Okay I’ll bite. It’s because he’s not saying “nothing exists” – he’s saying "nothing has any intrinsic existence (i.e. he was rejecting a substance-based onltology, but expressly not in order to replace it with a “better ontology”).
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I love etymology, for looking into root metaphors.
The word intrinsic comes from the Latin word intrinsecus, meaning “inward” or “on the inside”
Intrinsic is something like self-sufficient or atomic.
The word substance comes from the Latin word substantia, which means “that which stands under” or “underlying essence”
No substance is no ground, no “set apart” Something that holds up everything else.
We’ve discussed this before. Hegel used “idealism” to represent the recognition that isolated entities are merely “ideal” or “mere idealizations.” So Hegelian idealism is holism. Only the whole shebang is a genuine entity, but it’s a process turned in on itself.
You recall my fondness for “all is vanity” where “vanity” translates a word meaning breath or vapor. All is vapor. Centerless. No substance. No ground. Particular entities are ideal, are idealizations. The meaning of "ideal " ? The meaning of vapor as metaphor ? Not intrinsic or substantial, not hidden in the secret core of this or that sign, but “exploded” across the entirety of the ongoing cosmic jazz.
The original texts say svabhava, which literally means “own-nature” or “own being.” Inherent existence is a translation that captures the intended philosophical sense, but it’s not a literal translation.
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“….. before I can even begin to wonder what I am (much less decide that I am such-and-such) I must already have realized that I am….”
(Edey, 2009)
“….. I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am…..”
(CPR, 1787)
For whatever anyone thinks that’s worth……
That makes sense ! Thank you. “Own-being.” Independent being. Isolated being.
Typical essay of someone who went to study philosophy because he is very bad at philosophy. As also happens a lot with people who go study psychology.
While he does mention to study the use of words to arrive at the meaning of them, he doesn’t really do it. Because very obviously if you want to understand the subject object distinction, then you must simply analyze the rules that are used in subjective and objective statements in conversation. As like subjective “I find the painting beautiful”, and objective “there is a glass on the table”, and all the many other subjective and objective statements.
Doing that will obtain the meanings of the word subjective and objective in practise. And then the concepts of subjective and objective can be put into a coherent conceptual scheme, and further evaluated for errors, and evaluated for consistency with other knowledge like science.
The rules for subjectivity and objectivity are very simple, the evidence for them is directly available to everyone in conversation, so that it is a complete lack of philisophical skill not to have found them.
It strikes me that distinctions like mind/matter or subject/object are meaningful, not because they are metaphysically fundamental, but because they are functionally prevalent, which seems to be the case because they are so darn useful.
I am incredibly sceptical of the project of determining some metaphysical bedrock upon which we can build our philosophical castles. This seems entirely like the wrong approach. Maybe I’m not looking at it correctly, but I can’t see a single example of this project actually bearing any fruit.
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Nagarjuna would say they have only a conventional existence – i.e. they have no being “from their own side” (which translates to “they are not substances in the philosophical sense of the word”). This is not a dismissal of their existence (i.e. it is not nihilism) – it is to say that they have relevance only within the framework within which they arise. It just denies them any “solid ground.”
Nagarjuna would say the account is “empty of self-being” (has no solid ground) But he also cautions us against thinking that his own account of “emptiness” has any self-being. It is no exception – emptiness is itself empty.
I’m not sure that I think a conventional/substance distinction is any different. I’m not sure there is any “solid ground” is my point. I think rather there is a desire or expectation of such a thing, and I think that expectation leads us astray frequently.
That was the second point I made – emptiness is itself empty.
I wouldn’t call that the same thing. I’m actually pretty dubious at the idea that the position I arrive at after looking at primarily western philosophy of the past few hundred years would be meaningfully similar to a philosophical position that came out of an ancient religious tradition. I don’t disagree about emptiness, I just think in context it’s a considerably different point.
We seem to have arrived at diametrically opposite positions then. I’d be interested to hear more about your position.
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Not sure what else I have to say about it. I’m not an academic. I haven’t written a paper. I am just an autodidact that is interested in philosophy and have developed views. This particular one is pretty much Quine’s web of beliefs, at least to the degree and in the way I understand it.
Then our positions may not be diametrically opposed after all. There is a kind of “family resemblance” between Quine’s web of belief and Nagarjuna’s notion of conventional truth. Both are anti-foundational, although Nagarjuna is more radical and would likely regard the “core” of Quine’s web as a vestigial reification and accuse Quine of “residual clinging” (Pali: upadana). To bring in a third character, I would include William James’ pragmatism in that “family resemblance” regardless of Quine’s protestations.
I don’t think they’re diametrically opposed, I just don’t think they’re the same, and I think historical context, in this case, is a big consideration. Quine’s view isn’t just correct, IMO, it is a shrewd diagnosis and response to the philosophy being done where and when he proposed it (and still, I think).