# Reading Group: Davidson: Actions, Reasons, and Causes

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/reading-group-davidson-actions-reasons-and-causes/1696>\
**Category:** Reading Groups\
**Tags:** davidson\
**Created:** [July 8, 2026, 11:18pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/reading-group-davidson-actions-reasons-and-causes/1696 "2026-07-08T23:18:37Z")\
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**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\
**Post date:** [July 9, 2026, 4:01am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/reading-group-davidson-actions-reasons-and-causes/1696/9 "2026-07-09T04:01:44Z")

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Yes, I think @Wosret, @Joshs, and @Elephant make good points. See also @Pierre-Normand’s post [in the previous thread](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/foot-morality-as-a-system-of-hypothetical-imperatives/1401/143).

I would say that if we look at Davidson’s definition of a “primary reason” we will see the same ambiguity between reason-why-something-should-be-done (forward-looking) and reason-why-something-was-done (backward-looking). An efficient-causal understanding of reasons cannot achieve organic growth in this context. It must simply be assumed in the same moment that one points to the notion of “completed act” or “act that was in fact carried out.” Indeed, if “cause” is left general and open-ended, then it will not yield Davidson’s conclusion; but if it is defined in terms of mechanistic philosophy and efficient causality then the conclusion will be secure but it will lack plausibility for the reasons pointed out by others.

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