# On Pure Potentiality, Pure Actuality, Sustainer, and Creator

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-pure-potentiality-pure-actuality-sustainer-and-creator/4097>\
**Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology\
**Created:** [November 16, 2026, 11:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-pure-potentiality-pure-actuality-sustainer-and-creator/4097 "2026-11-16T23:38:06Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![MoK](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/mok/32/578_2.png) [@MoK](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/MoK)\
**Post date:** [November 16, 2026, 11:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-pure-potentiality-pure-actuality-sustainer-and-creator/4097/1 "2026-11-16T23:38:06Z")

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Here, I would like to discuss the existence of the Creator and the Sustainer based on the fact that physical substance has pure potentiality. First, I have to show that nothing cannot turn into something. I discussed this in another thread in the archive [here](https://archive.thephilosophyforum.com/discussions/14969-nothing-to-something-is-logically-impossible.html). The original argument in that thread was the subject of extensive discussion and revision, and we eventually managed to finalize two versions of the argument; one of them is mine, and another is from Bob Ross. Here you can find my argument and his argument in order.

My version:

P1) Time is needed for change  
P2) There is no time in nothing  
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (from P1 and P2)  
P3) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing  
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P3 and C1)

Bob Ross version:

P1) If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality  
P2) ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence  
C1) Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality

P3) Change requires temporality  
P4) ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality  
C2) Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change

P5) ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change  
P6) ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change  
C3) Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something)

So there was something instead of nothing. Now that we established that something existed, we have to investigate things further. There are four types of existence: Pure actual, actual, potential, and pure potential. We say that something is purely actual if it exists and has a set of definite properties and it cannot undergo substantial change (it cannot turn into other things, cannot be created and destroyed). We say that something is actual if it exists and has a set of definite properties but can undergo a substantial change. An electron is an example of such a thing since it has definite properties, but it can undergo substantial change (it can turn into a neutrino and a photon). We say something is potential if it exists, does not have a set of definite properties, and cannot undergo substantial change. A string is an example of such a thing, since it exists, does not have a set of definite properties, and cannot undergo substantial change. Finally, we say that something is purely potential if it exists, does not have a set of definite properties, and can undergo substantial change. Branes are an example of such a thing in M-theory.

Physical substance cannot be purely actual. This is discussed in another thread, which you can find [here](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-the-ontology-of-physical-substance/3953). Physical substance cannot be actual as well because of the explanatory gap in defining the physical properties of physical substance and forces. Physical substance cannot be potential as well, as theories such as string theory cannot reproduce proper experimental results. Moreover, there are different string theories. M-theory encompasses all string theories. So physical substance is pure potential.

Here I first argue in favor of the Sustainer, considering that physical substance is pure potential.

P1) Pure potential things can be destroyed and created  
P2) There is at least one possible state of affairs in which pure potential things do not exist  
C1) Pure potential things can fail to exist (from P1 and P2)  
P3) Physical substance has pure potentiality  
C2) Therefore, physical substance can fail to exist (from C1 and P3)  
P4) Physical substance exists persistently  
P5) If something can fail to exist on its own and nevertheless exists, then there must be something else on which its existence depends  
C3) Therefore, there is a Sustainer that sustains physical substance (from C2, P4, and P5)  
P6) A sustaining explanation possessing potentiality would itself require a sustaining explanation  
P7) An infinite regress of sustaining explanations is impossible  
C4) Therefore, the Sustainer is pure actuality (from C3, P6, and P7)

Now that we have established the existence of a sustainer, I would like to argue for a Creator.

P1) Physical substance is sustained temporarily  
P2) The act of sustaining cannot go back into the eternal past  
C1) Therefore, there was a point at which physical substance did not exist (from P1 and P2)  
P3) Physical substance has pure potentiality  
P4) Whatever can be created cannot bring itself into existence  
C2) Therefore, physical substance cannot be the cause of itself (from P3 and P4)  
P5) Physical substance exists  
P6) Whatever begins to exist and cannot cause itself must be caused by something else  
C3) Therefore, there was a point at which physical substance was brought into existence (from C1, C2, P5, and P6)  
P7) The act of bringing something into existence is the act of creation  
C4) Therefore, there is a Creator of physical substance (from C3 and P6)  
P8) A creator explanation possessing potentiality would itself require another creator  
P9) An infinite regress of creator explanation is impossible  
C5) Therefore, the Creator is pure actuality (from C4, P8, and P9)

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**Author:** ![180Proof](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/180proof/32/1100_2.png) [@180Proof](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/180Proof)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2026, 3:58am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-pure-potentiality-pure-actuality-sustainer-and-creator/4097/2 "2026-11-17T03:58:03Z")

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> [@MoK](#):
>
> P5) If **something** can fail to exist on its own and nevertheless exists, then there must be **something else** on which its existence depends.

What’s at issue is not mere “something” but _everything_ (i.e. “physical substance” aka “the universe”), and thus, it does not follow – makes no sense – that “there must be something else” other than _everything_ …; so “P5” is not true, which invalidates C3 (“Therefore, there is a Sustainer”) etc, as well as the subsequent “Creator” argument.

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**Author:** ![MoK](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/mok/32/578_2.png) [@MoK](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/MoK)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2026, 2:48pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/on-pure-potentiality-pure-actuality-sustainer-and-creator/4097/3 "2026-11-17T14:48:00Z")

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> [@180Proof](#):
>
> What’s at issue is not mere “something” but _everything_ (i.e. “physical substance” aka “the universe”), and thus, it does not follow – makes no sense – that “there must be something else” other than _everything_ …; so “P5” is not true

By something here, I mean physical substance, for example. I am saying that physical substance has pure potentiality; therefore, it can fail to exist. This is established in C2. P5 is obviously true. That is the only metaphysical premise that comes to mind; by this I mean it is the only explanation for why something that can fail to exist can exist. Do you have any alternative?
