Yes. Exactly. Heidegger was far more genuinely empirical than either Carnap ( at that time ) or Ayer. The early logical positivists ( to risk a generalization ) were naive and theological about language. They took analytic statements for granted. But what exactly is an analytic statement ? The last tower of metaphysics, at the center of logical positivism, its refuge from time and experience. See Gellner’s diagnosis of OLP, a fuzzy folksy mutation, in Words and Things.
The “theological vanity” in linguistic philosophy is that a particular human being can “engulf and control” all possible meaning, declaring from his or her candy throne whether this or that is “nonsense.” For instance, Carnap walks right into this, fetishizing his magic symbols ( formal logic as the divine language ) and giving Heidegger hell. “I don’t get it so there is nothing there to be got ----because I am in touch with the eternal essence of Logic —ommmmmmmm.”
People tend to know the later Heidegger, the “wizard,” but his early stuff was destructive, skeptical, and relativistic —and yet ambitious to achieve a “pre-science” or “ur-science” of pretheoretical existence, which is the soil from which special sciences emerge and from which they draw their significance. This kind of pre-science is fundamentally personal and risky.
Kisiel writes this of the Heidegger of 1919.
In fact, it was in this semester which inaugurated his phenomenological decade that he first discovered his root metaphor of the ‘way’ to describe his very kinetic sense of philosophy. Philosophy is not theory, outstrips any theory or conceptual system it may develop, because it can only approximate and never really comprehend the immediate experience it wishes to articulate. That which is nearest to us in experience is farthest removed from our comprehension. Philosophy in its ‘poverty of thought’ is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only ‘formal indications’ which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life’s possibilities of understanding and articulation. In short, philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression than a science. That phenomenology is more a preconceptual, provisory comportment than a conceptual science, that the formally indicating ‘concepts’ are first intended to serve life rather than science, becomes transparent only after the turn…
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Philosophy is ‘philosophizing’, being ‘on the way to language,’ ways —not works.
Also found a great passage in Becoming Heidegger, where one can see the themes that would become famous later in Being and Time.
It is now a matter of regarding the basic structures in which this being-in-the-world takes place and plays itself out. How is the world given? Originally not as an object of theoretical knowledge, but as an environing world in which I look and move around, do something and takecare of it.These objects are primarily not objects of theoretical knowledge, but are matters I have to deal with, which carry within themselves references to what they are used for and how they are employed, their usefulness.Material things in physics’s sense are not what is first given. The extrication of nature from the immediately given world is a complicated [thought] process.
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The immediate world is a world of practical concern. The surrounding world [Umwelt] and its objects are in their space, but this space of the world-around-us is not the space of geometry. The space of our immediate environment is essentially defined by moments of proximity and distance, near and far, in our “getting around” [Umgang] this world-around-us, by possibilities of turning toward or turning away from handy things and things on hand, and the like. It does not have the homogeneous structure of geometric space, but is rather structured by particular and distinctive places. The spacing of furniture, for example, is not given as measurements, but rather in dimensions which are disclosed in “going about” [Umgang] our occupations with them (they can be reached by hand, we can pass between them, etc.). Uncovering the space of the surrounding world is also a task of the painter.It is on the basis of this environmental space that geometric space is, by way of precise procedures, first elaborated.
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The Da-sein of life is further determined by the being-there-with-us of other realities which have the same characteristics of being that I myself have: other human beings.We humans have a special kind of being-with-one-another. We all have the same surrounding world, we are in the same space. Space is there for us with one another, and we ourselves are there for one another. By contrast, the chairs in this spaceare merely present and on hand, they are not therefor one another. Though they are indeed all together in this space, it is not therefor them.
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Being-in-the-world is thus being-with-one-another. Being-in-the-world is defined by this being-with-one-another even when there is factically no other human there. In the natural way of living, I myself am not given to myself in such away that I[in detachment] observe my own experiences. I am first given to myself in what I have to do, in that with which I am involved, in that in which I daily dwell. The world (room, house, city, etc.) has a certain familiarity about it. It is in this world that I see myself, fading into its background, as it were, as something real. I encounter myself in my surroundings. The environing world [Umwelt] is immediately given in my practical circumspection, as I “look around” [Umsicht]. The possibility of theoretical research arises here only by way of a certain reorientation [Umstellung]. I can reorient myself by loosening my circumspection from my practical concern and letting it become a “mere” [detached] looking around, i.e., θεωρία [theory, “theater”].
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This declaration of independence from the surrounding world and move toward the autonomy of sight is the proper source of any science. Science is the cultivation of the mere look, looking straight at a matter. But now who is this Dasein ? First and foremost, we are not ourselves. We live according to what everyone says, what everyone judges to be the case, how every one sees things, what everyone wants. It is this indefinite “everyone” that rules this Dasein. First and foremost, this everyone exerts a proper dominance over Dasein.
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Even science lives under its rule. Tradition dictates how everyone investigates, how everyone does research.This publicness of Dasein which rules our being-with-one-another makes clear that we are mostly not ourselves, but the Others. We are lived by the others. Who is this everyone? It is imperceptible, indefinable, no one. Yet it is not nothing, but rather the most proper reality of our everyday Dasein.
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This everyone-Dasein has the tendency to lose itself in the concerns of the world and so to fallaway from itself.The human being is inauthentic in its everydayness, not itself. And this being-inauthentic, not-being-itself, is the primary reality of human Dasein. This becomes most evident in a constitutive structure of human being that the Greeks saw and used in their definition of human being. The human being isaζῷον λόγονἕχον [a living being possessive ofspeech].
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For the Greeks, who loved to talk a lot, the human being is defined by its speaking. Speech is not taken here as the basic structure of our being. (Here, of course, speech should not be understood as mere sound after the fashion of psychology as a natural science). Speech is always speaking about something and expressing oneself about something to and with others. What is being discussed is through discussing uncovered and made accessible to others. Λόγος [speech] is δηλοῦν[making visible]. But the possibility of mere talk [gossip, hearsay, idle chatter, etc.] shows that human beings have a tendency to fall or lapse. Idle talk is the possibility in which the everyone takes over.
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Characteristically, speech by and large does not arise from any original knowledge of the matters, for it is in fact impossible to have seen and demonstrated everything by oneself.Abroad range of speech comes from hearsay. What characterizes repeated gossip is that, in the process of being circulated, what is said gets solidified in its validity and at the same time becomes removed from the very matter about which it is said.The more idle talk dominates, the more the world gets concealed. Everyday Dasein thus has the tendency to cover over the world as well as itself. This tendency of concealing is nothing but Dasein’s flight from itself into the public, a flight that will becomeimportant for understanding the phenomenon of time.
page 260
For me, the concept of “idle talk” or “gossip” was the way into Heidegger’s work. Phenomenology tries to “pierce” this idle talk, which covers over phenomena which comforting evasive phrases.
Our foundation as individuals is the generic, inherited communal subject, the “form of life” or “impersonal conceptual scheme.”
Mach wrote a book on how “lived space” becomes mathematical-physical space. James spends many pages on this experienced space in his famous Principles — which is basically a brilliant work of phenomenology ( not surprising given that Husserl had trouble initially distinguishing his work from descriptive psychology.)