Here’s a brief description of the ontology:
Everything that exists is a state of affairs (SOA) composed of 3 sets of constituents: a “thin” particular, a set of intrinsic properties, and a set of relations to other SOAs. The individual constituents do not exist independently of SOAs; they exist immanently in a SOA.
Example: -1 electric charge, as a property of an electron. The charge is not an object itself, but it exists immanently in particular electrons. A proton has a +1 charge. There is an attraction relation between a proton and electron because of the opposite electric charge. The “law” is the attraction relation between the +1 charge property and the -1 charge property: it’s a relation between properties. It exists between any pair of objects with opposite charges. Objects with a -1 charge are a type of object, same with objects of +1 charge. Hence a law is a relation between types of objects. The attraction relation causes the objects to move toward each other. The causality is not due to a “thing” because thing=SOA. It is due to a relation between types of things. A type of thing is a universal. Every property corresponds to a type of thing, so we can also say that a property is a universal. So universals exist immanently in states of affairs, not as independent things.
I’ve outlined the nature of intrinsic properties and relations. The “thin particular” = that to which the properties and relations attach. Again, “thin particulars” do not have independent existence. This is equvalent to saying that every existent has properties.
It’s called a “thin particular” to distinguish it from an actual particular: a SOA. SOA=thing=existent=particular.
The State of Affairs ontological theory, of which I’ve barely scratched the surface with my description. It’s a comprehensive theory devised by David Armstrong, but with variations by other philosophers. If you really want to understand it, read Stephen Mumford’s book, "Armstrong . Armstrong’s theory was his life’s work. He wrote books on major components (e.g. universals, laws of nature, truthmaker theory of truth, theory of mind). Mumford’s summary is a good overview.
Of course, but that would take a good bit of time to study the theory. Again, start with Mumford.
Or…you could just present an alternative theory.
Good question. I’ll relate this to Armstrong’s theory of truth: truthmaker theory. A proposition is true if it has a truthmaker anywhere in the past, present or future in any universe, or in any plain of reality, that exists. It’s a viable theory of truth even if materialism is false.
We believe the stories in history books about killing “witches” are true. As such, the truthmaker is the actual events that occurred. Same with reports of child abuse.
Because you said, “your ‘current’ point of view and world view could NEVER allow you to see or believe things are any other way.”
You were wrong, and I described one way you were wrong: the belief in this metaphysical theory is the “best explanation” is defeasible. In addition, I’m capable of entertaining possibilities that are inconsistent with my own views. But the issue I tend to bring up is that possibility is cheap, because they are infinite. More than possibility is needed to accept it.
It sounds like you have an ontological theory, and are judging my position irrational because I have not considered it. Or, perhaps, because you believe you can actually prove your theory is necessarily true.
If I’m right on either of these possibililities, it suggests you are conflating being right with being rational. Two people with opposing views could both have arrived at those views rationally-i.e. without errors in reasoning. We aren’t omniscient.
Couple issues.
People use the word “believe” differently, and this leads to drawing incorrect conclusions and talking past each other. You said:
Right- you use the word differently. This is the problem with this assertion you made:
As I said, I consider this materialistic theory the “best explanation”. That is what I believe. I also believe the actual ontology of the world is unknowable- it can never be proven. Even scientific theories aren’t provable. Very few things are provably true in the strictest sense. Nevertheless, we draw comclusions on sparse evidence every day - most of our beliefs about everyday life are like this. When we’re careful, we strive for inference to best explanation- because that’s usually the best we can do.
Your admitted lack of openness to being wrong in your beliefs seems odd to me, because you can’t possibly prove all your beliefs are necessarily true. But perhaps you only use “belief” to the things you CAN prove. I can only speculate. I just ask that you recognize that we have a different framework, so it’s erroneous to draw conclusions by applying your framework to my statements of belief.
Sure- if your proof is based on agreed premises. Here’s my caution:
I’ve had discussions with “Thomists” (those who belive the metaphysical theory of Thomas Aquinas). Their tendency is to “prove me wrong” on the basis that my theory doesn’t account for potententiality, or essence. IOW, their “proof” is based on a Thomist framework. The Thomist framework is a premise. You can’t disprove one metaphysical theory false, on the basis of it being inconsistent with another metaphysical theory.
That’s a physics question. Under Quantum Field Theory, ordinary objects of experience are composed of particles. Particles are quanta of quantum fields, and the quantum fields exist at every point of space. So it is quantum fields that are “around” everything, but they also comprise everything.
Non sequitur. It’s possible that the quantum fields are fundamental- not decomposible into some common thing. You can nevertheless propose monism as a metaphysical theory.
What is a “singularity”,in your theory? I relate the term to the mathematical singularity that arises when usuing general relativity to calculate the density of the universe at time t0- it’s a mathematical singularity because it entails dividing by zero. It doesn’t correspond to an actual state of the universe at a point of time; rather, physicists consider it a sign that general relativity is inapplicable.
So please clarify your use of the term.
Your theory sounds inconsistent with quantum field theory. That’s sufficient reason for me to reject it. A scientific theory isn’t provably true, but the epistemic support is superior to a metaphysical theory.
Yes, you did- unless you can reconcile it with quantum field theory, and conclusively prove monism is true.
I define “material” with an epistemological constraint:
Material = That which exists (has existed, or will exist) including ourselves, everything that is causally connected to ourselves, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of our universe.