I respect that. A person who appeals to authority in philosophy ( an especially critical discourse ) is basically pre-scientific, in a generalized sense of scientific, that I associate with self-conscious autonomy.
As you say, the ancient thinkers did not have our world. Metaphorically speaking, we are the ancients, for we inherit a massive cultural memory.
On advantage that some of the great ancient Greek thinkers had is that weren’t trapped in Cartesian assumptions. In my view, it’s hard for us to “see” the Greeks, because we drag a certain framework along with us. Cultural memory is not always good.
Relevant to this thread, I currently see a strong reading of Protagoras as an early ontological perspectivist. Not much of his work survives, but the fragments are suggestive. I speculate that the “addiction” of theorists to “a-perspectival Truth” forced them misread Protagoras as incoherent.
This “mis”-reading isn’t a “false” reading but a bad reading, according to my own situated judgment. Returning to our initial theme, we might consider the fear in theoretical types of speaking for themselves, without the excuse of a projected absolute authority.
“Not I but The Method through me.”
We might also consider the tacit monological conception of “high truth.” The truth is “one.” In ethical terms, this is the assumption that there is one right way to believe. Typically there is also the assumption of “one right method” for moving toward this “one right belief.”
Finally the goal is conspicuously verbal. Belief is verbal, and belief should match the verbally understood “truth.” The semantic concern falls into the background. How do verbal signs signify ? Perhaps I verbally assent to the “one right belief.” What then ? Who cares and why ?
I respect the pragmatists because they grounded meaning and inquiry in non-verbal conduct. A theorist might say that a belief is effective because it is “true.” A half-pragmatist might say that a belief is “true” because it is effective. A radical pragmatist ditches the sign “truth” as decoration.
An animal just continuously adjusts its expectant and remembering behavior in response to continuous environment feedback, including social feedback. The theorist wants to know if this is “true.” They miss the point. It is not advertised in terms of “truth” in the first place. It is a tool they can pick up and try for themselves.
The “ontological perspectivism” that I find in Protagoras can be understood as a post-monological sense of the human situation. I don’t need to assume that there is “one right way” to think or act in the world. I become free to understand myself and others as inventors of a plurality of strategies for meeting the future. The tool that works for me may not work for you.
The novel that “shows itself” to me as profound may “show itself” as trash to you. Yet both of us can be certain that we are intending or discussing the same object. In my view, we don’t need to think of “internal mediations” of the “true external novel.” Rather it suffices to understand objects as “systems of faces.”
If this “faces approach” interests you, check out this thread.