# Is Consciousness an Effect or Something Else? **URL:** \ **Category:** Philosophy of Mind\ **Created:** [September 15, 2026, 2:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089 "2026-09-15T14:50:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 1:34am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/101 "2026-09-23T01:34:07Z")
> [@John](#): > > Can you give an example of an epiphenomenal effect? I still think a counterfactual of a shadow best accounts for what an epiphenomenal effect looks like in the real world. If there is something standing outside in a cloudy day there is no shadow cast. However, if the clouds move away, then the shadow has no effect on the thing casting a shadow. So, if there was a hypnotic drug that removed the quale of pain, an epiphenomenalist would have to say that removing the quale experience would have no impact on the function of the brain. The only difference is that the higher mental layer would lack the experience of pain but would still act and function as if in pain (just like the person casting a shadow would act and function the same if it were cloudy and not casting a shadow). Again, this is being defined purely in counterfactual terms. ---
**Author:** ![SmilesFromHere](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/f14d63/32.png) [@SmilesFromHere](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/SmilesFromHere)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 1:47am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/102 "2026-09-23T01:47:36Z")
Here’s my favorite subject; oops all physics. People naturally assert that consciousness exists without having maximum negative, and minimal positive descriptors for it. A good way of saying ill defined. Interestingly in any other case with the scientific method for deducting reality you don’t make leaps of logic to assert properties. You test and identify positive descriptions of what something is, and does, while simultaneously identifying all the negative descriptions for what it isn’t, and can’t do. All current arguments for consciousness stem down to, “but we can’t explain the ‘feel’, or ‘connection to physicality’” therefore its a wall people stick their backs to preventing any mental movement. The physicalist answer ends up being the most encompassing empirical answer. If I have identified individual locations in the brain that can entirely remove or change experiences like pain and emotional reactions, why assume more? Assumptions abound about how there can be 1 single continuous consciousness, when the simplest answer based on physical evidence is that we are in possession of a crisscrossed chemical leaking hormonal electrical _moist_ reactionary muscle that frequently gets things wrong, doesn’t understand itself or the world well, and bumbles through life. We keep finding all the ways mind’s can be effected. None seem to have anything other than physical causality. Hope you like reading and walls. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 11:20am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/103 "2026-09-23T11:20:07Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > Alright then. The other questions are irrelevant then. Does that mean there are no effects? The whole topic is trivially answered if you define away the primary terms. There are effects, but only when you perceive and judge it as effects. Before that, there is no effects or causes. Before your inference, you only perceive hurricanes and broken windows. Your inference will give you the judgements on the possible causes and effects. If you were the chaotic theorist, then you will say, well the butterflies flap in Amazon must be the cause for the hurricane in the pacific, which is the effect. If you saw your window broken with a stone lying underneath it, then you might guess your neighbor threw a stone to your window. You may claim that the cause of the window breaking was your bitter neighbor throwing a stone to your window, which is the effect so forth so fifth. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Well, probably not if causality doesn’t exist. Chaotic behavior utilizes a model where states evolve from prior states. You are missing the point. Causality exists, but it is in your mind, not in the world out there. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 2:10pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/104 "2026-09-23T14:10:50Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > The neurons could hold a very detailed imagery of what we experience as a painful experience and that’s what has the causal overtones and not the experience itself. If the neurons hold imagery of experience, then the experience caused the neuron state, and the neuron state causes say avoidance of painful stuff. The fact that it has this intermediate state does not eliminate a causal connection between experience and the avoidance. The quale of pain isn’t epiphonomenal since it causes this neuron state. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Full dualism would require that the quale experience is sufficient in itself to cause physical changes in the brain which is not the case. You just posited that it does cause physical changes in the brain. And no, that isn’t ‘full dualism’ since whether or not said quale is a physical state or not has not been specified. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > So, if there was a hypnotic drug that removed the quale of pain There is. It’s not hypnotic. Leprosy does the trick. One’s fingers eventually fall off not because the disease does that, but because you handle say hot items without pain, and kill them. > [@Corvus](#): > > If you saw your window broken with a stone lying underneath it, then you might guess your neighbor threw a stone to your window. Is there a fact to the matter, even if your guess is wrong? Causality is not epistemology, but I think you’re attempting to make it so. Saying it exists only in one’s mind is basically saying you’re idealistic about causality, kind of like I take an idealistic stance on ontology. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 2:43pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/105 "2026-09-23T14:43:10Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > Is there a fact to the matter, even if your guess is wrong? Causality is not epistemology, but I think you’re attempting to make it so. Causality itself is not epistemology. But causality is a reasoned idea on the perceived objects or states of events. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Saying it exists only in one’s mind is basically saying you’re idealistic about causality, kind of like I take an idealistic stance on ontology. It is not being idealistic about causality, but understanding that causality is a concept or idea, not some material or physical objects in the world. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 2:54pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/106 "2026-09-23T14:54:24Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > If the neurons hold imagery of experience, then the experience caused the neuron state, and the neuron state causes say avoidance of painful stuff. The fact that it has this intermediate state does not eliminate a causal connection between experience and the avoidance. The quale of pain isn’t epiphonomenal since it causes this neuron state. Let me clarify this further. The quale isn’t what causes the neural correlates to record “pain.” Rather, it is purely an electrical-chemical (biological) set of conditions such as C-fiber stimulation that causes the reaction within other parts of the brain as well as having the memory of this C-fiber stimulation (as an example). This stimulation is vividly recorded in terms of increased heart rate, maybe increased blood pressure, sweating, electrical or chemical stimulation of the dPAG in the brain, etc. It’s these electrical and chemical signals that are transmitted, processed, and recorded inside the brain. The quale of pain is not transmitted, processed, or recorded. However, because those neural correlates of pain are directly associated with the mental experience of being in pain, whenever those neural correlates are excited in the brain (either because of the first instance of their activation or due to being remembered), the quale occurs but has no causal impact on the brain. It feels painful, but what is actually happening in the brain is a complex web of chemical and electrical reactions and nothing more. (Again, I am not advocating for epiphenomenalism but only trying to defend it as a metaphysically possible position within the philosophy of mind.) ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2026, 8:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/107 "2026-09-23T20:14:35Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > The quale isn’t what causes the neural correlates to record “pain.” Rather, it is purely an electrical-chemical (biological) set of conditions such as C-fiber stimulation that causes the reaction within other parts of the brain as well as having the memory of this C-fiber stimulation (as an example) The neural correlates are recording C-fiber stimulation then, not any memory of pain (this presumes the two are different things). The recall of the C-fiber stimulation might then trigger a recall of pain, but that recall of pain, being epiphenomenal, cannot in any way influence behavior in a way that makes the person more fit. The person avoids it due to C-fiber stimulation memory alone. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > The quale of pain is not transmitted, processed, or recorded. Apparently not in the brain at least. But then you can present zero evidence of there actually being any pain. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > However, because those neural correlates of pain are directly associated with the mental experience of being in pain, whenever those neural correlates are excited in the brain (either because of the first instance of their activation or due to being remembered), the quale occurs but has no causal impact on the brain. Totally agree. Still zero evidence of this going on, of there being pain at all. You posting otherwise is caused only by memory of C-fiber stimulation. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Again, I am not advocating for epiphenomenalism but only trying to defend it as a metaphysically possible position within the philosophy of mind Understood. Possible sure. Justifiable: Absolutely not. There is zero evidence of this experience of pain. The position is entirely untenable. > [@Corvus](#): > > > [@noAxioms](#): > > > > Is there a fact to the matter, even if your guess is wrong? > > Causality itself is not epistemology. But causality is a reasoned idea on the perceived objects or states of events. You didn’t answer my question. > [@Corvus](#): > > understanding that causality is a concept or idea, not some material or physical objects in the world. Nobody has suggested that causality is material or is a physical object. It is a false dichotomy to suggest that it being only a concept is the only alternative. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 3:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/108 "2026-09-24T03:48:23Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > The neural correlates are recording C-fiber stimulation then, not any memory of pain (this presumes the two are different things). The recall of the C-fiber stimulation might then trigger a recall of pain, but that recall of pain, being epiphenomenal, cannot in any way influence behavior in a way that makes the person more fit. The person avoids it due to C-fiber stimulation memory alone. Right, but the memory of the C-fiber stimulation can re-elicit the pain quale just by re-animating the memory of the C-fiber stimulation. The reason the non-quale memories act to suppress behavior would likely need to be due to natural selection and how the brain is wired. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Totally agree. Still zero evidence of this going on, of there being pain at all. You posting otherwise is caused only by memory of C-fiber stimulation. I wouldn’t say there’s no evidence. There is some indication that we don’t remember pain in the explicitness that it originally occurred. That might be because memory can’t record it because there’s nothing to record. I don’t think that’s convincing enough to say that epiphenomenalism is at all justifiable. If I were a physicalist, I don’t see how I could avoid epiphenomenalism because in order for qualia to be causal it would need to be physical. However, I don’t see how it could be physical as per my opening post that physical effects are generally efficacious (like electromagnetism). Qualia and other mental states are subjective and internal states which doesn’t seem to me to be physical. But, I’m not a physicalist so I have no qualms about dismissing epiphenomenalism. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 24, 2026, 9:50am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/109 "2026-09-24T09:50:14Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > You didn’t answer my question. Your question was not quite making sense. You never specified what fact to which matter, and what guess is wrong in what respect. Were you aware of what you were asking? Can you provide the required information, which are missing in your question? > [@noAxioms](#): > > Nobody has suggested that causality is material or is a physical object. It is a false dichotomy to suggest that it being only a concept is the only alternative. You appeared to have been claiming causality is some sort of material or physical object all along. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 3:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/110 "2026-09-25T03:09:41Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > There is some indication that we don’t remember pain in the explicitness that it originally occurred. Remember, we’re talking about the epiphenomenalist view, so we don’t remember pain at all, only C-fiber stimulation as you put it. So yea, in recall, we don’t replay C-fiber stimulation, which would perhaps cause one to scream. And hey, there are some event that really do get recalled to that extent, to the point they need to be blocked out. But it’s always memory of C-fiber stimulation, not of pain. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > If I were a physicalist, I don’t see how I could avoid epiphenomenalism because in order for qualia to be causal it would need to be physical. I don’t understand this reasoning at all. Why should epiphenomenalism follow from a physicalist stance? With that, the pain (all qualia) is physical, and remembered, and it is that memory that makes us learn from mistakes. C-fiber stimulation and pain would be the same thing under such a view. Epiphenomenalism doesn’t come into play. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > I don’t see how it could be physical as per my opening post that physical effects are generally efficacious (like electromagnetism). Qualia are efficacious under physicalism, so again, I cannot follow your reasoning (or lack of it). OK, they don’t seem to be physical to you, but that’s your opinion, not any kind of counter to the physicalist stance. The only justification I see is opinion and incredulity. Epiphenomenalism is not logically valid, but most of the rest of the various interpretations of mind seem to be. Supernatural mind feels the pain. It causes reactions, so not epiphenomenal. No conflict there. > [@Corvus](#): > > You never specified what fact to which matter, and what guess is wrong in what respect I very much did so, which you can read if you just scroll back a couple posts. To repeat the context and the question: > [@Corvus](#): > > If you saw your window broken with a stone lying underneath it, then you might guess your neighbor threw a stone to your window. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Is there a fact to the matter, even if your guess is wrong? The matter is the broken window. The guess is the ‘bitter neighbor’. The very fact that this is your guess presumes that you think the neighbor was the cause, despite you saying “I also defined causality doesn’t exist in the world” Perhaps our disconnect is your lack of definition of ‘exist’. Me implying that something exists makes you assume I take it for a physical object, so I’m guessing that you define ‘to exist’ to mean ‘to be a physical object’. If this is your definition, it’s non-standard, and needs to be explicitly specified. But I’m just guessing that this is the problem. > [@Corvus](#): > > You appeared to have been claiming causality is some sort of material or physical object all along. Nonsense. This is an empty claim without a quote of me (or anybody else) suggesting any such thing. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 4:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/111 "2026-09-25T04:48:10Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > Remember, we’re talking about the epiphenomenalist view, so we don’t remember pain at all, only C-fiber stimulation as you put it. So yea, in recall, we don’t replay C-fiber stimulation, which would perhaps cause one to scream. And hey, there are some event that really do get recalled to that extent, to the point they need to be blocked out. But it’s always memory of C-fiber stimulation, not of pain. Right. I’m talking about the evidence that would have to be the case if epiphenomenalism is true, and that is the pain quale is not what is recorded in the neurons. Rather, the C-fiber stimulation is recorded. You could still experience a pain quale by remembering the C-fiber stimulation (since it might elicit some of the previous C-fiber stimulation experience which generates the pain quale), however it’s understandable that this pain quale caused by memory would be less intense since a memory of a C-fiber stimulation is not the same as the original C-fiber stimulation. It seems that we don’t remember pain quales since people generally do not re-experience the pain. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Why should epiphenomenalism follow from a physicalist stance? With that, the pain (all qualia) is physical, and remembered, and it is that memory that makes us learn from mistakes. Without epiphenomenalism a physicalist would need to hold that the pain quale is physical. However, we have never observed such a physical property in nature. Physical effects (if they are not epiphenomenal like shadows) are \*always\* detectable (e.g., they have magnetic or electrical fields, emit radiation, odors, or generate heat, cold, etc.). There is no such thing as internal subjective properties. It is completely ad hoc to call them physical. Maybe it’s a new type of physical property never discovered (e.g., dark matter), but there’s absolutely no evidence of a new quale particle having these type of properties. If a quale is not a particle then why call it physical? All of physics are based on the notion of particle physics. Even gravity has the theorized graviton. At the very least, there are fields such as a gravitational field. Do quales have fields? Why can’t we detect them? Why doesn’t matter behave differently inside the brain where pain quales must be physically occurring. I’m sure this might look like a ridiculous argument to you, but I ask that you consider a view where we cannot just label something physical outside of physics. > [@noAxioms](#): > > K, they don’t seem to be physical to you, but that’s your opinion, not any kind of counter to the physicalist stance. To me, this is just stamping a label on something. Unless you can idenitfy it as a field or particle why should we consider it physical? We could call ghosts as physical things in that case. Ghosts, if they were to exist, would not be physical unless there is physics that conforms with the physics of the modern world through some type of mathematical theory. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 7:18am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/112 "2026-09-25T07:18:52Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > I very much did so, which you can read if you just scroll back a couple posts. To repeat the context and the question: > > > [@Corvus](#): > > > > If you saw your window broken with a stone lying underneath it, then you might guess your neighbor threw a stone to your window. That was my question to you. You have answered my question with your own question, and then accused me for not answering. > [@noAxioms](#): > > The matter is the broken window. The guess is the ‘bitter neighbor’. The very fact that this is your guess presumes that you think the neighbor was the cause, despite you saying “I also defined causality doesn’t exist in the world” See? This example was my question to you, not to me. The question is made to show anyone who thinks causality is something that exists in the world, is wrong. But you don’t seem to even realise who the question was directed to. Then you ask me to answer the question, which was addressed to you. So it seems that your method of argument is asking questions back to the asker, rather than trying to answer them yourself, and then making accusations for not answering them. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Perhaps our disconnect is your lack of definition of ‘exist’. Me implying that something exists makes you assume I take it for a physical object, so I’m guessing that you define ‘to exist’ to mean ‘to be a physical object’. If this is your definition, it’s non-standard, and needs to be explicitly specified. But I’m just guessing that this is the problem. The reason for our disconnection seems to be your not concentrating on the actual issues under discussion, but redirecting the questions addressed to you, to me, and then accusing for not answering them. My definition of “to exist” is logical and a result of attempting to narrow down the scope of the meaning in order to arrive clearer understanding of the issues under discussion. You should be able to do these conceptual adjustments in the rational analysis on the abstract matters. If you call anything you know under the sun as “existence” and “to exist”, then that is where you encounter confusion. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Nonsense. This is an empty claim without a quote of me (or anybody else) suggesting any such thing. It was the result of a natural inference on your posts, also your introduction to the examples of chaotic theorists into discussion. But then you don’t seem to care or be aware of, to where the discussion is flowing, why certain comments were made, and examples were given out, and to who the questions are asked. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 25, 2026, 11:48pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/113 "2026-09-25T23:48:30Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > the evidence that would have to be the case if epiphenomenalism is true, and that is the pain quale is not what is recorded in the neurons We don’t know what’s stored in the neurons. It certainly cannot be used to reproduce the original stimulus reaction. I cannot make my toe hurt by thinking about it. I can kind of reproduce emotional pain by remembering what causes it, but that’s almost identical to reproducing toe pain by stabbing it again. Epiphenomenalists posit something completely fictional (qualia). They have zero subjective evidence for it, so it has to be all made up. If they’re trying to explain the qualia they do subjectively feel, well that’s obviously not epiphenomenal since you trying to explain it would constitute an effect. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Without epiphenomenalism a physicalist would need to hold that the pain quale is physical. Gosh, imagine that. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > However, we have never observed such a physical property in nature. > There is no such thing as internal subjective properties. I observe it every day, hence everybody trying to explain it. So I deny this statement. And shadows are not epiphenomenal. You seem to equate the word to a negative effect, a place with less light, or perhaps simply something that isn’t a physical object with mass. That’s not what the word means. > It is completely ad hoc to call them physical. One can similarly assert that it’s completely ad hoc to call them not physical. The not-physical crowd may point out the lack of a physical explanation, but they don’t have an explanation either, so all they’ve done is posited a new thing without it solving any problems. Occam would not approve. And nobody is suggesting a quale particle any more than they posit a shadow particle. Physicalism does not assert that all effects are objects. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > I ask that you consider a view where we cannot just label something physical outside of physics. Dark matter was sort of like that. It was outside physics, and they had to ammend physics. If they manage to demonstrate matter having mental properties, then yay, physics will be amended and physicalism will still stand. It’s pretty easy to do. You suggest that matter behaves differently inside the brain. So find any primitive of the brain that’s doing something outside of physics. Turns out that brain primitives are very similar to multi-input transistors, with characteristics which are dependent on chemical and thermal environment. That’s the big difference. Computers are not sensitive to chemical environment. They don’t choose different things because of say hormones. But that difference is not outside physics. Computers are sensitive to environment, it’s just that the environment is still digital, not chemical and thermal. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > why should we consider it physical? Because it has not been shown that physical processes are incapable of the effects. You seem to want a quale particle, which physicalism doesn’t require. Maybe it does if it turns out that matter has mental properties. So show it by isolating those properties. Until then, it’s just magic of the gaps: hand waving without explaining anything. And we’re close to a full physical ‘explanation’ of it all. Given what we know and a computer with enough RAM, one can simulate a human (from conception), and if that simulated human is has all the properties of a real one, philosophy of mind will have been settled. Of course only the simulated guy will know what it’s like to be him, so the opponents are free to deny the results. Neither the computer doing the work nor the programmers will know what it’s like to be him any more than I can know what it’s like to be you. State of the art currently hasn’t the resources to run such a simulation, but they’re doing it to smaller beings already, unfortunately not from conception, implying that they’re giving the entity unnatural state. > [@Corvus](#): > > That was my question to you. You have answered my question with your own question, and then accused me for not answering. Post 103 (from whence it all came) contains zero questions, even if question marks were added. You go on at length about how I don’t answer question, but none was ever asked. Perhaps you need to learn the grammar of how questions are phrased and punctuated. OK, so now you’re asking perhaps what I would guess. Maybe I would guess the neighbor. But I would also say there is a fact to the matter (relative to the broken window, since I consider facts to be relative, not absolute). I did ask a question, and you’ve ignored it 3 times now. > [@Corvus](#): > > The question is made to show anyone who thinks causality is something that exists in the world, is wrong. That wasn’t demonstrated. Had you worded it as a question, my answer does not show any such thing, nor does it demonstrate that causality does exist in this world. Your claim here is still lacking a quote: > [@Corvus](#): > > You appeared to have been claiming causality is some sort of material or physical object all along. Again, kindly quote where I indicated any such thing, else you’re making up other people’s views. My comment here is worded not as a question, but as a request, as indicated by the lack of a question mark in it. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 12:41am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/114 "2026-09-26T00:41:17Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > One can similarly assert that it’s completely ad hoc to call them not physical. The not-physical crowd may point out the lack of a physical explanation, but they don’t have an explanation either, so all they’ve done is posited a new thing without it solving any problems. Just to make sure we are talking about physicalism of the mind and not metaphysical physicalism (the view that the world is physical), are you saying that compatibility with metaphysical physicalism necessarily requires physicalism of the mind? If not, then why must we assume that qualia requires physicalism of the mind “[b]ecause it has not been shown that physical processes are incapable of the effects”? ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 9:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/115 "2026-09-26T09:48:10Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > OK, so now you’re asking perhaps what I would guess. Maybe I would guess the neighbor. But I would also say there is a fact to the matter (relative to the broken window, since I consider facts to be relative, not absolute). > I did ask a question, and you’ve ignored it 3 times now. The point of the example case of the broken window was to demonstrate how causality emerges from the observed effects (results). So it is the type of psychological judgement, which is the nature of causality. What does this mean? It means causality can be subjective depending on the case, the availability of evidence for the cause, circumstance surrounding or underlying the situation or effects, and also the mental state of the person making the inference. Causality is not always guessing, as you seem to be misunderstanding. Causality is the product of rational and reasoned inference and judgement. What does this mean? It means, that you make the judgement based on the observed facts, evidence and all surrounding condition along with the effect in order to come to the judgement. So the point of the question was, not about in case you got it wrong, but to address above facts. It is not about ignoring your questions to answer. Because the answer is not about what happens if you got it wrong. The point was to force to you think how you come to the judgement of causality. > [@noAxioms](#): > > Your claim here is still lacking a quote: > [@noAxioms](#): > > Again, kindly quote where I indicated any such thing, else you’re making up other people’s views. Well, if you didn’t think it was the case, and keep insisting so, that is fine enough. This is not some sort of court process to nail down what you said. It is about trying to come to better understanding on the effect of Consciousness, and causality. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 1:07pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/116 "2026-09-26T13:07:20Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > My comment here is worded not as a question, but as a request, as indicated by the lack of a question mark in it. Causality being psychological judgement in nature, some folks can get things wrong, and they could just guess paying no attention to the evidential details on effect. Yes, it can happen. Even in the rigour of scientific inference can be wrong. It is due to the nature of the judgement and reasoning being inductive type. For more accurate judgment and knowledge, science requires you to observe the same instance of the effects and causes many repeated times, and only when the same causes resulted in the same effects, they qualify as the candidates for being the scientific law or principles. This has been clearly demonstrated by Hume 200+ years ago. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 9:46pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/117 "2026-09-26T21:46:37Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > Just to make sure we are talking about physicalism of the mind and not metaphysical physicalism (the view that the world is physical) I’m talking about actual physicalism (the kind described in places like wiki or Stanford), and not straw man physicalism where ‘everything is an object’, so shadows, process (combustion, erosion, etc) require shadow particles, erosion particles, quale fields etc). Nobody supports such a view. I cannot think of a distinction between metaphysical and physicalism of mind. They’re both grouped under naturalism and stand opposed to supernaturalism. Neither suggests that anything additional (e.g. res cogitans) is needed. So maybe you can provide an example of a (non-straw-man) view that qualifies as one of those but not the other. Then I’ll be better positioned to answer the question. Physicalism does not forbid there being something deeper on which the physical supervenes, as opposed to materialism which tends to assert material to be fundamental. The view does not assert that other worlds are necessarily ‘physical’, so it is a categorization only of how this world works. > [@Corvus](#): > > The point of the example case of the broken window was to demonstrate how causality emerges from the observed effects (results). > > So it is the type of psychological judgement, which is the nature of causality. Defining it as a type of psychological judgement is being idealistic about causality, but you deny that. I don’t see a demonstration of your point since the cause of the broken window has nothing to do with your suspicions observations. Most consider there to be a fact to the matter, but you repeatedly refuse to comment on that majority stance. Keep in mind that I’m pretty open to idealistic definitions of certain words. I find ‘reality’ for instance to be a mental designation since almost all attempts at a supposed ‘mind independent reality’ still very much depend on observation. > [@Corvus](#): > > Causality is not always guessing But you don’t give an alternative. I’m not talking about wild-ass guesses. The rock is there. That’s fair evidence that it was somehow involved. But there being a fact to the matter is not in any way a matter of evidence. Only knowledge of the fact is thus dependent. You’re seemingly taking a epistemic approach to causality vs my taking an ontological one. For the most part, that’s just a very different meaning to the word without there being anything actually different between views. > [@Corvus](#): > > Because the answer is not about what happens if you got it wrong. This phrasing suggests that there is meaning to ‘getting it wrong’, which in turn suggests that there is something to which your suspected cause is being compared. Hence I’m presuming you are answering ‘yes’ to the question you won’t directly answer. > [@Corvus](#): > > This is not some sort of court process to nail down what you said. No, but it’s considered somewhat hostile to accuse one of claiming something not claimed, all without evidence. It’s also pretty hostile to accuse me of repeatedly not answering a question when no question (about the window/rock) was ever asked. > [@Corvus](#): > > It is about trying to come to better understanding on the effect of Consciousness, and causality. Well IMO causality (ontic, not epistemic) does not seem to be a function of consciousness at all. But you seem to be talking about epistemic, and sure, some kind of information processing (designated as conscious or not) is required for that. So I think we don’t disagree, but lacking definitions, we’re talking past each other. ---
**Author:** ![Gnomon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/71e660/32.png) [@Gnomon](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Gnomon)\ **Post date:** [September 26, 2026, 11:11pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/118 "2026-09-26T23:11:19Z")
[BrightCanyon98] > [@John](#): > > Can you give an example of an epiphenomenal effect? I suppose the OP was questioning the common notion of Mental functions as epiphenomenal effects **1** with no phenomenal feedback. And that might explain _involuntary_ physical reflexes, that happen without conscious intention. But the adaptive function of human consciousness seems to be to allow precise voluntary control over behavior. And most of that _intentional_ behavior seems to be _noumenal_ feedback for social, not physical, control **2**. Social animals typically have some way to signal their intentions. But human animals have the super-phenomenal effect of meta-physical Language and Culture. 🙂 **1. An epiphenomenal effect** _is a secondary phenomenon or side effect caused by a primary process, but which does not exert any causal influence back on that primary process._ **Philosophy of Mind (Epiphenomenalism):** _The view that physical brain states cause mental states (like thoughts, desires, or conscious feelings), but mental states have **no physical impact** on actions or behavior._ [https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=epiphenomenal+effect](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=epiphenomenal+effect) **2.** **Social and Cultural Survival:** _Some recent perspectives argue that human consciousness evolved less for raw individual survival and more to broadcast **feelings, ideas, and intentions** , helping groups communicate, build social cohesion, and transmit culture._ [https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=evolutionary+purpose+of+consciousness](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=evolutionary+purpose+of+consciousness) ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 1:36am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/119 "2026-09-27T01:36:39Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > I cannot think of a distinction between metaphysical and physicalism of mind. They’re both grouped under naturalism and stand opposed to supernaturalism. Neither suggests that anything additional (e.g. res cogitans) is needed. So maybe you can provide an example of a (non-straw-man) view that qualifies as one of those but not the other. Then I’ll be better positioned to answer the question. They aren’t widely considered the same. Mostly, physicalists in Phil of Mind is considered an identity theory but metaphysical physicalism doesn’t make this claim: > First, in some discussions in philosophy of mind, the term ‘physicalism’ is used to refer to the identity theory, the idea that mental states or properties are neurological states or properties (Block 1980). In this use of the term, one can reject physicalism by rejecting the identity theory – so by that standard a behaviorist or functionalist in philosophy of mind would not count as a physicalist. Obviously, this is a much more restricted use of the term than is being employed here. [Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer 2007 Edition)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/physicalism/#4) For example, that article is chiefly on metaphysical physicalism and it leaves the view of ontological emergentism as a controversial version of metaphysical physicalism despite ontic emergence being a non-physicalist theory of the mind position since the mental is not identical to brain processes. > However, as we saw in our discussion above of the necessary beings problem, the proper interpretation of Hume’s dictum is itself a matter of controversy, so emergentism remains controversial. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 27, 2026, 1:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/120 "2026-09-27T01:57:32Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > So, if it’s not epiphenomenal then how can it be efficacious and still be an effect. Or, if it’s not an effect of some physical process/states, then what is it exactly? What is the Something Else? I’ve been reading along with this thread (kind of) so wanted to make the following contribution. When we say the ‘mental is not identical with the physical’ it’s important to avoid the conclusion that ‘the mental’ is some_thing_ that exists on the same ontological plane as the physical, but is of a different _kind_ (which is roughly the view of substance dualism). That anyway is the implication of ‘Something Else’. I think it’s better to posit intelligence or mind as that which is capable of interpretation or making distinctions. Thinking of it as an _attribute_ or _ability_ rather than a substance (philosophical ‘substantia’.) It is, to echo something I believe Wittgenstein said, not nothing, but not a something either. It take that to be an oblique reference to the realisation that mind or consciousness is never a ‘that’ to us; it is rather an attribute or actually the _basis_ of ‘the subject to whom experience occurs’. This ‘problem of reflexivity’ is why it eludes observation or the _objectification_ which is regarded as indispensable in the sciences. This kind of approach is of course central to phenomenology and the point at which it departs from analytical philosophy. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089.md?page=5) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089.md?page=7)