While I understand your arguments against a “foundational” interpretation of the text, I would like to make clear that my comments challenge the view of certainty as equivalent to “taking for granted.” Noting the groundlessness of belief is not presented as something like saying “nothing under-girds our ideas.” What can be said at a minimum is that Moore wants a standpoint beyond belief.
So, while I can appreciate how different theories can take lessons from Wittgenstein’s method, my effort is more strictly exegetical: If we don’t use certainty as a resource as dismissed in #30, phrases like “hinge certainty” do not fit the context of the text.
I understand your frustration with being challenged, but the insults are uncalled for, inaccurate, and rude. Disagreement is an ordinary part of philosophical argument. Accusing someone of trolled is not. You have put me in an awkward position where any further disagreement with you will not be taken in the spirit in which it was given, but the accusation will serve as a form of implicit suppression.
All complex languages are abstractions built on a true/false duality. This is provable by the fact that the most advanced computer systems and AI LLMs, which can store and process all epistemic knowledge, are built on the simplest possible language: binary, true (1) versus false (0). It is literally impossible to make a simpler coherent language.
Wittgenstein calls these foundational elements “hinges.” The issue is that he treats them as merely ungrounded “background practices” or grammatical frameworks of a language game, not as pointers toward an actual ontological precondition.
That assertion itself is self-refuting. It makes a universal truth claim about the nature of certainty and knowledge while simultaneously denying any universal Truth.
That proof only works if the AI demonstrates that it understands the language to the same extent as any human being. But the AI obviously doesn’t, so the proof isn’t a proof.
Whether the AI understands or not is irrelevant. The point is that all epistemic knowledge can be stored on a computer system that uses binary to operate, literally flipping physical switches in the silicon circuits between on (1) and off (0). This shows that all languages like English or German are just abstractions built on the simplest possible language: binary true (1) vs false (0).
That binary foundation is not merely epistemic. It is the ontological precondition that makes any coherent distinctions or reality possible at all, including Wittgenstein’s hinges. Without a true/false binary no system, natural or man-made, could exist.
But that doesn’t prove that all languages are built on a true/false duality. It just shows that all languages can be translated into such. If the translation misses out on understanding aspects of the original, as all translations do, then nothing is proven. In fact, that the opposite is the case, is demonstrated quite strongly.
We know because we can directly observe it. Furthermore, your very question exposes the duality directly. You have assumed that there is a distinction between the state of knowing (true) and not knowing (not true). You are already using Logic’s Law of Identity to make that distinction. This is what line 3 in my “Try Denying This Argument” thread is saying:
You wouldn’t even be capable of thought if this wasn’t true.
All languages can be encoded into binary without any loss of meaning. Every symbol, word, or structure is preserved exactly. This is how computers, digitized books, websites, and AI systems work.
Even higher levels of abstraction like music and movies are fully encoded in binary (digital audio and video files) with no loss of the original content.
Can you point to even one language that cannot be encoded this way?
I don’t understand why you would separate “hinges” from the rest of his metaphors, which seem to me to be circling the same concept. Whether he calls it a “hinge,” an “axis”, a “river-bed” or “foundation walls” the principle is the same: certain empirical propositions function like logical or mathematical ones (308, 340, 653, 657).
Wittgenstein’s insight that certain empirical propositions function like logical or mathematical ones applies equally to modern man and to hunter gatherers alike. Hunter gatherers and modern man have both had to take some empirical propositions for certain in order to doubt other empirical propositions.
I believe that Wittgenstein’s focus in both Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty is strictly on the grammar of language. Therefore, I think what you are referring to here - beliefs and/or actions “apart from language games” - falls outside the scope of his interest.
Ambiguity is common in language usage. it’s common in poetry, metaphor and parable. How does a true/false binary system deal with this sort of stuff?
That is your claim isn’t it, that since words can be represented by a binary system, this means that what words represent (meaning) is itself binary? Do you see the problem? It’s like saying that since the sensation of the colour red can be represented by the word “red”, this means that the colour red is experienced as words.
You haven’t provided any argument to support this assertion, so I don’t see why they would be different in practice. Whether he calls it a hinge, a river-bed, or a foundation, he’s talking about the same thing: some parts of our world-picture have to stay still so that other parts can move. Why do you see these as separate ideas rather than different ways of describing that same requirement?
I agree, but “seeing” isn’t a neutral starting point. You can’t have a “reason not to trust” what you see unless you already have a massive background of other things that you aren’t questioning. The logic is the same for the hunter-gatherer and the scientist: you have to be certain about the ground under your feet before you can start doubting the map in your hand.
Following TPF Guidelines, trolls should be ignored and reported. However, before I provide relevant discussion links, I’d like to respond.
This, to me, is unnecessarily antagonistic and dismissive. It isn’t the first time.
The exchanges about Wittgenstein and ‘On Certainty’ with its uncertainties as to the meaning of its metaphors…where does it lead us? In circles with overlapping pictures and perspectives.
Previously, I offered a tentative response in Sam’s TPF essay regarding Wittgenstein, his hinges and river-beds.
This followed effort, some research and a conversation with a helpful @Fooloso4.
I’m grateful but still not sure I have understood correctly - and I probably never will. So be it.
Sam’s essay gained a lot of attention, interest and some criticism.
I had not realised the time, word-spinning and image-painting spent on this. From Sam:
I decided to put my paper in this thread where it belongs. The paper tends to be a bit more precise than my general comments in this thread and elsewhere, which is why it’s important to write down one’s thoughts using more precise language. The area where my paper falls short is in not responding to potential criticisms.
The thread, started by Sam26, 5 years ago - An Analysis of “On Certainty”.
So much personal investment. Not only by Sam but other philosophers continuing to analyse, debate, trying to understand.
A never-ending challenge of patience and care.
I don’t think an argument is needed to support it. Wittgenstein’s description is sufficient to see that the movement around an axis, the movement of water on a river-bed, the shift of the bed itself, and the fixity and movement of a hinge are not the same.
In addition, the river-bed of thought and propositions exempt from doubt are two different things. What holds a hinge in place and nothing holding an axis fast are not the same.
Of course there are many things we do not question! Wittgenstein’s remarks are aimed at the radical skeptic for whom everything is doubted.
One issue in contention is whether hinges are, as Wittgenstein says, propositions that are exempt from doubt, or if they are some of the things or all of the things that are not doubted. And if this extends to other animals.