And a building’s plumbing can’t be explained using a diagram of its wiring. Of course reductionism is muddled. There are differing domains of discourse.
Good question. If the wheel was discovered at some time and the discovery became universally known, then it could not be re-discovered. But if the discovery was not universally known about, then it could be re-discovered.
Is “substrate” real or merely conceptual? It seems to me that if it is merely conceptual then our accounts (concepts) can certainly 'touch" it, but we would be merely “touching ourselves” andnothing beyond the human would be entailed by that “touching”. If substrate is real in some substantive metasensory way then we have no way of knowing whether our accounts touch it or “capture its character”. On the other hand if substrate is real, metasensory and “enminded” then maybe our conceptual schemas are reflections of a greater intelligence. This might count as “touching”. Problem is how could we know whatever the case is?
And this goes for the quantum “zoo” too, Are quarks substantive entities out there completely independent of us or are they merely conceptual/epistemic/mathematical entities? Then we can ask the same question about mathematics itself. Any position on these issues would seem to come down to faith.
If phenomenology understands what is foregrounded as pre-existing our foregrounding of it then that could be interpreted as an abandonment of the epoché. Or it could be interpreted as making the implicit explicit, or the unconscious (subconscious, pre-conscious) conscious.
Then is the unconscious anthropomorphic, just a part of the human, or is it larger, that is biomorphic, or is it even larger―cosmomorphic?
The key serves its purpose. A map serves its purpose. so it’s more than just a way of hoping, it’s a way of doing. It doesn’t do anything toward solving the question of the op though, because we don’t know whether the purpose of it is to reveal something about the structure of reality. A
I guess more existentially. Philosophy teaches me the limits of rationality, and engages me in an activity that I would call one of questioning. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. There are other doors, other exits from the prison cell of being my self.
Pretentious, huh? Sorry but it’s hard to find the words for what I mean.
Maybe we are now in a better position to see why Tim’s response misses the point. I hope it is clear that the accusation of relativism is quite misplaced. It presupposes the very dualism of schema and content that is being rejected.
For Davidson, of course, there can be no scheme-relative truth.
For Wittgenstein, following a rule is participating in a public practice, hence there need be no further grounding than “it’s what we do”.
For both, agreement overwhelms disagreement.
If traditions appear to differ in assigning truth, then that difference will be located in the interpretation of one tradition in the terms of the other, and not in what each holds true. We still share the truth.
The upshot: @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus is not addressing the positions adopted by Davidson, Wittgenstein, and myself, which are very much not relativist.
Not at all. I can relate to this. 
To be clear, I never had Davidson in mind. As for Wittgenstein, I find debates about Wittgenstein’s actual position to be interminable. Clearly though, he has often been read as a relativist or as at least providing ammunition for relativists.
What’s logic?
To produce an argument for logic is circular: Logic is good because logic says so. Grounding logic in logic is unacceptable.
This problem falls out of Agrippa’s trilemma (circularity, infinite regress, assumption).
Looks like logic has no leg to stand on.
Ok. Either way, logic is not grounded in this or that, but is instead another part of the ongoing process of discourse.
The alternative is to petrify logic in only one of its many incarnations, and so claim an arbitrary grounding as an absolute.
But isn’t arguing against logic using logic thereby affirming logic?
That is, I’m afraid, correct. Another circularity, but now on the other side.
The circularity problem of logic. 
So we’re stuck with logic? Trapped in it? Or should we be grateful for it because it allows us to complete work?
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We’re not stuck with logic. Consider irrationalism (re Blaise Pascal) or lumen fidei or lumen gratiae.
I don’t know what kind of work you’re envisioning here but if it means tasks like sending rockets to the moon or even cooking a meal, yes it helps us complete those tasks.
I guess the alternative is to see logic mapping onto the world through theism or, perhaps, Platonism. That’s surely one strand of this discussion? What does Van Til offer here? The laws of logic are reflections of the internal coherence of the Christian God’s rational nature, etc. But the Muslims will make similar presuppositional arguments. Hence logic as grounded in Being itself. As a non-theist I enjoy thinking about these arguments.
Indeed, just about everything the world takes for granted, from smart phones to medical diagnosis and treatment. Where do we find irrationalism useful?
I saw this debate between a theist and an atheist and the main issue was the foundation of logic. The former claimed that God is just that - the leg that logic stands on; I suppose this breaks the circularity that originally formed when attempting to ground logic (on logic).
@Tom_Storm The premise of irrationalism is that rationality fails to solve philosophical problems (look around and smell the roses).
Lumen fidei and lumen gratiae: Revelatory religions and some cases like Srinivasa Ramanujan (Namagiri Thayyar) and Georg Cantor (infinity and God).
Wouldn’t that mean it is grounded in the process of discourse? But then what is discourse grounded in?
@Banno I’m afraid I don’t really understand the Davidson stuff and cats on mats seem to be a case of simple correspondence. But it doesn’t really answer the question about how language maps onto the world. The ostensible argument here seems to be if a statement is true, it just matches how the world is, there’s no deeper barrier or interpretive layer between language and reality beyond meaning itself.
While I might be willing to tick that as true as far as cats go, it seems less helpful when we get to the idea of moral facts, properties, or how we ground the laws of logic. But I fear this is going to get more complicated that I am able to manage.
Would we be able to say that Davidson’s solution, while accepted by yourself and many others, is not uncontested and the question may still be open?
Yes, and I think there are some philosophers like Hilary Lawson (admittedly a minor figure) who would say that the attempt to fully capture reality in language leads to an infinite regress, since every description requires further description, and so we never reach a final point where reality is completely fixed in language.
Sure there are differences, but I don’t frame it in terms of sides.
I agree with you here:
But “the regime of scorekeeping” is a fundamental component of this meaning. For instance, you are asking me to decide between Brandom and Gadamer so that I remain coherent as a temporal synthesis of my sayings/doings ( from your point of view. )
More discourse.
There’s no regress, since discourse and logic are interdependent. The demand for a grounding is the demand for petrification.