# Solar eclipse of August 12, 2026 and Realism
**URL:** https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264
**Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology
**Created:** [August 12, 2026, 7:37am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264 "2026-08-12T07:37:08Z")
**Posts on this page:** 20
**Page:** 5
### Author:  [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 11:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/82 "2026-08-14T11:48:17Z")
đI know a bit of the last two, not much of the first.
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### Author:  [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 12:05pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/83 "2026-08-14T12:05:55Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> The number of follicles on your head right now is either odd or even, yet no one has counted, hence it is unknown; a truth absent of anyoneâs attitude toward it, named without being observed.
The electronâs spin is either up or down, yet no one has measured it, hence it is unknown; a truth absent of anyoneâs attitude towards it, named without being observed.
Doesnât quite work (unless there are non-local hidden variables). So clearly we have precedence for the anti-realist view.
Those who argue that this is only true at the smallest scales (and so against anything like Everettâs universal wave-function (and many worlds)) are taking a metaphysical position that strictly speaking is beyond the realm of scientific falsifiability.
Certainly like the electron example above, and as Wayfarer mentioned, that some âA or Bâ is true doesnât suffice to show that realism is true. Counterfactual definiteness requires something more substantial.
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### Author:  [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 12:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/84 "2026-08-14T12:08:15Z")
No, I canât name a thing that canât have a name.
So you hold that there are no unknowns; what follows is that you know everything. Well done. [Fitchâs Paradox](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitch-paradox/) awaits.
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### Author:  [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 12:10pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/85 "2026-08-14T12:10:34Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> So you hold that there are no unknowns; what follows is that you know everything. Well done. [Fitchâs Paradox](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitch-paradox/) awaits.
Thatâs a misrepresentation of the paradox. The conclusion is âall truths are knownâ not âI know everythingâ.
If I know half of everything and if you know the other half of everything then everything is known but neither of us knows everything.
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### Author:  [@PatternChaser](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/PatternChaser)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 1:19pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/86 "2026-08-14T13:19:32Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> Thereâs a basic difference between belief and truth.
Yes, belief is what we _think_ is true, while truth is what we _know_ to be true.
Having said that, this simple definition hides significant problems. For a start, what is truth? Next, how do we âknowâ itâs âtrueâ? Here we are heading for an assertion that we have knowledge â verifiable and maybe testable knowledge â of Actual or Objective Reality, which many philosophers consider ⌠overly optimistic.
But Iâm sure this was not the intended direction for these comments, or this topic. So Iâll stop here.
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### Author:  [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 9:40pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/87 "2026-08-14T21:40:10Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> So you hold that there are no unknowns; what follows is that you know everything. Well done.
Iâve said many times, the in itself neither exists nor doesnât exist. There are many things that are unknown, but the word âthingsâ is being used figuratively in this context, because without further information, it canât be ascertained whether there was something unknown that has become known, or nothing whatever. Itâs not blanket scepticism, but the suspension of judgement with regards to what is not evident.
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### Author:  [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 10:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/88 "2026-08-14T22:21:35Z")
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> Yes, belief is what we _think_ is true, while truth is what we _know_ to be true.
Thereâs a bit of circularity in the claim that to be true is to be known to be true. Are there truths that are unknown? Or do we know everything?
Also, we only know true things, to be sure â that seems to be the difference between what we believe and what we know. So if we are to be able to distinguish what we believe from what we know, we must be able to tell which of those things we believe are the ones that are true; and yet if we believe something, we already hold it to be true. So it seems we still need a difference between what we hold to be true and what is indeed trueâŚ
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> âŚwhat is truth?
The best answer we have at hand is that given by Tarski. âThe cat is on the matâ is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. It seems undeniable, if apparently uninformative. The threads Iâve made on Davidson offer a bit more detail.
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> âŚhow do we âknowâ itâs âtrueâ?
There seems to be an expectation that this question has a general answer. But why should it? Why should there be only one reason, or one way, to decide if something is true? We use whatever methods are appropriate to the domain at hand.
But also, notice again that there is a difference between something being true and it being known to be true. There are things we donât know, and hence there are things that are true, yet unknown. So âIs it trueâ and âHow we know it is true?â ask different questions.
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> âŚmany philosophersâŚ
Itâs actually an area of unusual agreement amongst professional philosophers. [See the Philpapers survey](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4846). Scepticism and idealism are far more prominent amongst the denizens of amateur fora than amongst those who do this stuff for a living. Folk will disparage this fact, claiming that the professionals have all been paid off or some such conspiracy, but it remains that those who study such things are remarkably less likely than those hereabouts to claim to know nothing.
A good first year course in philosophy will instil considerable scepticism. A good continuation beyond that will provide alternatives.
Iâll repeat the first point I made here: we can correct our errors only because there is a difference between what is true and what is believed. The flip side of this is that those who suppose that we only have access to what we believe, and not to truth, cannot self-correct.
So I will maintain, in response to the OP, that the Solar Eclipse happened, and that we know it happened, and that it happened whether one believes it to have happened or not.
Iâm already making plans for the Solar Eclipse that will occur hereabouts the year after next.
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### Author:  [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)
#### Post date: [August 14, 2026, 10:39pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/89 "2026-08-14T22:39:19Z")
I really donât much care if it is called realism or something else. I made two points in response to the OP and subsequent discussion. The first is that there is a purpose to differentiating belief from truth. The second is that there are things that are true yet not subject to some propositional attitude - not believed, known, doubted, or what have you.
Before anyone computed the ten-trillionth digit of pi, was it already some specific digit, or did it become that digit upon computation? If piâs digits are fixed by the definition of pi and the axioms of arithmetic, the value was already fixed â the computation discovers it, doesnât constitute it. Thatâs an argument about the nature of mathematical truth, not a pointed-to example.
Suppose, for reductio, all truths are knowable. Take any unknown truth p. Then âp and p is unknownâ is itself true. If that conjunction is knowable, then someone could know both p and that p is unknown. But knowing p is unknown entails p is not known, contradicting the fact that they just came to know it. Hence, the conjunction is unknowable, and if thereâs even one unknown truth, then there are unknowable truths. And if instead there are _no_ unknown truths, then everything true is already known, which is absurd; nobody thinks the totality of arithmetic, history, and physics is already known. Fitch has a point.
There are true propositions. And we know what some of them are. The alternative is incoherent.
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### Author:  [@PatternChaser](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/PatternChaser)
#### Post date: [August 15, 2026, 11:40am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/90 "2026-08-15T11:40:40Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> > [@PatternChaser](#):
> >
> > Now Iâve thought about it, no there can be no eclipse without perspective.
>
> Shadow of moon passing over Earth happens regardless of where a perspective is.
Perhaps, but you will only âseeâ an eclipse if your perspective â your literal point of view; the point from which your observations are made â lies within that âshadowâ. Light propagates in a rectilinear fashion, as I learned in GCE Physics, 50â60 years ago.
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### Author:  [@PatternChaser](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/PatternChaser)
#### Post date: [August 15, 2026, 11:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/91 "2026-08-15T11:57:59Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> Thereâs a bit of circularity in the claim that to be true is to be known to be true. Are there truths that are unknown? Or do we know everything?
Of course there are truths that are unknown to you, or to me, and so we may conclude that you or I cannot know that a truth unknown to you or I is true, and known to be so.
\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
> [@Banno](#):
>
> > [@PatternChaser](#):
> >
> > âŚhow do we âknowâ itâs âtrueâ?
>
> There seems to be an expectation that this question has a general answer. But why should it? Why should there be only one reason, or one way, to decide if something is true? We use whatever methods are appropriate to the domain at hand.
Yes, but outside of the appropriateness of your methods, how do we know that _these_ methods, in _this_ domain, return a TRUE result? _That_ was my question.
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> Here we are heading for an assertion that we have knowledge â verifiable and maybe testable knowledge â of Actual or Objective Reality, which many philosophers consider ⌠overly optimistic.
> [@Banno](#):
>
> Itâs actually an area of unusual agreement amongst professional philosophers.
I restored the full quote (of my text), so that we can see that my comments are aimed at the metaphysical discussion concerning Objective Reality. Where âObjectiveâ (capital âOâ) means something like _correspondence with **that which is actually is** , regardless of our thoughts, ideas, theories and opinions_, often called âObjectivismâ.
Scepticism is another matter, I think. And I think itâs that which you are referring to here?
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### Author:  [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)
#### Post date: [August 15, 2026, 12:16pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/92 "2026-08-15T12:16:15Z")
> [@Banno](#):
>
> Before anyone computed the ten-trillionth digit of pi, was it already some specific digit[?]
A somewhat ambiguous question. Do you mean it in the sense of mathematical realism?
As an analogy, consider a hashing algorithm like MD5; you pass it some input and it provides some deterministic output. Before I computed the hashed value of the string âthis is my passwordâ\*, was it already â210d53992dff432ec1b1a9698af9da16â?
I donât really know what it would mean for the hashed value of some string to already be some value (in the realist sense) before the hashing took place. I can understand the counterfactual claim âif you were to input the string âthis is my passwordâ then the output would be â210d53992dff432ec1b1a9698af9da16ââ being true (and unknown), but I donât think thatâs quite the same thing.
So although I agree with your claim that there are unknown truths, itâs important that we recognise the nuances. If these unknown truths are counterfactual in nature (e.g. âif you were to measure this then you would find thisâ) then we havenât satisfied the more robust realism that I believe you believe in (e.g. âit already is this even before the measurementâ) â and we must address the other concerns with counterfactual truths, especially if we desire a realist interpretation of counterfactuals.
\* Donât use MD5 for passwords.
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### Author:  [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)
#### Post date: [August 15, 2026, 7:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/93 "2026-08-15T19:17:16Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> But youâre overlooking the Kantian point that space and time themselves are the âforms of intuitionâ, not objectively existing phenomena.
Donât see the relevance here. I certainly didnât assert anything being âobjectively existing phenomenaâ. I wouldnât even know what is mean by that since it seems self contradictory.
Itâs weird to include spacetime as âforms of intuitionâ since itâs not intuitive at all and it gathers much resistance due to that. There are always active topics from people trying to wrap their heads around it, usually without first letting go of their intuitions.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> You canât describe nor imagine anything without a reference frame of some kind. If you were to imagine it as it is in itself absent any observer, what would you be imagining?
Yes, itâs an attempt to imagine the thing in itself, or at least something far closer to it. Your inability to imagine such things is noted, but I donât include myself in the list, having given examples of imagined things completely sans a point of view. It is precisely that kind of comment that I was disagreeing with in my post.
Here for instance is an imagined small portion of our own sun, compressed to 2 spatial dimensions (all images tend to be 2D) with the temporal dimensioned labeled (so 3 of 4D).
Point is, it has no particular point of view. Itâs not what any âobserverâ would observe.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> The problem that then seems to loom is that of outright relativism or subjectivism
Relativism in my case. Iâve been open about this. It makes so much more sense than trying to rationalize any kind of objective view. Not subjectivism since it spirals into solipsism. I am open about my biases against anthropocentrist views, despite not outright rejecting them.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> There is always a subjective element in any statement about what exists.
Not so. I gave a relational definition that is entirely independent of subjectivity. Hence it being one of the very few actual mind-independent definitions, despite the fact that it takes a subject to actually state the definition. But the definition need not be stated (noticed?) in order for it to work.
My relational definition seems only to work with causal structures. So the relation 5 \< 12 doesnât really imply that 5 and 12 exist relative to each other, but a different wording can include these relations.
As for Schopenhauer text, he says: âthat what is chemical can never be referred to what is mechanicalâ. How is that justified? Seems to be begging some kind of conclusion he wants to reach. It seems to presume that magic is needed for chemistry to work instead of being a function of atomic physics, which in turn would be a function of particle physics, and probably QFT and so on.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> > [@Banno](#):
> >
> > This is how we can be mistakenâwhen what we believe doesnât match what is true.
>
> When you claim the eclipse exists in absolute isolation from any mind or framework whatsoever,
I did not see in Bannoâs quoted words any implication of the eclipse existing in absolute isolation from any mind or framework. In fact it contains several observer dependent references, such as which-world, and sometimes a temporal reference. In aboslute isolation, a statement like
> [@Banno](#):
>
> âthe eclipse occurredâ
has no meaning whatsoever. An eclipse of what by what at what 3rd point. Itâs not like Earth has any kind of objectively specifiable location, or our world even. So it has to be not an objective statement, but one relative to somewhere, which kills it being an objective truth. I still would agree that the observer plays no role at all, unless âeclipseâ is defined as a phenomena instead of a certain kind of celestial alignment.
> [@Javi](#):
>
> These, among eclipses, are natural phenomena.
No theyâre not. Theyâre natural occurrences. Them being phenomena raises them to an unnecessary level of observed thing. Most supernovas are not phenomena at all. You speak of Gamma-ray bursts being energetic events occurring in distant galaxies, but all events anywhere are distant from something and not distant from something else. Them being a GRB does not depend on them being distant.
> [@Javi](#):
>
> Did the glaciation happen anyway? I think so, and therefore, it existed.
I agree that âit happenedâ has little to do with knowledge of it happening. Ontology and epistemology are not the same thing. And yet, ontologically speaking, âit happenedâ seems to be an observer dependent thing. By âhuman-likeâ, Iâll generalize to any entity that can work out the fact that some prior event occurred despite lack of observation of it. We find a crater and deduce that a meteor struck there, despite the hit taking place long before human history.
> [@Javi](#):
>
> It happened/occurred = existence.
Ah. Human past/present exists. The rest doesnât? Seems like an awfully human-dependent definition of existence.
> [@Geoff\_Dann](#):
>
> A quantum brain is a superposed, non-local informational brain, not a classical grey blob of meat.
A objects, people, brains, rocks, anything with extension, is in some kind of state of superposition relative to parts elsewhere, all presuming non-counterfactual interpretations, which deny superposition I think.
I donât think you mean that. A brain is almost entirely a classical thing. Yea, its parts are in superposition relative to each other, but none of its function is dependent on how those superpositions collapse. Itâs very much like a computer in that way, composed only of components which retain classical behavior and average-away (rather than amplify) any randomness.
You seem to be speaking of systems that do leverage the randomness, such as a quantum computer. So a biological version of same. I think I read that plants do this, as a vital part of photosynthesis.
> [@Geoff\_Dann](#):
>
> Technically the brain needs to model the world, with the agent/self/organism in that model as an entity persisting over time, it must be aware of multiple possible (superposed) futures, and be able to assign non-computable value to them.
Thatâs a lot of capability to give to a Cambrian level organism.
> [@Geoff\_Dann](#):
>
> it must be aware of multiple possible (superposed) futures, and be able to assign non-computable value to them.
Iâm not on board with humans being able to do that. I donât buy the premise put forth by Penrose-Lucas that essentially says humans can do what a Turing machine cannot. Itâs conjecture, not something demonstrated. If itâs actually the case, then quantum theory (not just MWI) is indeed probably wrong.
So apparently youâre describing a biocentric consciousness-causing-collapse interpretation, if not the same as the Wigner interpretation, which can be driven to solipsism. You should familiarize yourself with how that was done to see if your interpretation is somehow not susceptible to the same logic.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> > [@Banno](#):
> >
> > What Iâve said is that there are things that are true, but whoâs truth is unverified, unbelieved, unobserved, or otherwise removed from any attitude we might have towards it.
>
> But you would not be able to name one of them.
By definition obviously.
> [@Javi](#):
>
> > [@Wayfarer](#):
> >
> > > [@Javi](#):
> > >
> > > However, the new humans would never be aware of the previous glaciation.
> >
> > Which philosophers, do you think, would deny such a claim, and on what grounds?
>
> Perhaps those who follow anti-realism and subsequent grounds.
>
> @noAxioms, for instance
If the claim is that a new race of humans would not be able to chart the glaciation history of Earth, why not, when we can do it now?
What does my anti-objective-realism stance have to do with it at all?
@Wayfarer seems to understand the relevance of realism to the question at hand. I donât. Just ignorant I guess.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> Which of them [from the philosophical literature] do you think disputes realism?
Yea, I got what you meant there. Tickled that Javi considered me a philosopher at all, armchair or otherwise. If I were to answer this question not asked of me, I donât know since I pay little attention to the literature, the vast majority of which was written by people ignorant of modern physics.
Never took a philosophy course in school since the courses all seem bent on history of philosophy and not just learning how to think.
I looked up Dummett, who at a glance seems to define âis realâ to mean empirically real, a very mind dependent definition, and something I would call âreal to meâ since empirical only matters to an observer, and my definition is not dependent on observation.
> [@Scorpion](#):
>
> > âDoes the moon exist when weâre not observing it?â
>
> Ties up with the observer effect of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM.
Copenhagen (unlike most of the others) is an epistemic interpretation. Sans observer, there is nothing to know about a system. There is no observer effect (system collapsing due to observation), but the observer IS the effect: Observation collapses what is known about the system.
> [@](#):
>
> The electron becomes a particle when you observe it, is a wave when you donât.
This is just wrong. An electron is neither, and behaves similar to a particle in some situations and similar to a wave in others.
> [@Michael](#):
>
> The electronâs spin is either up or down
What an entirely counterfactual statement. I disagree. Superposition (a possibility, not a claim) is not this or that. Itâs both/neither until measured. Yes, a counterfactual interpretation would say itâs either up or down.
> [@Michael](#):
>
> Doesnât quite work (unless there are non-local hidden variables). So clearly we have precedence for the anti-realist view.
Thatâs talking about scientific realism (counterfactuals), a different sort. So for instance, MWI is not counterfactual, so in not real by your usage. But it asserts the (objective?) reality of the universal wave function. Thatâs the kind of realism I deny.
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> Perhaps, but you will only âseeâ an eclipse if your perspective â your literal point of view; the point from which your observations are made â lies within that âshadowâ.
Are you implying that an unobserved shadow of the moon passing over Earth is not an eclipse? Does it need to be observed by somebody within that shadow? Worse, observed by you?
> [@Michael](#):
>
> > [@Banno](#):
> >
> > Before anyone computed the ten-trillionth digit of pi, was it already some specific digit[?]
>
> A somewhat ambiguous question. Do you mean it in the sense of mathematical realism?
Real or not, the 2nd digit to the right of the decimal point is factually 4. Like Banno, I find it hard to reach for an objective truth without resorting mathematics. Yes, the ten-trillionth is some specific digit. Itâs fact. Whether or not it exist is up to whoever is deciding today what all to stamp that label on.
> [@Michael](#):
>
> Before I computed the hashed value of the string âthis is my passwordâ, was it already â210d53992dff432ec1b1a9698af9da16â?
128 bit hash. Weak. Moot, I know. Yes, given a specific hash algorithm (there are countless ones), it was âalreadyâ that. I put âalreadyâ in scare quotes because the word implies that it became that hash at some time prior to you computing it for that specific phrase. No, not already. That value just IS the hash of that phrase.
> [@Michael](#):
>
> I can understand the counterfactual claim âif you were to input the string âthis is my passwordâ then the output would be â210d53992dff432ec1b1a9698af9da16ââ being true (and unknown), but I donât think thatâs quite the same thing.
Point is not that the hash of the password is unknown, but rather that the password is unknown given the hash. Itâs a 1-way algorithm. P effortlessly generates H, but H generating P requires unreasonable effort (not entirely unreasonable with just 128 bits).
Whole books can be hashed in this manner, reduced to a single 128 bit hash value.
---
### Author:  [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)
#### Post date: [August 15, 2026, 10:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/94 "2026-08-15T22:59:11Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> I certainly didnât assert anything being âobjectively existing phenomenaâ. I wouldnât even know what is mean by that since it seems self contradictory.
So you donât think the statement âwater boils at 100c at an atmospheric pressure of 101.325 kPaâ is valid?
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> Point is, it has no particular point of view. Itâs not what any âobserverâ would observe.
Sure â no observer could actually _see_ what is represented in that diagram. But that doesnât make it _perspectiveless_. It is still a representation constructed from a particular standpoint: two spatial dimensions have been selected, the temporal dimension has been singled out and labelled, and the four-dimensional object has been projected into a form accessible to us. The fact that no human observer could literally see the resulting configuration is irrelevant. It still has an implied observer, in other words, it is seen _as if_ from a perspective.
> We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves, would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. ~ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trs Guyer), A42
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### Author:  [@PatternChaser](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/PatternChaser)
#### Post date: [August 16, 2026, 11:13am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/95 "2026-08-16T11:13:51Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> > [@PatternChaser](#):
> >
> > Perhaps, but you will only âseeâ an eclipse if your perspective â your literal point of view; the point from which your observations are made â lies within that âshadowâ.
>
> Are you implying that an unobserved shadow of the moon passing over Earth is not an eclipse? Does it need to be observed by somebody within that shadow? Worse, observed by you?
Just as the hands of an old-fashioned clock cross every 65 minutes or so, an eclipse is a visual curiosity, nothing more. And so yes, being a _visual_ curiosity, it has to be seen or âobservedâ. Otherwise thereâd be no point, would there? đ
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### Author:  [@Geoff\_Dann](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Geoff_Dann)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2026, 9:55am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/96 "2026-08-18T09:55:32Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> Iâm not on board with humans being able to do that. I donât buy the premise put forth by Penrose-Lucas that essentially says humans can do what a Turing machine cannot. Itâs conjecture, not something demonstrated. If itâs actually the case, then quantum theory (not just MWI) is indeed probably wrong.
I agree that Penroseâs proof (involving mathematicians and Godel sentences) probably doesnât work, but I believe it is obvious that heâs correct anyway. Conscious humans are capable of all sorts of things AI is not, such as understanding meaning and value, genuine creativity and intuition, and effortlessly avoiding the Frame Problem. I am therefore assuming it is correct as a structural hypothesis, to see what follows, rather than claiming it is a scientific/logical fact.
> [@](#):
>
> So apparently youâre describing a biocentric consciousness-causing-collapse interpretation, if not the same as the Wigner interpretation, which can be driven to solipsism. You should familiarize yourself with how that was done to see if your interpretation is somehow not susceptible to the same logic.
I am very familiar with the exact problem Wigner suffered from. I am not susceptible to the same logic for two reasons. Firstly I do not claim consciousness _causes_ collapse. I take von Neumannâs position that consciousness is the only place an otherwise infinite chain of physical observers can end, which does not imply dualism in the same way, because the trigger can be internal/logical rather than external consciousness âpokingâ the system. Secondly I provide a formalisation of exactly how to avoid the Wignerâs friend problem. It is called [Competition-resolved Collapse](https://www.twophasecosmology.com/en/2PC-concepts/competition-resolved-collapse).
---
### Author:  [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2026, 8:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/97 "2026-08-18T20:50:58Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> So you donât think the statement âwater boils at 100c at an atmospheric pressure of 101.325 kPaâ is valid?
Not objectively, no. It seems valid enough in this world, even if âatmosphericâ shouldnât be in that statement. Pressure is pressure (another non-objective statement).
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> The fact that no human observer could literally see the resulting configuration is irrelevant. It still has an implied observer, in other words, it is seen _as if_ from a perspective.
I disagree with the implied observer. Sure, the diagram is observed, but that which was depicted does not. You cannot identify a point (event?) that acts as the perspective point, but you can identify the point in space where the observer observes not the sun, but the diagram of it. The difference between the two is the same difference between X and concept of X.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> _if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves, would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us_. ~ Kant
If I read this right, Kant says sans observation, this and that would âdisappearâ. To that I sort of agree (Disappear implies that it appeared before, and ceased to do so). That the objects in question still relate to each other, Kant seems to suggest not. With that I disagree. But not sure if heâs suggesting that. The quote seems to only be about appearances. I do no see, especially from Kant, any support to the claim that a thing cannot be imagined without assigning a point of view.
> [@Geoff\_Dann](#):
>
> Conscious humans are capable of all sorts of things AI is not, such as understanding meaning and value, genuine creativity and intuition, and effortlessly avoiding the Frame Problem.
Again, seemingly stating a premise with which I do not agree. Take creativity: AI has solved some decades old problems in mathematics, taking a different approach to the problem than any human has thought of. Thatâs genuine creativity. As for intuition, thatâs arguably in its coding as opposed to what itâs learned, just like your intuition is often from your DNA and not taught.
I am familiar with Wignerâs friend, but not sure in which interpretations it is problematic. Yes, perhaps it sinks the Wigner interpretation itself, the friend thing being exactly how solipsism is derived.
> [@PatternChaser](#):
>
> an eclipse is a visual curiosity, nothing more. And so yes, being a _visual_ curiosity, it has to be seen or âobservedâ. Otherwise thereâd be no point
As I said above, I googled the definition, and none of the early hits mentions the necessity of it being observed, or of the necessity of there being a point to it. Iâm sure such definitions exist, and youâre apparently using them. Yes, given such definitions, I could agree to your stance.
By your definition, I witness a total solar eclipse every night. Hardly a once-in-lifetime event unless Iâm a fruit fly.
---
### Author:  [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)
#### Post date: [August 18, 2026, 10:20pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/98 "2026-08-18T22:20:43Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> > [@Wayfarer](#):
> >
> > So you donât think the statement âwater boils at 100c at an atmospheric pressure of 101.325 kPaâ is valid?
>
> Not objectively, no. It seems valid enough in this world, even if âatmosphericâ shouldnât be in that statement. Pressure is pressure (another non-objective statement).
**Mr Axiom:** Hello, Iâm calling about my car insurance. A stone hit my windscreen this morning and cracked it.
**Insurance:** Iâm sorry to hear that, sir. Before we proceed, could you clarify what you mean by âstoneâ?
**Mr Axiom:** A stone. A small piece of rock.
**Insurance:** Iâm afraid we donât recognise âstoneâ as an objectively existing category.
**Mr Axiom:** What?
**Insurance:** It may seem like a stone _to you_. It may even be valid enough in this world to call it a stone. But we canât establish that âstoneâ refers to an objectively existing thing.
**Mr Axiom:** It hit my windscreen!
**Insurance:** Again, âhitâ is problematic. We cannot objectively establish that there was an event in which one object made contact with another object.
**Mr Axiom:** The windscreen is cracked!
**Insurance:** We can certainly record that you _experience_ your windscreen as cracked.
**Mr Axiom:** Can I make a claim or not?
**Insurance:** We can process your claim once youâve demonstrated the objective existence of cars, windscreens, stones, impacts and insurance policies.
**Mr Axiom:** But surely you accept that I have a policy with you?
**Insurance:** It seems valid enough in this world.
---
### Author:  [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)
#### Post date: [August 19, 2026, 12:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/99 "2026-08-19T00:09:58Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> **Insurance:** Iâm afraid we donât recognise âstoneâ as an objectively existing category.
Youâre strawmanning. The insurance company recognizes ârockâ in our mutually shared context. How they operate has zero to do with objective (non-contextual) meaning of rock and windshield.
> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> **Insurance:** We can certainly record that you _experience_ your windscreen as cracked.
Youâre being inconsistent with your own nonsense since if the rock has no objective meaning, neither does the experience of the crack or anything else.
So you have no valid rebuttal of my pointing out the boiling point of water not being objective fact?
---
### Author:  [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)
#### Post date: [August 19, 2026, 12:25am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/100 "2026-08-19T00:25:12Z")
I will consider your claim.
---
### Author:  [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)
#### Post date: [August 19, 2026, 1:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/solar-eclipse-of-august-12-2026-and-realism/2264/101 "2026-08-19T01:48:13Z")
> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> So you have no valid rebuttal of my pointing out the boiling point of water not being objective fact?
I thought water boils at 212 degrees F at 1 atmospheric pressure. It boils differently inside a pressure cooker though. đ¤
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