# Newcomb's Paradox **URL:** \ **Category:** Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics\ **Created:** [March 11, 2026, 3:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298 "2026-03-11T03:09:32Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 9
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 2:03am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/161 "2026-03-12T02:03:05Z")
It’s weird I thought one-boxers had a million dollar, could it be that the cause of the million dollar isn’t one-boxing… No. Correlation is causality surely. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 2:03am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/162 "2026-03-12T02:03:23Z")
Maybe some recreational drugs might make you feel better. I got a lot of those now that I have a million ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 2:11am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/163 "2026-03-12T02:11:37Z")
Let’s see. One-boxers have a million dollars which is correlated with having lots of drugs so one-boxers have a lot of drugs and having lot of drugs is correlated with being a poor drug addict. This means one-boxers are poor drug addicts. Why would you want to be a one-boxer? ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 3:16am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/164 "2026-03-12T03:16:15Z")
> [@leo\_starboy](#): > > Think about it this way. It made its choice on what you’re going to choose before you entered the room. let’s assume the bot predicted you’d chose ob. If i chose ob i get 1mil but if i chose tb i still get that 1mil and a extra $1000,so by choosing tb im better off. Now lets assume the bot predicted id choose tb. If i chose ob id still get 0 but if i chose tb id get $1000. Im always better off since i can not change the past of what the bot predicted. But it’s not going to predict OB, and you take TB. It will have predicted TB. It’s extremely good at predicting. You won’t trick it that way. It’s too obvious. Other than the tiny percentage of people that it predicts wrong, TB will only get you $1K. Pick OB, and it will have predicted OB, and you get $1M. ---
**Author:** ![leo\_starboy](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leo_starboy/32/287_2.png) [@leo\_starboy](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/leo_starboy)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 3:22am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/165 "2026-03-12T03:22:38Z")
By your logic it seems that what we think has an affect on its prediction but it does not. The choice gets made before you enter the room,you have no say in whatever it desides to predict. People who OB have this idea that your choice matters when it really doesnt. Its an illusion of choice when really all you can do it pick all te money or just some. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 4:01am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/166 "2026-03-12T04:01:37Z")
It has an amazing percentage of predicting correctly. Would that be so if the people for whom it predicted OB went TB? Its percentage would be terrible. It is going to predict TB for the people who will pick TB. And they will all get $1K. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 4:35am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/167 "2026-03-12T04:35:05Z")
> It is going to predict TB for the people who will pick TB. And they will all get $1K. If you mean that in a strong sense, “it will always predict TB for the people who will pick TB” then this is simply the perfect predictor case where, personally I think the question is nonsensical as there is no choice. But if you want to imagine a choice, then yes one box, because, in a way, you ‘cause’ the box to have the money. If the predictor isn’t perfect however this ‘causal’ relation disappears and what we have is that the predictor predicted TB for some people. Those people should TB to get $1000 instead of $0 and the predictor predicted OB for some people. Those should TB too to get $1,001,000 instead of $1,000,000. You may say, sure but I should OB to be part of the people the predictor predicted OB but this isn’t possible, you taking OB doesn’t change in which group the predictor already put you in. So the only thing OB does is making you lose $1000 compared to TB. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 8:45am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/168 "2026-03-12T08:45:11Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > the predictor isn’t perfect however this ‘causal’ relation disappears There’s still a causal relationship. SOMETHING causing people to ob is also causing the predictor to predict that they will ob. Therefore there’s a sense in which allowing yourself to be swayed by the arguments for one boxing ties you into a causal past that also causes the predictor to predict that you will one box. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 9:02am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/169 "2026-03-12T09:02:27Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > What’s the point of saying ‘almost certain’, you will just copy the thinking and say the clone does the same, so let’s look at the case of the perfect clone. > > If the clone played in the past and is literally the same as me, it’s the same perfect predictor problem. The clone already played what I will play and there is no choice to make. If we have free will then cloning me doesn’t take it away. I am still free to make whichever choice I like — as is my clone. It is possible, even if unlikely, that one of us on a whim decides to two-box. Hence the clone is a near-perfect, but not infallible, predictor. > [@Suny](#): > > Same as before, switching scenarios. Either your clone will one-box or two-box, your decision might be evidence of what your clone did (or will do) but nonetheless it doesn’t affect what your clone did (or will do) and therefore two-boxing gives you more money in the situation. You’re just repeating the same error. If you and your clone follow your reasoning then you will walk away with $1,000. If my clone and I follow my reasoning then I will walk away with $1,000,000. You can’t evade this by repeating the misleading phrase “more money”. Compare these two games: **Game 1** 1. $1,000 is placed in a blue box 2. You are cloned and the clone is asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 3. The clone is destroyed 4. If the clone chose (a) then $1,000,000 is placed in a red box 5. You are asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 6. You win the contents of the box(es) you chose **Game 2** 1. There is an empty red box and an empty blue box 2. You are cloned 3. You are asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 4. The clone is asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 5. The clone is destroyed 6. If you both chose (a) then you win $1,000,000 7. If you both chose (b) then you win $1,000 8. If you chose (a) and your clone chose (b) then you win $0 9. If you chose (b) and your clone chose (a) then you win $1,001,000 Whichever is the most rational choice in Game 2 is also the most rational choice in Game 1, and the most rational choice in Game 2 is to choose (a). We can even say that you don’t know which of Game 1 or Game 2 you are playing. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 10:58am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/170 "2026-03-12T10:58:32Z")
The predictions aren’t lucky guesses. And the whole system isn’t a game of playing the odds. The predictor knows what’s going to happen, to an extremely high degree of accuracy. We don’t know how it does it, but we know it does. There might be a few cases where it is wrong, but expecting to be one of them won’t work out. If you TB, it is exceedingly likely it predicted you would TB, and you’ll get $1K. If it knew, say, 75% will TB, and it just randomly assigned TB to 75% of people, you’d have a fighting chance. But that’s not the situation. It knows which 75% of people will TB. And that’ll get $1K. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:11am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/171 "2026-03-12T11:11:40Z")
> If you and your clone follow your reasoning then you will walk away with $1,000. If my clone and I follow my reasoning then I will walk away with $1,000,000. You can’t evade this by repeating the misleading phrase “more money”. You are not listening, you are supposing the clone and I will follow the same reasoning, which is just the perfect clone case. If you don’t suppose that then yeah two-boxing gives you more money. You still haven’t explained how the word was misleading > Whichever is the most rational choice in Game 2 is also the most rational choice in Game 1, and the most rational choice in Game 2 is to choose (a). I agree it’s the same game (if the clone isn’t perfect) but the rational choice is to choose (b). I’ll just ask you a question: what determines the prediction? What makes it so the predictor decides to put the million in the box or not? ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:13am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/172 "2026-03-12T11:13:47Z")
> The predictions aren’t lucky guesses. And the whole system isn’t a game of playing the odds. The predictor knows what’s going to happen, to an extremely high degree of accuracy. We don’t know how it does it, but we know it does. There might be a few cases where it is wrong, but expecting to be one of them won’t work out. I am not denying any of this, but even with that, TB is the rational choice. > It knows which 75% of people will TB. And that’ll get $1K. I feel like we are not talking about the same problem. Tell me, what determines the prediction? What makes it so the predictor decides to put a million in the box? ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:21am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/173 "2026-03-12T11:21:12Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > You are not listening, you are supposing the clone and I will follow the same reasoning, which is just the perfect clone case. I’m not. I’m saying that the clone _almost always_ follows the same reasoning, given that it’s a clone of you. But you both have free will so it’s _possible_ that one of you behaves differently. > [@Suny](#): > > If you don’t suppose that then yeah two-boxing gives you more money. You still haven’t explained how the word was misleading I’ve explained it several times, most clearly [here](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/53). > [@Suny](#): > > I agree it’s the same game (if the clone isn’t perfect) but the rational choice is to choose (b). Why is it rational to choose (b) in Game 2? Note that both boxes are empty, so it’s not a choice between “all of the money” and “some of the money”. > [@Suny](#): > > I’ll just ask you a question: what determines the prediction? What makes it so the predictor decides to put the million in the box or not? I explained it in Game 1. If the clone chooses (a) then $1,000,000 is placed in the red box, else nothing is. Note that in Game 2 there is no prediction. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:27am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/174 "2026-03-12T11:27:49Z")
> Why is it rational to choose (b) in Game 2? Note that both boxes are empty, so it’s not a choice between “all of the money” and “some of the money” Well it’s still is all of the money, some of the money. Unless you changed some assumptions, I asked “does my choice now has any effect on the procedure with the clone?” i.e. the clone knows the boxes I took or something like that. If the answer is no, then yeah it’s virtually decided already. > I explained it in Game 1. If the clone chooses (a) then $1,000,000 is placed in the red box, else nothing is. > > Note that in Game 2 there is no prediction. So in Game 1, it’s because of the whole process with the clone that the predictor decides, right? Ok, Does your thinking about the problem in the room affect that process in any way? do your choice of boxes affect that in any way? i.e. causes the process to go differently. Yeah there is no “prediction” but what makes it so that the predictor put the million in the box is the process with the clone. Same questions as for Game 1. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:36am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/175 "2026-03-12T11:36:31Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > Well it’s still is all of the money, some of the money. No it’s not. Let’s compare Game 2 and Game 3: **Game 2** 1. There is an empty red box and an empty blue box 2. You are cloned 3. You are asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 4. The clone is asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the red and the blue box 5. The clone is destroyed 6. If you both chose (a) then you win $1,000,000 7. If you both chose (b) then you win $1,000 8. If you chose (a) and your clone chose (b) then you win $0 9. If you chose (b) and your clone chose (a) then you win $1,001,000 **Game 3** 1. There is an empty red box and an empty blue box 2. You are cloned 3. You are asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the blue box 4. The clone is asked to choose between either a) the red box or b) the blue box 5. The clone is destroyed 6. If you both chose (a) then you win $1,000,000 7. If you both chose (b) then you win $1,000 8. If you chose (a) and your clone chose (b) then you win $0 9. If you chose (b) and your clone chose (a) then you win $1,001,000 Game 2 and Game 3 are equivalent. Game 1 and Game 2 are equivalent. Therefore, Game 1 and Game 3 are equivalent. The most rational choice in Game 3 is (a) and so the most rational choice in Game 1 is (a). > [@Suny](#): > > So in Game 1, it’s because of the whole process with the clone that the predictor decides, right? Ok, Does your thinking about the problem in the room affect that process in any way? do your choice of boxes affect that in any way? i.e. causes the process to go differently. > > Yeah there is no “prediction” but what makes it so that the predictor put the million in the box is the process with the clone. Same questions as for Game 1. There are 100 participants. 50 of them are one-boxers and 50 of them are two-boxers. Their clones almost always reason the same way as the original, but two decide on a whim to defy their intuition. In this scenario, it is a fact that: 1. 49 one-boxers walk away with $1,000,000 2. 49 two-boxers walk away with $1,000 3. 1 one-boxer walks away with $0 4. 1 two-boxer walks away with $1,001,000 The probability that I am in (1) is greater than the probability that you are in (4). _This_ is the comparison that matters. So any rational person can see that it is rational to be a one-boxer. Your reasoning that “it is more rational to take all of the money than some of the money” will in almost every case result in you leaving with less money than if you followed my reasoning. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:51am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/176 "2026-03-12T11:51:02Z")
> Game 2 and Game 3 are equivalent. Game 1 and Game 2 are equivalent. Therefore, Game 1 and Game 3 are equivalent. No issue. > The most rational choice in Game 3 is (a) and so the most rational choice in Game 1 is (a). It is still (b). > The probability that I am in (1) is greater than the probability that you are in (4). _This_ is the comparison that matters. Your scenario doesn’t matter cause you are switching participants and therefore situations. You tell me I am but one particular person in the experience. First problem is you already mapped out the whole scene so where’s the choice? But if I tell you I two-box, you’ll tell me, “see you get $1000”. And if while being the same participant, I tell you I one-box, the correct answer is I’ll get $0 but you switch the participant I am supposed to be and I become one who wins $1,000,000. > So any rational person can see that it is rational to be a one-boxer. Your reasoning that “it is more rational to take all of the money than some of the money” will in almost every case result in you leaving with less money than if you followed my reasoning. The problem is that the reason why OB leave with more money ISN’T THE ONE-BOXING, it’s the rational profile. You’re conflating correlation and causality. When you accept that the reason why OB leaves with more money is the rational profile that is examined by the predictor _before_ the game, you understand that when you are in the room, you cannot change that anymore and so you can’t switch between “the rational profile was of a OB when I see that they pick one box” and “the rational profile was of a TB when I see that they pick two-box”. You can’t make this switch and you have to admit that there was ONE rational profile beforehand that cannot be changed, that already determines whether there is a million in the box NOT the one-boxing. If you see that people who take an IQ test have generally more psychological troubles, you don’t conclude that taking an IQ test gives you psychological troubles. Same here, you see OB winning more money _overall_, you don’t conclude that it is because of ONE-BOXING. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:54am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/177 "2026-03-12T11:54:16Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > It is still (b). Why is choosing the blue box more rational than choosing the red box in Game 3? > [@Suny](#): > > The problem is that the reason why OB leave with more money ISN’T THE ONE-BOXING It isn’t a coincidence that those who one-box will almost always walk away with $1,000,000 and that those who two-box will almost always walk away with $1,000. If your intention when entering the game is to walk away with at least $1,000,000 then it is rational to one-box. This is the important fact that you are evading. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/178 "2026-03-12T11:57:20Z")
> Why is choosing the blue box more rational than choosing the red box? You gain $1000 more. > Yes, it is. It isn’t a coincidence that those who one-box will almost always walk away with $1,000,000 and that those who two-box will almost always walk away with $1,000. If you say it is then that’s retro-causality, do you believe in retro-causality? or do you think correlation is causation? > If your intention when entering the game is to walk away with at least $1,000,000 then it is rational to one-box No, you will only be able to leave with $1,000,000 if the predictor put the million in the box, you have no choice in the matter. It isn’t up to you. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 11:58am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/179 "2026-03-12T11:58:50Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > You gain $1000 more. You don’t. Try reading Game 3 more carefully. The choice isn’t between “one box” or “two boxes”. > [@Suny](#): > > If you say it is then that’s retro-causality, do you believe in retro-causality? or do you think correlation is causation? No, it’s not. It’s game theory. > [@Suny](#): > > No, you will only be able to leave with $1,000,000 if the predictor put the million in the box, you have no choice in the matter. It isn’t up to you. Again, read Game 3 more carefully. There is no predictor and no money is placed in any box. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2026, 12:00pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/180 "2026-03-12T12:00:38Z")
> No, it’s not. It’s game theory. Great, that explains everything and answers my questions. > Again, read Game 3 more carefully. There is no predictor and no money is placed in any box. But there is in Game 1, do you one-box in game 1? [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298.md?page=8) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298.md?page=10)