Hi and welcome to my topic. Here I will go over a number of the “failures” of both the (typically classical or orthodox) theistic and (strong/philosophical) atheist position without delay. Note that I myself am unsure if I am agnostic about God; I am playing Devil’s Advocate for the sake of enlivening the agnostic position. Such is the life of the philosopher, whoever they may be, don’t you agree?
One small thing. The “I don’t know and neither do you (given current evidence)” version of agnosticism must be distinguished from the stronger “the question is in principle unresolvable by human faculties” version of agnosticism. I will advocate for the former while secretly holding the latter, and nobody can stop me.
Now:
The Conceptual Problem of an Ultimate Being
“God” is not one hypothesis but a family of hypotheses. Arguments often shift unnoticed between classical theism, personal theism, deism, pantheism, panentheism, process theology, finite-god theories, polytheism, and abstract necessary-being theories.
Theism and atheism often use “God” at different levels of specificity. An argument against one conception leaves others untouched, and an argument for one minimal conception might not support a richer conception.
Overreach in Scope-Shifting
Bolded for emphasis: Theistic arguments tend to move too quickly from metaphysical explanation to religious doctrine, whereas atheistic arguments tend to move too quickly from criticism of some traditional theism(s) to universal denial; both sides overstate what their arguments establish and invite category errors.
Shared Contentious Intuitions
Both sides rely on contentious intuitions about probability and necessity.
Both sides rely on contentious intuitions about what a perfect being would do.
Both sides rely on contentious intuitions about what counts as a satisfactory ultimate explanation.
Generic Reasoning Errors Both Sides Are Prone To
Both sides confuse explanatory depth with evidential proof.
Both sides mistake an argument’s emotional force for its logical force.
Both sides treat the lack of a satisfactory rival explanation as proof of their own view
Symmetric Appeals at Asymmetric Positions
Both sides appeal selectively to mystery: theist at the level of God, atheist at the level of the cosmos. (Sagan comes to mind, here).
Both sides allow brute facts, but at different points.
Generic Contested Shared Standards
Both sides might invoke simplicity, but disagree on whether God or an impersonal cosmos is more parsimonious.
Both sides might invoke common sense, but common sense is poorly calibrated for ultimate metaphysics.
Both sides might invoke science, though science is methodologically unable to settle an unfalsifiable transcendent hypothesis.
Both sides might invoke logic, though logic can only test consistency without generating substantive facts about ultimate reality.
The Underdetermined Theory-Ladenness of Evidence
Datum
Theistic reading
Atheistic reading
Agnostic verdict
Why anything exists
Creation or necessary ground
Brute fact, physical necessity, or unknown basis
Neither reading is forced; what faculty does one even use to determine either
Both grounding narratives face problems; evolutionary psychology has many of its own
Religious experience
Encounter with God
Psychology, culture, neurology
Private warrant does not equal public proof; open to interpretation
Evil and suffering
Free will, soul-making, unknown goods
Evidence against a good God
Strong challenge but not universal disproof; God could be limited (note: evil may be sufficient for atheism with the classic onmi-God).
Divine hiddenness
Non-coercive relation or epistemic distance
Evidence against a loving God
Depends on contested expectations
Religious diversity
Partial, culturally mediated revelation
Human religious projection
Undermines certainty more than favoring either thesis
Note that I am not arguing for logical underdetermination (the evidence doesn’t entail either conclusion) presently but epistemic underdetermination (the evidence doesn’t give one hypothesis sufficiently greater credence to rationally settle the question). This is an important distinction.
A closing remark. Perhaps the kind of Socratic ignorance I demonstrate is not mystical but is rather methodological. Socrates didn’t claim the gods were unknowable; he claimed he didn’t know, and that this ignorance was the beginning of wisdom rather than its end. So perhaps Wittgenstein was right, after all, for slipping into quasi-mysticism. This would be fitting, since Wittgenstein is often right after all, and that is a tragedy because Wittgenstein is so popular.
All this said, I hope you enjoyed the obligatory third installment in the trilogy of “arguments for God”, this edition the agnostic one, as seen right here on TPF. In further posts I might define the agnostic position and then address why some arguments for theism and atheism both fail specifically in light of agnosticism.
Theism does not meet its burden of proof as a positive claim or set of claims; therefore, on those grounds alone, rejection of theism is both more reasonable than theism and more pragmatic than agnosticism.
Which theism? There are a dozen. All must be addressed for the atheistic position to be coherent.
Which rejection? Weak rejection: “I don’t believe theism is true” (lack of belief, compatible with agnosticism) or strong rejection: “I believe theism is false” (positive metaphysical claim, carrying its own unstated burden)?
What standard of proof? You assume we know what would count as meeting the burden. But if the question is whether an ultimate ground of being exists, it’s not clear that “burden of proof”—a standard from law and everyday argumentation—cleanly applies.
What could be more extraordinary than the theistic claim “there is a transcendent, personal, all-creator deity that supernaturally intervenes in nature and history”?
This an assumption that may or may not be shown to be warranted in specific contexts or discourses. As a claim, however, it’s clearly vacuous (i.e. “whether or not existence exists”).
You still haven’t explained why the failure of these anthropomorphic theisms entails the failure of deism, panentheism, process theology, or abstract necessary-being theories. This is the kind of scope-shift my essay diagnoses. “Abrahamic” alone contains classical theism, nominalism, voluntarism, open theism, and process theology, each with different ontological commitments. “Hindu” contains Advaita Vedanta (non-dual Brahman), Dvaita (personal theism), and Charvaka (atheism).
Then your position is compatible with mine.
What counts as extraordinary evidence for a transcendent ground of being, Sagan? If theism is true, the existence of contingent reality is the evidence. It’s not rare or bizarre; it’s the most ubiquitous fact there is. We are half-justified in calling it a “brute fact”.
“A transcendent personal all-creator deity that supernaturally intervenes in nature and history” is not theism simpliciter; that’s classical theism plus interventionism. My essay explicitly said atheists tend to move too quickly from “traditional theism is unsupported” to “universal denial”, and you’re only targeting one notion of the divine. I haven’t even gotten into the unsayable apophatic theology of the likes of Plotinus, either.
I’m not asking for every religion to be refuted. And pixies are empirical hypotheses: they either live in the garden or they don’t. A necessary ground of being, or the metaphysical status of consciousness, or the origin of moral normativity are not empirical hypotheses in that sense. If your “default” is “not being convinced”, then your position is just as compatible with mine as 180Proof’s.
I do not believe in gods, Buddhist claims about reality, or providence.
I do not think a reasonable person needs an impossible standard of proof before rejecting such claims, or before sincerely advising others to treat them as false. If a claim is extraordinary, it is reasonable to require correspondingly strong evidence before accepting it as true.
If the claims were less extraordinary, I would require less evidence to believe them.
There are times when agnosticism is useful—for instance, when we want to acknowledge that rational enquiry is never completely closed to revision. I am agnostic about whether AI can become conscious, whether trees feel pain, and whether we will ever discover life outside the Solar System. I could also describe myself as agnostic about God if the purpose were simply to emphasise that there is always some scope for doubt.
However, I think agnosticism is too often used as a permissive attitude towards claims that have little practical value. The mere possibility that a claim might be true does not make it worthy of equal consideration. Our attention and intellectual effort are limited, and useful knowledge and understanding are precious.
What, without asking, hither hurried whence? And, without asking, whither hurried hence! Another and another Cup to drown The Memory of this Impertinence! — Omar
If I were God, I would not wait the years To solve the mystery of human tears; And, unambiguous, I would speak my will, Nor hint it darkly to the dreaming seers. — Gallienne
Failure to cause the acceptance of arguments for a rational audience.
This topic is a slightly tongue-in-cheek continuation of an emergent theme by two others about the alleged failures of arguments for and against theism/atheism. The “neither” position was not addressed.
Nevertheless, I’ve been told many times and forgotten all of those times that “I don’t know” is a valid philosophical answer to a question.
In religion there’s enough light for those who believe and enough shadow for those otherwise inclined
I take a page out of the popular atheists’ worldview who claim that they’re weak atheists, that they disbelieve until the other side has proved their claim. I’m a weak theist then. I believe until the other side has disproved the claim.
Agnostic is a strange word. ‘Gnostic’ customarily means something like ‘direct insight’ or ‘higher knowledge’, the implication being that it is something other than common or empirical knowledge. However most who describe themselves as agnostic would presumably also question whether there could be an actual ‘gnosis’ which they’re lacking.
You’ve got it backwards, sir. “The other side” observes that theism makes positive claims about “God” and thereby bears the burden of proof which (you) theists perennially fail to meet. Atheism is a second-order objection to theism warranted by theism’s first-order unproven positive claim/s about “God” (or “gods”) – more precisely, we are anti-theism (i e. rejection of ‘theistic’ claims), not anti-god/s (unless, more fundamentally, we’re also anti-supernaturalism).
I was referring to weak atheism. Popular atheists have constantly corrected what they see as an error - that they’re strong atheists (knows God doesn’t exist). Hence they claim they simply disbelieve until evidence is at hand. There’s no disproof of God. Why would there be theists then? Nobody challenges our ability to travel by air. Atheism isn’t proven as air travel is.
There are too many active topics about the failures of arguments for or against the existence of God, so I’m closing this, the newest one. Take it to one of the active discussions.
