Mathematical Platonism and its Critics

Really well done.

As you well know, I come to this discussion from a pragmatic perspective, but also from a metaphysical one. Yes, mathematics was invented by humans and yes it is real. I don’t see any conflict. As I see it, what we call objective or empirical reality is just as much constructed as abstract “objects.” I know you have some sympathy for that view given our common interest in Taoism.

So, anyway, math isn’t about physical reality, it’s about a reality abstracted by our minds and it’s primarily about relationships among things rather than things themselves.

Although I recognize the conflict you describe, I deny it has any implications or useful purpose. Again, that’s my pragmatist speaking.

As I see it, disagreements about what is real and what is not are metaphysical, by which I mean they are more questions of value, perspective, preference, and maybe even aesthetics than facts.

I just read Hamming’s “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics,” which is different from the Wigner paper (thanks to @j_j). I really enjoyed it, but I have to read it again. He seems to come down with Wigner on the subject, but he also has some seemingly contradictory things to say, e.g. he quoted another mathematician as saying “Some men went fishing in the sea with a net, and upon examining what they caught they concluded that there was a minimum size to the fish in the sea.” The implication to me is that we only find what our tools (mathematics) are capable of finding.

This brings to mind an article I tout whenever I get a chance:

Although not specifically about mathematics, Kant claims we know about the abstract concepts of time and space a priori, i.e. without empirical experience. Lorenz claims that Kant’s a priori knowledge results from the evolution of mental structures under the influence of Darwinian modification by natural selection.

It also brings to mind numerous studies by Karen Wynn and others that claim to show that infants are born with a primative natural sense of number and arithmetical operations.

Again—I don’t see that any of this reflects on the reality of abstract entities in general or mathematics in particular.

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Well I’d stress temporality : so meaning as deeply historical. For me it’s not like I slice off “meaning” and keep the rest. Instead I see the intense fusion of meaning and the sensory. Or rather we try to pry open a unity, like Plato’s unwritten doctrine, and see it can’t be done.

It’s not for me the stacking of two layers. Instead the “two layers” is a traditional explication that has its pros and cons. In this context, the cons are that it misses the centrality of time for or rather as articulate human existence.

If the principle is a principle that matters, then the signs in which it has its life are entangled with deeds in the world. The signs are vibrations of the air, for instance, but no vibration of the air, out of context, can mean a damned thing. It’s the total temporal context, their role in the larger world, that gives life to signs.

To paraphrase is to pair a phrase, to find a second phrase that has the same effect in the lifeworld, more or less, as the first. That’s how it looks over here. But this gives rise to the tempting metaphor of a “content” that rides like a passenger in the sensory “body” of the sign.

It’s like looking for something “behind” 1/2, 2/4, 4/8,… as their meaning, but they “say the same thing” because in many contexts it doesn’t really matter which. The “role” is the meaning, and that connects meaning to the world. Or rather finds the world already meaningful.

The roles give life to the signs, the signs give (meaningful) life to the roles?

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Yes, basically. I mean that’s how it looks to me.

Numerals through the number and the number through the numerals. Interdependent concepts. Left and right. North and South.

But the numerals are only numerals, only instituted in the first place, because notches on sticks or knots in rope come to dictate that Bob will give Alice so many coins in May. So we enact the number. (Sort of like enacting the value of fiat currency.) Which is not to say that nothing is “forced” on us by the world. Einstein was blown over by the intelligibility of the world, called it a “miracle.”

We can extend this beyond math. My cat is the unity of her manifestations for me and others. Perceptions, memories, etc. Where is the “real” cat in all of these fugitive showings ? Well the showings are the numerals, and my cat is the number. Perhaps !

And is this an insane reading of Plato’s unwritten doctrine ? Call it a creative misreading, but can you find it there also ?

The whole manifold of sensory phenomena rests in the end on only two factors. Form issues from the One, which is the productive factor; the formless Indefinite Dyad serves as the substrate for the activity of the One. Without such a substrate, the One could produce nothing. All Being rests upon the action of the One upon the Indefinite Dyad. This action sets limits to the formless, gives it Form and particularity, and is therefore also the principle of individuation that brings separate entities into existence. A mixture of both principles underlies all Being.
source

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The real Plato! I think he would agree that numbers and numerals are left and right, heads and tails. There is no number seven without its fugitive showings, but without the number, the showings would fall through the mind’s fingers in silence.

“fugitive showings” is now my favorite thing.

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@Wayfarer Thanks for starting this thread — I think this is a great continuation of the similar thread I started not too long ago.

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A well done post, as usual. Hard to hold up to such standards.

I can’t imagine why this wasn’t obvious to everybody claiming mathematical objects are real. The alternative is to suggest they have a location in space, and one can go and visit 17 if they can pay the fare. Sure, treating such things identically is a category error, one frequently made of ‘the universe’ which also doesn’t have a location, change, age, come and go out of existence (which means is temporally contained and bounded), etc.

I was soon to discover that most were not receptive, preferring various forms of constructivism or nominalism, saying that mathematics is created by the mind or at any rate is a human construction.

The book seems to suggest likewise:

I may be reading that wrong, but the wording seems idealistic on mathematics, implying that mathematics is the contemplation, is a human construct, not something independent and merely discovered. More context would verify whether or not my interpretation of those words is actually the case. Anyway, you seem to contrast this textbook with the ‘invented’ crowd, so maybe not.

Necessarily the case, or necessarily existing? I think the distinction is important to a claim of mathematical Platonism (MP).

Penrose talks about us “being explorers in a world that lies far beyond themselves”, but does that wording imply Platonism?

SEP:

If [MP] is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical.

It’s it only materialism that posits that? MP seems to fit in just fine with physicalism. Anyway, not being a realist, I cannot buy Platonism which is a realist position.

To say reality is confined to this world uses a relation definition of ‘is real’, which is ‘is a member of this universe’, and of course the universe being real by inheritance, even if it’s a different category. MP cannot use that definition of ‘is real’.

we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) [SEP again]

It seems to be a mistake to presume that something not located in this universe is causally inefficacious. It would mean the laws governing the universe cannot be mathematical in nature, and that pure mathematics is unknowable.

the salient point of Benacerraf’s epistemological argument against Platonism is based on what he describes as a causal constraint on knowledge — that to know something is true, you must be situated in an appropriate causal relationship with the facts that make it true.

I think 2 and 3 adding up to 5 has a causal relationship with empirical facts. Godel might say that one can deduce mathematics by pure reason, but I suspect that an absence of any empirical facts would prevent any such exploration.

Many excellent comments here, apologies in advance if I’m not able to respond to all of them.

The essay I had in mind was Nagel’s Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion (ref). I won’t digress too far into it, other than to observe that it’s the tendency to account for every aspect of human nature as a consequence of biology that can sometimes be, in fact often is, reductionist. Nagel says:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one’s psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one’s reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside–rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions.

By ‘stepping outside’, Nagel means providing an evolutionary rationale for the faculty of reason, trying to rationalise it in terms of being a ‘successful adaptation.’ As another writer put it:

if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it ~ Leon Wieseltier

But of course I agree that h.sapiens evolved, and that language and the faculty of reason were part of that process. But that with these faculties, we cross a cognitive threshold that opens horizons of being that are not available to other species. Evolutionary biology qua popular philosophy tends to obfusctate this but this is a separate topic.

@Jay @j_j

What I find interesting is that the core assumptions that define modern naturalism: mechanistic causality, a denial of teleology, cosmic homogeneity, the univocity of being (and downstream of this, the possibility of universal mathematical description), the privileging of “public” observation, and a strong natural versus supernatural dichotomy —none of these resulted in a backlash against mathematical platonism in early modern thought. That is, the core suppositions of naturalism, less maybe its empiricist psychology, are all there in theological and scientific turns that are mostly complete by the tail end of the Reformation, and yet, as near as I can tell, the fear that mathematical platonism would be incompatible with naturalism doesn’t seem to materialize until the 19th century and is if anything mostly a 20th century concern.

With Newton, Descartes, Boyle, Gassensi, Gallileo, etc., we’re not getting a constructivist turn. If anything, views of mathematics become more Platonic as it is elevated (and this goes back to Cusa in the Renaissance). Indeed, I’d say the prizing of the mathematical, particularly as platonic, is a fairly dominant feature of early modern naturalism.

So, the reversal whereby it comes to be attacked for being insufficiently naturalist is itself interesting.

Anyhow, in terms of the genealogy of the rejection of intuition, this has its roots in the clash between Augustinian and Aristotleian views of signs and our capacity to understand universals. Some figures try to split the difference between both authorities. Yet this had the effect of turning Augustinian illumination into a sort of sui generis divine aid, set apart from natural illumination. With the turn towards logic during the nominalist period, and an increasing rejection of anything to “grasp” through intuition, the intuitive faculty increasingly became a special, “mystical” faculty, which then made it suspect in the debate heavy environment if the Reformation (because it couldn’t be proved out, not initially because it relied on God, since Christianity still dominated). And then once it becomes suspect to include God in your wholly rational philosophy, intuition is found guilty by association. You still see this association between intuition and the “supernatural” a lot today, but it seems to me to be entirely historically contingent.

Thank you for the compliment! I hope you see the implicit metaphysical judgment at work. It already assumes a normative value for what are to be considered facts as distinct from values.

I did look into Lorenz - not by reading the edition attached, thanks for providing that, but by extracting a synopsis:

Lorenz on Kant

Konrad Lorenz’s 1941 essay “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology” proposes an evolutionary reinterpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant had argued that certain forms of intuition — space and time — and categories of understanding — causality, substance — are not derived from experience but are preconditions of it, built into the structure of mind prior to any particular encounter with the world. Lorenz accepts that these categories are genuinely a priori relative to the individual knower, but argues that at the species level they are a posteriori — shaped by natural selection over vast evolutionary timescales. Just as the fin of a fish is adapted to the properties of water without the fish having learned about hydrodynamics, our cognitive apparatus is adapted to the structural features of the physical world without any individual having derived that structure from personal experience. The categories fit the world because organisms whose cognitive apparatus failed to track physical reality accurately enough were eliminated by selection pressure. On this account, Kant’s a priori forms of intuition are not transcendental in the strong metaphysical sense but are rather phylogenetically acquired cognitive tools — inherited rather than individually learned, but biological in their ultimate origin and therefore contingent on evolutionary history rather than strictly necessary in the Kantian sense.

I find it generally congenial, however, as in my above comments, the fact that language and reason evolved doesn’t necessarily mean that they can be understood solely in biological terms.

I don’t think so. The invariance of meaning in arithmetic is fundamental to the subject and to the operations of reason. It is a fact that the same information can be conveyed in various languages and forms of media, whilst maintaining its identity, otherwise communication would be impossible, and we’d have no knowledge of those historic texts. The salient point is that in such translations, the representation changes, but the meaning can be discerned and extracted. In the case of mathematics, the same information can be represented numerically or in binary code which are completely different. So what is different, and what remains the same?

Thank you for the compliment!

I think you are reading it wrong.

From The Embodied Mind, p 141:

‘prior to Descartes, the term idea was used only for the contents of the mind of God; Descartes was one of the first to take this term and apply it to the workings of the human mind’. The footnote quotes Descartes: I take the term idea to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives. . . . I employed this term because it was the term currently used by the Philosophers for the forms of perception of the Divine mind, though we can discern no imagery in God; besides I had no more suitable term.’

So in the ancient world, an idea was in no way subjective, personal or individual. Ideas were real but only perceived by nous. You had to learn to ‘use your nous’ to see them!

Yes. And I think the point that @Jamal is making, and I’d agree with, is that there’s a more innocuous appeal we can make to evolutionary theory. Rather than using such a theory as a rationale for reason, in the sense of justification, we can simply note that the ability to reason no doubt evolved along with the other capacities of our species, and no doubt did so because it proved (largely) advantageous for us. This appeal to evolutionary theory doesn’t commit us to believing that reason must be reducible to a series of behaviors, with no warrant apart from their biological story. It’s even compatible with a non-physicalist account of reason, I would say.

However, and this is the salient point — one of the reference articles, namely, Indispensability Arguments for Mathematics, IEP, makes appeals to the fact of our being solely physical as an argument against the very idea of ‘mathematical intuition’.

For example (previously quoted, my bolds):

Sets are abstract objects, lacking any spatio-temporal location. Their existence is not contingent on our existence. They lack causal efficacy. Our question, then, given that we lack sense experience of sets, is how we can justify our beliefs about sets and set theory.

There are a variety of distinct answers to our question. Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

In the introduction to the same article, it is said that ‘our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.’ So, the question is: what are these ‘best epiistemic theories’ and why do they ‘seem to deny mathematical knowledge?’

In Paul Beneceraff’s essay Mathematical Truth, the epistemological argument is precisely that knowledge is basically physical in nature. It is derived from physical effects on physical organs and responses to them by the physical brain, which presumably evolved as a consequences of physical processes.

This may be not how you see it, or how @Jamal sees it, but that is the argument that the OP is addressing.

One must avoid the temptation to add a certain teleology to evolution where evolution supposedly leads to humans as a necessary destination. While the evolution of reason has proven very beneficial to us humans, that reason would evolve was by no means certain.

Well, advantageous to you that it has, in the circumstances :wink:

The rationalist position can be recast as the ability to understand mathematical truths as being emergent from human cognition rather than requiring the ability to understand mathematical truths as being some a priori metaphysical ability special to humans. There is no reason why a Martian would necessarily be incapable of comprehending mathematical truths, for instance.

Isn’t that because in the early modern period, faith in the ‘intelligible order’ was still maintained and there was an implicit recognition of the ‘separate magisteria’ attitude described by Gould? I mean, Galileo, though being persecuted by the Church, was still a believer, as was Descartes. Actually, one of Galileo’s primary sources was the Latin translation of Plato by Marcello Ficino. But the crystallisation of the dualistic model - mind and matter, primary and secondary attributes, the emergence of the Cartesian division - made ‘God a ghost in his own machine’, so to speak. The idea of the disembodied res cogitans became so tenuous, and the progress of the material sciences so spectacular, that the ascendancy of materialism became complete.

Although the times, they are a’changin.

And wouldn’t that be because they are true ‘in all possible worlds’, Mars included?

I’d be very interested in hearing more about why you think integers are imposed on us. Have you read Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic? There he derived the ‘unit’, same thing different time, from acts of noticing within colligations.

Husserl described a method for understanding the constitution of a multiplicity or plurality composed of independent parts, which he dubbed ‘collective combination’. According to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts(a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts.

“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This ‘psychical’ relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.”

He conducted these researches under a psychological rubric , leading to accusations of psychologism from Frege and others. Ten years later he understood his method to be phenomenological, correcting the impressions of psychologism without affecting the substance of his description of the constitution of totality. In Experience and Judgement, he conducts a similar investigation under the heading of apprehension of plurality.

In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.

“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”

While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed” , the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing’ back ‘ the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.

“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.”(p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].”

The constitution of an abstract multiplicity is analogous to the creation of any whole, even though the former involves a peculiarly external form of unification in comparison to combinations unified by similarity or continuity.

A key feature of the fact that a totality is a product of a temporally unfolding series of sense acts is that prior elements of the originally apprehended series have already changed by the time we move on to the succeeding elements of that series. “In forming the representation of the totality we do not attend to the fact that changes in the contents occur as the colligation progresses.”(p.32) The secondary sense-forming act of the uniting of the pasts into the whole is not, then, ‘faithful’ to the original meaning of the parts it colligates, in that they have already changed their original sense via the passage of time at the point where we perform the uniting act of multiplicity.

Rather than a being faithful, the sense of the unification act may better be described as a moving beyond the original sense-constituting acts forming the apprehension of the parts. In forming a new dimension of sense from retentional and protentional consciousness, the unifying act of totalization idealizes the parts that it unifies. In addition to the abstractive concept of groupness (collective combination), many kinds of more intimate idealizations are constituted as wholes out of original temporal successions.

We can see this clearly in the case of the real object, an ideal totality formed out of a continuous synthetic flow of adumbrations in which what is actually experienced in the present is not the ‘faithful’, that is, actual presencing of temporally simultaneous elements but a simultaneity of retentional series, present sense and protentional anticipations.So the integer, like the spatial object, is a subjective and relative product of idealizing constitution.

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Absolutely. And I have sympathy for both views.

I tried to show that I take the non-physicalist take on reason in general and mathematics in particular seriously. That being said, though, I have to admit the whole unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics argument leaves me cold.

I think so as well, and said as much. For one, thanks for fixing the quote origin, which I labeled “well regarded textbook” (imply it was something the book was asserting), when it was actually J Klein describing the Greek view I think.

So let me cut to a particular point about those that deny Platonism of mathematics:
Most seem to hold to the principle that existence is prior to predication (EPP), and 5 being less than 7 is a predicate, a property of both integers, a relation between them. Given EPP, numbers must exist. This doesn’t apply to me since I’ve been pretty open about my denial of EPP. So is it valid to hold to EPP but not Platonism?

Note: Speaking about the relation of 5 being less than 7, which is different than ‘concept of 5’ is less than ‘concept of 7’, which is undefined since the < operator isn’t often defined for concepts. Contrast with ‘concept of ( 5<7 )’ which is one concept, not a comparison between two of them.

For a very short term. It also seems to lead to our demise, unfortunately taking the vast majority of species with us. In the long run, it seems not a fix feature to have. Other species have managed the intelligence/language without the environmental destruction. It’s kind of patronizing to suggest humans are somehow superior or and end goal.

It is not a question that interests mathematicians. This I got from my discussion with AI. Mathematicians like to prove theorems and conjectures and very rarely or never discuss the metaphysics of numbers. There’s a clear line here between philosophy and the art of numbers. It’s a fact worthy of note that it was Pythagoras, a mathematician and a cultist, who coined the word “filosofia” (love-wisdom). To Pythagoras, omnia numerus est (all is number). He was the one who discovered that musical notes held precise mathematical ratios. Hippasus of Metapontum discovered \sqrt 2 was irrational. Descartes was a mathematician-philosopher and so was Bertrand Russell and Gottfried Leibniz but Leonhard Euler wasn’t, neither was Karl Friedrich Gauss, nor Henri Poincare, nor Bernhard Reimann, nor David Hilbert. Georg Cantor and Srinivasa Ramanujan were firm believers.