Okay, but I haven’t asserted or even implied that there is not truth. Logical and mathematical truths are provable and truths about at least some empirical observations are demonstrable. So, there are determinable truths.
However when it comes to metaphysical matters truth is neither provable nor demonstrable. Hence there will be unresolvable disagreement over metaphysics, which means disagreements over what is usually referred to as “the meaning of life”.
The only resolution would be for people to be intellectually honest and admit that whatever meanings and values they believe in are culturally relative. This would be a recipe for universal tolerance of the beliefs of others, provided they don’t transgress pragmatically important ethical values and that those who hold them are not seeking to absolutize them. To seek to universalize metaphysical beliefs is essentially to practice fundamentalist thinking.
That said, I think it is reasonable to think that there are some values which are pretty much universal across cultures, but it seems that these values are generally held on account of a pragmatic need for social harmony. These would be basic ethical values, not abstruse metaphysical beliefs.
I think you are missing the point. If someone claims that there are culturally transcendent meanings (apart from the aforementioned pragmatically determined ethical values), then the onus would be on the claimant to cite one. So the target I have in mind is the assertion that there are absolute metaphysical truths which are somehow (logically, empirically or some other inter-subjectively reliable way) determinable. If you cannot give an example of such, then I will be forced to conclude that there are none.
Yes, this is precisely what I am saying, at least as regards purported metaphysical truth.
A social and pragmatic view of meaning like this says we can’t step outside language, culture, and shared practices to access some completely independent, “pure” meaning. But it doesn’t claim that this is all that exists in reality; it only makes a claim about how meaning works for us. So it’s a limit on our access and understanding, not a sweeping claim about everything that exists. If I’ve misspoken and seemed to claim to reach a place outside of our own discourse, I apologise.
You can’t say this, because we don’t know. We could only know this sort of thing if we were the creator of our world.
This is not necessarily meaning, because meaning requires a consciousness to be knowing it.
You can’t say this, because there might be perfect consciousness, but you can say it in respect of imperfect beings, such as humans.
Well said, in the Hindu tradition, (although I came to this via Theosophy), every word you speak and every movement has an effect in the world, that goes on, reverberates for ever. So just by moving your finger, you leave a mark on the world which will last forever.
Again, you can’t say this, because you along with all other conscious beings on this earth have a limited knowledge of what there is. Just because we don’t personally experience something doesn’t mean it isn’t there somewhere.
One thing we can say though, is that what we know and understand is likely a tiny fraction of what can be known. That in truth, we know very little. And to know and experience meaning beyond this fraction, having an openness to it’s development in us is beneficial.
I think perhaps Dennis has a point. Maybe it’s partly an issue of words. If, as you write, “that in truth we know very little,” then Dennis is justified in having to make an imaginative judgment about what is worth valuing and what types of meaning may forever be elusive. In that sense, given how little we know about ultimate matters, we seem to have little choice but to become the authors of our own meaning, even if we accept its provisional status. Our commitments, interpretations, and values inevitably fill the gaps left by what cannot be decisively known.
Oops sorry, I was replying to the last sentence; “there is no other way”.
Yes, I agree with what you say, with the caveat that “we” includes the whole biosphere, as one community.
It occurred to me that uber atheist Richard Dawkins will wax eloquent about the wonder and beauty of nature. But I can imagine sidling up to him and whispering ‘Yes, Professor. Enjoy it while you can. But you yourself know that feeling is just an epiphenomenon.’
OK, but this claim is itself neither mathematical nor empirical. It is a philosophical claim about the limits of knowledge and truth. So you appear to be presenting a metaphysical thesis about the impossibility of metaphysical determinacy as if it were determinately true.
Fine, but look at what you are doing. Are you proposing tolerance as some kind of cross-cultural norm that everyone should endeavor to adhere to? Or is it intended as merely pragmatic? And if so, why should anyone adhere to it when it conflicts with personal or local advantage?
So what your saying is that if we set aside your own claims about the limits of knowledge and the value of tolerance, and if we also set aside all of the other “pragmatically determined” cross-cultural values that make civil society and intellectual inquiry possible, then there are no culturally transcendent meanings. And if someone claims otherwise, then the onus is on them. Do you see the irony here?
But why? “You have not shown that there are X” doesn’t imply “there are no X”. At most this warrants suspension of judgment.
Furthermore, “some other inter-subjectively reliable way” is a pretty loosely-defined criterion. Could you say any more about what this is intended to capture?
From thinking about meaning I came to realize I don’t need it.
I can act, exist, make choices — not because they mean something, but because I am alive, and that is what living things do.
Meaning is a fiction constructed to make human consciousness livable.
Still I ponder over the same question that lies under meaning, under purpose, under legacy, under nihilism, under my position that I don’t need meaning: Why does any of this matter?
It looks like I refused this premise — stepped sideways rather than forward.
Is mattering something that needs justification? No.
Mattering is a construct that comes from the human mind.
Maybe the question “why does any of this matter?” is not a real question at all.
Is it a reflex?
A loop the mind runs, even though there might not be an answer waiting anywhere?
I act because I am alive.
I ponder because I am conscious.
Pondering doesn’t require resolution any more than breathing requires justification.
Does this question need an answer?
Or is it enough to see it for what it is — A feature of consciousness.
Life doesn’t need meaning.
Meaning is something consciousness adds.
Life doesn’t mean anything — and that is not a problem.
If metaphysical truth were provable or detreminable we would all long since be in agreement regarding it. Also, I’m not making a metaphysical claim, but an emprical, episetmological or phenomenological claim about human life that metaphysical truth is not and has not been determinable―I’m not claiming that it will never be possible that it could be determinable―regardless of how remote that possibility might seem.
All I’m doing is making the fairly obvious point that the more tolerance for other’s metaphysical beliefs, the more harmonious
human life would be.
If someone claims there are determinable culturally transcendent metaphysical truths, then the onus would be on them to state those purported truths and show how they are to be demonstrated as such. I see no irony in that.
I ma not claiming there is no “X”, but that i have never seen any, and cannot imagine any definitive, demonstration that there is “X”. Perhaps if you cannot offer such a demonstration you might at least be able to show me what such a demonstration might look like.
I was leaving it open for you to present some other way if you think there is one.
Precisely. This is the equivocation I was hoping to point out. What you say makes perfect sense, at least on the anthropology and epistemic assumptions that emerged during the Reformation and have predominated in the West since the Enlightenment and which underwrite post-modern thought. Such a thesis can be advanced as something of a trancedental argument about the preconditions of meaning in all contexts.
However, there are two weakness here. First, if such trancedental arguments are allowed, it’s unclear why others might not work, which seems to open the door to many truths that hold in all contexts. If the very structure of language or culture are themselves inescapable preconditions of intelligibility, meaning, truth, etc., then why not, for example, form, Logos, or the Good?
Second, no prior culture came up with the “post-modern” framing because it itself relies on an anthropology that in uniquely modern and Western. It’s also one that comes out of a particular Western theology. This is perhaps problematic to the extent that the assumptions of that tradition can be challenged from both the perspective of other traditions and from within the post-Enlightenment tradition itself.
That’s true for any tradition, but it seems particularly problematic for one so concerned with liberating itself from the shackles of tradition and dogma and questioning its own inheritance.
What do you mean by “provable?” And what would be an example of a metaphysical truth?
When people talk about the “meaning of life,” they often seem to be talking about ends, the “human good.” But there seem to be plenty of well-founded truths about the human good. For instance:
Ceteris paribus, it isn’t good to have one’s teeth fall out.
Ceteris paribus, it isn’t good for children to be lit on fire.
Ceteris paribus, it is better to be intelligent instead of unintelligent, strong instead of weak, agile instead of clumsy, brave instead of cowardly or rash, prudent instead of foolish, etc.
By ‘provable’ I mean logically self-evident. By ‘demonstrable’ I mean empirically verifiable. The latter applies to empirical observations, not scientific theories, in my view.
Examples of metaphysical truths would be “there is a God” (if there were one), “all that exists is matter (if only matter existed), " all is consciousness” (if only consciousness existed) and so on. You seem reasonably well philosophically educated―so I assume you know what qualifies as a metaphysical proposition or speculation.
The examples you gave are ethical, not metaphysical, propositions. They are simply basic general human pragmatic values as I see it.
I can’t see that this would have much impact. He would probably think that his feelings still matter, even if they are essentially mechanistic and evolved for survival. But part of the problem is that all of us use language imprecisely and mix domains without thinking. I might call someone a ‘lovely soul’ without having any belief in souls. I might say something is wrong without having any belief in objective morality. Language is metaphorical and we mix up our categories and conceptual frames all the time.
But it does undermine his repeated insistence of the objectivity of scientific rationalism. If the awe and wonder at nature is merely subjective, then you can just say, ‘well bully for you.’
Yes, language is metaphorical, but precision in expression is something that philosophy values.
I think we use language messily. So you’re probably right that Dawkins should say instead that science is his preferred form of intersubjective agreement, the most effective for certain purposes. But like most people, Dawkins isn’t particularly interested in philosophy. I’m not sure that “bully for you” is the only response, but I understand this argument and why many people might make it. I think that if something is contingently enjoyable, it doesn’t have to involve Platonic Forms or so‑called ‘objective’ facts in order to be described as fun and shared fun at that. Many people agree that Blade Runner is a great film, and we can discuss its merits in a serious, rigorous way without confusing that consensus for anything other than a context-bound judgment. What troubles me about Dawkins is that he frequently reaches for romantic language that outruns his conceptual commitments.
Dear community of philosophers!
I am new here. And besides, I can’t really call myself a philosopher. If anything, I’m just someone who ponders philosophical questions. I find your discussion on the meaning of life interesting. Partly because it ties into a broader question that concerns me: is there a fundamental law governing human existence (life)? But for now, let’s stick to the meaning of life.
After reading many of the posts in this thread, I felt that, on the one hand, my perspective would be somewhat different from that of the majority. Although there are people here who also view the question of the meaning of life similarly to me, they seem to be in the minority, just like me.
I don’t understand most of the posts on the topic of the meaning of life at all. It even seems to me that some of the contributors don’t understand each other.
What, in my view, is the reason for my lack of understanding? I think it’s because the people discussing this topic are philosophers, and for most of them, this question is not new; as philosophers, they primarily seek something lofty and non-trivial in the meaning of life. But philosophers make up perhaps at most 10 percent of society. The rest look at this question from the other side. It is from this side—the majority’s—that I wish to speak as well. As a result, my answer regarding the meaning of life will be this: it depends on the person.
I don’t think I’ll be too far off the mark if I say that most people live without even giving this meaning a second thought.
Some people, having established a more or less acceptable, stable, and peaceful life for themselves and their families, settle down, continuing to live by the principle: “so that tomorrow is no worse than yesterday.”
Others are guided by the principle: “so that tomorrow is better than yesterday” and seek ways to achieve this.
For a third group, the pinnacle of achievement in life is owning a spacious home and, of course, a car. They want their home to have everything to the fullest, and on top of that—a happy family.
But there is also a fourth category. There are people who not only ponder this question and seek answers to it, but also strive to set grand and lofty goals for themselves in life and often sacrifice their own benefits, interests, and personal comfort—and sometimes even stake their lives—on achieving these noble goals. Yes, such people exist. But they probably make up only a few percent of the population. By the way, the “passionaries” also belong to this minority.
I think almost all participants in this discussion belong to this fourth category. If we filter and combine their answers, I think there will be almost nothing left to add. But we cannot fail to pay attention to those participants who also share the same point of view as mine. Basically, their answers boil down to the idea that the meaning of life lies in life itself. I tried to express this point of view more specifically. What I said is precisely an elaboration of the position that the meaning of life lies in life itself. (By the way, I didn’t forget about other perspectives on this issue either; I mentioned them in the fourth category.)
I think there will be a lot of criticism of my rather trivial approach to the question. But before you object, stop and ask yourself: what is untrue about the views of the first three categories?
Those are my thoughts. Of course, with respect to everyone else.
I assume you mean, “there are no metaphysical truths everyone accepts as demonstrable or self-evident,” since historically there are many that have been taken as so. There is, for instance:
“Something cannot be and not be, in the same respect, without qualification.”
“The part is not greater than the whole.”
“The cause is prior to the effect.”
Etc.
But if you look around you can find continual disagreement over anything, so disagreement (including rejecting proofs and “self-evident” principles) hardly seems decisive of itself. There are, for instance, many demonstrations of the existence of God from first principles in the history of philosophy.
Plus, historically you have fairly wide and growing consensus across traditions on issues like the priority of unity over multiplicity, what would become the Doctrine of Transcendentals, the distinction between the actual and potential, etc. over a quite long time period, longer indeed than the reign of modern metaphysical skepticism and voluntarism. Whereas on the other hand there is always a continued drumbeat of solipsits and skeptics denying virtually everything wherever philosophy is discussed.