Paradoxes of a Multiverse

No, I disagree. The point of multiverse is, whether you can communicate with the objects or agents in the multiverses. If so, then in what forms and content.

The next point is to clarify whether multiverses exists in this universe we live in, or in some other parts of space. Or if indeed in space at all.

Lastly and most importantly, you need to clarify whether we can go to multiverses, and live as we do in this universe.

After clarifying these points first, then you can go forward to the next stage of clarification which could bring in QM and all the rest of the simulations.

Is multiverse physical or mental existence? Or is it just a word? You need to start answering these questions first.

You’re making up stuff. That cannot be the point since by definition, disjoint worlds cannot communicate with each other. I say disjoint because in at least the case of quilted multiverse, some worlds overlap, but still never in a way permitting communication outside a given world.

The next point is to clarify whether multiverses exists in this universe we live in

Again with the quilted multiverse, the various worlds are merely in different locations in space. One can meaningfully point to them. But this is a collection of worlds, not a collection of universes. So if one defines such a world to be a universe, then the multiverse is not contained in any universe. If one defines ‘universe’ to mean the collection (all of spacetime), then it’s not a multiverse (a collection of universes), but just a collection of worlds.

Similar for the quantum multiverse. No matter how one defines things, the answer to your point is ‘no’. It makes zero syntactic sense to suggest a multiverse (a collection of universes) exists within a single one of the universes.

Lastly and most importantly, you need to clarify whether we can go to multiverses

Since by definition there is no communication between worlds, the answer to this is trivially ‘no’. The answer is of no importance at all. The purpose of the various types of proposals is to explain one thing or another. You’ve not commented on any of those at all.

Is multiverse physical or mental existence?

Neither. Most types are designated physical since they are interpretations of our own world. Ultimate multiverse describes universes which most would not describe as physical. The set of all legal chess states is one example.

Or is it just a word?

The word itself is a word, but not ‘just’. It includes definitions and thus meaning as intended by those proposing them, not by your redefinitions. The proposals themselves (and not that which is proposed) constitute mental abstractions. The topic is about multiverses, not about the nature of the publications concerning them.

But you need to explain and verify, what is the point of worlds that you cannot communicate? Plus you appear to be confusing with the subjects of communication here. It is not the worlds communicate. It is the possibility of communication between you and folks in this world, and the folks in the multiverse, I was meaning.

But any worlds, if you want to claim they have existence and meaning to us, you need to come with some sort of practical explanations and proofs that can make sense to the livings in this world.

When you claim the worlds overlap, what does that mean? Do they physically overlap in some parts?

This is the paradox of multiverse. The universe must be only one by its definition. The definition of multiverse denies it. It is implying that there are other universes apart from the universe.

If you accept there exists the universe, then multiverse makes no sense. If you claim there are multiverses, then the universe cannot exist. Now what is your stance?

If you say, multiverse exists within the universe, then the word multiverse sounds misleading. Why not correct it by saying some more clear words such as territories, paradigms, communities or realms?

The point is that they needed a word to mean regions/structures between which information cannot travel. The chosen word was ‘worlds’. It’s a definition, not a theory in need of a verification test.

It’s why the moon doesn’t cease to exist relative to us when we’re not looking (unless ‘exists’ is defined as ‘currently being viewed by any (or one particular) human’). It is impossible to avoid communication with the moon. It’s in the same world as us, and many define ‘exists’ simply as that which is in our world.

Their having existence to us depends on one’s definition of existence. Other worlds existing contradicts a typical relational existence definition above: Is part of my world.
I gave explanations of the purposes of the various types in post 39. You’ve not commented or even chosen one. I’ve kind of been talking mostly about the quilted multiverse since it is the most commonly accepted kind.
There is no proof of almost anything in science, so that’s unreasonable. There is mere evidence, and there is plenty of that. Primary evidence is lack of a mono-universe model that makes predictions matching what we observer.

In the case of quilted at least, they can overlap. For instance, the world (visible universe) to humans partially overlaps the world of Virgo. Most of what has a causal influence on us also has a causal influence on Virgo Supercluster. But the parts that affect only Virgo cannot affect us. Our ability to communicate with Virgo does not increase our visible universe in any way.
Thus we cannot have any way to know if somebody on Virgo can see stars that we cannot (unless you travel there, but then you’d not be able to send your findings back home).

Again you cannot communicate if you redefine words willy nilly like that. Sure, some people define ‘universe’ as ‘all that is’, but given that definition, the term ‘multiverse’ is meaningless. In context of a multiverse discussion (which this topic is), the word multiverse means literally ‘many universes’, which requires that ‘universe’ be defined as ‘one of them’, whatever they are. Often ‘world’ and ‘universe’ any synonymous in this context, but not always.

You’re they only one that tried to say that. Use the definitions that make sense in the context at hand.

Many-worlds is just a naive empiricists interpretation of a probability function as an actuality, and rejection of quantum wave function collapse on the grounds that it may not be possible to mathematically define it. Philosophically the grounds for MW is very dubious - it’s mathematical idealism. It’s often accepted by practicing physicists insofar as it makes calculations simple, not because they see it as the ontological reality. Questions of ontology are often dismissed as beyond the scope of practicing physicists. From the standpoint of a philosopher speculating about ontology I see really no reason to take MW seriously. The moment you apply Occams razor to its ontology rather than its mathematics, it collapses… It’s forced to hypothesize, at minimum, “1 followed by 300 octovigintillion zeros” full universes existing in parallel… quadrillion copies of you typing your response at this moment. Read that number again and try to imagine it, you can’t. And only one of these can we ever observe… infact, you can level a strong critique that it doesn’t even qualify as a scientific theory. It is probably the most absurd, inelegant theory of ontology you could come up with. It’s just the embarrassing result of physicists refusing to engage with philosophy.

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It sounds obtuse to use “multiverse” for meaning regions/structures between which information cannot travel.

Not a clever choice of definition, if not blatantly wrong.

You are being too sophistic here. There must be the correct definition which we all agree. If not, it is a philosophical endeavour to establish and agree. And this must be done before going on to the next step.

As said above, there is more urgent step to find and establish before jumping into the arbitrary fictional theories of the popular science.

A false premise leading you to wrong conclusions.

Such as? Do you have some examples supporting the claim?

Not sure what you are saying here. Could you please elaborate further on this point?

First of all, MWI is but one of 9 types of multiverse listed by Greene, what he calls the quantum multiverse. This topic might be about any of them. We can’t tell because the OP has gone AWOL since post 1.

The wave function is not a probability function, but yes, coupled with the Schrodinger equation, probabilities of future measurements can be computed from it.

As for the rejection of collapse, that’s sort of like rejecting a teapot orbiting past Jupiter because the mathematics has a hard time supporting that. True, but your wording makes it sound unreasonable.

Philosophically the grounds for MW is very dubious - it’s mathematical idealism.

Why is mathematical idealism dubious? What biases are you presuming here that MWI doesn’t? I mean, I also reject MWI, but only because it’s a realist interpretation and I have issues with realism. That’s my bias that gets in the way.

followed by 300 octovigintillion zeros”

Where’d you get that figure? Sounds like a quote.
And again, why does a big number scare you, especially a finite one like that? The quilted universe (one of Greene’s list) has more worlds than that, although they stop being distinct after about exactly that same number. Do you reject it then?

Read that number again and try to imagine it, you can’t.

So the actual number must be acceptable to you? Comprehensible to somebody? I didn’t know how it works was so dependent on our approval.

This is very similar to learning that the world is larger than your village, or that our galaxy is not the only one. Each time ‘reality’ got bigger, our place in it got smaller, and resistance to the idea was expressed. The resistance was never correct.

MWI has never been pushed as a theory. It’s an interpretation of a theory, making the exact same predictions as all the others. What it has going for it is its simplicity, and what it has against it is it conflicting with anthropocentric biases. Oh, and in my case, I don’t like the realism needlessly attached to it. It would work fine without that.

It is probably the most absurd, inelegant theory of ontology you could come up with.

Here you are wrong. DBB is arguably the most inelegant interpretation. MWI is neither theory nor inelegant. Being the simplest, I find it by far the most elegant.
It being absurd just means it’s not your choice. Others don’t find it so, including me. I reject it for other reasons.

Is it an explanation of ontology? I don’t think so since it give no clue as to how this universal wave function came to be, very similar to how Darwin’s theory (labeled all the same names you just gave) is one of progression from some initial state, but not an explanation of abiogenesis, which would be closer to an explanation of how life came to be, instead of how it got complicated.

No, but one must use the definitions already given by those making the various proposals. If you don’t, you’re discussing something else. I didn’t make any of the definitions. But I know about many of the types that Greene listed. None of them are his proposals.

So for instance, if you want to critique MWI like crazedrat does just above, use MWI terminology. He does. He’s not using deliberate language derailment to essentially make no actual statement. You are, so we’re not ‘getting to the next step’, and I don’t think you actually want to.

before jumping into the arbitrary fictional theories of the popular science.

They’re not arbitrary fiction. They’re all (the first 8 at least) real interpretations, published, peer reviewed, by scientists. The pop articles may report on them, and get things wrong often, but when in question, go to the source, not the pop author.

Just below then:

No light we see today has ever been more than 6 GLY away from here. So a mono-world model (one lacking in regions with which no signal could have arrived) would be one with Earth at the exact center of a sphere less than 6GLY proper distance in radius (about 1/6th of what is commonly called the radius of the visible universe, which references a different concept than the proper size of our past light cone).

It just ends there, and anything that gets there exits reality, or bounces off a wall, or any other story you might make up. It’s a more complex model, and lacks an explanation of why Earth happens to be at the exact center, lacks a description of the wall. It predicts that everybody but you can see the edge of the universe, a place where stars stop and the nature of the wall can be observed. It’s a far more complicated model than just saying “yea, there’s probably just more galaxies beyond that, and the one’s we see going there probably are still out there”. That’s a multiverse answer.

There’s a lot of ‘probably’ to that answer. We can’t prove it. Maybe there really is a rubber or antimatter wall and the galaxies leaving our world just die. It’s a violation of the cosmological principle, but that principle has never been proven.

You might counter that say JWST sees galaxies that are 36 GLY distant, but that’s misleading. JWST sees a galaxy merely 2 GLY (proper distance) away, and moving away at 2.5c, so it is projected to be 36 GLY away today (cosmological time, not inertial time), but the light we see was emitted from only a couple GLY away at best, taking most of the age of the universe to get to us.
There is no way to prove that the galaxy survived hitting (about 12 GYr ago) the edge of the universe 6 GLY away, and that edge has to exist if one is in denial of a quilted multiverse.

Sometimes, you need to go over the definitions in the proposals. Because they are just proposals. You see what I am getting here? You should not accept definitions and ideas in the proposals just because you saw them in the internet or AI scripts. You need to think with your own mind. That is real philosophy.

Keep shovelling up what you saw in the internet or AI, and claiming that we must accept them as absolute truths is not philosophy.

You need to be able to analyse the definitions given in the proposals. If you just read them and accept them as some absolute axioms, then it is not much different from spreading the citizens ethics or religious scripture. It is not philosophy.

Doesn’t mean they are the absolute axioms or absolutely correct definitions. Remember they are just proposals? Also remember folks used to believe the earth was flat and the sun rotates around the earth for thousands of years?

Your confusion seems be also based on not quite understanding what the word “multiverse” means. We need to define and agree for its real meaning before progressing in discussion.

Yes, they all belong to the realm of proposals made up with their imagination.

But there are also some scientific theories which have solid and concrete evidence too. Hence you cannot claim that all scientific theories are proposals with no evidence, or the other way around. It all depends on the individual cases.

This is wrong. The definitions are not in any way axioms, premises or proposals. They are not meaningfully right or wrong. They’re just descriptions (like in the dictionary) of how a word is being used in the present context.

If you can come up with an example of engaging with a proposal (hypothesis) by refusing to accept the definitions used by the hypothesis, then enlighten me. Else I can only assume your refusal to engage, and I see no point in continuing this nonsense.

Fair enough. To my understanding, you are not doing philosophy. You refuse to analyse the core concepts in the topic of discussions. You insist to accept whatever is proposed in the published paper. To me, it is just spreading popular science fictions.

Philosophy is mainly analytic, and it starts with the root of the topic in most cases - i.e. checking out, analysing, investigating, verifying and agreeing the concepts and definitions before progressing to further issues.

If you condemn the process and insist on accepting whatever you listed out from the internet information, then you are just preaching religious scriptures under the guise of philosophy.

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noAxioms: I don’t like the realism… It would work fine without that

This is an oxymoron, MWI is by definition wavefunction realism. Its entire premise is that the wavefunction is a physically reality and its various branches represent separate physical universes. If you take realism out of it, you are no longer describing MWI. You are just describing the Copenhagen interpretation. You cannot have MW without a realists commitment to the worlds existing.

noAxioms: Why is mathematical idealism dubious? What biases are you presuming here that MWI doesn’t?

In physics, math is only an approximate model of reality. There are many instances in physics where math either doesn’t model something real, or breaks down - for example, virtual particles are not real, they’re just mathematical constructs. At the origin of the universe or in the center of a black hole, the math just breaks - values approach infinite and operations are undefined. It simply isn’t possible to fully model all of reality with math. Math is not capable of modeling everything - it cannot define its own boundary conditions, for example. Just like math, the universe has a set of boundary conditions.

If a literal interpretation of a probability function leads you assume a number of cloned universes that’s approaching the limit of infinite, the first question you ought to ask yourself is whether your math has broken down, not whether everything you intuitively understand about reality (including the idea there is 1 you) is wrong.

The critique MWI assumes a probability function is reality is an anti-realist argument. You’re arguing that we ought to not interpret MWI as reality - well, you’re taking the same philosophical stance I am, but you don’t seem to understand the implications of your stance. Your argument is not defending the MWI, it is rejecting it.

noAxioms: So the actual number must be acceptable to you?

If MWI merely hypothesized 2 worlds, only 1 of which was unobservable, it would be problematic since it’s still unfalsifiable. But “1 followed by 300 octovigintillion zeros” is worse - besides being an absurdity, and requiring gymnastics to justify where all that new material came from, it’s only a few delicate assumptions away from approaching infinite, at which point the math just falls apart.

noAxioms: BB is arguably the most inelegant interpretation. MWI is neither theory nor inelegant. Being the simplest, I find it by far the most elegant. … Is it an explanation of ontology? ? I don’t think so since it give no clue as to how this universal wave function came to be

Here you just seem to be confused - ontology is the study of what exists, it’s not a study of origins (that’s cosmology or etiology). The claim that “1 followed by 300 octovigintillion zeros” unobservable parallel universes physically exist is probably the most extreme ontological claim in all of physics. The “elegance” you’re referring to is just axiomatic simplicity (i.e. it threw away the collapse postulate). I’m afraid you’re not following the conversation here.

Pilot wave theory is mathematically complicated but it maintains a one simple, coherent physical universe, precisely in an attempt to maintain some ontological elegance - an effort which MWI simply abandons.

noAxioms: MWI has never been pushed as a theory. It’s an interpretation of a theory, making the exact same predictions as all the others.

When prominent people champion MWI (as you yourself are doing here), they are not treating it as a mere interpretation equal to all the others, they are asserting it as the correct theory of reality. But by conceding these parallel universes are unfalsifiable, you’ve conceded the argument - we can apply Occam’s razor to the ontology of MW, and just do away with those parallel universes altogether. We don’t need them. Wave function collapse preserves a single, coherent universe - it better explains ontology.

There is an order of disciplines known as the Architectonic of Philosophy, which is as follows:

  1. The Transcendent (i.e. first metaphysics) - the study of the ultimate ground of reality, the uncaused cause, or the absolute origin.
  2. Ontology (general Metaphysics) - once existence is established, ontology dictates the fundamental categories of reality (substance, properties, space, time, mind, and causality). It asks what kinds of things exist
  3. Epistemology - the study of knowledge and truth. It describes how a conscious being can access the ontological reality.
  4. Logic
  5. Axiology (ethics and aesthetics)
  6. Natural philosophy

This Architectonic framework is as old as Aristotle’s “First Philosophy”, was expanded on by the Neoplatonists, and further codified by Immanuel Kant. The premise of the framework is logical dependency - you cannot establish a code of ethics until you know what is true, you cannot know truth until you establish how knowledge works, and you cannot study knowledge without a prior framework of what exists.

Point being, matters of ontology supersede matters of epistemology. When I point out MWI is ontologically dispensed with by Occams razor, and you point out that the math of MW is simpler and more elegant, you are failing to recognize the logical dependencies and priorities between disciplines - a simple, coherent ontology has greater precedence than a simple, coherent epistemology. Because we are attempting to model reality, not build a really beautiful model.

There was one minor error in my post I’d like to correct. I said MWI is favored by naive empiricists. It’s actually a mathematical realists interpretation, it is anti-empirical. Although it does seem to appeal to adherents of scientism, probably because it abandons an attempt at defining a coherent ontology.

First, thank you for your reply and for considering my points. I am going to concede this point. I am using a different definition of ‘is real’ when rejecting realism (the one referenced by the ‘why is there something’ question), and I doubt it is the definition used by say Everett, which is pretty much as you put it.

The worlds exist (are real) solutions of the universal wave function, which is the fundamentally real foundation of this universe. That makes it a relation, and I’m fine with that.

OK, our models break, but the universal wave function is the actual function, not our current best guess at it. We know the models are incomplete, lacking a unified theory which would hopefully resolve the singularities. Presumably our universe is based on say a function that doesn’t break.

Math is not capable of modeling everything

Modelling aside, if MWI is the case (probably coupled with Top Down Cosmology), then it seems a strong possibility that it supervenes on mathematics, which means that math is indeed capable of implementing (not modelling) this universe.

Makes me wonder about the nature of a non-mathematical universe. Can one be described?

If a literalist interpretation of a probability function leads you assume a number of cloned universes that’s approaching the limit of infinite, the first question you ought to ask yourself is whether your math has broken down, not whether everything you intuitively understand about reality (including the idea there is 1 you) is wrong.

Under MWI, there are not cloned universes, there are multiple solutions to a function. Yea, that function may have a lot of solutions, but no count of them yields a number that ‘approaches the limit of infinite’. I don’t even know what that might mean. The wording sort of implies a number so big it cannot go much higher.

If MWI merely hypothesized 2 worlds, only 1 of which was unobservable, it would be problematic since it’s still unfalsifiable.

First, it doesn’t hypothesize any number of worlds. It concludes it from the simplest hypothesis. Secondly, by definition, neither of the 2 worlds would be observable from the other. Hence it not be falsifiable. That’s why it’s an interpretation and not a theory. Lack of falsification test.

New material?? Where do you get that? You make it sound like these worlds need to be constructed from existing resources stored up somewhere. The view suggests nothing of the kind. The worlds are not ‘elsewhere’ in space or build of different/new material. It’s all the same stuff and same place, but (locally) entangled in different ways.

The “elegance” you’re referring to is just axiomatic simplicity (i.e. it threw away the collapse postulate).

Pretty much that, yea.

Pilot wave theory is mathematically complicated but it maintains a single, coherent universe, precisely in an attempt to maintain some ontological coherence and simplicity - an effort which MWI simply abandons.

Agree. First of all, PW, like MWI, is an interpretation, not a theory. Yes, it’s goal was to preserve some classical intuitions, namely single world (without which personal identity is an illusion), and counterfactual definiteness. It started with that and fleshed it out from there. One cost is locality, which let’s in funny things like retrocausality, even if lacking in retro-message-passing, which the theory does not allow.

My personal tastes shy from discarding locality like that, but that proves nothing.

noAxioms: MWI has never been pushed as a theory. It’s an interpretation of a theory, making the exact same predictions as all the others.

When prominent people champion MWI (as you yourself are doing here), they are not treating it as a mere interpretation equal to all the others, they are asserting it as the correct theory of reality.

That’s not true. Yes, I am defending MWI from what seem to be invalid attacks, but I’m a long way from asserting any view at all as the correct one. My leanings are closer to RQM, but I don’t run around asserting it must be thus.

You don’t like MWI’s numbers, and that’s a reasonable reason to prefer something else. I just don’t find it to be a valid critique of that interpretation.

we can apply Occam’s razor to the ontology of MW, and just do away with those parallel universes altogether.

So you can. It only requires one to consider other worlds to be a complication, a needless premise.

I balk at that one. Different universe have different grounds. Proposing a need for an absolute origin seems to raise unsolvable problems. Hence my comment about rejecting what is essentially absolute realism.

I don’t pay much attention to Aristotle and others that had no access to modern physics which put into question so very many naive intuitions. Unfortunately, many since then also seem unaware of the implications of physics. That lack is what got me into these forums in the first place.

The premise of the framework is logical dependency - you cannot establish a code of ethics until you know what is true

I would disagree with that since almost all truth is unknowable, guessable at best. This lack doesn’t prevent the establishment of ethical codes. Ethics is a pragmatic social agreement.

As for a ‘framework of what exists’, well, I’m kind of idealistic about that. We designate what exists, and I find little if any physical backing of it. Sure, relations are pretty obvious. The cup exists relative to me, but it doesn’t exist to something that cannot measure it, so where does that leave the cup? Pretty mind dependent, which is a sort of ontic idealism.

Again, not asserting my opinion to be the only option. It’s one I find that has less problems is all.

And I find MWI to be a simple coherent ontology. You don’t. We’re both good to go. You don’t like big numbers. I don’t like ‘1’. 1 is far harder to explain IMO, and it being really hard to explain is the whole point of (the majority of) the various multiverse proposals.

There was one minor error in my post I’d like to correct. I said MWI is favored by naive empiricists. It’s actually a mathematical realists interpretation, it is anti-empirical.

You can edit the post still, no? It’s not like I commented on that line (at least I don’t remember doing so).

Again, thanks for the discussion.

So the claim is that math can somehow “implement” a universe. Here you are dodging a conversation on the Transcendent (the uncaused cause), but then quietly smuggling it back through the back door by granting math the same properties.

Math is a formal descriptive language, it doesn’t cause events to occur. It is inert. Stephen Hawking has a quote about this: “Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”. And this is essentially the problem we run up against when we try to mathematically define wave function collapse - how can we make math define the cause of events? The best math can really do here is to model the events as random.

Math is not capable of specifying its own boundary conditions, hence it cannot self-actualize.

This is known - Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem has shown that any complex formal system (math) can’t be both internally consistent and complete - i.e., it must rely on axioms outside of the system itself, which can’t be proven by the system. Hence, math can’t serve the function of the transcendent, math is necessarily contingent on the transcendent.

It’s the difference between formal structure and first cause. This limitation is the reason physicists remain unable to produce a full, coherent mathematical model of QM.

The irony is you rejected Aristotle, but immediately found yourself in need of something that serves the same function, so you’ve taken the classical property of the transcendent (it being absolute, and a creative source of physical reality) and called it “math” in order to pretend you aren’t doing first order metaphysics. But that is exactly what you’re doing, and you have no choice, you have to.

This is incorrect. Again, you’re not recognizing what wavefunction realism implies, you’re walking back what MW actually proposes. MW does not merely propose a superposition of many possible worlds in one classical 3D world (we can get that just with the Copenhagen interpretation), it hypothesizes many bonified, separate, concrete physical universes

For starters, in MWI, when a quantum event occurs, the universal wave function branches into perpendicular vectors in hilbert space (not in 3d space), each representing a separate ‘world’. Since the vectors are perpendicular, they have no causal relationship between them. In terms of the 3D reality, the worlds are completely isolated from one another - they’re bonified separate worlds.

Your claim that the many worlds all consist of “the same stuff” is explicitly denied by MW advocates. Objects within these separate universes are considered physically distinct. In one world you’re eating a pear, in another world you are eating an orange. Those are two physically distinct versions of you.

Again, you’re presuming to defend MW but your claim is infact an explicit rejection of the MWI. Which is something we can agree on.

The way Everettians resolve this critique that there’s a creation of new stuff out of nothing is via some mathematical gymnastics whereby total mass is preserved within the universal wave function, but every time the universe branches (1 + 300 octovigintillion 0’s times), each universes “weight” is reduced; however, from a perspective within a universe, this thinning of material is unnoticeable. That is their argument. Again, MWI is by far the most ontologically incoherent account of QM, you could only arrive at a conclusion like that by placing math ahead of ontology.

This is again completely incorrect, there are many ways inwhich these branches can converge on infinite. It depends on how you model cosmology.

To maintain a limit on the number of branches in the universal wave function, you must assume total mass / energy in the universe is fixed (i.e. there are a limited number of quantum events in the universe). This is a dubious assumption - modern physics actually suggests otherwise. For example, there’s something known as Noether’s theorem, which shows that mass / energy conservation requires universal symmetries. On a cosmic scale, the universe is expanding and lacks time-translation symmetry. You can see this in the creation of dark energy. As the universe expands, the total amount of dark energy is increasing. Which means, on a cosmic scale, there isn’t a conservation of energy.

And because energy isn’t limited, the timeline of the cosmos is potentially infinite, and the number of quantum interactions is not limited. Therefor the total number of parallel universes that arise is not limited.

So what this means for MW proponents is their global wave function winds up being divided infinitely many times. The probability amplitude and “weight” of any given branch in that function converges on zero. When they go to calculate the total mass within a given universe (i.e. the ‘thinning’ of material issue we discussed), they’re forced to divide by zero. The model just collapses.

So no, it is a major problem that you have models of cosmology which suggest infinite parallel universes. It destroys MWI.

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Apologies for slow reply. I have only snippets of time to compose a reply.

That wording would not likely be accepted by somebody making the claim that the universe is fundamentally mathematical. The claim is more along the lines of ‘this universe is a mathematical structure’. No air quotes necessary for that one.

Math is a formal descriptive language

Again I must protest since this is misrepresentative of the stance. I don’t think they claim that this universe is a language construct. The language is a means by which humans (observers in general?) gain access to mathematics, but the mathematics itself is not a language. Yes, the word ‘mathematics’ is frequently used to describe the human activity of manipulation of the language. But the claim is about the thing itself, not about the reference to or concept of it.

[Mathematics] doesn’t cause events to occur.

A mathematical causal structure is a counterexample. Pascal’s triangle for instance is such a mathematical structure, with each row ‘caused’ by the prior one, that is to say, each row is fully determined by the preceding row. Notice that it has an initial state, a seed uncaused by any prior row.

Note once again that I am referring here to Pascal’s triangle, and not the human decimal depiction or concept of the structure.

It is unclear if Hawking is addressing the universe as fundamentally mathematical here, or if it merely has a mathematical description, and fire needs to be breathed into the actual rules, whatever their nature may be. I’d think that given the mathematical structure hypothesis, no fire breathing is necessary at all. The structure simply is what it is. If it needs to be ‘instantiated’ in some way, then there’s something more fundamental driving it, breathing the fire, and it ceases to be a fundamental mathematical hypothesis and becomes say a simulation hypothesis. There are plenty that posit that as well.

Tegmark (a strong proponent of MUH) seems to disagree since he does mention this fire-breating issue in his book, and as a real issue.

If I were to critique the view, I’d ask why our universe appears to be interesting since there are far more uninteresting structures which yield observers just like us. Much of the analysis of this kind of problem comes from Carroll. I’m not sure if/how it is resolved.

And this is essentially the problem we run up against when we try to mathematically define wave function collapse - how can we make math define the cause of events? The best math can really do here is to model the events as random.

Seems to be a problem only to stochastic interpretations, no? Indeed, how might a stochastic function be implemented in a pure mathematical manner? Is it a valid function, especially if we cannot get a calculator to do it? Poor example, since a mathematical structure has access to say all reals, and not just the countable set of computable numbers. So the inability of a calculator to do something hardly precludes the task from being mathematical.

Don’t understand this point. Why is self-actualization necessary for mathematics to work? I can work with a system that cannot prove its axioms. Secondly, this self-actualization requirement seems unrealistic, for the reasons given above.

So Pascal’s triangle is contingent on the transcendent? How?

It’s the difference between formal structure and first cause. This limitation is the reason physicists remain unable to produce a full, coherent mathematical model of QM.


Concerning MWI:

The hypothesis is simply that the wave function of a closed system evolves according to the Schrodinger equation. Nothing like the wording you just gave. Yes on the Hilbert space to describe ‘possiblity space’ if that’s anywhere near a correct term.
Yes, the resulting worlds are (effectively) noninteracting at any classical scale.

A claim of a split creating an entire new universe violates the principle of locality, and MWI is a local interpretation.

Your claim that the many worlds all consist of “the same stuff” is explicitly denied by MW advocates.

Maybe so. I don’t know the wording. But it isn’t posited that these worlds need to draw on some kind of resource with which to
‘build’ a new universe, with apparently one being an original and the new one being a copy.

In one world you’re eating a pear, in another world you are eating an orange.

I have to protest that one. A given fruit doesn’t magically collapse into a pear or orange. I’ve picked up different fruit in these two worlds. Sure, in some worlds pears haven’t even evolved, but then neither have I in those worlds.

Those are two physically distinct versions of you.

Fine, but I also have no persistent identity under MWI, so me yesterday is not the same person as me today (or even 1 ms apart). So going on about identity having that kind of meaning is kind of pointless. Not what I’m talking about when talking about where the mass comes from when ‘I’ split into two noAxiomses, which seemed to be the point you were balking at.

The way Everettians resolve this critique that there’s a creation of new stuff out of nothing is via some mathematical gymnastics whereby total mass is preserved within the universal wave function, but every time the universe branches (1 + 300 octovigintillion 0’s times), each universes “weight” is reduced

Got a non-pop reference to this? Because ‘weight’ here seems to refer to a probability that adds up to 1 rather than any kind of reference to mass.

To maintain a limit on the number of branches in the universal wave function, you must assume total mass / energy in the universe is fixed

But it’s not fixed. One, there is no mass of the universe unless it is finite in size, and even if it’s finite, energy conservation only works for inertial frames (where Noether’s theorem applies) and our universe is not described by such a frame.

As the universe expands, the total amount of dark energy is increasing. Which means, on a cosmic scale, there isn’t a conservation of energy.

Agree. Not only dark energy. Objects in motion tend to slow in absence of external force, but they never quite stop. Light redshifts to such long wavelengths that they eventually cannot interact with anything. Both those are examples of energy loss, but dark energy dominates. I cannot go so far as to say the total is increasing since there is no total.

When they go to calculate the total mass within a given universe (i.e. the ‘thinning’ of material issue we discussed), they’re forced to divide by zero. The model just collapses.

You confuse an infinitesimal with zero, and you presume non-locality in the computation of weights. And again, sans a quote, ‘mass’ has nothing to do with this. A rock doesn’t mass half as much when worlds split.

Well said ! Or, as you sort of imply, it is mathematical idealism, so the physicists are engaging in philosophy, but perhaps mistakenly in some cases as if such philosophy is science. The tendency to “fall into the math” weirdly often expresses itself consciously as anti-idealistic. But they seem to need to mean the “meaning” of the math. Surely not the scribbles. So it’s generally a denial of the reality of sensation and feeling toward a core of “pure mathematical meaning.” Basically “triangles” to put it metaphorical. “The world is really triangles.”

But I like operationalism, so my critique is situated. I expect empirical science to predict and control experience.

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I don’t quite understand the connection here. The Many Worlds Interpretation argues three things:

  1. Superposition is objectively real because there are no hidden variables
  2. There is only a universal wavefunction because there is no non-arbitrary distinction between a physical system being or not being a measuring device/observer
  3. There’s no good reason to believe that the universal wavefunction collapses because there’s no good mechanism to explain what can cause the universal wavefunction to collapse

Most physicists accept (1), in part because local hidden variables have been ruled out and nonlocality is considered problematic.

Proponents of MWI then argue that (2) and (3) are simpler than their negatives.

So which of these three do you disagree with?

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