Natural selection and the hard problem of conciousness

I’m in agreement with quite a bit of what @j_j has already said. But I’ll try and spell it out a little more formally.

I think you’re still trying to identify or understand consciousness (I prefer ‘mind’) as an object of analysis, some property that characterises conscious beings that can’t be explained in terms of their constituent particles. Unless, you say, it is already there, as an attribute of those fundamental entities. So the attempt is still to identify the objective nature and basis of consciousness. It’s like naturalism that has been expanded to include qualia.

Here I’m going to refer to another source altogether, namely, Husserl’s criticism of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge,all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism…—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role ~ Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology p.144

This approach is radically different—radical meaning ‘from the root’ — because it calls into question the idea of the objective knowledge of consciousness and the attempt to ‘naturalise’ the mind. Not from a mystical or spiritual perspective, but by acknowledging the distinction between the nature of the objects of the natural sciences, and the nature of the subject for whom that knowledge is meaningful. So this takes into account the experiential nature of knowledge from the outset, which is the particular contribution of phenomenology to consciousness studies.