I was thinking about the identity angle of this problem a bit more, and realized that perhaps a human being can be more accurately described as a process rather than a discreet unit? Especially given that past "me"s exist in both a different time and location, and are materially different. For instance, me in the current moment has additional memories and knows different things than the me of yesterday which means that the neural pathways of “my” brain will be slightly different. So the only fixed individual is the person that exists in a specific slice of time.
This seems to align with what the Buddhist worldview describes. If human beings are a process, then the process continues when our bodies are decomposed and recycled into the environment. Extending this, all our components can be said to be part of the process of the universe which would then be the only truly distinct “thing”. If so, then the question of whether a clone of a person has the same identity becomes irrelevant, as the idea of an individual person is not a metaphysical truth, but rather a notion that evolution “constructs” because collections of matching gene sequences compete with different collections of gene sequences to be more effective at spreading. Hopefully that makes sense.
Yes. Same if there are two humans that are qualitatively identical.
If the two balls are to-the-atom identical, but not the same atoms, then it doesn’t matter if the first is disappeared. They could exist at the same time, so they cannot be the same ball.
This, imo, is where it gets tricky. I see no reason to say the are not the same ball. The problem I see is applying that to humans. Take that perfect snapshot of me at the moment of my death, then I’m dead. If science allows you to recreate me, even using the same particles, does death no longer mean anything? Have we achieved immortality? Is taxes the only sure thing left?
Even if your body gets recreated with the same particles and exactly same way, would your new body’s consciousness be the same as the your old body’s consciousness?
The newly created body cannot inherit your old body’s personal experience accumulated having lived in the real world for so many years.
But what’s so special about the atoms? As I say, the proponents of both of the main positions on continuity tend to accuse the other of believing in souls. So here a believer in psychological continuity would say that you are suggesting that the atoms are carrying some kind of “spirit”.
Agree that it’s tricky. As I say, we have a “common-sense” description of what continuity means and how death will be permanent, but it falls apart in all kinds of hypotheticals.
We’re faced with just a few implausible or uncomfortable possibilities:
If the pattern of brain structure = continuity, then it implies we’re all immortal; it’s just a matter of time before some atoms come together into the right configuration, in this universe or another. And, from your perspective, this will have happened instantly.
We specify that it must be the same atoms. This actually doesn’t help because we could still say that eventually the specific atoms of your brain will come back together in a heat death universe. In fact all we’ve done is add the problem of needing to explain what’s so special about my atoms.
Just say that continuity is an illusion. You, me, everyone, exist for a fraction of a second only, but have the illusion of continuity by virtue of inheriting memories.
While the discussion we’ve had here has gone in a few different directions, the main point I was making in the original post is that conclusion 2 can be ruled out given that a person is constantly replacing their atoms every few seconds. Clearly, we all know from our experience that the stream of consciousness can seem continuous even if there is a change in specific atoms, and eventually a complete turnover.
From a certain perspective, preserved identity over time can be thought of as an illusion, as you say in point 3, and the only fixed thing that actually dies is the body and brain as it exists in that slice of time when death happens.
Colloquially, though, we tend to think of death not simply as the end of a person’s last moment but the end of a person as they’ve existed since their birth, the end of a specific stream of consciousness.
If point 1 is the case, then it does lead to the strange problem of where one’s stream of consciousness goes if two or more clones are created or spontaneously appear after a person’s death. Perhaps the quantum state associated a person’s mind collapses at random so that they “continue” in one clone without any prior ability to predict which one that will be. Something like the many worlds interpretation describes.
There are a few points here: 1) Perfect cloning is not possible since we cannot possibly measure the position and speed of particles within your body, 2) Here, there is this assumption that consciousness arises when matter is organized in a certain way, and 3) The perfect clone of you is not you, but another person who experiences like you.
No. It’s even more no when you realize that the length of time required for that to happen is longer than the universe has. But even if brain structure did = continuity it wouldn’t make you immortal.
No one is specifying it must be the same atoms but no the atoms of your brain won’t come back in a heat death universe, it’s literally impossible for that to happen.
Continuity isn’t an illusion but it is complicated. You, me, everyone, don’t exist for a fraction of a second. We exist until the process that makes us ceases to be. We don’t inherent memories either, they simply are there.
Again you make the same errors in our private message.
It actually doesn’t fall apart in hypotheticals because hypotheticals aren’t reality. All you’re really doing is speculating but with no way to really test any of this it’s just pissing in the wind.
Again I explained that in the messages, I even proved some of your hypothetical cases wrong.
Well no, his conclusion 2 is physically impossible, it’s got nothing to do with our atoms being replaced. But as was said you cannot answer the question of identity by looking at atoms because even though they are replaced we remain “the same”. So it’s something else.
Firstly, while many of the atoms of our body do change over time, there are many, particularly in the brain, which will not be replaced over a whole lifetime.
But secondly and more importantly, we don’t “know” from our experience. If I made a perfect copy of your brain and put that brain in a jar, then the jar brain will believe that it is 30 years old (if that’s your age) and that it had the experiences that you have had, because that’s how memory works.
Accordingly: the feeling of persistence, and time flowing up to this moment, doesn’t strictly tell us anything.
Let me be clear on this point because I feel people misunderstand me: of course, I, like everyone else, feel I am the same person who was born X years ago (47 in my case), and that the lifespan of this human body, and my consciousness, are one and the same thing.
But this is a philosophy forum, and being strict about what we can actually know: I cannot know that this instance of consciousness didn’t begin 5 minutes ago.
I gave up talking to you in the DMs (and directed you towards this thread) because it seems you just want to assert the bodily continuity position and not engage at all with the known – not invented by me – potential problems / difficult questions for this model.
I don’t know why you’re here if you’re so fixed in your view.
FTR I am 100% open to hearing arguments and retorts to the various views on the different models of personal identity.
My own position right now leans slightly towards “No continuity”, only because it doesn’t have strong counter-arguments yet, but I hope it’s not true.
So I definitely want to hear different ideas and compelling arguments.
I think it can. I think memories are stored in physical ways. I also think there is no immaterial soul or mind. Consciousness is not physical, but I do not think it is an immaterial thing. I think it is just a capacity to experience, though one that cannot be explained by the physical properties or characteristics that we know. Whether it’s the original body or an identical copy, what is there is what would be experienced.
For me, this is the big question. If I don’t think there is any kind of immaterial soul or whatever, and I don’t think consciousness is a non-physical…anything, but is experience that is not explained by anything physical, then I can’t claim consciousness is a “thing” that is lost at death, or that a consciousness that begins at the other end of the transporter is a different “thing”. Nor can I claim they are the same “thing”.
Rather, one hunk of matter stopped experiencing the consciousness of a human (whether through more common death or being dematerialized), and another hunk of matter began experiencing when it was assembled.
I believe I have reversed my position in the last several days. Well, that’s the way it goes sometimes!
I never said that, you projected that onto what I was saying. All I said was identity is complicated. You gave hypotheticals that were easy to demonstrate to be wrong. I dont know what else you want man.
The only one fixed was you which is why I gave up trying to engage. I explained the flaws in your hypotheticals but ultimately the argument just got dull because you didn’t really have anything besides speculation. You had no point so I left.
There were no difficult questions or potential problems with the model, you just didn’t really understand it. But again I didn’t argue it.
You are not, you have one view that you are dug in on and despite others here offering counterarguments you refuse to budge.
I also already dismantled your “no continuity” in the pms. Again it just doesn’t seem like it was well thought out and you’re relying on just speculation to form it. It’s not a good argument.
Plus the fact is we experience continuity so that alone is enough to refute it, and considering identity as far as living things go is an experience then you’ve got nothing.
Like I said in PMs, you don’t have any point here. It’s just pure speculation and it doesn’t really apply to our lives in practice. Buddhism at least had a better version. Also Process Philosophy sorta blows a hole in it too.
I also outlined the obvious problems with the “no continuity” stance as well in terms of ethics and morals. Also the fact that if you actually believed that you wouldn’t be replying to me.
Nothing like that at all. I’m just saying, if the exact same particles are arranged again in the exact same arrangement, in what way can we say it is not the same baseball?
I seem to be settling on this one. Except I won’t say it’s just a matter of time. It’s possible, but someone would need to have that perfect snapshot of me, and assemble me again.
Far as neuroscience knows memories aren’t stored physically. It doesn’t work that way. The brain is a very complex and dynamic organ.
Easily, it’s not. The first one ended and now there is a new ball with the same atoms. Though the “Same” isn’t really an applicable term when it comes to atoms, because atoms are really just excitations of fields and not objects.
This is kinda why process philosophy makes more sense to describe these things.
