# Is Consciousness an Effect or Something Else? **URL:** \ **Category:** Philosophy of Mind\ **Created:** [September 15, 2026, 2:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089 "2026-09-15T14:50:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 7
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 3:47am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/121 "2026-09-27T03:47:16Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#): > > Thinking of it as an _attribute_ or _ability_ rather than a substance (philosophical ‘substantia’.) It is, to echo something I believe Wittgenstein said, not nothing, but not a something either. It take that to be an oblique reference to the realisation that mind or consciousness is never a ‘that’ to us; it is rather an attribute or actually the _basis_ of ‘the subject to whom experience occurs’. This sounds very poetic, however an attribute is a property. Are you proposing property dualism? If so, is it correct to say that you reject the identity thesis that mental properties are physical properties that emerge through certain processes in the brain? Instead, a property dualist, per my undersanding, holds that the mental is a non-physical property that arises in the brain but is not reducible to the physical properties that enable it. Many property dualists go further and state that not only can the non-physical mental properties be reduced to the physical properties of the brain, but ontic emergence is the case and these properties provide downward causation on the brain. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 6:20am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/122 "2026-09-27T06:20:49Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Is it correct to say that you reject the identity thesis that mental properties are physical properties that emerge through certain processes in the brain? Indeed I do. I take issue with the claim that the mind or an act of thought is _the same as_ neural activity — that an act of thought can be _equated_ with the configuration or activities of neural matter. Why? Because whenever we claim that thought is identical with a neural configuration, we are already appealing to the _concept of identity_. But identity itself is not a physical object or process. It is a logical relation — a principle that allows us to recognize sameness across different instances or kinds of thing. This raises a simple question. When we say that two things are the same, or equal, what exactly is the status of the relation expressed by the equals sign? And is the “=” itself something that can be understood in physical terms? It would obviously be nonsensical to locate symbolic content on the same level as neurological data. Presumably you would need to interpret the neurological activity in such a way as to demonstrate a relationship between that data and ‘the concept of equals’. But there would be no way to do that without already utilising the very concept which you are trying to isolate! It is not the kind of thing you can identify ‘from the outside’, so to speak. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 6:58am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/123 "2026-09-27T06:58:32Z")
The equation thoughts = brain states is a natural conclusion if one is working out of materialism. I’m not abreast of developments in philosoohy/science of mind and so this remark may be deficient in many ways. The way I see it, materialism/physicalism is lacking important ideas that would allow it to view the mind in a way reasonable tk nonphysicalists. They’re missing the vocabulary to enunciate the problem with clarity. Nonphysicalists are not without fault either. They seem to be hampered as well, by conceptual defects and lacks. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 7:18am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/124 "2026-09-27T07:18:35Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > The equation thoughts = brain states is a natural conclusion if one is working out of materialism. Think about that. It’s a theory of physical causation. But the rules which govern rational inference are valid in a completely different way. To try and equate them is a category error. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 7:23am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/125 "2026-09-27T07:23:57Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#): > > Think about that. It’s a theory of physical causation. But the rules which govern rational inference are valid in a completely different way. To try and equate them is a category error. Physicalism-materialism is restricted by their metaphysics to come to any other conclusion. Descartes had to invent res cogitans to bring some tractability to the problem. For materialism to do that would be self-defeating: positing the reality of something that’s not accessible via their methods. I’m a materialist myself. I think deep down even Chalmers is. Nonphysicalism is uncomfortably close to pseudoscience for one not to be closeted about it and we all know who the big honcho is. What do you make of computers doing logic? Completely material/physical they’re as capable of logic as humans. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 7:51am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/126 "2026-09-27T07:51:30Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > Physicalism-materialism is restricted by their metaphysics to come to any other conclusion. Descartes had to invent res cogitans to bring some tractability to the problem. And I say your materialism is a direct consequence of Cartesian dualism. Descartes divided the world into physical and mental — which are, after all, abstractions. But Descartes himself could never really account for how they interacted. But meanwhile the physical sciences advanced in such leaps and bounds that res cogitans was abandoned as an explanatory principle. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 7:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/127 "2026-09-27T07:57:22Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#): > > And I say your materialism is a direct consequence of Cartesian dualism. Descartes divided the world into physical and mental — which are, after all, abstractions. But Descartes himself could never really account for how they interacted. But meanwhile the physical sciences advanced in such leaps and bounds that res cogitans was abandoned as an explanatory principle. Science is a well-tested idea, responsible for all the progress humanity has made, and there’s a pile of scientific literature on the mind from a materialistic POV. What do philosophers of mind have? Not much that’s testable. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 8:06am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/128 "2026-09-27T08:06:35Z")
Science delivers great power but not necessarily wisdom. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 8:41am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/129 "2026-09-27T08:41:52Z")
Indeed! Science though has more tangible results to display than philosophy, on the mind. Does all the science on the mind amount to a clear and complete understanding of the mind? Is it like a freeway vehicle pileup - studies, experiments, hypotheses accumulating at a point in complete disarray, without an inch of progress being made? ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 8:59am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/130 "2026-09-27T08:59:50Z")
It’s a change in perspective that is required. Not in what we know, but what it means. That’s all — but it’s a lot. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 1:47pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/131 "2026-09-27T13:47:37Z")
Good call. What we know is the brain, quite well from a scientific POV. Psychogenic drugs and other neurotropic chemicals can alter the mind and we’ve fully worked out how they affect neurons. Philosophers haven’t been twiddling their thumbs either. Their investigations are phenomenological (?). ---
**Author:** ![PatternChaser](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patternchaser/32/1041_2.png) [@PatternChaser](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/PatternChaser)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 2:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/132 "2026-09-27T14:12:44Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > Does all the science on the mind amount to a clear and complete understanding of the mind? I don’t intend to be provocative, but how can science tell us anything at all about the human mind? The mind is (to science) undetectable, and therefore unmeasurable. How can science tell us anything, when the tools and techniques of science cannot be applied to something that is (scientifically) invisible or nonexistent? Biological science can tell us about the human brain, but the abyss separating the brain and the mind is un-crossable, in the present day. So what of mind? ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 2:49pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/133 "2026-09-27T14:49:40Z")
> [@PatternChaser](#): > > I don’t intend to be provocative, but how can science tell us anything at all about the human mind? The mind is (to science) undetectable, and therefore unmeasurable. How can science tell us anything, when the tools and techniques of science cannot be applied to something that is (scientifically) invisible or nonexistent? > > Biological science can tell us about the human brain, but the abyss separating the brain and the mind is un-crossable, in the present day. So what of mind? You’ve stated the nonphysicalist position very well. 👍 ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 3:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/134 "2026-09-27T15:08:46Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Instead, a property dualist, per my undersanding, holds that the mental is a non-physical property that arises in the brain but is not reducible to the physical properties that enable it. Well, not _this_ property dualist. 😃 Although I also don’t think _consciousness_ and _mental_ are the same thing, or even related. I think consciousness exists when there is no mental activity. Regarding consciousness, I do not think it “arises” in the brain, or anywhere else. Just as I don’t think mass arises anywhere. It’s just there, a fundamental property. Although, unlike mass, consciousness is not a _physical_ property. I have come to much prefer the term _capacity_ to _property_. Property sounds like a thing you should be able to find. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 6:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/135 "2026-09-27T18:17:07Z")
> [@Patterner](#): > > I do not think it “arises” in the brain, or anywhere else What is consciousness a property of if you consider yourself a property dualist? If you mean non-conscious mental is a property then what is that? ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 8:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/136 "2026-09-27T20:27:34Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > What is consciousness a property of if you consider yourself a property dualist? If you mean non-conscious mental is a property then what is that? No, I don’t mean that. I don’t think consciousness and mental are there same thing. I don’t think they have anything to do with each other. I think consciousness is a capacity of matter. “Property” is the word traditionally used, buy I think “capacity” is a better word. “Property” seems to be a thing you can look for/detect/measure. Which I don’t think applies to consciousness. I don’t think “capacity” has that feel. I suppose “experiential property”, as opposed to “physical property”, works, but I think it’s better to just avoid the “p” word. Everything is conscious, just as everything has mass. Most things do not have mental qualities/abilities/characteristics. Anything that _does_ have mental qualities is conscious, since everything is conscious. But not everything that is conscious has mental qualities. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 28, 2026, 11:13am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/137 "2026-09-28T11:13:45Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > Well IMO causality (ontic, not epistemic) does not seem to be a function of consciousness at all. But you seem to be talking about epistemic, and sure, some kind of information processing (designated as conscious or not) is required for that. So I think we don’t disagree, but lacking definitions, we’re talking past each other. I am not quite sure what your points are in your postings. You seem to be agreeing that causality is a mental concept or psychological judgement, but then you talk about “ontic”, which is totally reversing your claims and going back on your agreement. It is like you are agreeing on something, then immediately disagreeing on your own agreement talking about something totally contradicting on what you have just agreed with, which is really perplexing on what your true idea is on the point. Of course, the rock nearby the broken windows is a physical object. But it is not a cause for broken window until you observe all the situations and the objects, and link the rock as a cause for the window breakage. Causality only emerges from the objects and situations in the world with your perception and reasoning, hence yes it is epistemic in nature. Why is this so difficult to grasp? It is a crystal clear simple idea. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 28, 2026, 1:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/138 "2026-09-28T13:08:14Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > No, but it’s considered somewhat hostile to accuse one of claiming something not claimed, all without evidence. It seems your psychological state to feel it was hostile. The fact of the matter is that you claim one thing, and then deny it immediately, hence it was a bit tricky to pinpoint what your definite stance was on the point. It would be actually considered hostile, if anyone was pushing you with the accusations digging out evidence and quotes - this is what you were saying, hence you are wrong, bad, confused, confusing or whatever. That is not my style of arguments or discussions at all. The point is that these are not really the main point of the topic, hence answers are only given out, if the questions are clear on what they are asking, and relevant to the main topic. If not, it is far better just moving on to what is more relevant and compelling points for the topic. Even if you have not written something direct to say something, what you have written can be interpreted and inferred for implying or meaning something else, hence you must bear that fact in mind when writing posts. Other interlocutors could always claim that this is what you were implying or denoting from what you have been writing **without having to quote** what you have written. But please note, if questions are not clear on what they are asking about, and not compellingly relevant to the main topic, then they don’t need to be answered to save time for all. If there is no compelling reason for making quotes of posts, then it will be avoided, again to save time, and move on to more relevant points. This way of posting and discussion topics is nothing to do with hostility. Linking them without any evidence or reason would be interpreted as irrelevant exaggeration. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 28, 2026, 1:18pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/139 "2026-09-28T13:18:56Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > But you don’t give an alternative. I’m not talking about wild-ass guesses. My idea on consciousness is that it is a mental capacity to be able to interact intelligibly with others, and the world around the agent based on the biological synthetic body evolved from the fetus to adult existence. The evolution of life of the agent could be traced and linked to the cause of consciousness. But the evolution of life is a problematic concept which is different to every individual and agent coming from all different background of social, cultural and educational experiences which are the foundation of the evolution. But at the same time, it is also coherent in respect to the fact, every consciousness of each individual agents are different in their capacity which makes sense. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 28, 2026, 10:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/140 "2026-09-28T22:28:43Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > They aren’t widely considered the same. Your post brings up quite a number of named ‘views’, none in which I hold significant expertise. My core complaint about epiphenomenalism lacking any justification at all seems to have been dropped. > [@Gnomon](#): > > **1. An epiphenomenal effect** _is a secondary phenomenon or side effect caused by a primary process, but which does not exert any causal influence back on that primary process._ > > **Philosophy of Mind (Epiphenomenalism):** _The view that physical brain states cause mental states (like thoughts, desires, or conscious feelings), but mental states have **no physical impact** on actions or behavior._ > > **2.** **Social and Cultural Survival:** _Some recent perspectives argue that human consciousness evolved less for raw individual survival and more to broadcast **feelings, ideas, and intentions** , helping groups communicate, build social cohesion, and transmit culture._ These two points seem mutually contradictory, the former positing no physical impact\*\* on actions or behavior, and the latter asserting it. Natural selection cannot select for a trait lacking any distinction in behavior or other physical effect (like immunity say). > [@Corvus](#): > > You seem to be agreeing that causality is a mental concept or psychological judgemen The concept of causality is a concept. I also labeled this as ‘epistemic causality’, where epistemic means . It was never what I was talking about when referencing actual causality instead of the concept of it. An idealist often cannot distinguish between an apple and the concept of an apple. Hence my suspecting idealism in your view. For instance, you say > It is like you are agreeing on something, then immediately disagreeing on your own agreement talking about something totally contradicting on what you have just agreed with This tells me you cannot distinguish between causality (ontic) and concept of causality (epistemic). I never contradicted myself since I kept it clear when I was talking about the concept of it as opposed to causality itself. > [@Corvus](#): > > Of course, the rock nearby the broken windows is a physical object. But it is not a cause for broken window until you observe all the situations and the objects, and link the rock as a cause for the window breakage. The rock is evidence, that’s all. It may or may not be the efficient cause of the breakage. The neighbor may or may not be the proximate cause. That’s the epistemic view. The ontic view says there is a fact to the matter (both efficient and proximate), even if that fact is not known. > [@Corvus](#): > > Causality only emerges from the objects and situations in the world with your perception and reasoning, hence yes it is epistemic in nature. There are those that disagree, the majority I’d say. Most would not agree that perception is required for Earth to have gained its moon. I’m actually more on the fence on that subject than most. I might agree that at least the existence of the moon is assigned due to perception, but that’s assuming a non-relational definition of ‘exists’. Given a relational definition, perception once again is no longer required for the moon’s creation to have been caused. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089.md?page=6) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089.md?page=8)