# Newcomb's Paradox **URL:** \ **Category:** Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics\ **Created:** [March 11, 2026, 3:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298 "2026-03-11T03:09:32Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:31pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/41 "2026-03-11T16:31:40Z")
No. Two boxers leave with 100% of the money they could while one boxers don’t if we are looking at it through the same perspective as the situation of the problem. Again, the situation doesn’t include what happens before. The reason why one boxers leave with more money considering the big picture (and not the relevant one) is because of the common cause, the attitude or whatever before the choice. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/42 "2026-03-11T16:32:09Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > all the people leaving the room with $1,000,000 could have left the room with $1,001,000 if they had taken the rational choice. Taking two boxes ALWAYS gets you more money if you are in the situation described in the problem. It predicted correctly 99% of the time. If you leave with two boxes, and it predicted you would leave with two boxes, you only get $1K. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:33pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/43 "2026-03-11T16:33:01Z")
yeah and if you leave with one box, you don’t get anything in the same situation. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:35pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/44 "2026-03-11T16:35:39Z")
You say “no” but then confirm that yes they do in fact leave with more. So… that’s not a “no”. Yes, they leave with more. Yes, it’s relevant why they leave with more if the point of the paradox/riddle/puzzle/whatever is to leave with more. By two boxing you’re trying to maximise how much you leave with - which is certainly rational of you - but in so doing, basically guaranteeing you leave with a whole lot less money. It’s not trivial that two boxing is correct or rational by any means. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:40pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/45 "2026-03-11T16:40:17Z")
When you talk about “they leave with more”, you are looking at the big picture that includes a “strategy” before entering the room and before the prediction. If we restrain ourselves to the situation at hand, where you cannot change the pre-game “strategy”, you always leave with more money when you two-boxes. > but in so doing, basically guaranteeing you leave with a whole lot less money. NO, that would be implying retro-causality. Do not conflate the stages before and during the game. You choosing one or two boxes doesn’t guarantee anything about the money in the boxes. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:40pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/46 "2026-03-11T16:40:31Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > yeah and if you leave with one box, you don’t get anything in the same situation. It predicted correctly 99% of the time. If you leave with one box, and it predicted you would leave with one box, you get $1M. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:41pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/47 "2026-03-11T16:41:24Z")
I didn’t say anything about any strategy before entering the room. I think the correct choice is to be a one boxer even if you’ve never heard of Newcombs paradox before. You have the boxes in front of you for the first time, you’ve been given no time to strategize before hand, you should still one box. Nothing about pre strategies whatsoever. ---
**Author:** ![AlveK](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/alvek/32/594_2.png) [@AlveK](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/AlveK)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/48 "2026-03-11T16:42:12Z")
> [@FlannelJesus](#): > > I don’t think that’s the right diagnosis of one boxers. I think “whatever causes people to be one boxers seems to be also consistently causing the predictor to predict that you’re a one boxer.” There’s no confusion between causation and correlation there. That there is **literally** the conflation of correlation with causation. By the time you are making your decision, the prediction has already been made and the money already been placed (or not been placed). > [@FlannelJesus](#): > > And really, it’s hard to argue the group of people leaving with more money is irrational. We can all acknowledge that, right? Not if they are making money in a game that rewards irrationality. If the nature that makes them win in this game, makes them lose in most games, and the most realistic games, then they also not making more money in general. I refer you the Irrationality Game again. The irrational people are also making more money in that game, but we obviously cannot argue that, therefore, they are more rational. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/49 "2026-03-11T16:42:18Z")
yes but look at what you are saying, you are switching situations. You said: > If you leave with two boxes, and it predicted you would leave with two boxes, you only get $1K. So in this situation, the prediction has been made and it was “two boxes”. In this situation, you should take two boxes. Now you are talking about a different situation: > If you leave with one box, and it predicted you would leave with one box, you get $1M. And in this situation (prediction is “one box”), you should take two boxes and leave the room with $1,001,000 Keep in mind that the prediction already happened when you get to choose. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:43pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/50 "2026-03-11T16:43:40Z")
Maybe you’ll answer unlike someone else. What statement here would you disagree with? “Once the prediction “one box” has been made, in 100% of cases, those who take two boxes win more money” “Once the prediction two boxes has been made, in 100% of cases, those who take two boxes win more money” “We are in a situation where the prediction has already been made, therefore me taking two boxes will win me more money in 100% of cases.” ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:44pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/51 "2026-03-11T16:44:04Z")
> [@AlveK](#): > > That there is **literally** the conflation of correlation with causation. What are you suggesting? That there’s no causal link whatsoever? That he’s just by pure chance guessing correctly 99.999% of the time? Nah I don’t think that’s part of the riddle. I think it’s pretty rational to think there’s some kind of causality involved causing the predictor to be correct that often. Correlation doesn’t guarantee causation, but it does gesture successively in its direction. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:51pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/52 "2026-03-11T16:51:05Z")
I don’t disagree with any of them, which is what makes this an interesting question. I’m not the one saying you’re irrational. I think you’re saying things that make sense, I just also notice that people who reason like that leave with less money, and I , rationally, would like to leave with more money. You aren’t being unreasonable in all of that, but despite not being unreasonable, you’re dooming yourself to a hell of a lot less money. I choose differently. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:52pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/53 "2026-03-11T16:52:34Z")
> [@Suny](#): > > You still haven’t told me which of the three statements is wrong. They are all misleading given that they just use the phrase “more money” and don’t specify the actual values. Your reasoning should be: A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,000 (choose both) 2. You win $0 (choose one) B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,001,000 (choose both) 2. You win $1,000,000 (choose one) It is true that A1 is greater than A2 and that B1 is greater than B2, but it’s also true that B2 is greater than A1. Given that we don’t know whether we are in A or B, and cannot force ourselves to be in one or the other, the comparison between A1 and B2 is relevant. This is why we must invert the above: C. If you choose both then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,000 2. You win $1,001,000 D. If you choose one then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,000,000 2. You win $0 We can force ourselves into either C or D, and so don’t have to consider the comparison between C1 and D2 or between C2 and D1. The only comparisons that matter are between C1 and C2 and between D1 and D2, and these comparisons must take into consideration the reliability of the predictor. Given that the predictor is near-perfect, if I force myself into C then I will most likely win $1,000 and if I force myself into D then I will most likely win $1,000,000. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:52pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/54 "2026-03-11T16:52:53Z")
> [@FlannelJesus](#): > > I think the correct choice is to be a one boxer even if you’ve never heard of Newcombs paradox before. You have the boxes in front of you for the first time, you’ve been given no time to strategize before hand, you should still one box. And > I don’t disagree with any of them, which is what makes this an interesting question. are contradictory. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:53pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/55 "2026-03-11T16:53:59Z")
I guess that’s what makes it a paradox, right? The statements you made are explicitly correct, and yet if I follow the behaviour they suggest, I’ll leave with less money than if I do the other thing. And I choose the money. ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/56 "2026-03-11T16:55:24Z")
Have you watched the video yet? If not, I really recommend it. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/57 "2026-03-11T16:55:38Z")
> I guess that’s what makes it a paradox, right? No. What makes it a paradox is that people intuitions can be wrong. > The statements you made are explicitly correct, and yet if I follow the behaviour they suggest, I’ll leave with less money than if I do the other thing. No you won’t. You will always have more money. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 4:56pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/58 "2026-03-11T16:56:16Z")
The Veritasium one? I skimmed through it. ---
**Author:** ![Suny](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e0b2c6/32.png) [@Suny](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Suny)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 5:10pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/59 "2026-03-11T17:10:11Z")
> They are all misleading given that they just use the phrase “more money” and don’t specify the actual values. What’s misleading about it? Why would I need to specify the values? All we want is to take the action that gives more money than the other action (as there are only two actions). > Given that we don’t know whether we are in A or B, and cannot force ourselves to be in one or the other, the comparison between A1 and B2 is relevant We don’t know whether we are in A or B but we know we are in only one of the two. But let’s use your reasoning: C. If you choose both then there is one possible outcome: 1. You win X + $1,000 D. If you choose one then there is possible outcome: 1. You win X X is already fixed, I just don’t know it but it is the same whether I am in C or D. So it’s obvious I should pick C. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [March 11, 2026, 5:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298/60 "2026-03-11T17:21:35Z")
X stands for two possible values; either $1,000,000 or $0. You are committing the same fallacy that switchers make in the [two envelopes problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_envelopes_problem). To make this clearer, consider this again: A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,000 (choose both) 2. You win $0 (choose one) B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,001,000 (choose both) 2. You win $1,000,000 (choose one) You commit to choosing both. This allows you to rule out two of the four possible outcomes: A. If there is a combined total of $1,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,000 (choose both) 2. ~~You win $0 (choose one)~~ B. If there is a combined total of $1,001,000 in the boxes then there are two possible outcomes: 1. You win $1,001,000 (choose both) 2. ~~You win $1,000,000 (choose one)~~ It is true that A1 = X + 1,000 and it is true that B1 = X + 1,000 but it’s not true that A1 = B1. And that’s because A1 = X + 1,000 where X = 0 and B1 = X + 1,000 where X = 1,000,000. In treating these as a single “X + 1,000” outcome you are conflating two different values of X. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298.md?page=2) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/newcombs-paradox/298.md?page=4)