, because the _context_ which surrounds a specific word or phrase can _actualize_ one possible definition over another, because such a definition is the one that applies more appropriately to the rules of the specific “game” being played, such as the word, “Water!”, meaning a _command_ to pour water on a POW who is being waterboarded if someone is carrying out a torture session, over being a _signal_ that someone found potable water on a desert island, and needed to inform his friends; one use of the word, “Water!”, is correct over the other one. And because the liar’s sentence has no context, and because it is multidefinitional, then this is why it is _apparent_ that it is at the same time _true_ and _false_, because there _is_ no correct definition of the Liar’s sentence which can be actualized by context, unless you decide to probe into what the liar’s sentence _means_, independently of context.

I ain’t no linguist, nor why language possesses this property, but I don’t see it truly proving the law on noncontradiction to be incorrect, because language _maps_ onto logic, and not the other way around, so if the liar’s paradox exposes a problem regarding language, it doesn’t therefore follow that it exposes a problem regarding logic, even though language is capable of replicating logic, correctly, very much of the time. I wonder what you say of the matter yourself, since you seem to know about the liar’s paradox quite well yourself.

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**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 8:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/7 "2026-03-26T20:12:28Z")

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It seems to me, it’s almost always interpreted like in 2. But you haven’t solved the contradiction.

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> But then if this is true, then “This sentence is false” would be a whole proposition, and so would be formally expressed as A

Right, so A is “This sentence is false” and “this sentence” refers to the whole proposition, i.e. A so A is “A is false”. If you say A is _true_ then “A is false” is itself false. But A _is_ “A is false” so A is false. You have the contradiction.

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**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 8:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/8 "2026-03-26T20:37:23Z")

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> [@Porge0](#):
>
> A self-reference to what?

To itself.

Where you say:

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> And we can do it with this simple question: What is “This sentence”? Is “this sentence” the full proposition as stated, “This sentence is false,” which can be expressed as A, or else is it “This sentence” by itself, expressed as A, and then the “is false” expresses a _negation_ of “This sentence” (A), which would look like ~A?

I’m saying it’s not so ambiguous as all that.

“This sentence”, all by itself, cannot be true or false because it is not a sentence. And since it is sentences which are truth-apt, rather than nouns, “This sentence is false” refers to the sentence being uttered, written, heard, or read.

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> True and false _simultaneously?_

Yes.

In analogue consider Russell’s Paradox which has a similar trick going on in that the set refers to itself.

I think that’s something the liar’s points out: there is something funny about our reasoning when we include self reference and are consistent.

The context then, to answer:

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> This is why Wittgenstein’s concept of “word games” is very important, because the _context_ which surrounds a specific word or phrase can _actualize_ one possible definition over another, because such a definition is the one that applies more appropriately to the rules of the specific “game” being played…
> 
> And because the liar’s sentence has no context, and because it is multidefinitional, then this is why it is _apparent_ that it is at the same time _true_ and _false_ , because there _is_ no correct definition of the Liar’s sentence which can be actualized by context, unless you decide to probe into what the liar’s sentence _means_ , independently of context.

The context is philosophy so I figure it’s fairly apparent that we’re talking about some philosophical problems related to the liar’s. One of those is whether or not there is one true logic, which I don’t think there is so the liar’s is useful for pointing that out (we make up the rules of logic). The other is self-reference.

Even if we reduce the problem to one of semantics I could just stipulate that I’m speaking in the context of logic and philosophy so, in this case, the sentence “This sentence is false” refers to itself by stipulation.

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**Author:** ![Porge0](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/porge0/32/452_2.png) [@Porge0](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Porge0)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 8:51pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/9 "2026-03-26T20:51:21Z")

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Nice instance of cherry picking BTW. If you read the argument _just below_ this quote, you would see why this is relevant to the liar’s paradox, because just below this quote, I say:

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> So if someone were to say that “This sentence is false” is _true_, then they would merely be saying that A is true, which is not a contradiction.

So, “this sentence”, if defined as 2, as you said it is often done so, is defined this way, then it would simply become a basic proposition, A, not A is false (As the “is false” is a _part_ of the full proposition here), and so when someone would say that “this sentence” is true, they would only say that A is true, and so is not a contradiction. Please observe surrounding context in further criticisms, rather than direct “gotcha” responses my way.

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**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 9:00pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/10 "2026-03-26T21:00:11Z")

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I may have misunderstood what you meant but I did not cherry picked anything. Sure, if someone were to say that “This sentence is false” is true, then they would be saying A is true. I agreed with all of that, and just continued the analysis.

What is A? A is “this sentence is false” but we can continue further and say A is “A is false” as we know ‘this sentence’ refers to the whole proposition, i.e. A. That’s what I am saying.

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**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 10:19pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/11 "2026-03-26T22:19:44Z")

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Presumably, if our domain includes all sentences, it includes “This sentence is false”.

If meaning is understood extensionally, it is unclear what the extension of either “This sentence is true” or “This sentence is false” would be - either might be true or false.

One approach is simply to say that not all sentences are either true or false. This is to deny the excluded middle, giving us a non-classical logic.

Another approach is not to assign truth values in the language in question, but to keep them in a metalanguage, a language about the target language. This is the approach adopted by Tarski and much of model theory, avoiding the Liar by rendering “This sentence is false” inadmissible, since a language cannot contain its own truth predicate.

Another approach, from Kripke, is to permit a language to contain a truth predicate, but to assign truth values in a strict sequence. Here’s an example:

Suppose we restrict the language to being about a group of people, Adam, Bob and Carol… an so on, and their respective nationalities, English, French… etcetera. We can construct any number of sentences from these: “Adam is English", “Bob is English”, “Adam and Bob are french”…

We start by assigning “true” and “false” to statements of our language on the basis of an extensional interpretation. We assign “true” or “false” to these as appropriate; so in our interpretation, “Adam is English” is true, and “Adam is French” is false, and so on.

Notice that so far any sentence that contains the term “true” is not _yet_ assigned a truth value. So “‘Adam is English’ is true” is at this stage neither truth nor false.

We then start to permit sentences that contain “true” or “false” to be assigned values, but under strict conditions. So:

- If “Adam is English” is true, then we allow that “‘Adam is English’ is true” is also true.

- If “Adam is French” is false, then we allow that “'Adam is French”’ is false" is true.

And so on. Generally, if p is true, then “p is true” is true, and ‘“p is true” is true’ is true, and so on; if p is false, then “p is false” is true, and ‘“p is false” is true’ is true, and so on.

But notice that in this construction, we never get to assigning a truth value to the sentence “this sentence is false”. So it remains without a truth value. The Liar is thus not considered inadmissible so much as un-modelled.

Yet another approach is to accept that the truth value flip-flops between true and false, and build a logic that incorporates this as a process. On this account we might begin step one by assigning “true” to “This sentence is false”. Since if “This sentence is false” is true, the sentence is false, our second step is to assign ”false” to “This sentence is false”; and again the consequence is that the sentence is true, so in step three we again assign “true” to “This sentence is false”; and so on. This may not be a solution so much as an explication, and interestingly has been formalised by Hans Herzberger and Anil Gupta.

Compare an alternative, “This sentence is true”. If we begin by assigning “true” to “This sentence is true”, our conclusion is that the sentence is true, and the process of revision ceases. And if we begin by assigning “false” to “This sentence is true”, then our conclusion is that “The sentence is true”, is false. Here there is a problem, which encourages the revision of assigning “true” to “This sentence is true”. What the revision process shows that assigning “true” to “This sentence is true” results in stability, but assigning “false” results in a need for revision.

So, four differing approaches: adopting a non-classical logic; adopting a Tarskian hierarchy; adopting Kripke’s assignment of truth values in stages; and adopting a revision theory of truth. What I’d like to point out is that the choice here is not forced— we can choose whichever of these approaches suit our purposes.

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**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [March 26, 2026, 10:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/12 "2026-03-26T22:28:00Z")

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> [@Porge0](#):
>
> since _definitions_ aren’t fixed, but the objects which propositions can be assigned to _are_ fixed, then the paradox seems, from this, to be a larger problem in _linguistics_ than it does for logic itself.

What you may have captured here is the observation that the paradox does not lie in the _syntax_ of the logical system adopted, but in the semantics, in the interpretation. However, in formal logic, definitions _are_ fixed by being explicitly stipulated. Above, I’ve given a few examples of how a formal system can accommodate assigning truth values in a consistent fashion.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Porge0](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/porge0/32/452_2.png) [@Porge0](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Porge0)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 2:24am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/13 "2026-03-27T02:24:56Z")

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> [@Banno](#):
>
> One approach is simply to say that not all sentences are either true or false. This is to deny the excluded middle, giving us a non-classical logic.

There is a distinction to be made between propositions, which _are_ sentences which carry a truth value such as true or false, and other types of sentences, such as “What time is it?”, which cannot be declared as either true or false, because such sentences fail to make a truth claim. What doesn’t seem to follow from this, though, is that if it is the case that not all sentences carry a truth value, but the reason why is because not all sentences make truth claims, then the _mere_ existence of non-propositional sentences does not seem like a sufficient ground to reject the law of excluded middle, and so I don’t see, personally, how granting that not all sentences can be true or false justifies that the law of excluded middle can be reasonably abolished. Unless you meant by this that not all _propositions_ can be true or false, which would be a very different story.

> [@Banno](#):
>
> However, in formal logic, definitions _are_ fixed by being explicitly stipulated.

Yes, but that is the problem with the liar’s paradox, and where my critique is really trying to hone in on right now, is that the liar’s sentence seems to do a very poor job at _characterizing_ itself, even though, with all of the responses and feedback I’ve received thus far, there seem to be _four_ equally valid ways to characterize the liar’s sentence, either as a negation of some _other_ proposition, a simple proposition, a _negated_ simple proposition, or else the liar’s sentence is not a proposition at all, but an _empty_ sentence, and so cannot coherently be assigned any truth value at _all_ without contradiction. This argument I’ve been setting forth has been more of an internal critique of the problem itself than it is an argument where I grant that the liar’s paradox holds, and then see what follows from it, and its effect on how logic is to be conducted in the future, as you seem to have done so in your responses. Categorically, you seem to approach the problem in a different way than I do.

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**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 3:18am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/14 "2026-03-27T03:18:48Z")

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> [@Porge0](#):
>
> …not all sentences make truth claims

Indeed, at least in natural languages; less so in most formal languages, where a sentence usually equates to a statement. There’s of course a long tail of discussion here.

Another approach is simply to stipulate that a proposition is a sentence with a truth value, or if you prefer, what is said by a sentence that has a truth value. If we adopt that approach, then “This sentence is false”, if it does not accept a truth value, is not a proposition. A good reason for not talking of propositions.

I was following Davidson out of habit, using “sentence” rather than reifying propositions as entities. I’ll continue to do so, and trust you to understand the implications.

There are logical systems that make use of the excluded middle, and others that do not. I don’t see a reason to prefer this system or that one, except for what is useful in the context of our conversation. So I’ve offered four different systems that each avoid the issues presented by the liar. Take your pick, or come up with an alternative.

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> …the liar’s sentence seems to do a very poor job at _characterizing_ itself…

At least in the last three approaches, the liar can be characterised formally.

For Tarski, the Liar requires a predicate having a truth value within its own language, which simply cannot happen given the way Tarski defines truth in terms of satisfaction.

For Kripke, the Liar remains ungrounded, never being assigned a truth value.

For Hans Herzberger and Anil Gupta, the Liar never stabilises over revisions. This last preserves classical logic while explaining the instability quite directly, which is why it is worth considering.

Tarski will not admit the Liar. Kripke admits it by refusing to evaluate it. Revision admits the liar and sets out the problem. That’s not far at all from what you have been saying, as I’ve understood.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![ssu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/f07891/32.png) [@ssu](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/ssu)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 2:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/15 "2026-03-27T14:21:17Z")

</div>

> [@Porge0](#):
>
> Yes, but that is the problem with the liar’s paradox, and where my critique is really trying to hone in on right now, is that the liar’s sentence seems to do a very poor job at _characterizing_ itself, even though, with all of the responses and feedback I’ve received thus far, there seem to be _four_ equally valid ways to characterize the liar’s sentence, either as a negation of some _other_ proposition, a simple proposition, a _negated_ simple proposition, or else the liar’s sentence is not a proposition at all, but an _empty_ sentence, and so cannot coherently be assigned any truth value at _all_ without contradiction.

The liar paradox, just as Russell’s paradox, just shows our false assumptions or false premises about logic, when we generalize something (like a set) to contain everything and do not take into account negative self-reference (which, in my view, is the most awesome rule in logic that we still dismiss and do not understand even it’s extremely crucial for logic to be consistent).

Put it short, it is about what happens in logic with negative self-reference.

Remember that the original Liar paradox was the Epimenides paradox, where Epimenides, a Cretan, says “All Cretans are liars”.

OK, if Epimenides would have been an Athenian, there’s no problem. But now as he belongs to a group of Cretans, he is, as a Cretan, doing a _self reference_. Ok, still no problem. But when talking about “liars”, there’s the _negative_ self-reference. As a Cretan, then he is a liar.

So the outcome is totally similar like with Russell’s Paradox with idea of there being an “set of all sets”, and then using negative self-reference and getting a set, that does not contain itself. So we have a paradox, because there are sets and we can imagine all of them… but then that isn’t a set, but a very paradoxical set!

Before you comment anything, here me out, here is the moment where many people take go down the futile and useless rabbit hole of discussing liars can tell truths or not. This is about simple rules of logic, not a World hugging debate about liars or just what truth of false just means. And let’s leave also Russell’s paradox and naive set theory aside here.

Let’s look first how powerful negative self-reference is with an example that doesn’t end up with a Paradox. I’ll give an example.

_Statement 1:_ **People can write in the Philosophy Forums any finite response they want in PF**. (Only afterwards the administrator can erase nonsensical or comments that are against the rules.)

The above statement seems obvious at first. But it isn’t true, for many reasons, like we have only a finite time that we are live etc. Yet it is also logically for the logical limitation that negative self-reference gives us. Why?

Because using the negative self-reference rule, we can also say that:

_Statement 2:_ **People cannot write a response in the Philosophy Forum which they do not write.**

Now, are there responses that people don’t write here? Yes. You cannot write something that you don’t write. I cannot either. @Banno cannot write something that he doesn’t write. But obviously you can something that @Banno doesn’t write, and also you and me can copy him. Is this a limitation on what we can write? Surely not, but in some situations can be.

Now it really sounds incredibly simply (or stupid) to say:

_Statement 3:_ **People can write in the Philosophy Forum anything, except what they never will write.**

But that still is true!

So why do we have the Paradox or _Antinomy_, as Kant put it? I think it is because we absolutely hate limitations and see something like the paradox as an obstacle to solve. Just remember how devastated Russell along everybody else was after the re-emergence of the paradox. It isn’t something to be solved, but simply something to be understood.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 9:01pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/16 "2026-03-27T21:01:24Z")

</div>

There are things you _might have_ written, but didn’t, and never will. so “ **People can write in the Philosophy Forum anything, except what they never will write”** looks in this sense false. One might have written what one didn’t write. We need here to be clear as to whether we are using a existential quantification, as you are, or a modal quantification, as I am. I think the instability here comes from modality, not truth.

The Liar is not dependent on indexicality, as “I am a Cretan”; nor modality, as in that we might have written something other than we do write; nor self-reference. All good points, since each of these can be used with without contradiction or paradox.

There are versions of the Liar that do not rely on self-reference. The obvious one is

- (A) Sentence B is false
- (B) Sentence A is true

[Yalbo’s paradox](https://iep.utm.edu/yablo-pa/) is even more fun, since no sentence ever ultimately refers to itself, nor is it clear that there is some overall circularity.

It’s worth here again drawing parallels to [my discussion of Aesthetics](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-approach-to-aesthetics/). There I proffered the argument that whatever definition of art one might offer, some artist will produce an item of art that undermines that definition. It may be that whatever general solution or analysis of paradoxes is offered, some logician will produce a paradox that bypasses that analysis.

At the least, no simple diagnosis of paradoxes is apparent.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![ssu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/f07891/32.png) [@ssu](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/ssu)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 9:20pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/17 "2026-03-27T21:20:44Z")

</div>

> [@Banno](#):
>
> One might have written what one didn’t write. - I think the instability here comes from modality, not truth.

I think here “what people write” would refer to everything people do write in the entirety of their lives. That is a large yet still finite amount of writing and doesn’t take into account the temporal aspect of this (which you think about when thinking about what they might but didn’t). Obviously what people write is something we couldn’t even list as long as the people are interacting with the world and writing.

To refer to modality more like the question if liars can also say something true every once and a while… Hence Russell’s paradox is more easier to understand as there isn’t the problem of the complex nature of physical or real life examples, which can be understood in many ways.

> [@Banno](#):
>
> There are versions of the Liar that do not rely on self-reference. The obvious one is
> 
> - (A) Sentence B is false
> - (B) Sentence A is true

Yet both sentences reference each other, right?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 9:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/18 "2026-03-27T21:24:08Z")

</div>

> [@ssu](#):
>
> I think here “what people write” would refer to everything people do write in the entirety of their lives.

Yep. The existential quantification - there is indeed stuff that I will not actually write. The modal quantification remains - there is stuff that I will not actually write, but which I might have written. I’m just pointing to the need to seperate out the two, for clarity.

> [@ssu](#):
>
> Yet both sentences reference each other, right?

Yep. Not so in the Yalbo case.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\
**Post date:** [March 27, 2026, 9:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/19 "2026-03-27T21:38:33Z")

</div>

> [@Banno](#):
>
> The Liar is not dependent on indexicality, as “I am a Cretan”; nor modality, as in that we might have written something other than we do write; nor self-reference. All good points, since each of these can be used with without contradiction or paradox.
> 
> There are versions of the Liar that do not rely on self-reference. The obvious one is
> 
> - (A) Sentence B is false
> - (B) Sentence A is true
> 
> [Yalbo’s paradox](https://iep.utm.edu/yablo-pa/) is even more fun, since no sentence ever ultimately refers to itself, nor is it clear that there is some overall circularity.

Huh.

There’s always more to learn that you didn’t know. Thanks for the reference.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![ssu](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/f07891/32.png) [@ssu](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/ssu)\
**Post date:** [March 28, 2026, 2:56am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447/20 "2026-03-28T02:56:07Z")

</div>

> [@Banno](#):
>
> Not so in the Yalbo case.

Interesting, have to attempt to understand that one.

[Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/the-liars-paradox/447.md?page=2)
