# Is Consciousness an Effect or Something Else? **URL:** \ **Category:** Philosophy of Mind\ **Created:** [September 15, 2026, 2:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089 "2026-09-15T14:50:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![John](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/john/32/665_2.png) [@John](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/John)\ **Post date:** [September 19, 2026, 11:23pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/61 "2026-09-19T23:23:17Z")
> [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > > [@John](#): > > > > Not true―things will cool down in the shade. > > That’s a counterfactual event. Again not true. The cooling down of something in shade is a fact, an actual event. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 19, 2026, 11:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/62 "2026-09-19T23:28:20Z")
> [@Corvus](#): > > “Result in” is a psychological judgement on events or objects in the world backed by your perception only. Not sure what is meant by that. The butterfly flap ‘results in’ the hurricane (stated far more precisely in the prior post). Absent perception, the hurricane would not be perceived, but that wouldn’t alter the causal fact. It is not dependent on it except under idealism where everything needs perceptual backing. > [@Corvus](#): > > “caused” or “causality” is also your psychological judgement on events or objects, but backed by your perception, reasoning and inference. I parse that to suggest that my judgements and knowledge are (mostly) backed by perception. With that I agree. Sans perception, it would really be hard to hold any opinion at all. > [@Corvus](#): > > You describe someone is conscious when the person has opened his/her eyes from unconsciousness, recognising you, and remembering the past, and talking to you intelligibly. You seem to use ‘consciousness’ as a synonym for awake, not unconscious. OK fine, but that’s not the definition most are talking about when asking if an LLM is conscious. Sure, it’s awake (not turned off at the time) if it’s responsive. It does all that you list there. > [@Corvus](#): > > which sounds your conscious mental state on the claim No, it’s just a claim, not a conscious mental state on one. It’s neither imaginary nor unfounded nor an assumption. It’s well known conclusion of chaos theory. It’s relevant since the subject was cause and effect. > [@BrightCanyon98](#): > > > [@noAxioms](#): > > > > I have no idea what you mean by ‘counterfactual’ here. > > If whatever causes a shadow had not blocked the sunlight, then whatever causal consequence of there being a shadow would not have occurred. Isn’t that what you meant by a shadow is causal? You didn’t mean to say that there are real objects called shadows that exist like atoms and molecules, correct? I do not consider shadows or electromagnetic fields to be objects. Nevertheless, they both can cause effects in objects. Your reply shed zero light on what you mean by ‘counterfactual’ in your posts. ---
**Author:** ![hypericin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/71e660/32.png) [@hypericin](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/hypericin)\ **Post date:** [September 19, 2026, 11:34pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/63 "2026-09-19T23:34:09Z")
I agree consciousness is a very peculiar problem. Not necessarily because “we are what we seek to know”. We can study many aspects of human reality. The problem with consciousness is that it is only observationally accessible to the person who has it. But crucially, it is indirectly accessible via report. So I don’t think a theory of consciousness is impossible. Imagine a theory that not only explains why our brain structure results in phenomenality, but actually makes successful predictions. For instance, telling us how to disable phenomenal awareness with magnetic stimulation to the right area. That would be an actual theory of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![Gnomon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/71e660/32.png) [@Gnomon](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Gnomon)\ **Post date:** [September 19, 2026, 11:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/64 "2026-09-19T23:37:29Z")
> [@hypericin](#): > > In your sense, consciousness is the explanans of anything at all. And without an understanding of the explanans, we cannot successfully **explain the explanadum**. And so nothing whatsoever can be explained absent a successful theory of consciousness. Perhaps the predicament of Self-Reflection — using Conscious Reasoning to study Sentience — is the Infinite Feedback Loop **1** problem. 😜 **1.** Self-Refection regresses into infinity ![Self Refection](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/uploads/thephilosophyforum/original/2X/d/dae4f88722d54a39b5b28d573cc3d5168b43ea68.jpeg) **2. I Am a Strange Loop** _He demonstrates how the properties of [self-referential](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-referential "Self-referential") systems, demonstrated most famously in [Gödel’s incompleteness theorems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems "Gödel's incompleteness theorems"), can be used to describe the unique properties of [minds](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind "Mind")._ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I\_Am\_a\_Strange\_Loop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Am_a_Strange_Loop) ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 12:50am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/65 "2026-09-20T00:50:57Z")
> [@hypericin](#): > > For instance, telling us how to disable phenomenal awareness with magnetic stimulation to the right area. That would be an actual theory of consciousness. That is the approach called neurophenomenology pioneered (I believe) by Francisco Varela. He explicitly introduced and coined the term **neurophenomenology** in his seminal 1996 paper, _“Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem”_ (which I haven’t read.) ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 1:01am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/66 "2026-09-20T01:01:37Z")
Re the above, ‘Neurophenomenology is a methodological approach pioneered by Francisco Varela that seeks to bridge the gap between subjective experience and objective neuroscience, offering a potential remedy for the “hard problem” of consciousness. Rather than relying solely on third-person neural data or purely first-person introspection, this framework integrates rigorous phenomenological descriptions of conscious experience with precise neurophysiological measurements. By treating subjective reports not as mere anecdotes but as valid data that must co-evolve with neural findings, neurophenomenology aims to create a more robust scientific account of how brain processes give rise to phenomenal awareness.’ As for results of research to date, see[this report.](https://docs.google.com/document/d/18i_WOfeZmYFwjxT8yCvU-nmlUqvav7izcgHz3vEyPSU/edit?usp=sharing) ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 10:30am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/67 "2026-09-20T10:30:04Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > Not sure what is meant by that. The butterfly flap ‘results in’ the hurricane (stated far more precisely in the prior post). Absent perception, the hurricane would not be perceived, but that wouldn’t alter the causal fact. It is not dependent on it except under idealism where everything needs perceptual backing. What it means was that to say that butterfly flap results in the hurricane, you didn’t need anything more than perceiving the butterfly flap and than 2 month later the hurricane (provided that your statement was factual one). You just saw the 2 events, and made connections between the events using the word “results in”. There is no necessary connection between the two events in material, logical or rational sense. Your perceptions were the only thing which made you to come to the claim one resulted the other. I saw many butterflies in the garden this year, but there was no hurricane at all, or maybe there were some hurricanes in some other parts of the world, which means there is no rational reason to connect the events, and which means the “results in” statement was just a fluke imaginary statement, not backed by anything such as evidence, logic or reasoning. So it proves any statements on “results in” or “caused” are the manifestations of your psychological events or states, not the events or objects in the world. Hope it is clearer now. If not, please let me know. TBC (The other points to be continued in due course.) ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 12:13pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/68 "2026-09-20T12:13:59Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > No, it’s just a claim, not a conscious mental state on one. > It’s neither imaginary nor unfounded nor an assumption. It’s well known conclusion of chaos theory. It’s relevant since the subject was cause and effect. OK. I thought it was your own claim. So it is a claim by chaos theory, you are saying. I am not familiar with chaos theory. Not knowing the detail of the theory, it sounds chaotic. 🙂 I don’t agree with their claim. I cannot see any reasonable aspect of their claim that a butterfly flapping in amazon results in the hurricane in the pacific. It sounds illogical, irrational and chaotic. It needs solid material evidence collected from millions of times of observations in the real world to be credible. ---
**Author:** ![noAxioms](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/noaxioms/32/658_2.png) [@noAxioms](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/noAxioms)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 2:15pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/69 "2026-09-20T14:15:25Z")
> [@Corvus](#): > > > [@noAxioms](#): > > > > > [@Corvus](#): > > > > > > “Result in” is a psychological judgement on events or objects in the world backed by your perception only. > > > > Not sure what is meant by that. > > What it means was that to say that butterfly flap results in the hurricane, you didn’t need anything more than perceiving the butterfly flap and than 2 month later the hurricane OK, You’re talking epistemology. I must disagree with your statement since observation of the butterfly and hurricane is in no way evidence that one causes the other. The evidence is based on observation, yes, but not on observation of that. One needs to observe results of experiments that demonstrate (lead to, are only explained by) chaos theory, and then apply the theory to the butterfly, which needs not be observed at all. > I saw many butterflies in the garden this year, but there was no hurricane at all You misrepresent the theory. I didn’t say there were as many hurricanes as there are butterfly observations. > or maybe there were some hurricanes in some other parts of the world, which means there is no rational reason to connect the events There very much are rational reasons. You admit to being unfamiliar with chaos theory, so you’re not in a position to assert the lack of rational reason to connect the two. > [@Corvus](#): > > It sounds illogical, irrational and chaotic. Got 1 out of 3 at least. How it sounds to a lay person is little if any evidence of it not being a solid established theory. It is a mathematical theory, entirely valid and supported by vast evidence, and very applicable to known chaotic systems, the weather being a significant example of a system noticed to exhibit such behavior. Poincare did early work on it (1887), showing that the 3-body problem (orbital mechanics) was chaotic and thus unpredictable. Breakthroughs on the theory came from work done by Edward Lorenz doing work on weather prediction using a 1963 computer. The term butterfly effect was coined from this work. Gleick (1987) mainstreamed the theory (named 12 years prior) with his book on the subject. ---
**Author:** ![BrightCanyon98](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f08c70/32.png) [@BrightCanyon98](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/BrightCanyon98)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 4:25pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/70 "2026-09-20T16:25:09Z")
> [@John](#): > > Again not true. The cooling down of something in shade is a fact, an actual event. A shadow is counterfactual in my opening post. Physical effects can be causally efficacious like electromagnetism can be efficaciously caused by electrical current flowing through conductive materials like metal, _or_ they can be inefficacious like shadows where a shadow is casted on the ground. In the latter case the shadow is not being causally generated onto the ground, rather the blocking object is absorbing photons and as a result a shadow appears. Had the blocking object not been there then there would be no shadow. Similarly, it is metaphysically possible that consciousness is a causal effect brought into being by electrical-chemical events happening either synchronically or diachronically in the brain, or it is also metaphysically possible that consciousness is a shadow, a purely accidental result having no causal effects on the brain, just a byproduct of certain events (e,g., standing in the light causing a shadow). Is your stance that a) You agree non-efficacious effects exist but a shadow is not such an example, or b) it is not metaphysically possible for consciousness to be non-efficacious inside the brain, or perhaps some other clarification? ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 5:34pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/71 "2026-09-20T17:34:58Z")
> [@noAxioms](#): > > You misrepresent the theory. I didn’t say there were as many hurricanes as there are butterfly observations. I was not talking about the theory. I was talking about my experience and the external world events, which don’t seem to have any connections whatsoever. So you misunderstood the point there. > [@noAxioms](#): > > There very much are rational reasons. You admit to being unfamiliar with chaos theory, so you’re not in a position to assert the lack of rational reason to connect the two. We can still give our impressions and opinions on the theories by reading their claims. We don’t need to know much details on these to be able to do that. If it is not much relevant to the topic, it is always better save time, and read something more relevant. 🙂 > [@noAxioms](#): > > It is a mathematical theory, entirely valid and supported by vast evidence, and very applicable to known chaotic systems, the weather being a significant example of a system noticed to exhibit such behavior. Poincare did early work on it (1887), showing that the 3-body problem (orbital mechanics) was chaotic and thus unpredictable. Breakthroughs on the theory came from work done by Edward Lorenz doing work on weather prediction using a 1963 computer. The term butterfly effect was coined from this work. > Gleick (1987) mainstreamed the theory (named 12 years prior) with his book on the subject. Do they mention anything about consciousness? What is the nature of human consciousness according to their theory? The world looks chaos at times to anyone when observing some events happening in the universe. We even say the state of a country, work or garden is chaos depending on what angle we see them from. We don’t need to study a theory to be able to say that. But perhaps those folks above must be saying something more deeper and meaningful than that? Or is it more or less the same song sung by different arrangement? ---
**Author:** ![Gnomon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/71e660/32.png) [@Gnomon](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Gnomon)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 9:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/72 "2026-09-20T21:36:41Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#): > > I hold to a kind of neo-aristotelian ontology. **Vegetative** , animal, rational as levels or kinds of being(s) along a **continuum**. That seems to be the assumption of Michael Pollan’s 2026 book, **A World Appears** : _A Journey Into Consciousness_. His voyage into innerness may have begun with a peek into his own mind, after consuming a Magic Mushroom, which seemed to dissolve accustomed boundaries between self and world. I suppose Eastern Meditation is a drugless path to similar insights. But, he took the rational route of Western Science. Anyway, although he reaches no hard & fast conclusions about the provenance of Consciousness, he tries to begin at the beginning : the roots, so to speak, of rational awareness. He reports on the researches of empirical, but not reductive, scientists, who observe the burgeoning of _Sentience_ in plants & animals far down the continuum from human _Sapience_. He marvels at sped-up videos of creeping vines that seem to “sense” a support that they can’t yet touch. Yet they “strive” to reach-out as-if they know what they’re doing. Lacking the DNA to make rigid cellulose, the vine leans on trees (as a tool) to reach up to where essential sunlight penetrates the forest. Is that intelligent, or what? Similarly, single cell organisms without neurons, such as Amoeba & Slime Molds, propel themselves along chemical gradients to find food. And then it extends its membranes to incorporate non-self protoplasm into its own structure. One scientist also showed him how root tips are the “brains” of plants, with their mouths pressed to the earth, and their tails in the air, to absorb nutrients from both _Sol_ and _Gaia_. Again, adaptation to necessity. These lower level beings seem to possess a _state of pure awareness without a rigid “I”_. So, they have just enough Consciousness to make a living in their natural ecosystems. Yet, bipedal naked apes have adapted to more complex social habitats, and were forced (or allowed) to develop more sophisticated Sentience & Sapience & Tools, to find sustenance and avoid predation. The ability to distinguish _Self_ from _Other_, while associating with _Us_, has led to the flexible subjective & objective perspectives that have propelled humans to the top of the food chain : the existential continuum. 🙂 USING TOOLS TO REACH OUT ![reach out](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/uploads/thephilosophyforum/original/2X/f/f69e413eb0fb0169391ceb6ff0a476412b08a0f0.png) ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 9:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/73 "2026-09-20T21:59:11Z")
Yes, it’s a hard problem. At times I feel Chalmers was being too optimistic when he refused to call it the impossible problem of consciousness. How do physical processes lead to mental phenomena? He must’ve known about how physical changes in the brain lead to mental changes in the person - there’s so much literature and evidence on the healthy and damaged brain. I even heard someone say that the matter is very simple - the body is you (based on, here too, neuroscience). In conclusion given the givens physicalism is more plausible than nonphysicalism. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 10:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/74 "2026-09-20T22:12:08Z")
> [@Gnomon](#): > > > [@Wayfarer](#): > > > > I hold to a kind of neo-aristotelian ontology. **Vegetative** , animal, rational as levels or kinds of being(s) along a **continuum**. > > That seems to be the assumption of Michael Pollan’s 2026 book… I watched a few interviews with Pollan and found them congenial but didn’t buy the book. Another recent title I’ve noticed is called [“Alive” by Melanie Challenger:](https://amzn.asia/d/052r56sy) > In _Alive_, researcher and natural philosopher Melanie Challenger takes us through the latest discoveries in biology and physics to reveal a radical truth: to be alive is first and foremost a way of being a body. From Greenland sharks that can live for half a millennium, to birds that sense the Earth’s magnetic field through their retinas, and even slime moulds that solve mazes, this book tells a new story of intelligence in the living world. I wrote [an essay](https://medium.com/philosophytoday/is-the-mind-cause-or-consequence-c27d82856b32?sk=01ec0804e06e849dafb057b0e77cc271) which explores the question: **what if consciousness is a causal as much as consequential?** That the appearance of life just is the appearance of mind, — or rather, of _intentionality_, even if in rudimentary form. Which says: > The organism stands in a dialectical relation to its material constituents: it needs matter to exist, but maintains an identity distinct from a particular collection of matter. It “rides the wave” of material change, maintaining its form through the constant replacement of its substance. Dependent on matter as material, it is independent of any _specific_ matter. Its identity is functional and formal, not material. > > And hence (an) ontological reversal: in the realm of the lifeless, form is the accident and matter the substance — form is just a temporary configuration of enduring particles. But in the living organism this relationship is inverted: matter becomes the accident, form the essence. The material contents are phases of development for the self-continuation of the form, not the other way around. > > …Fungi, algae, sponges, and single-celled organisms are not consciously aware, at least so far as we know. They do not reflect, narrate or plan. But even though it would be quite unrealistic to say they have an “inner life”, the distinguishing characteristic of any organism is that it _acts in order to maintain itself._ A bacterium navigating a nutrient gradient is not simply being moved by a force — it is _responding to conditions_. So it maintains itself against entropy, defends its boundary, and responds to its environment in ways oriented toward its own persistence. That’s why I say there’s an ontological distinction between living and non-living which physicalism cannot recognise (and there is only allowance for a single ‘substantia’) ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 10:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/75 "2026-09-20T22:32:13Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > In conclusion given the givens physicalism is more plausible than nonphysicalism. Notice that your argument assumes a clear distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’. I think this reflects a cultural attitude conditioned by Cartesian dualism, that mind and body are separate ‘substantia’ that interact. I say most of what is described as physicalism views the question through this perspective, which makes ‘the mental’ or ‘mind’ appear as a ‘ghost in the machine’, which is a common criticism of Cartesian-style dualism. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 10:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/76 "2026-09-20T22:42:52Z")
> [@Wayfarer](#): > > Notice that your argument assumes a clear distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’. I think this reflects a cultural attitude conditioned by Cartesian dualism, that mind and body are separate ‘substantia’ that interact. I say most of what is described as physicalism views the question through this perspective, which makes ‘the mental’ or ‘mind’ appear as a ‘ghost in the machine’, which is a common criticism of Cartesian-style dualism. That’s true but I find the distinction brain operations vs. mental phenomena to be real. In an oversimplified sense I can actually see the energy consumed by my hands as it types this response but I see all the glucose and oxygen being delivered to the brain, consumed by it and eppure non si muove (yet it does not move). ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 10:54pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/77 "2026-09-20T22:54:34Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > I can actually see the energy consumed by my hands as it types this response but I see all the glucose and oxygen being delivered to the brain, consumed by it… Yes— but what about language is physical? Sure you have to type letters and move your hands, and so on. But verbal communication is about conveying ideas. When I say something to you, it affects you - it might even affect you physically or metabollically, if I annoyed you and your heart-rate subtly accelerated. But nothing physical has passed between us. It’s not as if I reached out and injected a substance into your body that accelerated your heart rate. Whatever effect happened was solely through the tranmission of an idea. That, of course, is in the territory of biosemiotics, about which I learned a great deal from a poster named Apokrisis (who hasn’t re-joined since the changeover). I won’t launch into a dissertation on it, other than to say that while it endeavours to operate within the confines of naturalism it is no longer physicalist in the reductionist sense. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 11:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/78 "2026-09-20T23:08:26Z")
Nevertheless something physical (sound waves) exists between X and Y. Einstein wouldn’t have been in the least bit inconvenienced by that. What I refer to is mental phenomena and how brain operations don’t easily gel together in the nice way it does for our hands. ---
**Author:** ![Wayfarer](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/wayfarer/32/123_2.png) [@Wayfarer](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Wayfarer)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2026, 11:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/79 "2026-09-20T23:28:08Z")
> [@Scorpion](#): > > Nevertheless something physical (sound waves) exists between X 𝑋 and Y 𝑌. Einstein wouldn’t have been in the least bit inconvenienced by that. Einstein was not a reductive materialist. Objective realist, yes. But that is beside the point. If you think it through, you can see that you are imposing a false dichotomy on your own thinking. The act of forming words and trying to convey them is both physical and mental. It’s not one or the other. I maintain that nothing whatever is _purely_ physical or _only_ physical. Which discipline would you look to to ascertain the nature of the physical? That would be physics, and the question of ‘the nature of matter’ is still wide open. > **Werner Heisenberg The Debate between Plato and Democritus 1958** > > The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do. > > But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century. > > This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on. > > During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato? > > I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato’s sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [September 21, 2026, 1:11am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/is-consciousness-an-effect-or-something-else/3089/80 "2026-09-21T01:11:53Z")
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