More that we decide that P is true.
I’ll go along with setting aside the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic accounts of truth, and point to a deflationary, minimal account along the lines of Tarski; we use “true” to differentiate some sentences from others, for various reasons; but the commonality is that any sentence “p” will be true if and only if, p. “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white; a straight forward case. It works when we say something false, too: “grass is purple” is true if and only if grass is purple. Since grass is not purple, the “if and only if” is true.
The point is almost one of mere grammar, of the use of language: if we assent to a sentence, then we thereby assent to it’s being true.
And we do assent to sentences.
That assent can take different forms. If we see that snow is white, then we see that “snow is white” is true; if we doubt that snow is white, then we doubt that “snow is white” is true; and if we believe that snow is white, then we believe that “snow is white” is true.
How does that sit with you?