# Paradoxes of a Multiverse

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697>\
**Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology\
**Created:** [October 21, 2026, 7:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697 "2026-10-21T19:38:52Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 2

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**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 1:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/21 "2026-10-23T13:38:09Z")

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What you have stated is not telling us very much at all. It sounded like something from the internet or AI.

So I was asking about the details of the evidence and reasoning you were talking about.

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**Author:** ![WeSee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/c5a1d2/32.png) [@WeSee](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WeSee)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 3:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/22 "2026-10-23T15:32:31Z")

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Suspected that you weren’t really interested in having a discussion about the points I was making in my initial post.

Try addressing my initial post in its entirety, instead of taking a sentence out of context as you have done . Additional details are irrelevant to the points being made.

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**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 7:04pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/23 "2026-10-23T19:04:33Z")

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It sounds like you are taking it into some irrelevant issues, which has nothing to do with the topic.

I simply asked for the details of evidence and reasoning you were stating.

OK, QM talks about multiverse, but what are their definitions of multiverse? What evidences are they presenting to support the existence of multiverse etc under what reasonings?

Something like that was what I expected to hear. Hope it makes sense.

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**Author:** ![WeSee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/c5a1d2/32.png) [@WeSee](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WeSee)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 9:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/24 "2026-10-23T21:17:53Z")

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From what I can now tell, you didn’t undersand that the main point of my initial post was a meta-level commentary about the “paradoxes of a multiverse”. Does that help you to understand the intent of my initial post and why your question was irrelevant to that point? Especially your continuing to press for even more detail?

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**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 9:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/25 "2026-10-23T21:27:58Z")

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They are not totally irrelevant issues. Clarifying the peripheral issues with the OP will help understand the topic better.

After all you mentioned about it in your post in unclear manner. Hence I was asking you to clarify on the details in your point. If you don’t know the details, then you could have just said so, and we could have just moved on.

Please note, if something is evidence and reasoning for something, then it has to present the details why and how they are. You cannot just say, they are the evidence and reasonings without the details, proof and agreement that they are.

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**Author:** ![WeSee](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/c5a1d2/32.png) [@WeSee](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/WeSee)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 10:02pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/26 "2026-10-23T22:02:40Z")

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Guess I’ll take this as evidence that the concept of meta-level commentary is beyond your grasp.

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**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 10:10pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/27 "2026-10-23T22:10:29Z")

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I have no idea what you are talking about. You could have explained it clearly here if it is related to the main topic.

What is it, and how is it related to paradoxes of a multiverse?

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**Author:** ![Jbgrx](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/edb3f5/32.png) [@Jbgrx](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jbgrx)\
**Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 4:55am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/28 "2026-10-24T04:55:18Z")

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Distinction between several possible outcomes isn’t a thing for you?

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**Author:** ![hunbanban](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a9a28c/32.png) [@hunbanban](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hunbanban)\
**Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:58am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/29 "2026-10-24T10:58:27Z")

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I’m not sure what you’re trying to say. Are you perhaps assuming that distinction can be split into many parts? If so, you may not have seen this yet: distinction, at its root, is binary. Every “manyfold” distinction you can name is just a derivative built on top of that one split.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jbgrx](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/edb3f5/32.png) [@Jbgrx](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jbgrx)\
**Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:03am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/30 "2026-10-24T11:03:13Z")

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> [@hunbanban](#):
>
> Every “manyfold” distinction you can name is just a derivative built on top of that one split.

And?

What stops one world from acting as, from splitting into many?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hunbanban](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a9a28c/32.png) [@hunbanban](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hunbanban)\
**Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 1:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/31 "2026-10-24T13:37:48Z")

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No one stops it, because the binary split itself is already the result. The world we live in is itself a world that exists as the result of that split. All your cognition is formed on the basis of the binary; no conscious concept can ever break free of this bifurcated structure. The split is a result, not a source. To try to stop the result from happening, while standing inside the result, is like standing on the ground, grabbing your own hair, and trying to lift yourself off the earth.

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**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 10:39am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/32 "2026-10-25T10:39:32Z")

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The world we live in appears in our senses and experience. Do the possible worlds or other worlds within a multiverse ever appear to us in any form of sensory object?

Can you contact anything in material or spiritual forms with the possible world or the objects in the other worlds? How and what contacts can you make? These are the questions we could ask.

If positive, then there is no paradox. If negative, then there is more to explore and investigate?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hunbanban](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a9a28c/32.png) [@hunbanban](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hunbanban)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 11:53am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/33 "2026-10-25T11:53:14Z")

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The way many people understand the world runs like this: the world exists in and of itself, and we human beings are outsiders who entered it from somewhere else. This way of thinking almost inevitably gives rise to ideas like the multiverse — as if we had traveled here from some other place, and could just as well travel elsewhere to make contact with others. We simply take the experience of being in _this_ world and extend it, quite naturally, to the scale of the universe.

But at the level of the universe, the structure is nothing like that.

My own theory is that the universe itself is something co-created by our soul together with other souls. And the human being is merely the product of a soul’s descent into flesh. That being the case, there is no “other universe.” Our soul took part in creating this one universe, and this one universe alone — and it incarnated itself in one, and only one, human body.

This is only a bare sketch of the model. The details would take far more to lay out; I’m just giving the outline.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hunbanban](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a9a28c/32.png) [@hunbanban](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hunbanban)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/34 "2026-10-25T12:14:45Z")

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This model isn’t something I invented. Taoism and Buddhism in China have both been saying this all along — they simply approach it from different angles, and their accounts of the details are never quite clear. What I’ve done is clarify those details.

Our world is the shared manifestation of all souls. These souls come from a single source — what the West calls Christ, and what China calls the Tao.

The souls “fell” by distinguishing themselves from that source, and it is this very act of distinction that became their defining way of thinking. Through their collective resonance and interaction, these souls manifest a world in which difference and commonality coexist.

We human beings perceive difference, yes — but we also gather those differences up and abstract out the common ground. That capacity has an innate foundation: difference arises because souls have pulled away from the common source; commonality is inescapable because souls, rooted in that source, carry it with them by necessity.

Human thought, then, plays out entirely inside the tension between difference and commonality.

When these souls descend and manifest within this world, the result is what we call a human being. That is why a person has not only a body, but a soul — and why human consciousness inherits the innate character of the soul that preceded it.

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**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 1:33pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/35 "2026-10-25T13:33:18Z")

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> [@schopenhauer1](#):
>
> the idea that there are other possible worlds are just as real as our actual world that we inhabit. It seems the implication is that there is an indefinite infinite set of worlds, but that they are _limited in spatio-temporality._

There’s little point in commenting on an OP of a topic with not a single response to those commenting, but I’ll say that you’ve referenced no ‘possible world’ hypothesis that suggests limited spatio-temporality. So the argument commits a straw man fallacy.

> [@invicta](#):
>
> an infinite container cannot contain an infinite object, if we’re to assume that universes are infinite … that is multiple object’s mass would mingle/interfere with the next universe and you would be unable to tell where one universe is in relation to the next if they’re infinite.

One, an infinite container very much can contain infinite size objects. Hilbert’s hotel illustrated this.  
Using Greene terminology, a quilted multiverse has infinite finite size visible universes in one infinite spacetime. To suggest that all possible outcomes exist is a statement presuming principle of counterfactual definiteness (PoCD or ‘scientific realism’). Presuming that, one can meaningfully point in the direction of your nearest exact copy.

If you instead presume the principle of locality (PoL), then it is meaningless to discuss your nearest exact copy.

Most multiverse hypotheses (Greene lists 9 kinds) do not presume one contiguous container space, and many of them do not presume infinite sized ‘universes’. Therefore it would be meaningless to suggest them interfering with each other due to their size.

> [@WeSee](#):
>
> Realistically the whole multiverse thing is extremely speculative. For all intents and purposes, attributes assigned to it are only limited by imagination. Not unlike God and other supernatural entities.

Speculative, sure, but many of the hypotheses have explanatory value, explaining things that otherwise require needless complications like wave function collapse or God, each of which solves one problem by creating a worse one.

> [@Banno](#):
>
> The one is physical, being a response to Schrödinger’s equations that rejects the notion of quantum collapse that is part of the Copenhagen interpretation; it says that instead of collapsing within one universe, the various possibilities diverge into other parallel universes.

That’s one of the 9 multiverses, one that Greene calls the quantum multiverse. It is the simplest interpretation, and entirely deterministic.

I know this wasn’t your point (contrasting physical multiverse with modal possibilities). Modality seems to be the means by which we reference said other worlds.

For instance, under MWI, there might be a 2% chance that I measure spin up and 98% chance of down. Both worlds ‘exist’ (whatever you decide that means), so does one world exist 49x weightier than the improbable one?

> [@Michael](#):
>
> There’s a second physical one, which is this universe being a “bubble universe” within a much larger spacetime,

Far more than just those two. Greene calls that one ‘Inflationary’ multiverse, which has possibly been superseded by ‘Top Down Cosmology’ (Hawking. Hertog). The ’  
container’ here yes, contains ‘bubbles’ or ‘collapses’ respectively, but the container is not itself any kind of spacetime, lacking meaningful space or time. E.G. one cannot meaningfully talk about the distance between two bubbles, or which came first.

> [@Banno](#):
>
> Lewis’s modal realism comes from treating the existential statements in possible world semantics _very_ seriously; as if “I might have not written this post” brings into being worlds that are for all intents and purposes as real as the world in which I did write this.

But I’ve always treated existential statements as pure mental designations, lacking ontic foundation. One is free to slap the label of ‘exists’ or not on worlds at whim, but there is no physical test to distinguish two worlds identical in all respects except only one existing.

> [@Toothy\_Maw](#):
>
> I don’t think he claims that discussions of modality can bring into, or tease out, the existence of different worlds.

Or even tease out the existence of this world.

> [@Banno](#):
>
> So worlds are not universes.

Depends on definitions/context, especially where one designates the boundaries of ‘universe’, which sometimes is the same boundary as a world.

As for the accessibility relation, I think by definition all ‘other worlds’ are inaccessible, true of all 9 types, no?

> [@hunbanban](#):
>
> In today’s world, no theory has yet been able to fully explain how the world actually came into being.

Not the point of any of the MW hypotheses. This problem is only a problem if one asserts that ‘the world’ (as you put it) is something in need of ‘coming into being’, which I find to be a category error, treating a universe like an object within spacetime which requires a creation event.  
Platonists for instance might suggests that 13 (the universal) exists, but few go on about how 13 came into being.

> [@Corvus](#):
>
> What are the details of the evidence and reasoning for multiverse?

Depends which kind. Pick [one of the 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hidden_Reality). I don’t understand much of string theory, but a few of them relate to the consistency of that.

> [@hunbanban](#):
>
> The way many people understand the world runs like this: the world exists in and of itself, and we human beings are outsiders who entered it from somewhere else.

I’m going to balk at the assertion that ‘most people’ think this way, especially those that ponder any kind of multiverse.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 1:53pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/36 "2026-10-25T13:53:50Z")

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> [@hunbanban](#):
>
> Our soul took part in creating this one universe, and this one universe alone — and it incarnated itself in one, and only one, human body.

It sounds mythic and religious. If our souls created this one universe, why they couldn’t have created other universes?

What do you mean by “created”? Can universes be created? What was the material it has been created with? Can souls create things? How can they do that?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hunbanban](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a9a28c/32.png) [@hunbanban](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hunbanban)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 1:54pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/37 "2026-10-25T13:54:02Z")

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At its core, I agree with you: the existence of the world cannot be accounted for by causality. But the fact that causality can’t explain it does not mean human cognition is doomed to stop at the level of phenomena. In truth, cognition transcends causality.

I have a different account of the law of causality. And this — these seemingly strange things — is exactly what philosophical inquiry is for. But to leave cognition parked at the phenomenal level, to my mind, is to flatten philosophy into something mediocre. If “it just is” becomes the final answer, then every philosophical thought ever thought has been utterly without meaning.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 1:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/38 "2026-10-25T13:55:25Z")

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> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> Depends which kind. Pick [one of the 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hidden_Reality). I don’t understand much of string theory, but a few of them relate to the consistency of that.

They are all theories, which means “speculations”, aren’t they? Speculations don’t mean they are real or have concrete evidence on what are being speculated.

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**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 5:06pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/39 "2026-10-25T17:06:26Z")

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> [@Corvus](#):
>
> They are all theories, which means “speculations”, aren’t they? Speculations don’t mean they are real or have concrete evidence on what are being speculated.

A theory is a hypothesis with predictions, and speculation or interpretation lacks that. Not sure what you mean by a theory or speculation being real or not. If they’re proposed, they’re real proposals, that it, they relate to whatever proposes them.

The various multiverse types usually have some kind of explanatory value. So a quilted multiverse would explain why we find ourselves at the exact center of the visible universe. It’s an impossible chance if one denies that kind of multiverse, and it becomes trivial fact given the quilted speculation.

Inflationary multiverse similarly explains why our world is fine tuned for observers.

Cyclic multiverse attempts to explain the causality issue so many bring up. I find this needless, but that’s just me.

Landscape multiverse seems to be a marriage of bubble multiverse and string theory.

Quantum multiverse comes out of Occam’s razor: It is simplest quantum interpretation, stripped of all the randomness, observer dependence, collapses, hidden variables, etc that complicated the other speculations.

Holographic and Simulation multiverses seem to be pure speculation, possible, but seemingly solving no problems. I could be wrong.  
I don’t understand Brane Multiverse, so I don’t know if it attempt to resolve a problem.

Ultimate multiverse paves over the distinction between that which is and that which isn’t. In a way I am on board with this since as I’ve posted just above, there seems to be no empirical test to distinguish the two. But in the end, it isn’t speculation, it is simply a denial of a distinction. ‘Everything exists’ becomes indistinct from ‘nothing exists’  
One thing for it: Any speculation about mind independent existence seems to require Ultimate Multiverse. Anything else turns out to be mind-dependent (a relation) upon analysis.

> [@hunbanban](#):
>
> If “it just is” becomes the final answer, then every philosophical thought ever thought has been utterly without meaning.

I pretty much agree with that. Funny that any attempt to explain the existence of a creating deity is typically answered by “it just is”.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\
**Post date:** [October 26, 2026, 10:54am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/paradoxes-of-a-multiverse/3697/40 "2026-10-26T10:54:02Z")

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> [@noAxioms](#):
>
> A theory is a hypothesis with predictions, and speculation or interpretation lacks that. Not sure what you mean by a theory or speculation being real or not. If they’re proposed, they’re real proposals, that it, they relate to whatever proposes them.

Theory is a word originated from Greek word “theoria”, meaning to view, speculate, reflect or observe. Hypothesis with prediction doesn’t mean they are real, just because it is proposed, it is not real, existing in the world or practical.

I could propose a hypothesis with a prediction that Garden of Eden exists, and I make up a patch of land, plant some apple trees and bushes, and put a man and woman in the boundary, and predict that they will eat the apple tree, and then God will come down to them to interrogate and scold them. That doesn’t mean it is real, or existing in the real world.

All simulation is just out of imagination, dramas and scenarios for fictions. Just because you supplied some hypothesis and prediction, that doesn’t mean it is real life happenings in the world.

Other points later.

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