Except that “p” is completely made up: it’s not the one the Newcomb’s problem explicitly tells you is “almost certain”.
Your “p” — which I’m going to call q — is deliberately chosen to completely obscure the real p, which we know.
So once again you are refusing to engage with Newcomb’s problem and avoiding an explanation as to why.
At this point it’s clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that you are engaging in bad faith. Refusing to answer a very straightforward question because it defies your entire position just made it more obvious.
I’m just going to state for the record what you are doing.
- You completely ignore the real probability p (which we know)
- You don’t explain why you are ignoring it
- You claim you don’t ignore it
- You invoke a completely different probability q (which we don’t know)
- You use this to conclude that two-boxers obtain more money
- You use this to conclude that therefore the correlation doesn’t matter
- You use this as justification to completely ignore the real probability p
It’s an obvious case of circular reasoning: you claim the probability p doesn’t matter because two-boxers obtain more money anyway, except the probability p tells us they don’t, so you have to completely ignore it in order to conclude that.
I already proved it’s irrational to ignore the probability p with my simple example, in which you did not ignore the probability and fully utilized the correlation even though there was no causation.
You are still refusing to explain why you completely ignore the probability p in one problem, but not the other. And you are refusing to explain why correlation with no causation is useful in one problem, but not the other.
I also proved it’s irrational to ignore the correlation even though you see no causation with my sunscreen example. By completely ignoring the correlation you arrived at the wrong conclusion, which I showed by explaining a potential common cause. After understanding the potential common cause, you changed your answer.
But you never acknowledged you were wrong. You claimed the typical “I was wrong but I was right” (given the available information).
You never addressed the point raised by many others — not just me — that correlation is evidence of causation (in fact, the only reason we suspect causation in the first place). According to you, the correlation magically becomes meaningful once you are told the causal network of a potential common cause.
But here’s the nail in the coffin for your position: there is a common cause.
I already proved why a rational observer shouldn’t discount the correlation: it’s evidence of causation. Even if there’s no direct causal link, there could be an indirect causal network, for example a common cause. We don’t need to know any specific common cause, a rational agent would consider the possibility of it existing, and that’s all that is needed.
But in fact there is a common cause in Newcomb’s problem: it’s you. Your beliefs and your character is what causes the prediction to be two-box, and also causes your choice.
Your mistake is thinking you and I are interchangeable, but we are not. I cannot choose to have your brain while making my choice, I will choose with my brain, and you will choose with your brain, both are predictable, and both will be the cause of the prediction to be two-box for you, and one-box for me.
Just because you don’t see a common cause doesn’t mean there is no causal network between choice and prediction.
But you already tipped your hand that you are never going to change your mind, no matter the arguments, no matter the evidence. I already showed you probability shouldn’t be ignored just because there’s no causation, didn’t matter. I already showed you just because there’s no direct causal link you can see doesn’t mean there’s no causation involved, didn’t matter. I already showed you there is a common cause in Newcomb’s problem, it won’t matter.
Personally I don’t see the point in engaging in a debate if there’s absolutely no possibility in changing your mind. An intellectually honest interlocutor must accept the possibility they might be wrong, even hypothetically. I call it “suspending belief”. Just like I know The Lord of the Rings is not realistic but I can suspend my disbelief and pretend it is for a second, so can you even though you “know” the correct answer is two-box, you could suspend your belief and pretend it isn’t for a second. But you cannot even do that.
So there’s really no point. I already showed your position has no grounds whatsoever.