Putin’s folly in Ukraine

Talking about prejudice, bias, cognitive distortions, and feelings suggests a more moral and psychological approach, which I don’t find particularly enlightening. The explanatory and analytical power of such notions is undermined by two facts. First, their use often implies that the person applying them to criticise others is exempt from them or can free themselves from them at will, or else it suggests a pretence of impartiality. Second, their use can again be politically weaponised against perceived enemies.
On the other hand, competing views are just one aspect of an anthropological constant in human affairs: competition over scarce resources. One can increase scarce resources through consensual cooperation, and find ways to mitigate competition through fair redistribution, and hope for a “happy ending” where one could say “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”. Unfortunately, people disagree profoundly about what “fair” is and how much productive cooperation can be achieved through “consent”. And if individuals can deeply disagree on matters that are important to them, you can imagine how this can escalate when collectives are involved. Not to mention the peculiar nature of that type of competition which you were mentioning in one of your previous comments, which in philosophy can go under the label of “the dialectic of the recognition”
Finally, we shouldn’t overlook the fact that being partial does not necessarily mean being blind, unfair, or fanatical. People can be very pragmatic, lucid, and also fair in competitive settings while still fully engaging in competition.

their use often implies that the person applying them to criticise others is exempt from them or can free themselves from them at will.

As does the use of absolutely any analytical method. If one says “I look at matters from a purely realist stance”, it implies others are mired in an ideology the speaker has cleverly risen above.

What you point out here is common to all meta-analysis.

their use can again be politically weaponised against perceived enemies.

Likewise. As can the “Very Sensible and Detached” mode of analysis be politically weaponised. You’re not presenting alternatives which surmount these problems.

we shouldn’t overlook the fact that being partial does not necessarily mean being blind, unfair, or fanatical. People can be very pragmatic, lucid, and also fair in competitive settings while still fully engaging in competition.

Indeed. Thus rendering your prior argument moot. People can be lucid and fair whilst emotional, competitive, analytical, or moralising. There’s nothing unique about competitiveness that allows people to remain rational that other modes of engagement lack.

I disagree. I don’t think that implication holds. Maybe it’s an implicature. But one doesn’t need to make it.
One can contrast an analytical method to another analytical method to distinguish between analytical methods, sure.
However I take “ideology” to mean something different from “analytical method” and while other analytical methods can be maintained for “ideological reasons”, that doesn’t imply that the distinction between analytical methods should necessarily lead people to draw conclusions over other people’s ideology or to feel above others in light of such considerations.

My point is precisely that political weaponization is a political function, inherent to political competition, not just a psychological or moral “problem” that a philosophical analysis can surmount (whatever that means). That’s why I find it more meaningful to understand the nature of the political competition itself, rather than engage in a supposedly impartial genealogical analysis of political competition as rooted in people’s biases and manipulated feelings

Not sure to understand what you are trying to say. Normally, people see political polarization as lacking rationality and fairness (therefore they talk about bias, cognitive distortions, being overemotional). Apparently Astorre shares this view. Do you? If you do, I don’t. I’m questioning this view. I’m claiming not only that polarisation can be a functional part of political competition, and it has its own compelling logic. But also that political competition is not simply a moral-psychological problem that can be “solved” by relying on analysis over others biases, prejudices, and overemotional analysis (while sparing one-self a similar treatment).

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I like your point of view, but I’d like to clarify mine. Since my post is reactive to other posts in this thread, rather than me researching this topic from the perspective I’m interested in, what I’m writing doesn’t quite reflect what I wanted to discuss.

In exploring this topic, I try to separate “what should be” (in my or someone else’s opinion) from an attempt to analyze “what is.” In this regard, I admit that my success is quite limited, since by asserting that the debaters are moralizing and defending their position based on “feelings” and “prejudices,” I’m engaging in moralizing myself. My moralizing simply lies in Humanism.

In this sense, we must honestly admit that any opinion, to one degree or another, will be biased and based on one prejudice or another.

The next aspect I’d like to highlight is the incompleteness of information. When analyzing events and forming our view of them, we must understand that whatever conclusion we reach, it will in any case be largely based on assumptions. Essentially, we know only 1/1000th of all the data about what’s happening: from the number and status of the opposing forces to the political and economic interests of the participants. This same problem besets political leaders making decisions. They don’t have all the data when making decisions, often relying purely on intuition. This is confirmed by the failures along the line of contact on both sides. After all, if you have complete data, conducting military operations becomes a matter of mathematics, eliminating the possibility of error.

Of course, a system that ensures the flow of more reliable information is the key to successful military operations.

Thus, we get a picture in which the parties are unaware of the facts, and their beliefs, from leaders to citizens, are formed by intuition, self-perception, pursuit of their own interests, and a host of other assumptions.

As a result, I, as an ordinary citizen, face a choice: either side with their prejudices and interests, or question my own prejudices and interests. The first approach is understandable, convenient, and logical both from a biological perspective (joining a group provides greater security) and from a sociological and psychological perspective (why drive when you can take the bus). The second approach is more energy-consuming and risky: you have to make your own decisions and be responsible for them. Furthermore, you find yourself alone: ​​a stranger to everyone.

The approach I take when discussing war or writing texts is inconvenient and harmful for most communities or states: How can you govern a society in which each individual has their own understanding of their desires and interests? This is only possible temporarily: they are together as long as their interests coincide. Such a society will be extremely individualistic and ungovernable in the long term. So I support your position when you write: “I am arguing not only that polarization can be a functional part of political competition, but that it has its own compelling logic.”

Which questions to ask and which to ignore is already a manifestation of bias. You suggest starting with definitions of terms, but this assumes that these are the relevant and priority questions. And who decides that these categories are the right entry points? Why not others: “What are the humanitarian consequences?”, “How many lives does each arms shipment cost?”, “Is it even possible to talk about justice in war?”, or “What is the role of propaganda in shaping each side’s narrative?”

The very focus on “defining imperialism” can already be biased—it often diverts the discussion into a historical-theoretical debate (which could drag on forever), instead of a direct discussion of current casualties or ethical imperatives.
If we assume that alien philosophers will arrive and bring the parties to the negotiating table, then your approach seems preferable. Ultimately, it would be possible to force the parties to ask questions and provide answers, which would resolve all conflicts under threat of annihilation. But in reality, no one has such power over major geopolitical players. Even in our discussion, this is highly questionable, although perhaps we can try. Your approach only works if all participants are willing and able to sit down at such an analytical table. In practice, I don’t see such political will, and the parties need victory, recognition, security, and resources, not an impartial analysis of terminology.

For resolving disputes at the everyday level, your approach is optimal. This is roughly how an adversarial court works. But in a court, there is a judge and the coercive power of the state, and court decisions are binding.

But what if there is no external regulator? We see millions of people weary of war, seeing only destruction, the loss of loved ones, and the economic crisis. To them, such an approach seems detached, cold, and even insensitive.

Why did I settle on what I propose (and this isn’t a final position and is subject to revision)?
My approach provides a tool for self-reflection: “I, too, am biased, my feelings influence me, I only know a smattering of facts, so my conclusion is largely based on intuition and peer pressure.”

This frees one from the illusion of objectivity and the need to “win” an argument. Instead, it requires self-honesty: “I choose humanism because it feels closer to me, although I recognize that it, too, is a prejudice.”

For the average person, this provides a psychological tool for survival in the modern world: avoiding arguments, avoiding fanaticism, maintaining empathy even for people with different opinions, and not losing one’s humanity (which I define as “humanity” for myself). At the very least, this provides comfort, prevents radicalization, and allows one to move on without sacrificing one’s conscience.

If we imagine that all of humanity woke up tomorrow as strict analysts (as you suggest) or humanists (as I suggest), both would clearly bring the situation closer to resolution. It’s a shame that this is only possible in fantasy.

the distinction between analytical methods should necessarily lead people to draw conclusions over other people’s ideology or to feel above others in light of such considerations.

I agree, but what matters in any given case is not whether it is ‘necessary’ but whether it is the case, in that given case.

My argument was not that selecting one analytical approach over another necessarily involves the same level of putting oneself ‘above’ the others, it’s that it can. To counter that wholesale you’d need to show it was impossible, not merely that it’s not necessary. To counter it in any given instance you’d have to show it was not happening in this case. That brings us right back to the same argument.

It is possible to point out another’s bias without assuming to be ‘above others’. It’s also possible to not do that and be hypocritical.

It is possible to appear to take a particular ‘analytical’ approach, and deliberately imply you’re therefore above others taking what you consider less effective approaches. It’s also possible to not do that.

So the analytical approach hasn’t won us anything. We’re still in a situation where the person might be assuming themselves to be ‘above others’ and we have to look at the individual case to see.

My point is precisely that political weaponization is a political function, inherent to political competition, not just a psychological or moral “problem” that a philosophical analysis can surmount (whatever that means).

I agree with you here too. No approach can really avoid bias, we select our arguments, and methods of argument, to achieve objectives which will include our political preferences. But then you say…

I find it more meaningful to understand the nature of the political competition itself, rather than engage in a supposedly impartial genealogical analysis of political competition as rooted in people’s biases and manipulated feelings

… which, of course you will not be able to do impartially for the very reasons we’ve just agreed on. You will not be ‘understanding’ the nature of political competition. You will be framing the nature of political competition in exactly whichever way suits your political biases. You argue we can’t ‘take a step outside’ politics, and then claim to be doing exactly that.

As @Astorre points out, even your selection of ‘let’s define some terms’ is heavily biased by your political preferences.

Normally, people see political polarization as lacking rationality and fairness (therefore they talk about bias, cognitive distortions, being overemotional). Apparently Astorre shares this view. Do you?

Not uniquely, no. I’m of the view that all cognitive activity is subject to bias, we undertake cognitive activity precisely to try and confirm our existing beliefs. That includes emotional outbursts and ‘Oh So Detached and Unemotional’ analysis. So I think I’m more with you on this one.

I’m claiming not only that polarisation can be a functional part of political competition, and it has its own compelling logic. But also that political competition is not simply a moral-psychological problem that can be “solved” by relying on analysis over others biases, prejudices, and overemotional analysis (while sparing one-self a similar treatment).

Yep. Agree with this too. But if it’s the case that we’re politically polarized and there’s some good reason for that (it’s us or them so we’d better fight for us - that sort of thing), then there isn’t available to you, the sort of detached ‘understanding’ that you’re aiming for. It’s all part of the same fight. You will deliberately frame the approach to whatever ‘understanding’ you try an achieve to suit your political ‘side’.

And if you’re going to do that anyway, you might as well shout “Yah Boo - You’re all wrong!”, if that works. The aim is to promote your political agenda after all. So just pick whatever method works.

Thanks for your comments, Astorre.

Notice that accusing others of moralizing and saying that you are attempting to see this as “what is”, do notice that this is actually similar like the argument that some here are just fixated with “Western media propaganda”. It is still all about the question of “what is”, as neomac stated.

I’ll refer to something that you stated earlier:

Let’s take another conflict, a longer conflict, and view WW1 and WW2 as one combined entity and not take them as separate events, which indeed they are not. And let’s not be eurocentric and understand that the China-Japan conflict is an integral part of this great conflict.

Is then the narrative “Japan was the aggressor” towards China and “Hitler’s Germany was the aggressor in Europe 1939” a moralistic view or a simple statement of a historical fact? We know that Versailles Treaty was harsh on Germany and Germany alone surely isn’t responsible for WW1 and the web of alliances that one assassination in the Balkans then sparked into a Great War. Indeed we can look at this from another perspective, but I don’t think would still reject at all that Japan did indeed attack China and Hitler’s Germany was the aggressor in the case of WW2. It’s not even a moral judgement.

I would disagree with this. We have ample information and data about the conflict and the argument that we know less than 1% of the facts is not true. We do know a lot. In fact today with independent satellites and being in the information age, we do know far more than people knew earlier. The Ukraine war since the annexation of Crimea is well documented. There are many conflicts that aren’t at all so well documented, for example the civil war in Sudan or Myanmar etc. To argue that it is all just propaganda that is fed to us is just a flimsy rhetorical opinion.

Then if I can comment on what you responded to neomac:

These are relevant and priority questions in responding to the pro-Russian narrative (depicted as to be free of “Western propaganda”): was NATO enlargement really the most important reason for this conflict? Was Russia forced to respond with an invasion because of the actions of the US and the West? Was the “revolution of dignity” an astro-turf event staged by the West?

It indeed needs to start with the definitions. And I think the first one here is to understand the nature and history of Russia itself and how it differs from other Great Powers.

This doesn’t answer the charge. That you think they are relevant and priority questions is a given. The point was that it’s moot whether they actually are relevant and priority questions. (And if you can’t tell the difference between what you think is the case and what actually is the case, then we’ve nothing further to discuss)

Of course you think they are, because they’re central to your cause (combatting what you see as a pro-Russian narrative), but others might see things differently, prioritising humanitarian considerations, for example.

Simply repeating the unsupported assertion that they are the “relevant and priority questions” doesn’t progress the discussion.

Since history unfolded as it did, we’d like to think these statements aren’t moralizing, but rather fact. Nevertheless, World War II is over, and there are winners and losers. Had things turned out differently, we might now be asking questions differently, for example: “Was the Treaty of Versailles an act of aggression or did it lead to what’s now in place?”

But history has happened. The victors have been declared, their strategy is considered correct; the losers are declared villains, and their strategy is declared erroneous. In the current conflict, the context is heavily dependent on future events: everything depends on who emerges victorious and with whom it will be advantageous to cooperate.

One can agree or disagree with the assertion that we only know a small portion of the facts as they really are, but I’ve already made my argument above: if everyone knew everything, then there would be no defeats. But despite satellites, a ton of video, and living witnesses, we essentially have no data at all. Take, for example, the question of the actual number of casualties on each side. I’m afraid that even the commanders-in-chief of the opposing armies don’t know this figure (but of course, their data is much smaller than ours).

I have no objection to discussing these issues, either in the text of my answer or now. I’m simply pointing out the practical benefit of attempting to answer them. If we had some kind of regulator capable of bringing everyone to the negotiating table, that’s what we should do. But we don’t have one. Without a regulator, even these fair questions are essentially impractical for anyone except analysts in laboratories or propagandists continuing to sort things out.

From here, I proposed my approach, which, as I myself admit, is not a meta-position, but is based on humanism: I don’t care what anyone says or how they justify it in this conflict.

I began my analysis with the preconditions for the conflict and believe it was inevitable. Then I delved a little deeper into the history and identity of the populations on both sides to assess the internal state of the inhabitants of the rival states. That’s enough for me. Now I’m concerned with another question: Can all this end quickly? And I’ve come to the conclusion that most likely it won’t. I don’t see any preconditions for this. This is practical for me, since my personal fate depends on it, among other things.

That’s a brief summary of all these meaningless texts I’ve written. I’m sure this approach has its supporters and opponents. Excellent. I admit and acknowledge this, and even appreciate it. Those who wish to find justice can continue to seek it, continuing to dwell in their passions. But even if someone establishes the final and absolute truth, identifies the aggressor, exposes all the villains, I’m afraid all this will remain good chatter, but not a prerequisite for ending the conflict.

So what was inevitable about it? What was the factor which was inevitably going to lead to this invasion?
I looked at your first response and I couldn’t find an answer to this question.

If we are talking about “bias,” then we must agree on what “bias” is and what it is not, and how it applies to concrete cases [1]. This must be a shared notion; otherwise, we are using words equivocally, without really understanding each other. The same goes for “partial” and “impartial” (which I do not take as synonyms of “biased” and “unbiased”). And if we are all biased and partial, these notions risk losing their discriminatory power and therefore becoming meaningless.
My starting point is to take political competition as other competitive games, where one can be politically “partial” in the sense of pursuing the objectives of one part or participant at the expense of other parts or participants in the game (therefore, impartial would equate to “cooperative”; both notions admit degrees, of course). Still, political competition, like other competitive games, has “shared rules,” so one can understand and apply such rules in a “shared” way (shared with competitors) and still be “partial.” The tricky side of politics is that political competition is a game where, as a result, a certain type of rules (e.g., laws and treaties) must be (re)defined and enforced. And even though there are some pre-established legal norms to guide any incoming government or political leader (e.g., national constitutions, political-legal customs, international laws, etc.), no government or political leader can take them for shared or granted by default, especially in time of crisis (as the Russo-Ukrainian war proves). So we must take the rationale of political competition to be grounded also in some other, deeper, “shared rules.” These are the ones I’m interested in. That’s why I wrote that I’m interested in focusing on the nature of the political competition itself, on those “shared rules” that compel politicians and political reasoning independently from which side one is supporting. So yes, we can understand the nature of political competition without stepping outside political competition, if we wouldn’t political competition would be unintelligible.

[1] I take “cognitive bias” to refer to a systematic error, which means we have a shared method to identify the “correct” answer, but due to our cognitive limits, we rely on mental shortcuts or heuristics to find the answer—a bad one, though. In politics, if one doesn’t care about the discrimination over immigrants because one doesn’t like immigrants then we can’t say that supporting anti-immigration extreme right movement is “biased”. On the other hand one can overstate the crimes committed by immigrants with respect to publicly available stats and therefore can be claimed to be biased by their anti-immigrant feelings. But what if the publicly available stats are accused of being manipulated by the government or by powerful economic lobbies while alternative “independent” sources say otherwise? How can we identify political biases when evidences brought up to prove the bias are under question because of some counter-evidence?
If all you want to say is that whenever we (ordinary people and politicians) bump into our cognitive limits, then we rely on more fallible and habitual mental shortcuts, I can agree with that. And whenever we bump into our moral limits, we all have private interests to pursue, I can agree with that too. I can agree also with the idea that education and intellectual discipline can change these limits, hopefully for a better life for an individual and the community the individual belongs to.
But one thing is to have re-usable and shared methods to find errors and fix problems that we individually can circumscribe. That’s not the case of politics (in a broader and deeper sense, not in the sense of ordinary administration, of course). Politics concerns collectives with non-necessarily shared feelings, beliefs on how scarce resources must be produced and/or redistributed under historical and geographic constraints. Politics is very personal to the extent it impacts our own life style preferences and trust dispositions (is there a shared and re-usable method to trust politicians, political programs, political movements?). This can easily exceed any individual attempt to intellectually circumscribe political issues. And it’s the impossibility by individuals to circumscribe political issues within a comfort zone and for possible guidance, that makes political thinking more heuristical and political action more destructive or creative.
It’s the nature of politics that is compelling people toward a polarized intellectual attitude, not whatever level of collective intellectual laziness, lack of education, dishonesty or passion one is confident to attribute to others or oneself (and then label it as “biased”).

if we are all biased and partial, these notions risk losing their discriminatory power and therefore becoming meaningless.

I don’t see why. We’re all human. That has no discriminatory power either, but it’s useful in understanding how we respond if deprived of water. Something we all share doesn’t become meaningless in analysis.

political competition, like other competitive games, has “shared rules,” … These are the ones I’m interested in.

Very interesting, but it doesn’t in any way follow from this that…

we can understand the nature of political competition without stepping outside political competition, if we wouldn’t political competition would be unintelligible.

The existence of rules doesn’t mean we’re able to discern them, produce an exhaustive list of them, or explain them. And it certainly doesn’t imply that we can do so impartially.

If I asked you now for a list of these ‘rules’ you would provide me exactly that list which most suits your political agenda (as would I). So what use is the list going to be in arbitrating disputes or furthering shared understanding?

It might be useful as a tool, to further your (or my) political agenda, but I don’t see it’s a better tool that emotional appeal (which, let’s face it, works pretty well).

Take for example…

Politics concerns collectives with non-necessarily shared feelings, beliefs on how scarce resources must be produced and/or redistributed under historical and geographic constraints.

This is a view of politics straight out of conservative thinkers like Nozick or Haidt. I can see it might chime with your personal views (or maybe not?), but it’s not a given. It’s not just ‘true’ out of the box. It’s a view about politics which serves a very specific agenda (that of universal competition being a basic of human existence > capitalism is a natural state).

And conclusions like…

It’s the nature of politics that is compelling people toward a polarized intellectual attitude, not whatever level of collective intellectual laziness, lack of education, dishonesty or passion one is confident to attribute to others or oneself (and then label it as “biased”).

… again just perpetuate a notion of permanent fighting over resources that plays very well into neo-liberal economic political agendas… But it’s not a given.

@Jamal

I feel like @neomac and I might have strayed off topic (being the Ukraine War). My fault entirely, I was trying to squeeze some more analysis out of a post and got sidetracked. Not sure how to rectify it. Is there a way to move comments to a new thread?

Having studied history in the University, I wouldn’t be so pessimistic about the objectivity of history itself, because I don’t live in an authoritarian/totalitarian country. If you look at actual history of WW1 and WW2, there is ample amount of criticism to everybody’s strategic thinking. Especially in the case of WW1, history isn’t so judgmental on the losers, Austro-Hungarian empire and Germany. With WW2 it’s different, but likely you understand the reasons for this if you emphasize humanism.

The narrative doesn’t change so much even if either Russia somehow wins the current war and achieves it’s objectives or somehow loses the war in a similar fashion like in the Russo-Japanese war or the Polish-Soviet war. (In both cases btw. neither opponent ended the war with a parade in the Red Square, but the wars are still seen as a loss to Russia/Soviet Union.) The reasons for this war and the initial history we have now lived does stay the same. We may not know everything, but we know quite a lot. The idea that we don’t know anything and are totally dependent on propaganda that cis purely fictional isn’t true.

In Russia history writing is dependent on the whims of the rulers, but it is basically now back to being a totalitarian state. According to their history (again), my country (Finland) attacked the Soviet Union in 1939. Similar lying isn’t prevalent in Western historiography and we should not mix the nuances or just what is studied in history to be similar fraudulent behavior.

Historical truth or historical reasons have absolutely nothing to with ending the conflict. The conflict ends when both sides stop fighting.

But do you think that the history, as we know it now, about WW1 and WW2 is just chatter? Do you assume that we don’t know about the history what happened in these conflicts? That some new findings would turn our understanding of the two conflicts totally to be totally different? I don’t think so. Yes, we can even today get historical studies that bring light to new surprising issues, but those won’t change totally the way we see these conflicts to have happened.

Time and the accumulation of historical studies does create in the end a reasonably unified picture in my view. Especially when the events have no link anymore to current politics or the present political climate and when the archives are open for historians to study.

Yes and Putin is already writing the history. I think we should draw the distinction that the truth of the history written is different between the aggressor winning, or the defender winning. The aggressor (if they win) must justify their actions and discredit the actions of the defender. By contrast the defender (if they win) will seek to understand what caused the aggressor to attack.
There are many examples of history written by the aggressor, having won the war. And historical studies have analysed the narrative and the way it was composed to justify their aggressive behaviour. Likewise when the defender wins. There is a glaring contrast between the two analyses, I would wager.
Imagine if Hitler had won and we were in the first century of the thousand year Reich and how the history would differ from the history we now have in our libraries.

Yes it does, humans can be contrasted to non-humans. People can give “shareable” and non-questionable examples of how those notions apply. If ultimately you want to link everything you believe into a “bias” then you must explain to me what is not a bias. Feel free to give concrete exemples. Words to have meaning shouldn’t lose their semantic contrastive value and applicability, and bring cases of application must still shared undebatable exemples, otherwise what is the point of using those words?

How do you know? Why can’t it be the other way around? Why can’t one claim that own’s political agenda is the one that most suits their understanding of such rules. Indeed how would I myself know what is the political agenda that suits me best? I would still need to have a certain understanding of the political predicament I’m in, and then identify my hopefully achievable objectives via certain hopefully effective means. I rather doubt that one can pin a certain understanding of our political predicament on political interest as if political interest was self-evident. I don’t find them self-evident at all, and this idea very badly escalates at the level of collectives.

No, as I said, it’s a tool for a better analysis than offering a genealogic analysis of political polarisation as rooted into cognitive and moral limits one may feel immune from. And if one wants to use it to pursue their political agenda or if this should be a better tool than an emotional appeal (I most certainly don’t think so if we are talking about mobilising masses), it’s irrelevant with respect to what I’m arguing. I’m very skeptical about the idea that analysis must be driven by an urge to fix the world.

You mean that non-conservatives do not believe that “politics concerns collectives with non-necessarily shared feelings, beliefs on how scarce resources must be produced and/or redistributed under historical and geographic constraints”? So what else does politics concern?
As far as I’m concerned, what I’m saying must hold for conservatives and non-conservatives. Besides, your distinction (between conservatives and non-conservatives) and your reference to capitalism proves that you too understand politics ad involving competing views over how resources must be produced and redistributed.
I didn’t make any such claim as “universal competition being a basic of human existence > capitalism is a natural state”, nor I find it true as along as by capitalism we refer to some historically determined economic arrangement of societies and technological/organizational development of productive forces.
And make no mistakes, I don’t think that there is only political competition. I don’t think it even make sense to claim it. I do believe that people are compelled to cooperate and overcome a competitive attitude. Still I find questionable to understand political competition as rooted into cognitive biases and artificially inflated emotions.

You attribute to me beliefs I never stated, nor believe, nor do my claims imply.
But focus: I do not care if my claims “perpetuate a notion of permanent fighting over resources that plays very well into neo-liberal economic political agendas.” And even if they played any such role, I would argue that they could play very well also into communist economic political agendas (where the struggle is between economic classes), theocratic political agendas (where the political competition is between religious views), feudal political economic agendas (where the political competition is between lords), and nationalist economic agendas (where the political competition is between globalisation and national economy). All of them have to deal with scarce resources to be produced and redistributed under geographic and historical constraints, for which people in their community and outside their community may not share the same understanding. It’s this fact that has practical consequences and strategies which all political views are compelled to follow to be effective.

This is condradictory. You’re arguing that history informs our understanding of current events. You claim we do in fact have knowledge to help in this. Then you caveat that with “Especially when the events have no link anymore to current politics or the present political climate”. Well then how can it help us understand the current political climate if it no longer has any link to it?

Either it’s relevant (in which case interpretation will be biased by current political ideologies), or it’s not relevant (in which case we might have an unbiased and clear view of it, but it’s no use in understanding current events).

You can’t have it both ways.

If the history of Russia and Ukraine is relevant to the current political situation, then interpretations will be biased by the strong emotions around the issue.

If there is enough disconnect to take a dispassionate look, then, by definition, it’s no longer relevant.

This is even more obvious with ancient history, where we lack actual references. Yet we should not forget, especially as this is a philosophy forum, the Greek tradition of Herodotus, which is the basis for Western history writing. Herodotus thought that a divine justice would punish hubris and arrogance One can see how this differs from Persian or Egyptian history writing, where the purpose is to praise the successes and victories of the ruler. In a way this is the traditional form how history writing is used as to prop up the current power. That you have a separate academic tradition that is usually critical to power is more rare.

I think you didn’t understand what I meant. When we have things that are “forgotten” to history, meaning that the things and events are basically read from only in history books, when nobody is referring to these events or comparing the present to them, there isn’t the passion of the present and we can look at the events in a quite objective way. Especially when we feel there is no direct link to our problems in the present. I’ll try to give an example what I’m trying to say here.

Let’s say the policies of the Whig-party and it’s presidents don’t (at least first) reflect to our current political discourse, because the vast majority of the people do not know anything about the party. Hence the short presidency Zachary Taylor won’t stir up emotions in a way like let’s say Bill Clinton or and later Republican Presidents of Bush and Trump.

A historian of the 19th Century likely would disagree and point out many things that are quite similar to our times now and naturally one can notice what effects the whig-party did have in American politics (with the most obvious perhaps being that this party was partly creating the modern Republican party). Yet to do this one needs some historical knowledge.

Then there is history and historical persons that we basically use nearly daily like, well, Adolf Hitler. So much that we joke about using the “Hitler-card”. Yet if anyone would start claiming here that actually national socialism would have worked if only done differently, but otherwise the ideology is great, that person will be banned from this site. Now if a person would similarly start to argue how beneficial the Mongol Horde was to humanity and start defending them (which actually the present state of Mongolia would like), the person wouldn’t be banned. Even the opposing replies might not be heated, because that history is so far from us.

you want to link everything you believe into a “bias” then you must explain to me what is not a bias

Are you saying you don’t know what a bias is? Or that if everyone has one, you suddenly don’t know what one is anymore? I’m baffled as to this line of argument. Everyone having something doesn’t typically render it meaningless. Everyone has beliefs, everyone has opinions, everyone has desires,… doesn’t render these things unintelligible. If you want an example of someone without a bias - a person in a coma, someone with severe brain damage,… Is the concept now intelligible?

How do you know? Why can’t it be the other way around? Why can’t one claim that own’s political agenda is the one that most suits their understanding of such rules.

I’m not the one claiming what must and must not be the case. I’m sure it could be the other way round? Or, it could not. Leaving us in no better a position to adjudicate.

Indeed how would I myself know what is the political agenda that suits me best? I would still need to have a certain understanding of the political predicament I’m in…

Again, it doesn’t follow from the existence of rules that we understand them. You might well benefit from understanding the political predicament you’re in, that doesn’t entail that you actually do understand.

as I said, it’s a tool for a better analysis than offering a genealogic analysis of political polarisation as rooted into cognitive and moral limits one may feel immune from.

I’m aware of what you said it was. I’m disagreeing it is such a tool. You may try to use it as such, but you’ve not shown any reason why it would not just confirm your prejudices in the same way as the ethical analysis might.

You mean that non-conservatives do not believe that “politics concerns collectives with non-necessarily shared feelings, beliefs on how scarce resources must be produced and/or redistributed under historical and geographic constraints”? So what else does politics concern?

There’s all sorts of alternative views. We could say, for example that politics is about power (regardless of resources), or thay it’s about knowledge (resources being plentiful and the scarcity entirely manufactured). It could be that politics is about cooperation and finding mutual ground for agreement (again over plentiful resources).

The limits of your imagination are not the limits of human theorising. Going back to biases, it’s important to recognise that something seeming unquestionably true to you doesn’t mean it is true.

You attribute to me beliefs I never stated, nor believe, nor do my claims imply.

I’ve done none of those things. I said that the view of humanity as being in a permanent state of competition over resources is one that is primary to key conservative, and neo-liberal thinkers. You can read them if you don’t believe me. No where did I claim you agree with them. I’m pointing out that the view is not universally held, and where it is held, it is held for its utility for conservative economic arguments about capitalism. I’m pointing out that an opinion about these ‘rules’ is still held in the service of some wider ideology.

For example, I strongly suspect you feel very strongly opposed to any anti-Western narratives on the Ukraine war. I strongly suspect this because the only people you’ve opposed in this thread are those taking a more balanced view. You haven’t raised these concerns to those posters taking a fierce pro-Western stance.

I would bet my hat that absolutely any ‘analysis’ you undertake would end up showing that the West are vindicated and we should definitely keep arming Ukraine until Russia are defeated.

If I can tell that now, before any such ‘analysis’ has taken place, then what was the point of the analysis. You already had your answer before you set out?

I think you didn’t understand what I meant.

I understood perfectly well what you said (assuming the below is a summary thereof). I’m saying it contradicts your main thesis. the very fact that certain events of history are important to us is what makes historians prone to bias.

Your claim is that we can take the conclusions of historians pretty much at their word because they have reached agreement on some matters without bias, right?

You further claim that there is more clarity in recent events because they are still relevant to us (your example here with Hitler).

Those two claims are contradictory, unless you want to support a third claim that Historians are magically immune to bias along with @Punshhh’s military analysts and politicians - the three musketeers of unbiased analysis!

Except, of course it’s not that is it? Because the ones you don’t agree with are still biased; Mark Urnov who contradicts your story of steady Russian Imperialism, or Pawel Rojek who sees the Ukraine war as an end of Russian Imperialism, not an culmination of it, or Andrei Tsygankov who rejects your focus on authoritarianism and ant-West sentiment as driving forces behind Russian Foreign policy… all biased, no doubt.

The same is true of @Punshhh 's ‘military analysts and politicians’ - not a magically unbiased group after all, only the ones supporting the preferred view are unbiased. No doubt the CSIS analysis gets a pass concluding that “Russian military forces have failed to effectively advance along multiple axes in Ukraine, seized limited territory, lost substantial quantities of equipment relative to Ukraine, and suffered remarkably high rates of fatalities and casualties since January 2024”. But I suspect the AUSA’s conclusion that “Russia is winning the conflict” will turn out, on Very Careful Analysis to be riddled with bias. And we haven’t even gotten to mention infamous John Mearsheimer…

It’s an absurd pretense.

There is expert disagreement on these matters. You choose the experts that agree with your pre-existing opinion, then claim they’re unbiased and all the others are bewitched by propaganda or ideology. What’s astonishing is that such transparent post hoc rationalisation gets treated as serious analysis here.