I am a Moral Nihilist

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

I don’t think it tracks with how we ordinarily understand morality. Morality isn’t usually thought of as an instrumental means to achieve some desired end but as a demand that we behave a certain way even if it conflicts with what we want.

If we ought not kick puppies then we ought not kick puppies even if we all prefer to kick puppies and even if kicking puppies helps us reach whatever our goals are.

You are equivocating between ‘end’ and ‘goal’. Teleological accounts are not limited to considering the goals one sets for themselves.

[Citizenschallenge]

I’m coming into this dialogue way too late. I did skip through comments to get feel for the discussion. I noticed 'truth" getting invoked in a lot of comments.

I hope I’m not out of line simply asking about “Truth” - you see, it seems to me, “truth” is a human construct that is fundamentally meaningless without a specific frame of reference.

It seems to me “morals” fall into that category, in that it only makes sense within a specific human context, . . .

Any thoughts?

[Leontiskos]

@Citizenschallenge

It seems to me “morals” fall into that category, in that it only makes sense within a specific human context, . . .

Any thoughts?

Do you have some examples of specific human contexts that ‘morals’ would make sense within?

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

But do you see how the term “moral nihilism” appears nowhere in your source? Instead of answering my question you have actually begged the question in favor of your own view while quoting a source that does not say a single word about “moral nihilism.”

Then I’ll quote from here:

Moral nihilism today broadly tends to take the form of an error theory: the view developed originally by J. L. Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, although prefigured by Axel Hägerström in 1911. Error theory and nihilism broadly take the form of a negative claim about the existence of objective values or properties. Under traditional views, some moral properties or methods hold objectively in some sense beyond our contingent interests, which morally obligate us to act. For Mackie and the Error Theorists, such properties do not exist in the world, and therefore, morality conceived of by reference to objective facts must also not exist. Therefore, morality in the traditional sense does not exist.

I don’t understand why you’re willing to die on this hill. If you don’t like the term “moral nihilism” then we can just use the term “error theory”. Either way, the position is that all sentences of the form “X is morally wrong” are false — because moral properties, if they exist, obtain even if we believe and act otherwise, and no such properties exist — and so nothing is morally wrong.

@Leontiskos

Until you tell me what you mean by ‘moral’ I can’t know what you argument is supposed to say.

The beauty of validity is that you don’t need to know what the words mean for it to be valid. The argument “if P then Q, not Q, therefore not P” is valid even if you don’t know what P and Q mean, and I first want you to understand that the argument is valid.

According to both moral realists and nihilists, if something is a moral obligation (P) then it is an obligation even if we believe and act otherwise (Q). As per modus tollens, it follows that if some obligation does not obtain if we believe and act otherwise (¬Q) then it is not a moral obligation (¬P).

So, one of these is true:

1. A soldier’s obligation to salute his superior officer obtains even if our institutional norm is for him to bow
2. A solider has no obligation to salute his superior officer
3. A soldier’s obligation to salute his superior officer is not a moral obligation

As both (1) and (2) seem untenable it follows that (3) is most likely true — whatever the word “moral” means.

Of course, if you’re unwilling to accept (3) then you can either a) argue for (1) or (2) or b) argue that moral obligations are contingent on our beliefs and practices, and so in favour of moral subjectivism/relativism.

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

If you don’t like the term “moral nihilism” then we can just use the term “error theory”. Either way, the position is that all sentences of the form “X is morally wrong” are false — because moral properties, if they exist, obtain even if we believe and act otherwise, and no such properties exist — and so nothing is morally wrong.

Right: so you’re actually talking about Mackie’s error theory. Knowing what we’re talking about is not a minor issue.

@Michael

According to both moral realists and nihilists, if something is a moral obligation (P) then it is an obligation even if we believe and act otherwise (Q). As per modus tollens, it follows that if some obligation does not obtain even if we believe and act otherwise (¬Q) then it is not a moral obligation (¬P). This is true whatever the word “moral” means.

But you’re committing the same circumlocution you committed with “moral truth.” This is presumably your argument:

• 1a. All obligations obtain even if we believe and act otherwise
• 2a. A “moral” obligation is some kind of obligation, regardless of what “moral” means
• 3a. Therefore, A “moral” obligation obtains even if we believe and act otherwise

@Michael

And as both (1) and (2) are untenable it follows that (3) is true

Wouldn’t the simple answer just be that one owes their superiors respect, and the particular form that this respect takes will vary according to time and place? The common answer would distinguish what you want to glue together: the respect owed to one’s superior officer and the material act of saluting. Seems pretty basic.

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

This is presumably your argument:

• 1a. All obligations obtain even if we believe and act otherwise
• 2a. A “moral” obligation is some kind of obligation, regardless of what “moral” means
• 3a. Therefore, A “moral” obligation obtains even if we believe and act otherwise

That’s not my argument. The argument is:

1. Moral obligations, if there are any, obtain even if we believe and act otherwise
2. Some obligations do not obtain if we believe and act otherwise
3. Therefore, some obligations are not moral obligations

This is an argument that both the realist and the nihilist can accept. The nihilist just argues that all obligations are contingent on our beliefs and practices and so no obligation is a moral obligation, with Mackie arguing that the very concept of an “objective” obligation is “queer” (in the sense of being strange and “utterly different from anything else in the universe”).

@Leontiskos

Wouldn’t the simple answer just be that one owes their superiors respect, and the particular form that this respect takes will vary according to time and place?

Then the realist might distinguish between the moral obligation to show respect and the non-moral obligation to salute, and between the moral obligation to not cheat and the non-moral obligation to not move your pawn three spaces forward.

Although the moral nihilist will argue that even the obligations to show respect and to not cheat are contingent on our beliefs and practices; that they are socially constructed rather than “objective” facts.

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

That’s not my argument. The argument is:

1. Moral obligations, if there are any, obtain even if we believe and act otherwise

I was providing you with an argument for (1) given your tendency to beg the question. If you don’t like my argument for (1), do you have an alternative argument for (1)?

@Michael

Then the realist might distinguish between the moral obligation to show respect and the non-moral obligation to salute, and between the moral obligation to not cheat and the non-moral obligation to not move your pawn three spaces forward.

So you think there is a non-moral obligation to salute?

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

I was providing you with an argument for (1) given your tendency to beg the question. If you don’t like my argument for (1), do you have an alternative argument for (1)?

I think the best argument is that it’s consistent with how we actually use moral language. Most people will say that human sacrifice was morally wrong even in those societies in which it was the norm, and so our intention when we use the predicate “is morally wrong” is to assert some “objective” property.

@Leontiskos

So you think there is a non-moral obligation to salute?

Yes; it is an institutional norm. Given that institutional norm, “a solider ought salute his superior officer” is true even though “it is morally wrong for a soldier to not salute his superior officer” is false.

[Joshs]

@Citizenschallenge

I hope I’m not out of line simply asking about “Truth” - you see, it seems to me, “truth” is a human construct that is fundamentally meaningless without a specific frame of reference.

It seems to me “morals” fall into that category, in that it only makes sense within a specific human context, . . .

Any thoughts?

I agree completely. If a notion like truth is not groundable outside of the immediate
context of its use, would you say there are structural preconditions for meaning which are not themselves dependent for their sense on specific contexts? And if these are not truths, are they something like practices, constructions or performances?

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

I think the best argument is that it’s consistent with how we actually use moral language. Most people will say that human sacrifice was morally wrong even in those societies in which it was the norm

But unless you think that most people would not say that human sacrifice was wrong even in those societies, then you haven’t said anything contrary to the justification I provided you. If you really want to talk about common speech, then there is no significant difference between “wrong” and “morally wrong,” or between “obligation” and “moral obligation.” Yet you seem to think otherwise.

@Michael

Yes; it is an institutional norm. Given that institutional norm, “a solider ought salute his superior officer” is true even though “it is morally wrong for a soldier to not salute his superior officer” is false.

When other people equivocate between “obligation” and “ought” you complain, but aren’t you doing the exact same thing here? I asked if you think there are non-moral obligations given your claim, and you replied with a statement about an “ought”.

As I said a number of posts ago:

@Leontiskos

(The further difficulty here is that you are going to do the same thing with the word ‘obligation’, and therefore there are presumably two words in your argument that you do not have even a provisional definition of, and these are the two central words of your conclusion!)

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

When other people equivocate between “obligation” and “ought” you complain, but aren’t you doing the exact same thing here?

No, because I am drawing a clear distinction between moral obligations and non-moral obligations, whereas others are collapsing this distinction. They are arguing that if a soldier ought salute his superior officer then moral nihilism is false, but this is a non sequitur because it’s not a given that such an obligation is a moral obligation.

It’s especially problematic to make such an argument without endorsing moral relativism, which is why I’m confused by your objections. Are you not a moral realist?

[Banno]

@Michael

Because nihilists like Mackie don’t say that we don’t have preferences or that we don’t or can’t participate in a community; they say that there are no moral truths,

Indeed; and what I have shown is that this is an error. To have a preference is to assent to a truth, on pain of performative contradiction.

@Michael

Is “shooting children is wrong” true even if we all prefer to and expect others to shoot children?

This presumes an “ought” that is independent of our attitudes. There ain’t no such thing. Communal preference does not settle the question.

[Tom_Storm]

@Joshs

I agree completely. If a notion like truth is not groundable outside of the immediate
context of its use, would you say there are structural preconditions for meaning which are not themselves dependent for their sense on specific contexts? And if these are not truths, are they something like practices, constructions or performances?

I’d be interested to see this explored more seriously. I imagine such a position is still fairly radical that many will consider it beyond the pale and easily countered.

[Tom_Storm]

@Banno

Indeed; and what I have shown is that this is an error. To have a preference is to assent to a truth, on pain of performative contradiction.

I don’t think I get this point. If I say Beethoven’s third is better than his nineth am I assenting to a truth? How does preference become a truth other than it is true that I believe X?

[Banno]

@Tom_Storm

If I say Beethoven’s third is better than his ninth am I assenting to a truth?

Yes. Consider “Beethoven’s third is better than his ninth, but it is not true that Beethoven’s third is better than his ninth”.

There’s a contradiction, if only performative.

[Tom_Storm]

Hey Performative Contradiction is my drag name…

I guess a responsible musicologist would probably say there are reasons to rate the third higher than the ninth

Might it not be the case that we too often speak in truths and absolutes when we should be more circumspect?

[Banno]

@Tom_Storm

Might it not be the case that we too often speak in truths and absolutes when we should be more circumspect?

Sure. Does this apply to shooting children for entertainment?

[Leontiskos]

@Banno

There’s a contradiction, if only performative.

Is there a clear reason here as to why it would be performative in particular? I don’t have any strong opinions on your claim that a truth is at stake, but I’m not sure where “performative” is supposed to begin and end.

[Banno]

Google it.

*********

[Leontiskos]

So you don’t have a reason, then.