Is the Mind Cause or Consequence?

That Steve Talbott essay that I’ve mentioned has something to say about that.

What distinguishes the language of biology from that of physics is its free and full use of the because of reason. Where the inanimate world lends itself in some regards to application of a “deadened,” skeletal language — a language that perhaps too easily invites us to think in terms of mechanisms — the organism requires us to recognize a full and rich drama of meaning.

And so when we ask whether a protein has folded correctly, we’re not suggesting it may have rashly disregarded the laws of physics. Its respect for the syntax of a physical law is not the issue we’re addressing. We want to know something much more plastic — more plastic in the way that meaning is more plastic than a rigid grammar or mathematical formula. That is, we want to know whether the folding is consistent with — serves the needs of and is harmonious with — the coherence and the active, self-expressing identity we recognize in the surrounding context. It’s a context and an identity whose qualities and intents differ greatly from a snake to a lion, from a German shepherd to a golden retriever, or from a lung to a kidney. Likewise, when we inquire into the communication between cells, we are not merely curious about the physical impact of molecular projectiles fired from one cell to another; we are trying to clarify a context of meaning. The one cell is saying something to the other, not just pushing against it. ~ What do Organisms Mean? Steven Talbott.

But the difference is apparent even from the definitions I gave - that’s why I gave them! Organisms are self-organising and self-maintaining. They maintain homeostasis, heal from injuries, adapt, reproduce and evolve. No machine does that. Surely, some of that can be simulated in software, but software does not act autonomously in nature in the way that organisms do.

And the fact that you refer to the ‘ghost in the machine’ is, I think, illustrative of the reason for the reluctance to differentiate organisms and machines. As you’re well aware, that expression is generally associated with Descartes’ dualism of mind and body (the expression was originally coined by Gilbert Ryle, popularised by Arthur Koestler in his book of that name.) I think the difficulty arises from saying what it is that differentiates organisms and machines - from defining, or putting your finger on, the difference, without it soundling like an appeal to a ‘vital force’.

Basically the question ‘if it’s not physical, then what is it?’ almost guarantees the answer: something non-physical. A ghost! A vital spirit! But phenomenology seeks to re-frame the entire debate, by not treating consciousness or being or life itself AS an object, as something. Hence Terrence Deacon’s ‘constitutive absences’ and much of the emerging approaches of enactivism and semiology. (And I think our friend @j_j 's various improvisations on Heidegger et al also serve to illustrate this ‘re-framing’ even despite his peculiar affection for positivism.)

Phenomenology doesn’t add a ghost back into the machine — it asks whether the machine analogy was ever adequate to what we actually observe when we look at living beings without that mindset already in place.

It sounds like you’ve defined the word ‘machine’ in a way that makes your claim true – i.e. a machine is necessarily an artifact. I take a different view – I regard machines as devices that transfer energy from one place to another, or convert energy from one form to another, in order to perform work. It is this use of the word that enables biologists to speak of “the machinery of the cell,” such as the conversion of chemical energy (in the form of ATP) into mechanical work (e.g. locomotion).

That sounds like a good place to start.

My impression is that phenomenology is an attempt to return the horse to its rightful place before the cart. I don’t yet see how that has any bearing on the question of what living things are over and above devices that transfer energy from one place to another, or convert energy from one form to another, in order to perform work.

Your reply might be that it is precisely our propensity to put the cart before the horse (i.e. to take our fallible conceptual world models as the primary reality in place of the indubitable fact of conscious experience) that leads us to overlook the fundamental difference between living things and machines. That might be an interesting avenue to pursue, though I can’t help feeling that it will turn out to pivot on a conflation of ‘life’ and ‘conscious experience.’

Isn’t that the essence of reductionism? Reductionism has been described as ‘nothing but’, which is just what this does. It robs existence of any inherent meaning.

You said it!

The extraordinary reslience of algae in Washington’s Relfecting Pool despite all efforts to exterminate it is an apt illustration of one life-form’s resilience and determination to survive!

@Andy
I’ve been following the conversation, and I offer a few notes expressing my own position at the moment.

Phenomenalism ( common among the earlier positivists) is an anti-materialistic and non-dual explication of how we share the world. For instance, Ayer understands objects like chairs as “logical constructions” from “sense-data.” These “sense-data” are prior to categorizations like “mind” or “matter.” Ayer explicitly dissolves even flesh-and-blood subjects into phenomenal streams, for people are also logical constructions from sense-data.

From the POV of the realist / physicalist / materialist, this phenomenalism is wildly idealistic. Lenin accused Mach of “idealism.” But, properly understood, phenomenalism ( like James’ radical empiricism) is pluralism. Consciousness is not a stuff that exists. Rather consciousness is the very being of the world, its “presence” or “quality.”

Those who neglect the ontological difference will be tempted to read this “being” of the world as a stuff that the world is made of. This misses the point entirely, so that one remains stuck in “ingredient ontology.” In other words, one remains stuck in the Cartesian framework, perhaps trying to reduce mind to matter or matter to mind. The positivists were sophisticated on this issue.

The problem about which the matter revolves here is evidently the so-called problem of the reality of the external word, and there the seem to be two parties: that of “realism” which believes in reality of the external world, and that of “positivism” which does not. In truth, I am convinced that it is quite senseless to set the two views in opposition in this manner. In truth, I am convinced that neither party really knows what it wants to say (which is the case with every metaphysical proposition.)

In this essay, Schlick is pushing for his version of positivism against earlier versions that were ( for him ) still too metaphysical. Note that I don’t endorse all of Schlick’s views, but I mostly agree with what he presents in the linked essay.

Heidegger is especially important here because he focused on the historicity of meaning. Hegel is likewise relevant, because he saw the world itself as auto-poetic or self-authoring. Reality is an organism. The mighty oak tree is latent in the acorn. The human conversation builds on itself. We are the ancients, for we inherit centuries of thought.

I look for “mind” (to oversimplify) especially in the presence of signs, rich in historically developed and accumulated significance, among non-sign objects in the world. Clearly individual human brains and sense-organs are important here. I am “alone” to some degree as I make sense of the words of a stranger or some ancient inscription. Yet I’ve been trained into using signs since childhood. Some thinkers try to deny the centrality of the individual subject, but to me this is escapism toward a monological metaphysics. Of course individual subjects become individuals through a shared language, so the I is always a “we” but never completely reducible to this “we.” Early logical positivists were sometimes naive on this issue, pretending that “nonsense” could be an objective or transpersonal property of assertions they didn’t fancy.

Both Husserl and Heidegger were interested in how “meaning” is “stored” and “transmitted” or “reactivated.” In some sense, the great dead philosophers are still arriving, as we continue to find news aspects of significance in their signs. Heidegger is more empirical and does without the comforting but also constraining assumption of a set of eternal essences somehow secure outside of the ravages of time and chance. Bakhtin makes possible a dialogical positivism that gets us well beyond any residue of scientism.

Phenomenalism as the positivists grasped it was anti-materiaistic only in the very specific sense that it was opposed to the idea of a truly existent material substance behind or in the background of experience. This is why Mach refused to endorse the existence of atoms. But positivism as an historical movement is also completely opposed to anything it deems metaphysical, and it casts the net very wide with that definition. It needs to be recalled that Auguste Comte, who coined the term ‘positivism’, meant to distinguish it as ‘positive science’ distinct from metaphysical or theological ideas. The definition remains ‘a philosophical stance stating that authentic, reliable knowledge must come from objective, observable facts and logic. It holds that the scientific method is the only valid way to understand the world, rejecting subjective experiences, intuition, introspection, and metaphysical speculations.’ As such, it is sharply different from phenomenology, which has a completely different take on the meaning of the word ‘experience’. For the positivists, this means ‘sensible experience’, i.e. that which can be known by senses and instruments, or mathematical extrapolation of the same. For phenomenology, the first-person nature of lived experience is the fundamental datum of philosophy, whereas phenomenalism methodically brackets this out.

Husserl viewed positivism as the root of a profound “crisis in European sciences”. While he valued its emphasis on empirical evidence, he strongly opposed its reduction of human consciousness to mere physical nature and its dismissal of subjective experience as unscientific. Chalk and cheese.

Yes. I too am for science and against metaphysics and theology. We go from (1) crude myth to (2) metaphysics or abstract myth to (3) positive science.

But a purely positive science is an ideal that we pursue. For instance, the logical positivists were unwittingly metaphysical and theological in their conception of language. Heidegger’s early work on the historicity of meaning is a vital corrective. Signs are things in the world, that “radiate” a significance. The theological hope in some of the still naive positivists was a kind of logic that was safe from history. In this they were like Husserl, clinging to a divine essence that remained safe in Heaven, allowing for an atemporal correctitude.

Like self-righteous seminarians, they’d cry “nonsense” at whatever they were unable to unfold. They pretended to escape from their own situatedness as organisms and interpreters, and acted like priests of Logic.

We see this echoed in physicalistic scientism, which appropriates the mathematics of scientific models as somehow pointing at an otherwise ineffable “fundamental reality.” This objective reality is implicitly enjoyed as spectacle by an omniscient narrator.

Personally, I just want a less rigid and naive philosophy of science. There’s nothing wrong with science itself. I see philosophy as a more open and general science that includes a placing of science proper within the lifeworld.

Perception is first-person. Phenomenology is an enrichment of empiricism/phenomenalism. Husserl is great, but he was incautious on the issue of essences. His early work is also too egological, insufficiently appreciative of intersubjectivity as the basis of subjectivity. Derrida’s early work offers a decisive critique. Basically traditional metaphysics needs “signifieds” to exist outside of time, needs “the mind of God” to insure the possibility of an eternal logic of essence.

Heidegger, as I mentioned, gives us a crucial enrichment of phenomenalism. We share the world largely through the historically generated and co-maintained significance of signs. This is our gift as humans, to live intensely in signs and therefore beyond the temporal and spatial present.

To me this is just culture-war stuff. Husserl’s ontological phenomenalism is very close to Mach’s, except Husserl was attached to the experience of atemporal essences.

Also Husserl was a theist, and Mach was an atheist. Husserl resented historicism, and Mach surely embraced it.

If we just look at the way they understand the structure of the world ( ignoring the issue of eternal essences ), we see a strong overlap. But Mach was a physicist and almost a pragmatist, while Husserl wanted an absolute theory of reality.

It’s much more than that. There are real differences between positivism and phenomenology that can’t be just interpreted away. I don’t know Heidegger well, but I can’t imagine that he could find any common ground with positivism. I do know that Rudolf Carnap referenced an expression of Heidegger’s as a paradigm case of the uselessness of metaphysics and that Ayer was similarly dismissive.

I’m not going into bat for ‘theology and metaphysics’ as such, but I will say the questions they wrestle with are real questions and not just the chimera that positivism would make them out to be. And certainly Heidegger engages with metaphysics, even if critically, rather than simply dismissing it as ‘useless words’ as does A J Ayer.

It’s how I’ve been culturally conditioned to use the word ‘machine.’ It’s a very useful word. And reduction is a very useful way to investigate the world. Understanding the behavior of the parts helps in understanding the behavior of the whole, but the idea that the world is ultimately explicable only in terms of the parts seems to me to be claiming too much. The whole and its parts arise in mutual dependence, but I don’t see this as being an argument for claiming that living things are not machines.

A grain of sand is not a machine. A living cell looks very much like a machine to me, and if you’re going to argue that a living cell is not a machine then you have to say how you can avoid implicating some kind of “vital force.”

‘Machine’ is just a useful word. ‘Life’ is a useful word. Your argument seems to be that we must distinguish between them if existence is to have any meaning – I distinguish them: there can be non-living (allopoietic) machines. It seems that this is an unsatisfying distinction for you, and I’m trying to work out why.

It seems very much like neutral monism to me, and as you know, I have no quarrel with neutral monism.

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Well, again, a machine IS reducible to its parts. A car, for instance, comprises a list of parts with a set of instructions that allow it to be assembled. An organism, on the other hand, begins from a single cell — in fact, as far as we know, all life began from a single cell — from which the entire organism then grows, while as the cells divide and multiply, they differentiate themselves into the various specialised functions that comprise the different organs and systems of the body. And all the while, maintaing an operative unity to which all the various cells and organs remain subordinate (except for in the unfortunate case of cancer.) No machine does anything remotely like that. They don’t self-assemble from a single part by dividing into all of the specialised parts that comprise them. So machines and organisms operate by very different principles, the first assembled from the outside by an artisan or engineer which designs and builds them, the second from within itself.

On the other hand, maybe you’re using the word ‘machine’ in a more loose sense as ‘a system that produces an outcome’. In that sense there’s nothing the matter with it, provided that it is understood as a metaphor.

The issue with the machine analogy is precisely that machines are not living things. They’re not beings in the sense that organisms are. I’m struggling to understand how that can be seen as other than an ontological distinction. For that matter, do you think there can be such a thing as an ontological distinction? Do you think there can be beings of fundamentally different kinds, or all beings and machines different examples of the same general kind?

The original post is based on a 1966 book called The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophy of Biology, Hans Jonas. It comprises a series of long (and rather dense!) essays.But the salient philosophical point is that Jonas says that the attitude of the modern world generally has failed due to its deficient understanding of the nature of being. You can see how this might have been influenced by his teacher and mentor Heidegger (of whom he was also a critic.) I did try and present some of Jonas’ points in the essay that this thread was based on Is the Mind Cause or Consequence? from which:

With the Renaissance and the Copernican revolution, the horizon of human experience expanded, vastly and even catastrophically — from the living terrestrial nature to the enormity of cosmic space, now understood as mainly devoid of life. Very rapidly, the new science proceeded by progressive subtraction of vital features from its picture of reality, until what remained was only matter, measurable, mathematical and tractable to the laws of physics. The rejection of anthropomorphism extended to animals as well — no purpose or interiority could be projected onto nature even if animals seem to display them. Complex behaviour could be described as instinctual and treated as if it were something “programmed” by genetics.

…Now inert matter becomes the norm, the baseline, the “natural and intelligible condition.” Life becomes the anomaly — minute in the vastnesses of space, qualitatively different and so theoretically problematic. Where once death demanded explanation, now it is life that does. And crucially, the explanation must be given in terms of the lifeless — life must be reduced to non-life, the organism unmasked as what Jonas memorably calls ludibrium materiae — a subtle hoax of matter.

It is the existence of life within a mechanical universe which now calls for an explanation… Quantitatively infinitesimal in the immensity of cosmic matter, qualitatively an exception from the rule of its properties… That there is life at all, and how such a thing is possible in a world of mere matter, is now the problem posed to thought.

So — the reason I differentiate organisms from machines is that seeing creatures as machines denies them the very quality that defines them, namely, that they’re alive.

I used to think of it as neutral monism, but recently I think it’s better to emphasize it as radical pluralism. I think you and I ( whatever differing language we use ) both recognize the ontological difference (via Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Sartre, Fasching, James, etc.)

Consciousness is not something present in the world but rather the presence of the world. The world is present as all kinds of things, from protons to promises to puppies. We can create and abandon these categories as needed for practical life. None of them are ontologically deep or fixed.

In my view, neutral monism is the high water mark and final station of ingredient ontology. As soon as we get “All is X” where X is neutral, we see ( I claim) the pointlessness of such a monism, except as a transitional state out of ingredient ontology altogether.

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You’re speaking my language now j_j.

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Of course there are. My point is just that you seem to be ignoring the structural breakthrough of phenomenalism. Many early positivists were phenomenalist, so much so that Putnam’s mentor Reichenbach, arguing against it, uses “positivism” as a term for phenomenalism. At one time, the terms were more or less synonymous.

This conception permits the positivists to interpret the existence of concreta in the same way as the existence of abstracta is interpreted. There is, they argue, no genuine problem of the existence of the external things; it is a pseudo-problem. We can say that external things exist; then this means the same as, "Impressions of such and such kinds exist.’ We can say also that external things do not exist. Then we must admit that the term “external things” may nevertheless be used and expresses the same as propositions concerning impressions.
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To decide upon the first or the second mode of speech is a matter of convention only. To demand more, to ask whether the external things exist “beyond” the impressions, would be meaningless. This is the famous positivistic interpretation of the existence of the external world. It is one of the advantages of this conception that there remains no doubt as to the “reality” of the external world.The existence of the world is as sure as the existence of my impressions; this is because the first contention means no more than the second. Any doubt of the reality of the external world is an outcome of a meaningless question which supposes an existence of the things “beyond” my impressions.

Reichenbach’s primary idea is the probabilistic “weight” of beliefs. He defends a kind of probabilistic realism, which is very much still on the secular side of the culture war. Here’s a passage a few paragraphs down.

These are the fundamental ideas of positivism as they are generally developed by their adherents. There is something very suggestive in these conceptions, something comparable to the convincing clarity of a religious conversion; and the ardor with which this interpretation of the existence problem has been emphasized by the preachers of positivism reminds one indeed of the fanaticism of a religious sect. I do not say this with the intention of discrediting positivism; on the contrary, it is just this strength of conviction which attracts our sympathies because of its manifest intensity and candor and its extreme desire to submit to the exigencies of intellectual cleanliness. But it is the danger of fanatic doctrines that they forget the necessary criticism of their basic conceptions; we must take care that admiration of the lucidity of the theory does not restrain us from a sober examination of its logical bases.

Note that he is attacking positivism, somewhat genially, as still too religious.

Excellent ! I know we come from different backgrounds, so it’s nice when we manage an intermediate language on a crucial issue.

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Yes. Exactly. Heidegger was far more genuinely empirical than either Carnap ( at that time ) or Ayer. The early logical positivists ( to risk a generalization ) were naive and theological about language. They took analytic statements for granted. But what exactly is an analytic statement ? The last tower of metaphysics, at the center of logical positivism, its refuge from time and experience. See Gellner’s diagnosis of OLP, a fuzzy folksy mutation, in Words and Things.

The “theological vanity” in linguistic philosophy is that a particular human being can “engulf and control” all possible meaning, declaring from his or her candy throne whether this or that is “nonsense.” For instance, Carnap walks right into this, fetishizing his magic symbols ( formal logic as the divine language ) and giving Heidegger hell. “I don’t get it so there is nothing there to be got ----because I am in touch with the eternal essence of Logic —ommmmmmmm.”

People tend to know the later Heidegger, the “wizard,” but his early stuff was destructive, skeptical, and relativistic —and yet ambitious to achieve a “pre-science” or “ur-science” of pretheoretical existence, which is the soil from which special sciences emerge and from which they draw their significance. This kind of pre-science is fundamentally personal and risky.

Kisiel writes this of the Heidegger of 1919.

In fact, it was in this semester which inaugurated his phenomenological decade that he first discovered his root metaphor of the ‘way’ to describe his very kinetic sense of philosophy. Philosophy is not theory, outstrips any theory or conceptual system it may develop, because it can only approximate and never really comprehend the immediate experience it wishes to articulate. That which is nearest to us in experience is farthest removed from our comprehension. Philosophy in its ‘poverty of thought’ is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only ‘formal indications’ which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life’s possibilities of understanding and articulation. In short, philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression than a science. That phenomenology is more a preconceptual, provisory comportment than a conceptual science, that the formally indicating ‘concepts’ are first intended to serve life rather than science, becomes transparent only after the turn…
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Philosophy is ‘philosophizing’, being ‘on the way to language,’ ways —not works.

Also found a great passage in Becoming Heidegger, where one can see the themes that would become famous later in Being and Time.

It is now a matter of regarding the basic structures in which this being-in-the-world takes place and plays itself out. How is the world given? Originally not as an object of theoretical knowledge, but as an environing world in which I look and move around, do something and takecare of it.These objects are primarily not objects of theoretical knowledge, but are matters I have to deal with, which carry within themselves references to what they are used for and how they are employed, their usefulness.Material things in physics’s sense are not what is first given. The extrication of nature from the immediately given world is a complicated [thought] process.
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The immediate world is a world of practical concern. The surrounding world [Umwelt] and its objects are in their space, but this space of the world-around-us is not the space of geometry. The space of our immediate environment is essentially defined by moments of proximity and distance, near and far, in our “getting around” [Umgang] this world-around-us, by possibilities of turning toward or turning away from handy things and things on hand, and the like. It does not have the homogeneous structure of geometric space, but is rather structured by particular and distinctive places. The spacing of furniture, for example, is not given as measurements, but rather in dimensions which are disclosed in “going about” [Umgang] our occupations with them (they can be reached by hand, we can pass between them, etc.). Uncovering the space of the surrounding world is also a task of the painter.It is on the basis of this environmental space that geometric space is, by way of precise procedures, first elaborated.
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The Da-sein of life is further determined by the being-there-with-us of other realities which have the same characteristics of being that I myself have: other human beings.We humans have a special kind of being-with-one-another. We all have the same surrounding world, we are in the same space. Space is there for us with one another, and we ourselves are there for one another. By contrast, the chairs in this spaceare merely present and on hand, they are not therefor one another. Though they are indeed all together in this space, it is not therefor them.
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Being-in-the-world is thus being-with-one-another. Being-in-the-world is defined by this being-with-one-another even when there is factically no other human there. In the natural way of living, I myself am not given to myself in such away that I[in detachment] observe my own experiences. I am first given to myself in what I have to do, in that with which I am involved, in that in which I daily dwell. The world (room, house, city, etc.) has a certain familiarity about it. It is in this world that I see myself, fading into its background, as it were, as something real. I encounter myself in my surroundings. The environing world [Umwelt] is immediately given in my practical circumspection, as I “look around” [Umsicht]. The possibility of theoretical research arises here only by way of a certain reorientation [Umstellung]. I can reorient myself by loosening my circumspection from my practical concern and letting it become a “mere” [detached] looking around, i.e., θεωρία [theory, “theater”].
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This declaration of independence from the surrounding world and move toward the autonomy of sight is the proper source of any science. Science is the cultivation of the mere look, looking straight at a matter. But now who is this Dasein ? First and foremost, we are not ourselves. We live according to what everyone says, what everyone judges to be the case, how every one sees things, what everyone wants. It is this indefinite “everyone” that rules this Dasein. First and foremost, this everyone exerts a proper dominance over Dasein.
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Even science lives under its rule. Tradition dictates how everyone investigates, how everyone does research.This publicness of Dasein which rules our being-with-one-another makes clear that we are mostly not ourselves, but the Others. We are lived by the others. Who is this everyone? It is imperceptible, indefinable, no one. Yet it is not nothing, but rather the most proper reality of our everyday Dasein.
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This everyone-Dasein has the tendency to lose itself in the concerns of the world and so to fallaway from itself.The human being is inauthentic in its everydayness, not itself. And this being-inauthentic, not-being-itself, is the primary reality of human Dasein. This becomes most evident in a constitutive structure of human being that the Greeks saw and used in their definition of human being. The human being isaζῷον λόγονἕχον [a living being possessive ofspeech].
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For the Greeks, who loved to talk a lot, the human being is defined by its speaking. Speech is not taken here as the basic structure of our being. (Here, of course, speech should not be understood as mere sound after the fashion of psychology as a natural science). Speech is always speaking about something and expressing oneself about something to and with others. What is being discussed is through discussing uncovered and made accessible to others. Λόγος [speech] is δηλοῦν[making visible]. But the possibility of mere talk [gossip, hearsay, idle chatter, etc.] shows that human beings have a tendency to fall or lapse. Idle talk is the possibility in which the everyone takes over.
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Characteristically, speech by and large does not arise from any original knowledge of the matters, for it is in fact impossible to have seen and demonstrated everything by oneself.Abroad range of speech comes from hearsay. What characterizes repeated gossip is that, in the process of being circulated, what is said gets solidified in its validity and at the same time becomes removed from the very matter about which it is said.The more idle talk dominates, the more the world gets concealed. Everyday Dasein thus has the tendency to cover over the world as well as itself. This tendency of concealing is nothing but Dasein’s flight from itself into the public, a flight that will becomeimportant for understanding the phenomenon of time.

page 260

For me, the concept of “idle talk” or “gossip” was the way into Heidegger’s work. Phenomenology tries to “pierce” this idle talk, which covers over phenomena which comforting evasive phrases.

Our foundation as individuals is the generic, inherited communal subject, the “form of life” or “impersonal conceptual scheme.”

Mach wrote a book on how “lived space” becomes mathematical-physical space. James spends many pages on this experienced space in his famous Principles — which is basically a brilliant work of phenomenology ( not surprising given that Husserl had trouble initially distinguishing his work from descriptive psychology.)