I am a Moral Nihilist

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

Even if it is true that if something is morally wrong then we ought not do it, it is affirming the consequent to infer from this that if we ought not do something then it is morally wrong.

But in all such claims you beg the question of your own view. This is the argument you always avoid:

1. All moral claims are X
2. Not all ought-claims are X
3. Therefore, not all ought-claims are moral claims

Yet you always refuse to argue your position, instead begging the question of (3). If you can’t give anything resembling a definition of “moral”, then it is not philosophically permissible to make all of your arguments on the basis of the definition of morality. If you have no way to justify (3) then you can’t keep appealing to it blindly.

In moral philosophy (3) is often affirmed on the basis of the idea that what is moral is that which involves interpersonal action (i.e. it has to do with actions that affect others). But this does not amount to your sui generis view.

@Michael

The moral nihilist, like the realist and unlike the subjectivist and relativist, believes that moral claims are doing something more substantial than asserting the existence of certain preferences and institutional/social/cultural norms; that if “this is morally wrong” is true then it is true even if our preferences and institutional/social/ cultural norms were otherwise. Unlike the realist, the nihilist believes that this does not — or even cannot — obtain; there are only preferences and institutional/social/cultural norms.

But isn’t this all imported? Doesn’t it all go back to your misreading of Moore? Which philosophers actually maintain your view that “moral” is something sui generis and undefinable? If you are idiosyncratic in that usage then it seems to me that you are merely importing your idiosyncratic view into other ill-defined terms like “moral nihilism.”

@Michael

If the subjectivist and relativist can condemn and convince others without believing that there is some X such that “X is morally wrong even if we believe and act otherwise” is true then so too can the nihilist.

As I said to @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus, it’s not at all clear whether moral relativism is a species of “moral nihilism” (where the latter term seems to have no well-defined meaning in the literature):

@Leontiskos

Could we just say that Banno is a moral relativist and then ask whether moral relativism counts as moral nihilism?

[Leontiskos]

@Frank

So let’s say everyone agrees to ought-statement P. Everyone agrees that it’s true. That’s not moral realism. Moral realism is the notion that we answer to a higher power than ourselves.

A moral nihilist might happily agree that P is true, depending what it is, but might also suggest that morality is a path of growth and learning that each individual walks.

At this point I’m pretty sure we have no idea what we mean by “moral nihilism.” It has become nothing more than a foil to the interlocutor’s view. Your claim that, “The moral nihilist might suggest that morality is a path of growth and learning that each individual walks,” sort of seals the deal on this one, doesn’t it?

I think you mean something like “a moral non-realist,” not “a moral nihilist.” But you tell me what you mean. And if it is a term of artifice then give me the definition of that term or point me to a source which provides a definition.

[Joshs]

@Tom_Storm

Well, what if I give a fuck about the wrong things (racial purity, eugenics)? How do we determine what things we give a fuck about are correct?

If all we have is conversation and a putative set of agreements then you can see how some people would find this unsatisfying if not bereft.

Great discussion so far. Agreement and convention leave me flat. I have always found myself on the outs with respect to what a consensus majority agrees upon concerning ethics. It’s not that I prefer shooting children or kicking puppies, it’s the articulation of these or any behaviors as ethically ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. I may have my own preferences in these matters, but they don’t amount to a judgement concerning what others ‘ought’ to do.

But where do my preferences come from? Aren’t they shaped by communal norms? No, not directly. They will certainly have a relation to those norms, if only deviating from them. Concensus is only possible if people are already close enough to each other in their thinking to reach partial agreement.

We derive evidence for our models of the world, and our preferences which derive from those models, by exposure to others. But this can lead as much to disagreement as agreement with them. What we centrally strive for as individuals isn’t consistency with the values of the group but consistency with respect to our own schemes of understanding, which are already OF the world from our perspective.

More important than agreeing with others is being able to subsume their perspectives within our own, so that we can honor their choices as necessary for them even as we prefer what we find to be more promising ways of looking at things. We can share with them our outlook and see whether they are able to make sense of it in their terms.

Since humans beings are incapable of not trying to make sense of their world, which is the basis of the ethical as well as volition and desire, there is no ethical right or wrong track, only a development of effective sense making.

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

As I said to @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus, it’s not at all clear whether moral relativism is a species of “moral nihilism” (where the latter term seems to have no well-defined meaning in the literature):

I don’t think it is. I think each view is best assessed against moral realism, which argues that:

1. The moral sentence “X is morally wrong” is truth-apt
2. If the moral sentence “X is morally wrong” is true then it is true even if we all believe and act otherwise
3. There is some X such that “X is morally wrong” is true

The non-cognitivist disagrees with (1), the subjectivist and relativist with (2), and the nihilist with (3).

@Leontiskos

Yet you always refuse to argue your position, instead begging the question of (3).

I think the discussion has to start with how we actually use moral claims, and almost nobody claims that not brushing one’s teeth is immoral. In ordinary language we often distinguish between moral obligations and non-moral obligations, and so I am simply following suit in lieu of good evidence or reasoning to the contrary.

I assume the moral realist accepts this. If we take the three premises above, a moral obligation is one that obtains even if we all believe and act otherwise, but I doubt the realist believes that a soldier is obligated to salute his superior officer even if our institutional norm is for him to bow. So the realist must either accept that a soldier’s obligation to salute his superior officer is not a moral obligation or claim that a soldier is not obligated to salute his superior officer.

[Frank]

@Leontiskos

But you tell me what you mean.

I mean nihilism as described in the OP:

@Existism

At this point in my life, I would consider myself a moral nihilist, meaning that I don’t believe there are any objective rights or wrongs

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

The non-cognitivist disagrees with (1), the subjectivist and relativist with (2), and the nihilist with (3).

Do you see how this still remains dependent on your contentious claim that moral statements are sui generis statements? You are inevitably implicitly saying that the “moral nihilist” disagrees with (3) precisely on account of the modifier “morally.”

@Michael

I think the discussion has to start with how we actually use moral claims,

Sure, and therefore you should give a provisional definition based on how you think we use terms. That’s what definitions are. When I ask for a definition I am not asking you to forget about how we use terms. You keep falling into the problem that Socrates points up, where you want to give an example and avoid a definition. Socrates doesn’t like this because it goes hand in hand with eristic.

Furthermore, the example you keep giving of brushing one’s teeth overlaps with the justification I pointed out (i.e. interpersonal action). But you reject that justification, and therefore the example is misleading. The reason a moral philosopher might agree that brushing one’s teeth is non-moral is because it does not involve other people.

[Leontiskos]

If you want to talk about a term based on the definition that a now-absent TPFer gave, namely, “I don’t believe there are any objective rights or wrongs,” then our whole discussion will be bound by the deep ambiguity of that statement and the opacity of a relatively undeveloped personal view. Do you see why this is an unstable foundation for a discussion?

[Michael]

@Leontiskos

Do you see how this still remains dependent on your contentious claim that moral statements are sui generis statements? You are inevitably implicitly saying that the “moral nihilist” disagrees with (3) precisely on account of the modifier “morally.”

I’m just explaining in simple terms the commonly understood difference between the main branches of meta-ethics. Those three premises are pretty open in terms of what “X is morally wrong” actually means.

@Leontiskos

Furthermore, the example you keep giving of brushing one’s teeth overlaps with the justification I pointed out (i.e. interpersonal action). But you reject that justification, and therefore the example is misleading. The reason a moral philosopher might agree that brushing one’s teeth is non-moral is because it does not involve other people.

So we’ve at least made some progress. Not all obligations are moral obligations. Now we then ask; are there any interpersonal obligations that are not moral obligations? I’ve given an example of one I think is not; a soldier’s obligation to salute his superior officer.

[Frank]

@Leontiskos

Do you see why this is an unstable foundation for a discussion?

It doesn’t strike me that way because I’ve observed the issue discussed ad nauseum elsewhere, and that language community uses the term in the same way the OP did.

You can definitely scour the SEP for a review of professional opinions. I gravitate back to what real people living real lives think about it. But that’s me.

[Leontiskos]

@Michael

I’m just explaining in simple terms the commonly understood difference between the main branches of meta-ethics.

If that is true then you should be able to provide a reliable source which holds that “moral nihilism” is a main branch of meta-ethics, and that the definition of “moral nihilism” is in accord with your own claims, no? Can you do that?

@Michael

So we’ve at least made some progress. Not all obligations are moral obligations.

No. “The reason a moral philosopher might agree…” Moore, who you have named, is but one philosopher who would not agree to such a definition.

Your whole M.O. is, “That’s not a moral claim and I have no idea what I mean by ‘moral’.” Until you fix that methodological error these discussions will continue to go nowhere. Using terms that one is willing to explain is part and parcel of good-faith dialogue. If you don’t know what you mean by ‘moral’ then neither do I.

[Leontiskos]

@Frank

You can definitely scour the SEP for a review of professional opinions. I gravitate back to what real people living real lives think about it. But that’s me.

I’m all for talking to real people. That’s why I’d rather talk about what you believe, rather than trying to mind-read what someone who is no longer a part of the conversation meant. If you want to generalize about positions that others hold, then sources like SEP are invaluable. If you want to talk about positions that you yourself hold then we can happily avoid encyclopedias.

[Frank]

I talked to the OP and found that we were in agreement about what moral nihilism is. It’s not the sort of thing that is resolved by tinkering with the concept of truth. It’s a side effect of the noted absence of a bearded white dude in the sky.

Have you no history with that term yourself?

[Leontiskos]

I don’t have much exposure to Reddit or the places where people might call themselves “moral nihilists.”

@Frank

It’s a side effect of the noted absence of a bearded white dude in the sky.

So are you saying that moral nihilism is the view of morality that follows from atheism? Or what?

[Frank]

@Leontiskos

So are you saying that moral nihilism is the view of morality that follows from atheism?

By and large, yes.

So that’s a no, you haven’t encountered the term “moral nihilism” before this thread?

[Leontiskos]

I have only encountered it among the youth and among people who have no substantial or clear position. That’s presumably why Wikipedia is the only place you can find a definition. It looks to be a kind of slang term in moral philosophy.

[Frank]

Maybe. In general, nihilism is about the absence of objective purpose and value. Moral nihilism is addressing the value part of it, but the two (purpose and value) really go together.

[Count_Timothy_von_Icarus]

I agree, the use of “moral” tends to be incoherent. That’s a point @AmadeusD and @Michael agreed to.

Earlier, @Tom_Storm said that he didn’t think suicide had any moral valance, but was generally regrettable, and a bad decision, at least insomuch as survivors tended to regret their decisions. Now, I forgot to follow up on that, but I probably should have asked what Tom meant by “moral” there. Because in cases where something is a bad decision, the key moral virtue of prudence, seems relevant. And to the extent that some suicides are impulsive (e.g., after a break-up) they seem particularly to be cases where we might appeal to prudence, and maybe fortitude and temperance (and perhaps even justice, if we consider the effects of such acts on our friends and family) and that would be all of the cardinal virtues.

But in this thread, I get the feeling that common understandings of “moral” goodness has little to do with the historical moral virtues. That makes sense. It modern thought, it is even common to see “prudential reason” (now instrumental) set against “moral reason.” “Moral goodness” then, seems to relate to obligation in these discussions, but then not just any obligation, but ones particularly tied to opprobrium—or in essence, as you rightly say, sin. Only now, we have sin without God, and yes, that doesn’t make a whole lot of sense as far as I can tell.

But all of this just makes Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument about the incoherence of Enlightenment ethics seem pretty strong to me (and we can add Anscombe’s point about trying to have “moral law” with no lawmaker).

That said, I’d vigorously disagree with the whole “man in the sky” thesis, and not even because this is a caricature of Christian and Muslim thought, but also because it hardly seems to me that Buddhist, Neo-Confucian, or late-Platonist ethics are remotely “anti-realist” and yet, particularly in the first two, you don’t have God grounding the ordering of the virtues. You do, however, have an objective end for the virtues in all three cases, despite the lack of divine commands.

[Leontiskos]

@Frank

By and large, yes.

Okay, well in that case your first post makes more sense, although you are contrasting “moral nihilism” with something like divine command theory, not moral realism. The divine command theorist ties ethics to divine commands, whereas the “moral nihilist” thinks that there are no divine commands and therefore no ethical consequences of divine commands.

[Frank]

@Leontiskos

Okay, well in that case your first post makes more sense, although you are contrasting “moral nihilism” with something like divine command theory, not moral realism. The divine command theorist ties ethics to divine commands, whereas the “moral nihilist” thinks that there are no divine commands and therefore no ethical consequences of divine commands.

Ok. How would you define moral realism?

[Leontiskos]

I think I would say that for moral realism moral claims are about real things (in the realist/nominalist sense). Things like harm, flourishing, real duties, etc. So a divine command theorist is one kind of moral realist, given that they view divine commands as real things. On the other hand, emotivism is not a species of moral realism because for the emotivist emotions are not “real” in the relevant sense. They are instead subjective or idiosyncratic.

Maybe it’s worth pointing out that one could erect a form of moral realism that is “emotivist,” in the sense that the emotions are reified in the appropriate sense. If one objectifies the emotions and provides a calculus by which normative action is derived from these objectified emotions, then you would have a form of moral realism that focuses almost entirely on the emotions.