Intent doesn’t really move anything. I could intend that my claim to have a line to God is thst I’m reporting something “true”. But it would be false(well, actually, unknowable for the hearer - so not truth apt, practically speaking).
So, I can accept that there are true/false statements to be made. But they are all false, or senseless in a Russelian way (ie neither true, nor false. Just reportage. Which is what all those statements seem to be to me. Reportage of an emotional state. No one’s been able to get past that that I’ve seen)
For sure. I’m not sure Emotivism entails Error Theory, but you raise an interesting question. Strong Emotivism does seem to be a flavor of Error Theory given the way it interprets utterances that are not intended as expressions of emotion as being expressions of emotion.
In general this is what Theodore Sider calls “hostile translation.” It is a form of semantic translation that is hostile to the speaker’s intended meaning.
But let’s consider your own claim:
This also looks to be hostile translation, not so different from Error Theory or Emotivism. In other words, your points about Brandt would also seem to preclude the preference-interpretation, no?
I’m interested in your thinking on emotivism, which I find somewhat appealing myself. There’s the Frege–Geach problem. Simon Blackburn seems to have responded by developing a view centred on attitudes, but as I understand it, emotivism doesn’t allow us to argue about what is right or wrong, since those notions are, by definition, not truth-apt. It seems to leave us with morality as a matter of preferences: a code of conduct that gains authority insofar as we can persuade others to adopt it, rather like a legal system. No doubt you’ll dislike those conclusions.
You repeat the argument of Thrasymachus in the Republic but without his claim of power as the determining factor. Since the matter is central to human experience, it is useless to treat it simply as a problem for explanation.
Whatever you opine has to relate to what you actually do.
Well as always, I would want someone to explain what they mean by “emotivism” before jumping in. Usually it’s different from what folks like Ayer and Stevenson were presenting.
But the problem comes with your word “persuade.” Right after saying that the moral analysis of emotivism leaves no room for truth-apt moral claims, and that it “doesn’t allow us to argue about what is right or wrong,” you immediately go on to talk about the importance of persuasion, “like a legal system.” I’m not sure how someone who does not believe that anything is right or wrong could go on to engage in persuasion.
Haha, okay. But the word “agree” has similar difficulties. What is there to agree on if there is nothing to be right or wrong about?
I guess the question is this: What does the proselytizing emotivist wish to accomplish? Does he want others to have the same emotional makeup and reactions that he himself has? Is he trying to shape everyone else’s emotions to mimic his own as closely as possible? Is it like saying, “My emotions are ideal and I am going to try to make everyone else’s emotions just like my own”?
I mean, I think in general, I ought to interact with people how I want, and these wants include the morals that are built in evolutionarily, and from my upbringing in a Western society.
Why ought you do as evolution says? Why ought you do as your upbringing suggests?
And here I’d have you not just think about the answer, but think about the question. It’s what is known to philosophers as the “Open question argument”. The claim that we ought do as evolution says is very different to the claim that we do as evolution says. It seems to be available to us to also say that we ought not do as evolution says, and without contradicting the claim that evolution pushes us to act in a certain way.
Suppose evolution encourages tribalism. It does not follow that we ought be tribal.
There is something missing, in an argument that begins only with how things are, and ends with how things ought be.
But this is a side issue. Back to the main thread.
If your contention is that we ought do as evolution says, then you are saying that there are true ethical statements
Could you please tell us why you continue living? A nihilist has no reason for continuing his/her life! You are somehow attached to reality, so I am wondering about those things that attach you to reality and help you to live the life you are living. The fact that you continue living means that you are not a nihilist. Accepting that you somehow prefer life over permanent death, then you have to deal with situations in life when there is tension in your interests or your interest and another person’s interest. Moral nihilism claims that nothing is right or wrong. You can believe it, but you cannot avoid the consequences when it comes to you! Let’s say that you are sitting on your chair in your yard and a person attacks you with a knife, attempting to kill you. You, however, have a shotgun! So the question is what you are going to do and why? You need to decide in this situation!
no no I am not saying I ought to do as evolution says I am saying I ought to do what I want, which my wants have aspects driven in by evolution. Although I’m not exactly sure ought is even the right word it’s just that I end up doing what I want, not that I ought to per se.
Yes! This is the key point and one I have been pondering for some time.
I suppose many people would argue that society is a partially negotiated series of agreements among diverse groups, and that not everyone gets what they want. Just as traffic lights say nothing about right and wrong, yet work effectively to guide traffic and reduce harm, morality can be constructed in a similar way. The overarching principle might be that we all want safety and predictability, but woudl we want to pursue that goal as rigidly as, say, eudaimonia might require. Instead, we want a set of flexible, constantly renegotiated traffic lights. But I can see that we are heading toward a form of teleology here, perhaps more of a minimalist, contractualist kind.
Well, I mostly continue living because I am a machine programmed to do so, and my instinct fights against death. Still, I do seriously consider offing myself, so it’s really a struggle between instinct and the conscious. The thing is, a nihilist isn’t about preferring life or death… It’s just accepting there might not be a meaning to it all. At the end of the day, whether I decide to end my own life or live and die of heart complications or something, it will ultimately not matter, but it doesn’t mean I prefer death over life.
Well we did end up at teleology last time we spoke about this, but are you agreeing that the emotivist wants others to have the same emotional makeup and reactions that he himself has? Or do you think he aims for something else? I mean, if he wants traffic-reduction and he wants it for a reason—i.e. his desire is not merely an emotional expression—then it looks like he has abandoned emotivism. In that case he has abandoned emotivism in favor of his belief that traffic-reduction is right path forward and traffic-increase is the wrong path forward. Presumably he would say that it doesn’t matter whether someone has a strong emotional attachment to traffic. Traffic should still be reduced even despite their emotional state.
Sorry - I may have simply missed this first sentence if it wasn’t added in an edit. That answers my question!
In a few words, I think everyone has a view of morality and I think societal moral norms require buy-in, especially in democracies. So if we believe traffic-reduction is right and there is a lot of agreement around that topic, it becomes an easy axiom or point of reference for social mores and law.
My interpretation of emotivism is that its truth hinges on people intending to express emotion rather than express propositions, which I think is clearly false.
The fact that people think there are moral rights and wrongs doesn’t make it so, and, at base, these are just preferences.
No, I am not happy to have them treat me as they want. I want to be treated in a way that produces pleasure, and I want to interact with others in a way that produces pleasure.
So if we take that first sentence and switch out a few key terms, we could arrive at this:
My interpretation of [moral nihilism] is that its truth hinges on people intending to express preferences rather than express propositions, which I think is clearly false.
Doesn’t the same argument apply to your own position, “moral nihilism”? Or do you think there is some difference?