# Limitations of Reason

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106>\
**Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology\
**Created:** [September 16, 2026, 10:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106 "2026-09-16T22:32:20Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 5

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**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 12:51am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/82 "2026-09-23T00:51:24Z")

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> [@Jay](#):
>
> I would say it’s this sort of oversimplified cartoon that genuine rationalists should reject. Personally I find a lot of daylight between these two extremes.

I agree with you about the daylight. But I think it’s helpful to emphasize via cartoon.

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**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 2:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/83 "2026-09-23T14:28:40Z")

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> [@j\_j](#):
>
> But I think it’s helpful to emphasize via cartoon.

I suppose it can be. The danger is that some will read it as representing a viable rationalist position. And do you yourself really espouse the view that words are “just marks and noises”? I hadn’t thought so.

> [@Tom\_Storm](#):
>
> Steven Pinker defines rationality as the use of knowledge to achieve goals. Seems slightly lacking.

Not only lacking but terrifying. Philosophers generally call this “instrumental rationality,” and draw attention to the fact that if a person has insane or wicked or self-contradictory goals but uses knowledge and logic to achieve them, they are behaving rationally, on this account. That cuts rationality off from anything normative, and makes it problematic whether there could be such a thing as a rational discussion _about_ goals and ends.

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**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 2:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/84 "2026-09-23T14:38:37Z")

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> [@Sam26](#):
>
> Self-description is yours, and that’s fine as far as it goes. But this isn’t about a label, it’s about what you’re doing. If I see someone playing chess, they’re playing chess. They can decline to be called a chess player, but that doesn’t change what’s happening on the board.

I agree with everything you’re saying here about the breadth of philosophical discourse. But the self-description question seems more complicated. This is where the “Rortyan move” comes in.

Suppose you see someone playing chess, and afterwards they tell you they weren’t really playing chess, they were part of a conceptual-art installation that featured two people moving pieces on a chess board in accordance with the rules of chess. “But you obeyed all the rules!” you protest. “It _was_ a chess game; I watched every move.” “No,” comes the reply, “it only looked that way. In fact, I don’t even know how to play chess. I was following the script I was given – and so was my ‘opponent’ – and moving each piece as instructed.”

This is similar to Rorty’s position about philosophical argument, except Rorty was certainly not ignorant of how to argue. He knew the “rules of chess” very well, but was _putting on a performance_ using them.

I think we have to allow that the performing “chess-player” and Rorty are correct in their self-descriptions.

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**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\
**Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 1:47am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/85 "2026-09-24T01:47:29Z")

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> [@Jay](#):
>
> That cuts rationality off from anything normative, and makes it problematic whether there could be such a thing as a rational discussion _about_ goals and ends.

Interesting. I’ve never held that rationality must be good. It’s a tool - and like a chisel, say, it can carve an angel out of wood or stab someone. Isn’t that one of the great lessons of the Holocaust? The state can function as a highly rational killing machine. Putting that aside, I wonder if we have too often used rational as a synonym for sanity. While rationality may rule out formal thought disorder, almost by definition (psychosis) , I don’t think it rules out cruelty or delusion. A person can be perfectly capable of reasoning clearly and still pursue destructive, harmful, or deeply irrational ends in a broader human sense. Thoughts?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 12:47pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/86 "2026-09-24T12:47:50Z")

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> [@Tom\_Storm](#):
>
> Thoughts?

Yes, what you’re describing is exactly the basis for the “critique of Enlightenment rationality” that was so prevalent in the mid 20th century and still continues today. Those of us who think rationality has a normative element, applying to ends as well as means, resist the idea of it being only a tool, and the idea that Hitler, say, could be described as rational in implementing the Final Solution. But it’s a deep question, hard to resolve. Perhaps we _ought_ to limit the concept of rationality to instrumental rationality, and be properly cautious in our appraisals of what rationality is good for.

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**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 7:43am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/87 "2026-09-26T07:43:59Z")

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> [@Tom\_Storm](#):
>
> I’ve never held that rationality must be good. It’s a tool - and like a chisel, say, it can carve an angel out of wood or stab someone. Isn’t that one of the great lessons of the Holocaust? The state can function as a highly rational killing machine

In Plato’s dialogues rationality is good because of the presumption that the rational thing is to do what is best. An example is in the Phaedo where Socrates talks of Anaxagoras who claims to understand the reason for all things. But he’s disappointed that Anaxagoras’ reasons turns out to be more like what we would describe as physical causes. Which he compares to the muscles and sinews which enable him to move. ’But’ , he says, ‘I’m sitting in this jail cell facing death because I know that this what is best’ (paraphrased). He appeals to what we would now call ‘the space of reasons’. Of course it seems almost quaint to the cynical modern eye.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 1:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/88 "2026-09-26T13:45:38Z")

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> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> **He appeals to what we would now call ‘the space of reasons’**. Of course it seems almost quaint to the cynical modern eye.

Totally agree about the bolded part, and its importance to understanding rationality. But . . . OK, there is a “cynical modern eye,” and also a modern eye like Sellars’ or McDowell’s or Kimhi’s or Nagel’s or any number of other current friends of non-instrumental rationality too. I have to think that by characterizing the debate as between “modern” and “[something else]” you might be neglecting how extremely long-standing this argument is, and placing undue emphasis on recent cultural developments (though I’m not sure where “modern” begins for you). Yet you yourself trace it back to Plato, quite rightly.

In fact, just for fun, I’ll take a further leap and posit that the question “What is philosophy?” _is_ the question of the nature of rationality, and there have always been those who interpret philosophy cynically or ironically.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 10:05pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/89 "2026-09-26T22:05:13Z")

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My recent thread [Beyond Survival of the Fittest](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/beyond-survival-of-the-fittest/2680) is about these questions.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 10:25pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/90 "2026-09-26T22:25:37Z")

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Thanks – not sure how I missed it.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 10:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/91 "2026-09-26T22:28:47Z")

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> [@Jay](#):
>
> And do you yourself really espouse the view that words are “ **just** marks and noises”? I hadn’t thought so.

I would **not** add this “just.” The “living system” of these marks and noises is one of the more complex structures that we know of. **One** advantage of recognizing that thought is “incarnate” is that it helps us out of a inherited, confused dualism. As I see it, it almost suffices to really think about and “see” communication.

> [@Jay](#):
>
> That cuts rationality off from anything normative, and makes it problematic whether there could be such a thing as a rational discussion _about_ goals and ends.

To me, one aspect of the dualism I challenge would be a kind of brute instrumentality versus a sacred normative “something” that is not instrumental. Personally it makes more sense to me to think in terms of a social animal that employs cooperation as one of its basic tools.

To me the “should” is not something that is glued on. The “selfish rational agent” as “calculating ego” is a “fiction.” The subject that is “in language with others” is fundamentally non-atomic. Rationality is the performance of virtue for others. Sociality is “prior” to individuality.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 10:35pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/92 "2026-09-26T22:35:24Z")

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> [@Sam26](#):
>
> But saying you like phenomenology doesn’t get you out of the tent, it just picks a corner. If the tent is too big, that’s a reason to qualify the term, not drop it. Physics, for e.g., covers everything from cosmology to condensed matter and nobody refuses the term.

Largely following Bakhtin, I try to think in terms of particular conversations. So I would avoid “philosophy” in particular conversations. Because “phenomenology” is a “wierd” term, those who don’t read phenomenology will probably be less liable to project a “vague cartoon” on my intentions.

The term “philosophy” is baggy and inflated, and for many “obviously” includes bong-driven sci-fi speculation as well as ratoinalized and/or esoteric spirituality.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 10:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/93 "2026-09-26T22:38:01Z")

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> [@j\_j](#):
>
> > [@Jay](#):
> >
> > And do you yourself really espouse the view that words are “ **just** marks and noises”? I hadn’t thought so.
> 
> I would **not** add this “just.”

Well, it was a direct quote:

> [@j\_j](#):
>
> Words are just marks and noises subject to blurry norms.

. . . but that’s not so important.

> [@j\_j](#):
>
> The “living system” of these marks and noises is one of the more complex structures that we know of.

Could you say more about how the marks and noises form a living system? (I’m assuming you don’t mean this literally.)

> [@j\_j](#):
>
> To me, one aspect of the dualism I challenge would be a kind of brute instrumentality versus a sacred normative “something” that is not instrumental.

But surely it’s you who’ve created the dualism? I would never divvy up the conceptual map the way you’ve done. It’s as if you call a dualism into being and then say, We shouldn’t do that!

Again, I know – as you’ve said before – that you use exaggeration and “cartooning” to help make your points, but it muddies the waters when the cartoon doesn’t depict any existing dualism other than the one it just invented.

> [@j\_j](#):
>
> Rationality is the performance of virtue for others.

Could you say more about that? Is this the Rortyan ironic perspective?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 11:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/94 "2026-09-26T23:17:03Z")

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> [@j\_j](#):
>
> Personally it makes more sense to me to think in terms of a social animal that employs cooperation as one of its basic tools.

Sets a low bar doesn’t it?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 11:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/95 "2026-09-26T23:58:47Z")

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> [@Jay](#):
>
> But surely it’s you who’ve created the dualism? I would never divvy up the conceptual map the way you’ve done. It’s as if you call a dualism into being and then say, We shouldn’t do that!

I’m not accusing you personally of foisting a dualism on others.

> [@Jay](#):
>
> but it muddies the waters when the cartoon doesn’t depict any existing dualism other than the one it just invented.

Let me give some examples.

(1) Consciousness is often taken as a “mind stuff” that emerges from a “physical” “non-mind stuff.” This gives us a “hard problem.”

(2) Meaning is often understood as a stuff that is “other than” the marks and noises that “carry” it. This meaning-stuff is associated with the “mind-stuff” from (1).

(3) A “normative” “ought-stuff” is understood as separable from a “pure” instrumental rationality.

In this thread, I use “cartoon” not to indicate an extreme exageration. It’s more of an excavation. The cartoon is an attempt to point out what seem to me to be vague, tacit assumptions. I use “mathematical platonism” to point at the fetishized “half” of the mostly unconsciously enacted dualism.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 12:01am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/96 "2026-09-27T00:01:41Z")

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> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> Sets a low bar doesn’t it?

But why do you interpret it as a **low** bar ?

Is cooperation a low thing ? Is it automatically bad or low for us to acknowledge that we are “grounded” in nature as flesh ? I am strongly influenced by Schopenhauer, who saw the centrality of sex. Each of us alive now has a tree of ancestors, who found enough food to survive. Each ancestor was able to mate. Etc.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 12:08am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/97 "2026-09-27T00:08:13Z")

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> [@j\_j](#):
>
> I am strongly influenced by Schopenhauer,

As am I. So presumably you will agree with the bolded section of the first sentence of The World as Will and Representation:

> § 1. “The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, **though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness.**

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 12:50am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/98 "2026-09-27T00:50:57Z")

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> [@j\_j](#):
>
> Let me give some examples. . . . (3) A “normative” “ought-stuff” is understood as separable from a “pure” instrumental rationality.

This would be the example, presumably, that fits the topic we’re discussing, which you earlier referred to as “a kind of brute instrumentality versus a sacred normative ‘something’ that is not instrumental.”

But where are you getting this example from? Who proposes it?

I thought you were going to give an example of a more realistic dualist position we ought to avoid – something other than what I was suggesting was a cartoon of your own creation. But once again, this is phrased so absurdly that no accomplished philosopher would ever espouse it! – not even at the level of a “vague, tacit assumption.” You can’t seriously believe that proponents of non-instrumental rationality condone “ought-stuff” and maintain that there’s some strict separation between instrumental rationality and a consideration of ends. You’re too well-read for that.

It’s kinda baffling. Couldn’t you offer a charitable reading of an actual position you consider to be dualist on this topic – using language actually used by its proponents – and then show us where you see defects? I’d find that really interesting, and much more helpful.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 3:14am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/99 "2026-09-27T03:14:49Z")

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> [@Jay](#):
>
> But once again, this is phrased so absurdly that no **accomplished** philosopher would ever espouse it!

I’m not even sure of **this** version of the claim. But isn’t “accomplished” doing a suspicious amount of rhetorical work for you here ? I speculate that you also see on this very forum plenty of “not so accomplished” “dualism” that is just as crude as I suggest.

> [@Jay](#):
>
> Those of us who think rationality has a normative element, applying to ends as well as means, resist the idea of it being only a tool, and the idea that Hitler, say, could be described as rational in implementing the Final Solution.

I am with you here, just to be clear.

> [@Jay](#):
>
> This would be the example, presumably, that fits the topic we’re discussing, which you earlier referred to as “a kind of brute instrumentality versus a sacred normative ‘something’ that is not instrumental.”

You wrote to someone else:

> [@Jay](#):
>
> **Philosophers generally call this “instrumental rationality,”** and draw attention to the fact that if a person has insane or wicked or self-contradictory goals but uses knowledge and logic to achieve them, **they are behaving rationally, on this account.** That cuts rationality off from anything normative, and makes it problematic whether there could be such a thing as a rational discussion _about_ goals and ends.

Are you not agreeing with me here ? Who do **you** have in mind ? I’m also interested not only in “accomplished” philosophers but in general attitudes.

Rationality is an “ethical” or “dramatic” concept, in my view. To be “rational” is to perform a virtue in a fundamentally social space that is **prior to** the Cartesian subject. “If” there is philosophy, then the world is fundamentally a forum or stage.

The dualism of the sign is not separate from dualism with respect to rationality. I mention these dualisms together because I see them as entangled components of a Cartesian heritage.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 3:20am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/100 "2026-09-27T03:20:02Z")

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> [@Wayfarer](#):
>
> As am I. So presumably you will agree with the bolded section of the first sentence of The World as Will and Representation:

I agree that we are the only animals on this planet that seem to have substantial self-consciousness. I do wonder how time-binding the oral culture of animals like dolphins might be. Written signs are not **necessary** for time-binding. On the other hand, it seems likely enough that animals approaching our level of self-consciousness would manifest this through a substantial modification of their environment.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\
**Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 8:33am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/limitations-of-reason/3106/101 "2026-09-27T08:33:23Z")

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Schopenhauer had definite views on this:

> “It must be possible to arrive at a complete knowledge of the consciousness of animals, in so far as we are able to construct such consciousness by merely taking away certain properties of our own. … Animals have understanding without the faculty of reason, and consequently they have knowledge of perception, but no abstract knowledge. They apprehend correctly, and also grasp the immediate causal connexion, the higher animals even through several links of its chain; but properly speaking they do not think. For they lack concepts, in other words abstract representations.” **CHAPTER V: On the Intellect Devoid of Reason**

Mind you, he’d never heard of Paul the Octopus.

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