OK. But if it is a precondition of the practice, doesn’t that allow that it may not be a precondiiton of other practices, i.e. contexts. In that case, it ight not be protected from question in some other context.
I see that we can distinguish between hinges and preconditions. I find this a bit confusing. Can you explain?
Do you mean that Godel show that formal systems rest on something non-epistemic or just that just Witt shows that?
Yes, I think it does, and that it is - just like the private language argument.
I think there’s a but of a lacuna about the possibility of philosophical discourse. Witt wants to rule certain questions out as not legitimate questions and so not deserving answers. But that’s exactly what Moore is trying to do, and surely he has to be engaging with that project in some way. Maybe philosophy is a special context in which one can raise questions that don’t make sense elsewhere?
[quote=“Fooloso4, post:179, topic:113”]
And one can not say that of the propositions that I am called L.W.[/quote]
That’s an interesting example. In one way, to make certain that L.W. is his name, one must go back to the baptism event or some certificate of it. But I would maintina that’s insufficient. What is fundamental is that he responds to “L.W.” as his name and other people use it to call him or address him.In other words, it is certain because the on-going use of it maintains it.
Yes, that’s true. But doesn’t it rest on ruling out philosophical contexts. My difficulty is that they seem to be sufficiently well-established, for all their uselessness, to count as language-games of a sort. What am I missing?
I don’t disagree. But hinges are liminal, and, in a sense, they do have to move to allow the door to move. Of course, the physical connection is not present in our discussion, but still, there has to be a connection between logical hinges and the propositions that do move. They are not entirely self-sufficient entities.