Just for the record – you said earlier that there was only one correct perspective on this question, “the one which matches reality.” But now you allow that @Banno 's phraseology is acceptable, and contrast it with “the Aristotelian way” – not with “reality.” I think this is a step in the right direction – Aristotle’s way is not the only way, and what makes the whole question so interesting is what it shows us about how different understandings of logical structure can lead to different metaphysical commitments.
Possible world semantics is not a “workaround”. It’s a parsing of modal language that is formally consistent. It sets out the relation between contingent futures in such a way as to avoid contradiction, while maintaining biconditional logic.
Your account throws out biconditional logic. That is a far more dubious thing to do than anything found in possible world semantics.
One can be astonished and puzzled at the fact of there being something rather than nothing, at there being a world, without the leap to the conclusion that there is a god. The very puzzlement itself can be understood as sacred, and as deserving of silence over just-so stories.
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Aristotle didn’t have the mechanics of possible worlds at hand to deal with future contingents. And it’s not that there are no problems remaining; it’s that the issues are set out more coherently if one makes use of a coherent system to start with.
If we want to talk about truth regarding future contingents, we can use possible world semantics. If we want instead to talk about knowledge, we might do well to use a non-binary logic so that we can have what we know to be true, what we know to be false, and the third category of what we don’t know.
We adopt the logic that suits our purpose.
I think you understand this.
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A lot of the misfires in this discussion could maybe be cleared up by highlighting the difference between something being true and being known to be true. The dreaded fatalism problem is a problem about foreknowledge.
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There’s a pop notion, always fashionable, that we can dispose of truth in favour of opinion. I suspect a part of its appeal is that giving one’s opinion, as opposed to presenting the truth, requires a lot less effort.
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I don’t see anything very interesting there. Wallace is definitely in agreement with me, that there cannot be any truth value to propositions about the future. And, the author of that article seems to believe that even Taylor agreed with this. Look:
Taylor’s infamous fatalism paper was intended, it seems, not as a defense of its title position but rather as a reductio ad absurdum of the six presuppositions on which his argument depends. As the appendix paper makes clear, Taylor followed Aristotle in rejecting presuppositions 1 and 6. That is, Taylor believed that the truth-value of future contingent propositions is indeterminate and that the passage of time alone could make the determining difference (thereby affecting the powers of agents).
I don’t see the issue here. I explained the Aristotelian way, but did not claim it is the correct way. I said I think that violation of the law of identity is likely the correct way to deal with future propositions, but I don’t claim to know that it is. I do think there is a correct way though, the way which represents the reality, we we do not yet understand..
This is not true at all. A “workaround” is an acceptable way of working around a problem without actually solving it. I don’t suggest that we throw out biconditional logic, only that we respect its limitations. The requirement for modal logic indicates that its limitations are very real.
Are you assigning divinity to the individual human being here?
Yes, I covered this extensively already. I presume ‘god’ designates a set of features that, ‘in general’(if you generalize across all historical versions) most broadly corresponds with ‘capabilities far exceeding human’. So traditional doctrinal qualities like ‘created the universe in six days’ etc. aren’t compelling counterarguments.
No. Wallace asks whether “we can allow contingent future-tensed propositions to take standard truth-values without doing violence to our belief that parts of the universe enjoy at least some degree of causal contingency and that persons enjoy at least some control over what does and will happen to them” (F,T & L,142). His answer is that “Taylor gets his fatalist result only by equivocating between two different tensed physical-modal propositions.” (159)
Sorry if the Notre Dame review seemed to suggest otherwise.
[Note: I edited my first response to make it clearer and more faithful to Wallace’s argument.]
I think we’ve knocked this around enough, don’t you?
I don’t think so. A small choice can quickly have a big effect, like the proverbial finger on the button of the nuclear warheads. You know, the butterfly effect. This is why I say, that by extrapolation it is more consistent with reality to assume that the entirety of material existence is contingent.
What freedom of choice indicates is a lack of continuity of material existence between past and future, through the present. Consider that a human choice, can annihilate a large part of material existence, at any moment chosen. Any material objects which can be annihilated at any chosen moment , cannot have any real existence in the future because it is indeterminate as to whether or not they will continue existing beyond the moment of now, with the finger on the button of the explosives. We can show continuity of objects through the past, but there is no necessary continuity beyond the present.
This lack of continuity through the present implies that such material objects must be recreated at each moment as time passes. And why would some material objects (the ones which human beings are standing beside with weapons of mass destruction) be recreated at each moment of passing time, and not others? And because human beings can move from one place to another, it’s more consistent and realistic to assume that the entirety of material existence is recreated at each moment as time passes.
All things fall into one of two categories. Things that are intentionally caused by design and plan and things that are the result of happenstance minus any plan or intent.
Theism is the claim a transcendent being commonly referred to as God intentionally caused the universe and intelligent life as opposed to the claim no intent or Creator was necessary and all came about by happenstance.
F1. The fact the universe exists.
If it didn’t exist theism would be false. The belief the universe was naturalistically caused would also be false. This fact makes the claim God did it or Nature did it more probable. I don’t know of any fact that supports the claim the universe had to exist.
F2. The fact life exists.This is where theism and naturalism part company.
Life is a requirement for the claim theism to be true as defined above. It’s not a requirement of naturalism that life occur. If we could observe a lifeless universe no one would have a basis to claim it was intentionally caused.
F3. The fact intelligent life exists.
It’s a requirement for theism as defined above to be true that intelligent life exists. It’s not necessary for the claim we owe our existence to mindless natural forces that it caused sentient autonomous beings. At best that was an unintended bonus.
It’s not a requirement of the claim our existence was unintentionally caused by natural forces that a single condition necessary for life obtain. If we observed a chaotic universe minus any life, no one would claim that universe was intentionally caused. Such a universe would be completely compatible with its source being natural causes.
F4. The fact the universe has laws of physics, is knowable, uniform and to a large extent predictable, amenable to scientific research and the laws of logic deduction and induction and is also explicable in mathematical terms.
F5. The fact that in order for intelligent humans to exist requires a myriad of exacting conditions including causing the ingredients for life to exist from scratch.
These conditions are so exacting that many scientists have concluded we live in one of an infinitude of universes. If I had any doubt the universe was extraordinarily suited for life, the fact many scientists (astronomers and physicists) conclude it would take an infinitude of attempts convinces me.
Please note I’m not listing premises or making any arguments from the gaps of our understanding. I’m referring strictly to known thoroughly established facts. It also doesn’t prove God exists. It provides reason and evidence to believe theism is true. I’m open to competing facts that make naturalism more probable.
It sounds like you are talking about God from the religious, or theists view. Shouldn’t we try to argue for the existence of God from logical, scientific, or phenomenological point of views?
Because unless one is a believer of the religion, or theism, he/she wouldn’t understand or accept what you are talking about regarding God and it’s properties.
Surely the discussion is ongoing. We exchanged posts before the weekend. I’m still waiting for your reply on my question: “Why is good not a natural property in an action?”
Here is what I said in a previous post.
I have already replied to these problems in previous posts.
“Whatever is perfect must exist” because the Particulars of what is perfect (goodness, beauty, truth, virtue, power, desire) exists in the world and in our experiences.
Perfection is absolute. Perfection is not relative.
God has a settled function. God used His perfect power to create all things.
How did I breach divine simplicity?
Goodness (beauty, truth, virtue), appears distinct to us, but they are alike in their perfection as a part of God.
Do you mean the things that satisfy that meaning like perfect beauty, perfect truth, perfect virtue?
A perfectly good being and a perfectly powerful being can’t do evil.
God do know sin and failure. God just don’t do sin and failure.
How is the whole move unfalsifiable by construction?
What observational or evidential basis gets answered by restating the definition that God is perfect because God is perfect?
Power can be use for good as well as evil. Perfect power can only be use for good.
“All powerful” is not more perfect compared to less than “all powerful”. “All powerful” is just more powerful than less than “all powerful”. You are confusing perfect with powerful. God is incorruptible because He is a perfectly good and a perfectly powerful being.
No, that’s the exact opposite of what I am doing. I am discounting doctrinal versions in favour of generalized properties.
Imo, Greg, your not making sense (re: “perfection”) is self-defeating.
(a) It does not follow from the facts of nature (enumerated by you, Drew) that there is a supernatural – separate-from-nature (aka “transcendent”) – entity that “created, caused, designed” any aspect and/or the whole of nature.
(b) Also, sufficient objective evidence that the whole of nature (i.e. spacetime aka “block multiverse”) itself is ‘temporary and finite’ is completely lacking, and therefore there are no reasonable grounds to doubt that nature itself is “eternal” (i.e. unbounded / cyclic process).
(c) In fact: ‘quantum cosmology’ is far more consistent with the speculations of classical atomists and stoics as well as Spinoza’s natura naturans than it is with the “revealed” dogmas of creationists / intelligent designers or Kalam apologists.
implication:
From my phenomenological experience, I don’t perceive the existence of God. Therefore there is no properties of the existence. So, where do the generalised or doctrinal properties come from?
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And do you perceive atoms from your phenomenological perspective?
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I have been telling folks that atoms don’t exist for all my life. Some ancient Greek guy invented a word atom to describe what the world is made of. I think it could be Democritus. Folks still believe him after 2500 years? Not sure.
Phenomenological experience is not just visual perception. It is the general perception of the objects in the world as well as the body and mind of perceiver too via the whole bodily sensory organs.