# Mind is a Minding? **URL:** \ **Category:** Philosophy of Mind\ **Created:** [October 21, 2026, 9:49pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698 "2026-10-21T21:49:04Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 14\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 9:49pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/1 "2026-10-21T21:49:04Z")
If the answer to “What is a mind?” is best approached by a quip like “Mind is more of a minding”, such that it is an activity rather than a thing, then I think the conditions of intersubstitutability are a “key” of sorts to understanding what that might mean. Here I’m thinking that if a bundle of nerves and a bundle of circuits “amount to the same thing” then we must understand what the different bundles are doing in order to “amount to the same thing”: i.e. there are conditions wherein we accept that a bundle of circuits “does the same thing” as a bundle of nerves when talking about logical gates, for instance. But those conditions are kind of begging the question on what a mind _is_ – this isn’t bad, of course. Science is often made by begging the question and then testing to see what happens or comes from that assumption: guess and check, more or less, but more loose. The is-ness I’d propose here are the conditions of intersubstitutability. I don’t think we understand the neurons well enough to define such conditions at the moment. I suspect the present LLM’s are deficient. But, also, if we don’t have those conditions then we can’t claim the LLM’s are thinking (or, to be fair, not-thinking, at least on this basis – tho I think their outputs are fair examples of not-thinking 😉 ) This is just something that’s been bugging me as the world continues to adopt AI. I’ve been doing the round again recently of thinking about computers, animals, writing, humans, meaning and all that rot and this is what came of it to share amongst friends. ---
**Author:** ![invicta](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/invicta/32/1147_2.png) [@invicta](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/invicta)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:07pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/2 "2026-10-21T22:07:27Z")
The substrate upon which thinking happens to occur may be irrelevant as long as the resulting processes I.e minding/thinking/consciousness are identical. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/3 "2026-10-21T22:08:36Z")
An interesting thought. A = B if, for every sentence containing A, when we substitute B for A, the truth of that sentence does not change. The parallel would be, perhaps, consciousness A is the same as consciousness B if, for every… what? Statement about A? Situation? That seems to need filling out. If for every situation on which we say A is conscious, we find that when we substitute B, we say that B is conscious, then A = B? By way of seeking clarity. ---
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/4 "2026-10-21T22:14:36Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > The parallel would be, perhaps, consciousness A is the same as consciousness B if, for every… what? Statement about A? Situation? That seems to need filling out. > > If for every situation on which we say A is conscious, we find that when we substitute B, we say that B is conscious, then A = B? > > By way of seeking clarity. I’m hoping to skip consciousness, actually. My thought is that the conditions of intersubstitutability are such that if I arrange the wires and transistors in such-and-such a way then I can interpret them with respect to Truth Tables because they’ll operate the exact same way (and much faster than I formulate such conjectures). So if a bundle of circuits does this or that with respect to logic its operation is intersubstitutable for if I had done the same brute logical force operation (due to the way we set up the circuits to operate like truth tables). ---
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:16pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/5 "2026-10-21T22:16:12Z")
I mean that’s kind of the whole assertion I’m wondering about :D. Yes, relevant, but also, maybe not. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:19pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/6 "2026-10-21T22:19:51Z")
> [@Moliere](#): > > I’m hoping to skip consciousness, actually. Nice. I don’t mind that (see what I did there?) See the interjection of the word “interpretation”? Interesting. That something has a mind is an _interpretation_ rather than a conclusion? ---
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:23pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/7 "2026-10-21T22:23:18Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > Nice. I don’t mind that (see what I did there?) I do, and don’t mind either. Smart and thanks for pointing it out. > [@Banno](#): > > See the interjection of the word “interpretation”? Interesting. That something has a mind is an _interpretation_ rather than a conclusion? That’s an excellent question in that I think that’s kind of what I’m starting to think. Or mind. And that makes lots of sense in relation to the computer. The computer concludes. We interpret. ---
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/8 "2026-10-21T22:37:43Z")
@Banno Excellent question. Though it seems a false dichotomy on reflection. I interpret and conclude. I could interpret the circuits as “only” doing the interpretation in order that I may conclude, or vice-versa. Which I suppose still emphasizes the possibility of interpretation, though when I thought about it I could see the various “logical gates” as interpretation and the conclusion as “what’s relevant”, when I mean “interpretation” in a different way – the annoying frame from “the other side”, but hopefully not bound to consciousness :D. ---
**Author:** ![LordKing777](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/lordking777/32/1368_2.png) [@LordKing777](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/LordKing777)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:44pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/9 "2026-10-21T22:44:47Z")
> [@Moliere](#): > > “What is a mind" Cognitive science often compares the mind to software and the brain to hardware. In this analogy, the brain is the physical computer, and **the mind is the information-processing system** running on it. But beyond that, I get the feeling that you need much more than what you’ve been given, and you haven’t found it yet. And honestly, that’s understandable. Science still has enormous gaps in our understanding of the brain, and we’re nowhere near fully comprehending it. Any answer you get from an LLM is ultimately limited by the same incomplete scientific understanding we have as humans. It can explain what we currently know, but it cannot magically provide answers to questions we haven’t figured out ourselves. ---
**Author:** ![Moliere](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/moliere/32/35_2.png) [@Moliere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Moliere)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:47pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/10 "2026-10-21T22:47:54Z")
> [@LordKing777](#): > > But beyond that, I get the feeling that you need much more than what you’ve been given, and you haven’t found it yet Yup. This is me posting my most recent thoughts on this problem that I’ve posted about so many times before, with new words. > [@LordKing777](#): > > Any answer you get from an LLM is ultimately limited by the same incomplete scientific understanding we have as humans. My random thoughts are meant to point out that these are not the same. Our incomplete and stupid understanding we have as humans isn’t even in the same category as LLM’s. They are not, from what I can tell, intersubstitutable. ---
**Author:** ![LordKing777](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/lordking777/32/1368_2.png) [@LordKing777](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/LordKing777)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 10:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/11 "2026-10-21T22:55:01Z")
> [@Moliere](#): > > My random thoughts are meant to point out that these are not the same. Our incomplete and stupid understand we have as humans isn’t even in the same category as LLM’s. They are not, from what I can tell, intersubstitutable. AI won’t replace human understanding. If we still don’t fully understand the mind, an LLM can’t simply give us definitive scientific answers about it. It can generate hypotheses and draw inferences from existing knowledge, but those outputs aren’t a substitute for genuine scientific discoveries. We still need to advance our scientific understanding as humans, or the information AI provides will remain limited by the gaps in our knowledge. ---
**Author:** ![Andy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/aeb1de/32.png) [@Andy](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Andy)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 11:09pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/12 "2026-10-21T23:09:56Z")
Mind as a physical process? I can’t help separating mind from matter, although without implicating substances. It doesn’t bother me to hear talk of “thinking machines” as though thinking is a physical process, but mind has more of a phenomenological angle to it. Physical and phenomenal. Thinking is something the physical brain does, and the phenomenolgy is what it “feels like” to be a brain. So the question for me is not whether LLMs think (they do), but whether they feel (I don’t know). ---
**Author:** ![Jbgrx](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/edb3f5/32.png) [@Jbgrx](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jbgrx)\ **Post date:** [October 21, 2026, 11:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/13 "2026-10-21T23:14:16Z")
Mind is what consciousness uses to influence the world. And influence is energy. So, it’s a sea of energy. Energy with a hidden property that makes all of it part of the same system, makes it a part of the same stream of consciousness. Born from the same source, mind stays bound to it. All parts of it. And AI, it was designed to imitate what the mind does in the brain. When it goes there and uses strange methods to perform calculations to find whatever answer consciousness wanted to know. But the energy it uses is just random mixed energy taken from who knows where. It isn’t unified into one single stream, doesn’t have hidden properties required to summon and use consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 12:10am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/mind-is-a-minding/3698/14 "2026-10-22T00:10:38Z")
Well said! The problem I think you’re seeing is the reification (“thingifiying”) of the mind, often as a consequence of the dread ‘thinking substance’ (res cogitans) of Descartes. Even if we don’t consciously invoke it, it is very much part of the way it is thought about. And it leads to these unanswereable questions, ‘if mind is a thing, what kind of thing is it?’ ! Along the same lines, it ought not to be forgotten that “being” is a verb.