# Is motivational contradiction really irrational? **URL:** \ **Category:** Philosophy of Mind\ **Created:** [June 26, 2026, 9:43am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500 "2026-06-26T09:43:42Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 2:29pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/21 "2026-06-27T14:29:49Z")
I don’t think survival and meaning reduce to duty because each, to some extent, performs explanatory work that duty alone cannot. Survival can motivate action without obligation; for example, a drowning person struggles to stay alive not because they have consciously concluded that they ought to survive, but rather because the drive to survive is already exerting motivational pressure. So I think the obligation, if one exists at all, is a later interpretation rather than the source of motivation. While meaning explains symbolic pursuits such as purpose, legacy, status, and existential significance—even when neither survival nor duty adequately accounts for them. That’s why, at least in my current hypothesis, I distinguish between survival, duty, and meaning, because each explains what the other doesn’t fully explain. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 4:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/22 "2026-06-27T16:37:56Z")
Supposing one doesn’t have a duty to oneself, are you suggesting a beehive-type scenario where the queen bee (after dispatching her rivals) lays eggs while the worker bees have to attend to HM madam’s wants and needs? That’s a pretty good deal for the queen bee but the worker bees … perhaps I underestimate sisterly love. Assuming we’re not living in a beehive colony, we’re free and hopefully azadi (freedom) is a concept that’s relevant to your hypothesis. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 4:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/23 "2026-06-27T16:58:09Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > Supposing one doesn’t have a duty to oneself, are you suggesting a beehive-type scenario where the queen bee (after dispatching her rivals) lays eggs while the worker bees have to attend to HM madam’s wants and needs? That’s a pretty good deal for the queen bee but the worker bees … perhaps I underestimate sisterly love. Well, I don’t think that my hypothesis needs survival to be understood as duty to one’s self, and that’s the distinction I am trying to make here. In my current theory survival is a motivational system concerned with preservation, whereas duty is a motivational system concerned with perceived obligation. So even though they often align, they don’t need to be identical. So I don’t think the beehive analogy follows from my proposal. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 5:00pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/24 "2026-06-27T17:00:13Z")
> [@Reflectivenomad](#): > > Well, I don’t think that my hypothesis needs survival to be understood as duty to one’s self, and that’s the distinction I am trying to make here. In my current theory survival is a motivational system concerned with preservation, whereas duty is a motivational system concerned with perceived obligation. So even though they often align, they don’t need to be identical. So I don’t think the beehive analogy follows from my proposal. So you don’t think there exists communities that can be modeled with a beehive? Perhaps I’m overextending the social animal factor. Apologies. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 5:11pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/25 "2026-06-27T17:11:25Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > Assuming we’re not living in a beehive colony, we’re free and hopefully azadi (freedom) is a concept that’s relevant to your hypothesis. Well yes, in my current hypothesis freedom exists and I think it’s relevant too, but not as a motivational system. In my theory, freedom lies in the reflective evaluation through which competing motivations are assessed and prioritized into behavior rather than in the absence of competing motivations themselves. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 5:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/26 "2026-06-27T17:17:04Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > So you don’t think there exists communities that can be modeled with a beehive? Perhaps I’m overextending the social animal factor. Apologies. Not necessarily. I do agree that some communities may resemble beehive-like structures, but my point was only that the analogy didn’t follow my distinction between survival and duty, which are conceptually different in my hypothesis. ---
**Author:** ![philosopherwithmaxaura](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ac91a4/32.png) [@philosopherwithmaxaura](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/philosopherwithmaxaura)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 8:39pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/27 "2026-06-27T20:39:49Z")
I argue that contradiction is only a result of decision-making. I don’t think an underlying contradiction can exist, since priorities must be determined in order to be stored. I think we should separate two egos in decision-making: the impulsive ego and the rational ego. The impulsive ego is a temporary state, and it can produce a contradiction. For example, a person might commit a crime temporarily. The priorities of the impulsive ego are often different from those of the rational ego, since it does not operate based on rational thought, which is why we call it a contradiction. My argument is that contradiction is a phenomenon that can only exist after a decision has been made. ---
**Author:** ![philosopherwithmaxaura](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ac91a4/32.png) [@philosopherwithmaxaura](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/philosopherwithmaxaura)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 8:48pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/28 "2026-06-27T20:48:24Z")
> [@Reflectivenomad](#): > > Imagine someone genuinely wants to tell the truth but also wants to avoid hurting a friends feelings,so before even the decision is made,both motivations already exist and are competing with one another. In my view, the moment someone starts considering whether to tell the truth or not already indicates that a decision-making process has begun. I would argue that this is not an underlying contradiction, but part of the decision itself. ---
**Author:** ![philosopherwithmaxaura](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ac91a4/32.png) [@philosopherwithmaxaura](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/philosopherwithmaxaura)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 8:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/29 "2026-06-27T20:55:57Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > For instance, I believe in a present, and I also believe that the notion of a present is false, just an illusion. Thing is, it is the pragmatic part of me that holds the former belief, and the rational part of me that holds the latter. So despite my belief in both X and ~X, I’m not sure if this counts as a contradiction since it’s not the same part holding both beliefs. For noAxiom, I don’t think this is a contradiction. I would argue that it is an unfinished decision due to a lack of knowledge. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [June 27, 2026, 11:13pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/30 "2026-06-27T23:13:59Z")
> [@philosopherwithmaxaura](#): > > For noAxiom, I don’t think this is a contradiction. I would argue that it is an unfinished decision due to a lack of knowledge. It’s not that at all. The pragmatic side (which is not particularly rational) believes in a present. It’s the boss, and the issue not up for negotiation. It’s intuitive. Further knowledge, even proof, would not change that. The rational side has enough knowledge to know that it is the positing of a thing for which there is zero positive evidence, and so, like the superfluous teapot orbiting past Jupiter, it chooses to believe in the simpler model. You’d be surprised at what all is intuitive but actually wrong. Intuition is a product of evolution and its goal is being fit, not being correct. Recognition of that is a big first step in seeking models that are self consistent. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 1:46am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/31 "2026-06-28T01:46:06Z")
@Reflectivenomad Yes, but in a beehive structure the worker bees selflessly serve the queen bee and you say that there are communities that can be modeled by a bee colony. Also your hypothesis makes the assumption of sociality; think pack of wolves/jackals or a flock of sheep/birds. This is an old mindset but I’m not saying it didn’t work well, especially for the \alpha and his inner circle of close aides. However the world has changed dramatically. our intrinsic individualism and lone-wolf nature have found ways of expression unimaginable before the era of metropolises and the www. Small-town cults/cabals are a different story though. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 4:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/32 "2026-06-28T04:57:16Z")
> [@Reflectivenomad](#): > > I present this claim as something I have sat down with and observed for quite some time now. Many theories reduce human behaviour to a single dominant drive like survival, pleasure, conditioning, rationality or meaning. This doesn’t explain why humans might crave multiple contradictory things at the same time but still end up making choices following perceived importance, subjective value and priority allocation biased by personality and situational context. I think it does explain it. Suppose humans seek only pleasure. As long as there is more than one pleasurable object then there can arise the desire for multiple different things at the same time. Add in the fact that humans do not ultimately know what will bring them the most pleasure and a mild form of moral perplexity has already arisen. So do we even need your “three foundational systems”? If so, they would apparently only be needed in relation to some new and different question. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 8:05am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/33 "2026-06-28T08:05:28Z")
> [@philosopherwithmaxaura](#): > > I argue that contradiction is only a result of decision-making. I don’t think an underlying contradiction can exist, since priorities must be determined in order to be stored. If I am getting your argument in this sentence, it seems to assume that priorities must already be determined before they can be stored, but my current understanding is that the mind can contain multiple active motivational systems whose relative priority is context-dependent and not permanently fixed. For example, a firefighter can at first be exercising caution and prioritizing survival, but after hearing a child is inside the burning building, duty or meaning may become more heavily weighted and motivate the rescue. In this case, if survival were always the fixed priority, I don’t see how that shift would’ve occurred. In short, my question is: why must priorities be already determined in order to be stored? Why couldn’t motivations coexist with their relative weighting remaining context-dependent until evaluation occurs? > [@philosopherwithmaxaura](#): > > My argument is that contradiction is a phenomenon that can only exist after a decision has been made. I think this is where our hypotheses differ because I view the decision-making process as resolving the contradiction, not creating it. If contradiction emerges only after the decision has been made, then what exactly was the decision resolving? In my hypothesis, the competing motivational pressures already exist before behavior, and the decision is the process through which those competing motivations are evaluated and one is prioritized over the other. > [@philosopherwithmaxaura](#): > > be stored. > > I think we should separate two egos in decision-making: the impulsive ego and the rational ego. > > The impulsive ego is a temporary state, and it can produce a contradiction. For example, a person might commit a crime temporarily. The priorities of the impulsive ego are often different from those of the rational ego, since it does not operate based on rational thought, which is why we call it a contradiction. In my view, it isn’t necessary to posit two separate egos to explain the conflict. I argue that what appears to be a conflict between a rational and impulsive self can instead be understood as competing motivational systems being weighted differently. So reflection doesn’t create a second ego; it’s simply the evaluative process through which those competing motivations are prioritized into behavior. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 8:19am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/34 "2026-06-28T08:19:47Z")
> [@philosopherwithmaxaura](#): > > In my view, the moment someone starts considering whether to tell the truth or not already indicates that a decision-making process has begun. I would argue that this is not an underlying contradiction, but part of the decision itself. I think our disagreement here is about where deliberation begins. Well, I agree that once someone starts to weigh whether to tell the truth or spare their friends’ feelings, decision-making is already underway, but my point is that competing motivations don’t come into existence because deliberation begins; rather, they are already simultaneously present, and deliberation is the process through which those existing motivational pressures are ultimately prioritized into behavior. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 8:54am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/35 "2026-06-28T08:54:17Z")
I probably made it sound a bit biased towards social structures, but my hypothesis doesn’t assume that humans must be highly social in the beehive sense. Sociality in my current hypothesis is a modifier through social conditioning rather than a core motivational system. So a highly collectivist community and a highly individualistic society would simply produce a different weighting of the same motivational systems. My theory isn’t committed to one social structure over another. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 1:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/36 "2026-06-28T13:55:18Z")
@Reflectivenomad Ok, but I don’t see how society can function without institutions like the military. Termites have a military wing - even practising chemical warfare like acid spray - just like us. I mean to say, no tribe, no duty. Sharing living quarters and dining facilities, etc. doesn’t make it a society. Have you ever sat down and talked, seriously among your family and friends. Not gossiping and cracking jokes about people. You’ll begin to wonder how cults could even form. We’re so different and the sameness is not something you can write a book about (not gonna rule out a posthumous publication though, stuff of legends). Most people, if they can manage to get off the ferris wheel of fun, will begin to think and thinking is always a problem. ---
**Author:** ![Landon\_Caeli](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/landon_caeli/32/974_2.png) [@Landon\_Caeli](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Landon_Caeli)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 2:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/37 "2026-06-28T14:58:18Z")
Applying my own experiences and observations to the topic, I can say that what I see are two seperate aspects to my thinking, which often do cause motivational contradiction. **The first observation** can be described as such in varying degrees; A) _I’m about to sit down at the dining room table after heating a bowl of soup, and grab a spoon, but decide to also grab a fork. I don’t know why I grabbed a fork, but I allow myself to continue… Then sitting down at the table, I realize that I had forgotten there was pie there, and so, a part of my mind that is not my direct conscious mind remembered that for me, leading me to success._ B) _I go out to my car to grab a folder I left tucked behind the passenger seat in the pouch, but I grabbed my wallet with my credit card on the way out, for some reason, and again, approaching the car, I realized that earlier I wanted to go buy a quart of oil before it got too late, and so this ‘other’ part of my mind kind of helped me on something that my conscious mind had forgotten about._ …These are helpful observations. But on the flipside, I’ve experienced similar types of unhelpful ones too, such as; (A. _I make a committment to quit doing some activity, but then, subconsciously, the notion to do it again occurs, and when my mind catches on to this motivational contradiction, it causes me to have to make a conscious decision, which can then go either way_. B.) _An attractive woman enters a group setting, and I have, within some part of my mind, the idea that I should take a second look while taking part in a serious conversation. I now have an internal dilemma on my hands that may or may not cause a motivational values contradiction._ **The second observation** is my logical conscious “self”, with whom Inidentify as. …If I see two main parts of my mind (the conscious, logical me, and subconscious me), it’s almost as if there are two me’s, working together. Regardless of survival, duty, or meaning systems, these two basic aspects of “me” seem to hold the most weight in relation to any motivational contradiction I might face going forward in life. ---
**Author:** ![Landon\_Caeli](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/landon_caeli/32/974_2.png) [@Landon\_Caeli](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Landon_Caeli)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2026, 4:34pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/38 "2026-06-28T16:34:21Z")
> [@Reflectivenomad](#): > > In my view, it isn’t necessary to posit two separate egos to explain the conflict. I argue that what appears to be a conflict between a rational and impulsive self can instead be understood as competing motivational systems being weighted differently. So reflection doesn’t create a second ego; it’s simply the evaluative process through which those competing motivations are prioritized into behavior. I hope this doesn’t sound silly, but imagine a pet dog named Max. He also faces the dilemma of motivational contradiction… This occurs when his subconscious mind insists that when he hears a noise outside, that he must begin barking, even though his owner has explicitly warned him that he should not do that. While Max’s mind is by no means as advanced as yours or mine, in regards to self awareness, he still has to make a decision, even if his choices were superimposed by his owner. At what point does Max fall victim to motivational contradiction? I would say the moment the choice comes into existence. But keep in mind, the only reason Max has that choice is because a logical, rational human being, with a conscious mind gave it to him… Max doesn’t have an ego. ---
**Author:** ![Reflectivenomad](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/reflectivenomad/32/992_2.png) [@Reflectivenomad](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Reflectivenomad)\ **Post date:** [June 30, 2026, 1:31pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/39 "2026-06-30T13:31:33Z")
Building on your point that Max doesn’t have an ego, do you think he’s reflectively weighing incompatible reasons or simply responding to competing conditioned impulses? I wonder if there’s a philosophical distinction between motivational conflict in general and reflective motivational contradiction. If there is, perhaps humans and Max don’t experience the same kind of contradiction even if they both show competing behavioral tendencies. ---
**Author:** ![Elephant](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/elephant/32/294_2.png) [@Elephant](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Elephant)\ **Post date:** [July 3, 2026, 8:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500/40 "2026-07-03T20:50:53Z")
> [@Reflectivenomad](#): > > But still, these competing motivations have modifiers that change how strongly they compete, and this is where emotion, social conditioning, personality, and reflective evaluation come into the picture. Ok, I’m explaining under the ethical egoism school of thought. There are no multiple systems operating. Instead we can trace all these back to feelings and desires. I think you will need to tighten your argument and simplify all the elements in it. Leave only what’s empirically testable. If anything, you are mixing the instincts, desires, feelings–elements that are **natural** (unmediated or raw) in human beings – with **ideas** that we arrive at due to external influences. And I’m going to name drop a few thinkers here to give my explanation some force: Hume, Descartes, Kant: **ideas** are the mediated data or **representative** thoughts or concepts that are formed in our mind. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500.md?page=1) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-motivational-contradiction-really-irrational/1500.md?page=3)