# I am a Moral Nihilist

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218>\
**Category:** Ethics\
**Created:** [June 3, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218 "2026-06-03T16:42:17Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 419

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**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\
**Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:46pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/419 "2026-06-11T15:46:11Z")

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> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#):
>
> So, while teleology might face many hurdles justifying itself, the fact/values distinction and any is-ought gap based on it is not one of them.

Recasting what I’ve said above, a difficulty here is that “ought”—which I repeat is ill-defined—tends to refer to concrete actions or abstentions.

If we take your standard way of construing things relatively the difficulty comes out quickly:

1. X is more choice-worthy than Y
2. Therefore one ought to prefer X to Y

(2) is not a concrete action or abstention, and this is why folks will deny that it is an ‘ought’ of the relevant kind. You can’t get a standard ‘ought’ such as, “One ought not murder,” from a premise like (1),

It may be the case that a fact/value separation entails an is/ought separation, but it’s not so clear that closing the former closes the latter.

(See also my archived post [here](https://archive.thephilosophyforum.com/discussions/16235-ought-and-is-are-not-two-types-of-propositions.html#comment-1021392).)

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