No. Two boxers leave with 100% of the money they could while one boxers don’t if we are looking at it through the same perspective as the situation of the problem.
Again, the situation doesn’t include what happens before. The reason why one boxers leave with more money considering the big picture (and not the relevant one) is because of the common cause, the attitude or whatever before the choice.
You say “no” but then confirm that yes they do in fact leave with more. So… that’s not a “no”. Yes, they leave with more. Yes, it’s relevant why they leave with more if the point of the paradox/riddle/puzzle/whatever is to leave with more.
By two boxing you’re trying to maximise how much you leave with - which is certainly rational of you - but in so doing, basically guaranteeing you leave with a whole lot less money. It’s not trivial that two boxing is correct or rational by any means.
When you talk about “they leave with more”, you are looking at the big picture that includes a “strategy” before entering the room and before the prediction. If we restrain ourselves to the situation at hand, where you cannot change the pre-game “strategy”, you always leave with more money when you two-boxes.
but in so doing, basically guaranteeing you leave with a whole lot less money.
NO, that would be implying retro-causality. Do not conflate the stages before and during the game. You choosing one or two boxes doesn’t guarantee anything about the money in the boxes.
I didn’t say anything about any strategy before entering the room. I think the correct choice is to be a one boxer even if you’ve never heard of Newcombs paradox before. You have the boxes in front of you for the first time, you’ve been given no time to strategize before hand, you should still one box. Nothing about pre strategies whatsoever.
That there is literally the conflation of correlation with causation. By the time you are making your decision, the prediction has already been made and the money already been placed (or not been placed).
Not if they are making money in a game that rewards irrationality. If the nature that makes them win in this game, makes them lose in most games, and the most realistic games, then they also not making more money in general.
I refer you the Irrationality Game again. The irrational people are also making more money in that game, but we obviously cannot argue that, therefore, they are more rational.
yes but look at what you are saying, you are switching situations. You said:
If you leave with two boxes, and it predicted you would leave with two boxes, you only get $1K.
So in this situation, the prediction has been made and it was “two boxes”. In this situation, you should take two boxes. Now you are talking about a different situation:
If you leave with one box, and it predicted you would leave with one box, you get $1M.
And in this situation (prediction is “one box”), you should take two boxes and leave the room with $1,001,000
Keep in mind that the prediction already happened when you get to choose.
What are you suggesting? That there’s no causal link whatsoever? That he’s just by pure chance guessing correctly 99.999% of the time?
Nah I don’t think that’s part of the riddle. I think it’s pretty rational to think there’s some kind of causality involved causing the predictor to be correct that often.
Correlation doesn’t guarantee causation, but it does gesture successively in its direction.
I don’t disagree with any of them, which is what makes this an interesting question.
I’m not the one saying you’re irrational. I think you’re saying things that make sense, I just also notice that people who reason like that leave with less money, and I , rationally, would like to leave with more money.
You aren’t being unreasonable in all of that, but despite not being unreasonable, you’re dooming yourself to a hell of a lot less money. I choose differently.
They are all misleading given that they just use the phrase “more money” and don’t specify the actual values.
Your reasoning should be:
A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,000 (choose both)
You win $0 (choose one)
B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,001,000 (choose both)
You win $1,000,000 (choose one)
It is true that A1 is greater than A2 and that B1 is greater than B2, but it’s also true that B2 is greater than A1. Given that we don’t know whether we are in A or B, and cannot force ourselves to be in one or the other, the comparison between A1 and B2 is relevant. This is why we must invert the above:
C. If you choose both then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,000
You win $1,001,000
D. If you choose one then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,000,000
You win $0
We can force ourselves into either C or D, and so don’t have to consider the comparison between C1 and D2 or between C2 and D1.
The only comparisons that matter are between C1 and C2 and between D1 and D2, and these comparisons must take into consideration the reliability of the predictor.
Given that the predictor is near-perfect, if I force myself into C then I will most likely win $1,000 and if I force myself into D then I will most likely win $1,000,000.
I guess that’s what makes it a paradox, right? The statements you made are explicitly correct, and yet if I follow the behaviour they suggest, I’ll leave with less money than if I do the other thing.
No. What makes it a paradox is that people intuitions can be wrong.
The statements you made are explicitly correct, and yet if I follow the behaviour they suggest, I’ll leave with less money than if I do the other thing.
They are all misleading given that they just use the phrase “more money” and don’t specify the actual values.
What’s misleading about it? Why would I need to specify the values? All we want is to take the action that gives more money than the other action (as there are only two actions).
Given that we don’t know whether we are in A or B, and cannot force ourselves to be in one or the other, the comparison between A1 and B2 is relevant
We don’t know whether we are in A or B but we know we are in only one of the two.
But let’s use your reasoning:
C. If you choose both then there is one possible outcome:
You win X + $1,000
D. If you choose one then there is possible outcome:
You win X
X is already fixed, I just don’t know it but it is the same whether I am in C or D. So it’s obvious I should pick C.
X stands for two possible values; either $1,000,000 or $0. You are committing the same fallacy that switchers make in the two envelopes problem.
To make this clearer, consider this again:
A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,000 (choose both)
You win $0 (choose one)
B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,001,000 (choose both)
You win $1,000,000 (choose one)
You commit to choosing both. This allows you to rule out two of the four possible outcomes:
A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,000 (choose both)
You win $0 (choose one)
B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes:
You win $1,001,000 (choose both)
You win $1,000,000 (choose one)
It is true that A1 = X + 1,000 and it is true that B1 = X + 1,000 but it’s not true that A1 = B1. And that’s because A1 = X + 1,000 where X = 0 and B1 = X + 1,000 where X = 1,000,000. In treating these as a single “X + 1,000” outcome you are conflating two different values of X.