# I am a Moral Nihilist **URL:** \ **Category:** Ethics\ **Created:** [June 3, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218 "2026-06-03T16:42:17Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 308
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 9, 2026, 1:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/308 "2026-06-09T13:42:39Z")
But sociopaths absolutely _do_ seek some good. Even the BTK killer and Ted Bundy sought their own gratification as an _end_. So the question isn’t whether some people seek ends they deem choice-worthy (good). It is whether they can be wrong about what is _truly_ choice-worthy. That is, is there any distinction between what merely _appears_ to be good (to any one person) and what is actually best? For instance, we might ask, would Jeffery Epstein’s life have been better if he had desired a normal romantic relationship and a healthy marriage rather than coercing adolescents into sex? It seems so. Moreover, whatever happiness Epstein had was heavily dependent on good fortune. Once his luck ran out, he became miserable. Whatever flourishing he had was not self-determining, but highly contingent. More generally speaking: > So far, we have discussed how “the rule of the rational part of the soul,” will be essential for > pursuing a moral life regardless of which theory of morality we ultimately end up embracing. However, > moral nihilism, the denial that the Good exists, seems to offer up a unique challenge here. As we have > seen earlier, the “rule of reason” is still relevant for the moral nihilist in at least some limited way. The > epistemic virtues associated with the rule of rationality will be required to properly determine that nihilism truly is the case. “But,” the nihilist might reply, “if nihilism is true does this really matter? Sure, I might not be epistemically justified in claiming that notions of ‘goodness’ simply reduce to personal preference. However, if nihilism is true, I am under no obligation to prove to myself or to others that > nihilism is true. Attempts to suppress my appetites and emotions are just wasted effort.” > > How might we respond to this challenge? First, we might point out that no one _wants_ to believe > falsehoods. Nor do they want to do things that they would consider bad or evil if given proper information. That is, it seems implausible that the nihilist would want to be ignorant of the Good if it truly exists. To be sure, it is often the case that we are unhappy about what we discover to be true. In some > cases, we might even prefer not to be informed about the details of certain events. However, it does not seem plausible that a person would prefer to be _deluded_ when it comes to the fundamental nature of the world and their relation to it. > > For example, if Aristotle is correct, and there is a purpose to human life, a purpose that can effectively guide us in living a happy and fulfilling life, who would not want to know this truth? Thus, the rule of reason is still something the nihilist must pursue. First, because if there is a Good to know, they shall want to know it. Second, because even if there is no Good, they will want to be confident in their knowledge of this fact. And indeed, many moral nihilists and relativists put a great deal of effort into gathering evidence for their claims and trying to convince others of the truth those claims.31 > > Further, even if the nihlists’ position has some truth to it, it still seems that the rule of reason will be essential to living a “good life.” For even if “this is good,” turns out to be a synonym for “I prefer,” it is clear that we do not always know “what is good for us.” Consider here the heroin addict whose life has been ruined by his addiction. At some point in his life, he “preferred” to use heroin. Yet, even if the Good is entirely subjective, there is an obvious sense in which embracing this preference was not “good _for him_.” Clitophon’s suggestion in Book I of the _Republic_, that the good for an individual is merely whatever they currently believe to be to their advantage leads to incoherence.32 Under such a view, we can never be wrong about what is good for us. Thus, the heroin addict’s use of heroin was good for him when he first used the drug, yet that self-same event _became_ bad once he began to regret it. If this is the case, it seems impossible for there to be any value in introspection or doing philosophy. We can never err vis-à-vis our choices so long as we choose whatever it is we currently prefer. > > This seems to explain why Thracymachus, rejects Clitophon’s suggestion out of hand. Thracymachus is a sophist, someone who teaches reasoning and rhetoric. If people can never be wrong about practical reasoning, his trade is useless.33 Those who claim that “this is good” is equivalent with “I prefer,” would like to have it that “the Good,” the formal object of practical reason,does not exist. Yet, by and large, they also want to maintain that truth, the formal object of theoretical reason, _does_ exist. The problem here is that it is not possible to completely relativize practical reason and keep theoretical reasoning relevant. Plato points this out in section 160-162 of the _Theatetus_. There, he takes on the teachings of the sophist Protagoras. Protagoras claims that whatever each man believes is “true _for that man_.” Here, Protagoras is relativizing theoretical reason. However, it is not hard to see how Socrates’ arguments in the Theatetus against this position extend to the case where only practical reasoning is relativized. There is no point in making claims about practical reason if it is impossible for anyone to ever be wrong about such claims. If the Good is totally relative, then there is no reason for anyone to prefer truth over falsity vis-á-vis what is worthy of choice, even in an instrumental, “pragmatic” sense. That > is, if the Good is just “what we prefer,” then we should only embrace truth when we currently prefer it. If we do not like the nihilists’ conclusions, it is “good” for us to simply deny them, regardless of their truth. > > The total relativization of practical reason gives us no reason to pursue theoretical reasoning, or even to debate our opponents in good faith. “But,” the moral nihilist might complain, “there is pragmatic value in paying attention to truth. For example, it is true that smoking causes lung disease. If we do not want to suffer the subjective ills of lung disease, we should stop smoking.”34 Consider though that the appeal to “pragmatism” here amounts to defaulting on the claim that the Good is simply “whatever we currently prefer.” If “what is good” is merely “what we prefer,” and we do not prefer to stop smoking, then quiting smoking simply _cannot_ be “good for us.” To be coherent, the appeal to pragmatism must rely on the claim that there is some “truth of the matter” about what is good for us that lies outside the sphere of our immediate preferences. At the very least, what is “good for us” must also be tied to the truth about what we _will_ prefer in the future. > > However, it seems obvious that many facts relevant to what we “will prefer” lie outside our subjective preferences. For example, that lung disease causes pain and that smoking causes lung disease are facts that do not relate to any one person’s preferences. They will be true regardless of what we prefer, and yet it seems essential that many practical judgements are grounded in these sorts of facts. > > If what is good for us is related to truths about what we will prefer in the future, then it seems important that we have the epistemic virtues need to uncover these truths. Additionally, we will need > the self-control required to subordinate current desires to our judgement about what will really be best for us. Yet both of these abilities tie back to the virtue of “being ruled over by the rational part of the soul.” > > It is also worth noting the considerable focus many subjectivists still place on freedom. Yet, as > we have seen, the “rule of reason” seems essential to self-determination.vii Thus, due to its relation to gaining knowledge and freedom, the rule of the rational part of the soul remains essential across all of the dominant theories in ethics, even nihilism. --- _[View the full topic](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218)._