I hate analytical philosophy

We were talking about how AP is associated with liberalism, and I think this might be related. Pundits say that investors are happy that the US government is about to be strait jacketed by the Democratic takeover of the House. In other words, they like it when the government isn’t likely to do anything. AP likes for philosophers to restrain themselves, so there’s no rambunctious political statements being made. Although Chomsky was an outspoken social critic, it wasn’t part of the philosophy he’s known for.

Investors like for philosophers to keep their eyes on the nature of possible worlds rather than the nature of this one.

Perhaps a flair for indignation, then?

It’s not universal, but it’s definitely there. :grinning_face:

From the LA Review of Books on Christopher Schuringa’s Social History of Analytic Philosophy:

Analytic philosophy was constructed retroactively, in the 1950s, by American philosophers drawing on three distinct sources: Cambridge University’s holy trinity of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and G. E. Moore, devoted to the logical analysis of facts, in more or less technical forms; the logical positivists in Vienna, for whom science was the arbiter of truth and philosophy its sidekick; and the “ordinary language” school in Oxford, represented in different ways by Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin. (The later Wittgenstein, always a misfit, doesn’t quite belong to any of these camps.) The idea of a shared analytic method or vision was always a myth, but mythmaking flourished. In the 1970s, Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett would retell the history of analytic philosophy as unified by a “linguistic turn” indebted to the German logician Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), which gave priority to language over metaphysics.

…What unified Cambridge, Vienna, and Oxford, and thus analytic philosophy, was little more than style—a focus on defining terms and making arguments explicit, sometimes using technical tools from logic—a shared hostility to “Continental philosophy” or post-Kantian thought in Germany and France, and control of the major institutions of the discipline, from elite university departments to prestige journals.

Seems like quite an accurate depiction to me.

Historicist explanations are disingenuous.

@Jamal mentioned the genetic fallacy; its application here is trite. There’s more.

More damning perhaps is explaining away a body of argument in order not to have to deal with it. @Hanover talks of this, as a form of laziness implicit in the OP. Dismissing Camus’ body of work because he was just using talk to get laid is unwarranted, even if it’s true. Dismissing Quine because he had funding from RAND is no better. Addressing Quine’s funding is far easier than understanding and addressing his critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

There’s also the difficulty of circularity - if all critique is to be explained by its being embedded in the historical milieu, then so is social critique. The Historicist cannot claim a privileged position.

C. S. Lewis called this Bulverism, the combination of the genetic fallacy, circularity, and Ad Hominem in order to distract from what is being argued rather than address it. It has become standard practice with the advent of social media.

Better, by far, to drop the rather immature divide between analytic and continental, and look instead at the detail in the arguments found in actual texts.

But that requires effort.

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Thanks for that, I appreciate your finding it.

Obviously, I have identified myself as a formal-philosophy neophyte, and perhaps I have the idealism of a poet.

I’ll share my thoughts about this philosophical take on music -

To me, it seems surgical - a surgical representation

My original comment was the need for a philosophy that takes into account the effect of music on humans

I can’t say this passage does that.

Looking for the logic in music seems wholly against the purpose of music - which is feeling.

And - some more thoughts I have had about analytical philosophy - it appears to be an attempt to take the complex chaos that is our existence, and make some sense of it - make it manageable - and in that way master or control it.

Your comment stated that analytic philosophy “does not take into account the effect of music on humans”. The quotes show, from a central source, that they do.

See also

It would be jejune to criticise analytic philosophers for taking an analytic approach to aesthetics.

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No, they do what they do - and I am sure they do it very well - but to me - imho - they suck the juice out of it that way

This weekend, I began reading a book on African philosophy -

Existence and Consolation: Reinventing Ontology, Gnosis, and Values in African Philosophy

The African worldview strikes a chord with me. From the preface to the book, it

regards the Universe as the rational expression of a basic emotional impulse … (humanity is) defined first by emotion, which is fundamental, and secondly by reason…

And I am still trying to come to terms with Wittgenstein saying this -

What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.

I suspect that in this you are finding what you hope to see; a mild case of the Bulverism diagnosed previously.

At the least, have a read of the conclusion to Wittgenstein on Aesthetics.

Oh dear no, I am not saying that whatever Wittgenstein proposes is false - it is just not how I approach music or poetry, or indeed the human condition.

I will, thanks, going to read it right now.

It is not music or poetry.

Perhaps you might also take a look at my own musings:

It’s a straight up analytic extension of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to the topic of aesthetics, with a dash of Popper thrown in just for fun. If it’s missing the “flair” you expect, see Ciceronianus

I’m reminded of the Sokal Affair and Communications From Elsewhere.

Sorry to hear your opinion of analytic philosophy, but as been said elsewhere, your position makes a strawman of it. I started out by memorizing the PhilPapers index (an analytic index) to get a grasp of the theoretical issues in science. There need be no Venn diagrms.

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I think you should be thankful that philosophy isn’t music or poetry. I tremble when I imagine philosophers playing at being poets or composers of music. Think of the ponderous horrors which would result from their solemn efforts at art.

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I think there has been some misunderstanding – I did not mean to imply that philosophy should be in the form of music or poetry – that’s just silly. Although, it could be.

Maybe my proposition is this - Life is not defined by logic and reason, but by joy and sadness.

I’m not looking for “flair” but ultimate causes.

And … it is worth noting that, in a journal entry of 1934, Wittgenstein wrote -

I think I summed up my position vis-à-vis philosophy when I said: philosophy should really be written only as one would write poetry.

And it should be read slowly, as he writes in Culture and Value -

Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo.

My sentences are all to be read slowly. (CV 65)

Thoughts rise to the surface slowly, like bubbles. (CV 72)

How one should read poetry.

He wanted to produce certainty where there was uncertainty. Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (1936), begins, “One must start out with error and convert it into truth,” and then contains the isolated lyric line, “I must plunge into the water of doubt again and again…”

For Wittgenstein, a command of the structural – i.e. words – how they are used - provided a kind of certainty. He wrote things like “Every word in the language signifies something” and “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”

In several journal entries, over a period of months, he muses about the meaning of the word “happiness” – yet comes to no conclusion. Instead, he terms the word “happiness” transcendent, which is to say, indefinable. “What cannot be said, can be not said.”

Maybe poets can’t define happiness, neither.

Anyway, he really struggled with happiness.

All of this sent me to do some digging into Wittgenstein the man, and I found out that although he belonged to one of the richest families in Austria, his childhood was unhappy. Three of his older brothers committed suicide by 1918.

That called to mind something I wrote in an earlier post –

about analytical philosophy - it appears to be an attempt to take the complex chaos that is our existence, and make some sense of it - make it manageable - and in that way master or control it.

And I imagined the young man, serious, intellectual, and moody - desperate to make sense of his brothers’ deaths, and his own internal struggles – bring some logic to it – even though the chase for logic appears to have driven him half-mad - but ultimately finding some consolation in logical – ordered p’s and q’s - answers.

(If only life could be so meticulously ordered.)

As he said in a 1930 Lecture, “Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement.”

Anyway, in the last few months of his life, he wrote, “My life consists in that there are certain things I am content to accept.”

Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Wittgenstein’s Literary Syntax

What’s odd is that you seem to think that those philosophers associated with the term “analytic” might disagree with this.

But then you go on to show that Wittgenstein agreed with you. Well, yes.

Why might you suppose there are ultimate causes? What is a cause? What would it be for a cause to count as being ultimate?

Now we are doing philosophy.

Philosophy is concerned with conceptual analysis, rather than causes.

No, the opposite. I knew that behind every dry piece of writing, lived a real human being.

What a fascinating character. The haunted look in his eyes in this photograph taken in 1929 struck me.

I’ve just downloaded a biography of him that is advertised this way -

‘This biography transforms Wittgenstein into a human being.’

Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius

Well, the first thing I think of is the way Wittgenstein keeps referring to “context.” All is to be understood in context.

Even with matters of art appreciation, he says the “the expression (of art) itself has almost a negligible place” but that it becomes functionally aesthetic depending “on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place”

(To me, this reads as a statement that the meaning of art belongs to the receiver of the art)

Anyway – what is the primary context of a social animal like us?

What instincts drive us more than anything else?

How do you analyze a concept without reference to its causes?

The questions where rhetorical, examples of the sort of thing philosophy does. Perhaps it is psychology that concerns the causal stuff, to do with motivation. Are you in the wrong place?

Monk’s book is excellent, however it doesn’t go as far into exegesis as I’d have preferred.

What is a cause?

No, I’m not just talking about human motivation, but trying to understand the entire enchilada.

I’m just as interested as the next philosopher in the question, “What is it all about?”

That’s cheeky.

The stimulus for an effect

What does that mean?

I understand that hitting the ball with the bat cause it to fly out to square leg. Saying the bat stimulated the effect of flying out to square leg doesn’t seem to add anything.

See what I did there?

That’s conceptual analysis.