I don’t disagree that raw feelings and desires are foundational. But once reflection arises, human motivation cannot be reduced to them without losing what is distinctively human.
A person can feel intense hunger but still refuse food for symbolic reasons, or strong desire yet subordinate it to duty. This is not mere mediated “ideas” (Kant) or reason as slave to passion (Hume). It is the normal condition of a reflective existence, not a flaw. Ethical egoism can recognize this: the self whose interest is pursued is a reflective being whose flourishing requires negotiating these competing pulls. Motivational contradiction is frequently the price of depth and integrity, not irrationality.
To say that something is reductive (in philosophy) is to explain a complex process, system, or phenomenon using an ultimate property or entity. It is an ontological claim. (The problem is, it is done at the expense of a sustainable narrative that could accommodate anticipated challenges for decades to come. But this is a digression at the moment, just letting you know.)
Ethical egoism is not reductive because it is not an ontological claim.
What you said about refusing food even when hungry is not a violation of ethical egoism because, for an egoist, there is a more important reason or symbolic goal. And this important goal is an idea. Be more specific about what this symbolic reason is.
Nonetheless, rationality works on ideas but not on impulses. I can’t use reason to quiet down my hunger, but I can rationalize and say I will obey my religious beliefs and fast on holy Friday, for example.
Fair point here. I wasn’t using “reduction” in the strict ontological sense; I meant explanatory reduction—that explaining reflective motivation solely in terms of impulses seems to leave something important unexplained.
for an egoist, there is a more important reason or symbolic goal. And this important goal is an idea
Would you say that the symbolic goal itself is motivational, or is it simply an idea? Suppose two symbolic commitments conflict, for example, loyalty to one’s family vs. loyalty to one’s country. Both are ideas, but what explains why one ultimately prevails? Is reason alone sufficient, or does something motivational still have to organize that conflict?
A symbolic goal can give rise to another idea and it could influence the ideas we already have in our mind. It doesn’t mean it could make us act on it without the desire. Do not confuse this with: a picture of a delicious sandwich can make one feel hungry so the act of getting up and making a sandwich means that the picture makes him perform an act. Because in some people, appetite is suppressed, no amount of pictures of food can make him act on it. Ideas do not make us act, desires do.
I do agree that ideas by themselves don’t produce action, simply entertaining an idea isn’t enough to motivate behavior. However what am concerned with are symbolic goals rather than ideas in general. A symbolic goal isn’t simply an idea that happens to be in the mind,its an idea that has acquired motivational significance for the individual.
A person doesn’t endure years of hardship for a mathematical proof, religious “calling” ,or a work of art because those are just ideas. They act because those ideas have become psychologically significant for them. So I distinguish between an idea and a symbolically significant idea. The former may be motivationally inert, while the latter can organize desire and behavior.
I don’t disagree with your view that symbolic goals are more significant. We have religious beliefs or political beliefs that are very strong. What I’m telling you is, after all that and after all the rationalization, our actions still follow from what we desire. For example, churches in the modern era are not tyrannical. We can join or not join. I believe that people who join feel pleasure in their hearts.
I think we’re drifting a bit away from the main point of the thread.
I’m happy to grant for the sake of discussion that desire is what immediately precedes action, but I’d distinguish between the immediate motivational state (desire) and the psychological significance that gives that desire its particular object. My interest is in the latter.
The issue I’m interested in is whether a person can simultaneously possess competing motivational commitments, such as pursuing a symbolic goal while also experiencing other contradictory desires, and whether that tension reflects irrationality or simply the presence of different competing motivational influences.
I’m sure many (most?) of us can and do experience competing commitments, in the real world. How we reconcile that probably says much about us… Irrationality? I wouldn’t’ve said so. Just the “presence of different competing motivational influences”, as you say.