This is an interesting discussion—it clearly demonstrates the diversity of views. I’ll allow myself to add my own commentary, which will likely differ from the usual interpretations from the media, which each of us is familiar with due to our information preferences.
I’m not trying to justify anyone—rather, I want to try to understand the logic of what’s happening.
I’ll start with the United States. Today, in my opinion, we can observe how this country is acting after the loss of its key opponent, the USSR. Having lost its equilibrium counterweight, the United States is gradually, step by step, rebuilding the rules of the world order. It’s enough to look at its actions in the Middle East or Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia.
The old rules of global security were formed in different conditions. The USSR was an influential and powerful partner, without which the United States could not make strategic decisions. After the collapse of the USSR, it would have been logical to initiate an agreement on a new security architecture. However, this did not happen—at least not in the form of a comprehensive agreement. The result is a vacuum that creates fertile ground for conflicts, some of which we are already witnessing, while others are likely yet to come.
Currently, the United States operates within a pragmatic realist approach. This approach can be described as constantly testing the boundaries of the possible by asking “what if?” What if we take Greenland? What if we stage an operation against the Venezuelan president? What if we repeat Desert Storm? This appears to be a consistent strategy of empirically probing the limits of the permissible.
Today, global security is no longer so much institutional—based less on firm agreements—as it is in the process of formation, reassembly, or even reassembly. In this process, the United States operates through trial and reaction—like a child walking around a room, exploring every corner.
Another characteristic of the United States is its extreme caution in taking risks. It prefers not to directly initiate or wage potentially unwinnable wars or conflicts that could damage its authority. Opposition movements, public groups with appropriate funding, and sometimes even entire states are used for this purpose.
Russia, in turn, cannot boast comparable economic or military might, nor a similarly systemic approach to conducting affairs. Moreover, Russia suffers from a lack of internal organization: reports from Putin’s sycophants largely contributed to the illusion of his own strength, which turned out to be largely paperwork. However, he built this system himself; it cannot be attributed to external interference.
Can this be called madness? Probably not. The desire to concentrate power is nothing unique—just recall Donald Trump’s political ambitions. But if it is not madness, then perhaps it is a lack of wisdom: a wise approach would require a different structure of the state and a different decision-making system.
Why does the situation seem stalemate today? To answer this question, we need to understand the goals of the war and its current configuration. Can what is happening simply be called Russia’s war against Ukraine? This definition seems incomplete. Ukraine, by this logic, is not a fully independent actor in strategic decision-making. Russia, in turn, lacks sufficient resources to fully counter the United States—either economically, militarily, or ideologically.
From Russia’s perspective, this is less a struggle for global primacy than an attempt to improve its place at the “big table.” In 2022, its actions were apparently aimed at demonstrating its importance—to the world and to itself. An attempt to establish itself among “civilized states” and gain access to markets and technology from a position of strength. However, it turned out that Russia is not fully prepared for this game. The conflict has transformed into a persistent struggle for any positive outcome. At the same time, for the Russian government, continuing the war is paradoxically beneficial: it strengthens the leadership’s political position and stimulates the economy in isolation.
And what about the United States? It is doubtful that their strategic goal is to transform Ukraine into a fully independent and powerful entity. Why create a potential competitor? In this context, Ukraine’s victory over Russia also doesn’t seem like Washington’s clear goal. At the same time, the ongoing conflict brings the US certain dividends—both economic and military-political.
Who clearly doesn’t benefit from this war? First and foremost, the ordinary man in the trenches—his mother, wife, and child. A soldier isn’t preoccupied with geopolitical calculations—he faces a far simpler and more terrifying choice: whether he or his enemy will wake up tomorrow. War also doesn’t benefit the millions of refugees and families caught in the middle of events. They spend their lives waiting for bad news, in a state of constant anxiety. In this sense, what’s happening is, first and foremost, a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe.
What’s the prognosis? The conflict could last for years, or it could end abruptly, just as unexpectedly as it began. It could become chronic and diminish in intensity, or it could be dramatically altered by an unforeseen event capable of changing the course of history. Its future course largely depends on a combination of political will, resources, and, to a certain extent, chance.